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ELEMENTS OF MORALS

BY

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To

The Revered Memory

of

My Beloved Preceptor,

The Late Reverend WILLIAM SMITH, M.A.

Formerly Principal of the General Assembly's

Institution, Calcutta,

to whose lucid and learned exposition of

Philosophy is due

Any love which I may have for the subject,

This volume is gratefully dedicated,

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PREFACE.

This is a humble attempt to explain the main points of ethical inquiry with a view to infuse the principles of morality into young minds. To impress the principles on such minds, I have generally illustrated them by reference to the concrete problems of life as well as by quotations from the Bible, the Koran, the Dhammapada, and the Geeta. I have also compared in many places the western and the eastern systems so as to bring out their chief points of similarity and difference and thus to stimulate the student to their intelligent study and proper comprehension. As there is nothing greater on earth than man and there is nothing greater in man than the mind, its due cultivation should be the principal aim of life. A virtuous mind alone is the home of peace and happiness and is the source of true strength and prosperity to the State and the community. There has ever been the cry for

"Men of faith, but not of faction,

Men of lofty aim in action";

and we should do all in our power to breed men who are "fresh and free and frank."

On every important topic I have given the different views, with a statement of the reasons which seem to justify one as distinguished from

the rest. In discussing the character of the Moral Standard (Chapters IX—XII), I have given an account of the important ethical systems of the East and the West, which a student of Ethics should know before arriving at a definite view of his own. A patient and careful study of facts and of the opinions of great thinkers is more conducive to rational inquiry and the determination of truth than mere blind dogmatism. And, as the present volume is restricted to the Psychology of Ethics, I have as a rule employed both the subjective and the objective method in establishing a truth: instead of relying simply on the testimony of my own consciousness, I have referred also to the views of other writers and preachers. The disposition of parts in this volume is indicated at the end of the Introduction (Chapter III, § 11); and the classification of Ethical Theories, in the table facing page 40.

I have tried to make the treatment as much independent as possible, so that the book may be intelligible not only to university students, but to the general reader as well. The marginal notes will, I hope, be helpful to a careful preparation of the subject. To make the subject interesting, I have freely used poetical quotations, which are likely to throw adequate light on important points.

"Poets alone found the delightful way
Mysterious morals gently to convey
In charming numbers."

My indebtedness to other writers is too great

to be formally stated here. I have generally mentioned in proper places the names of the authors consulted or quoted; but it would not be easy to cite all the sources of information, as some of them have been converted into my life-blood. If there be any merit anywhere in the book, it is due entirely to the excellence of the materials supplied. The defects, I need hardly say, are due to my imperfections.

His Most Excellent and Imperial Majesty, the King-Emperor, who always has the welfare of his people very close to his heart, has exhorted the Indian Universities "To build up character, without which learning is of little value," that there may be "loyal and manly and useful citizens, able to hold their own in industries and agriculture and all the vocations in life." As character is the backbone of life, its proper development should be the end of all education. Thus, the importance of Ethics in the courses of studies prescribed for students can hardly be over-estimated. Without character all attainments turn out to be useless, if not mischievous. The Indian aphorist Chanakya rightly observes, "Bad men, in spite of their learning and attainments, should be shunned like venomous snakes with jewelled crests":

“दुष्कृत्योः परिहृत्यो विद्यालङ्घनोऽपि सन् ।

मणिना भूषितः सर्पः किमसौ न भयङ्करः ॥”

Indeed, it is a pity that, even in this enlightened

age, men may at times be disposed to value more the engines of war than the maxims of peace.

If the following pages contribute in the least to the moral education of young men, I shall consider my labour amply rewarded. I shall be thankful to all who, by kindly pointing out the defects of this volume, may help in its improvement.

CUTTACK,

February 15, 1912.

} A. C. MITRA.

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BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF ETHICS.

✓ § 1. **Definition of Ethics.** Ethics or Morals may briefly be defined as the science of human character as manifesting itself in right or wrong action. We are prone to judge ourselves and others as virtuous or sinful and to characterize certain acts as good or bad. Such judgments involve a valuation or estimate, the character and conditions of which constitute the subject-matter of ethical enquiry. In ordinary life men are content with mere judgments ; but *science*, as a criticism of common knowledge, inquires into their validity and grounds. Common knowledge is concerned only with such estimates, enforced generally by reward or punishment, praise or blame ; but moral science pushes the inquiry further and tries to discover the significance of these estimates and the principles on which they are based. As a philosophy it aims at a rationalization of our moral experience, discovering its true meaning, scope and test. "The leading conception of Ethics," as Sorley observes, "is that of worth or

Ethics is a science of human character manifesting itself in good or bad conduct.

As a science it inquires into the principles regulating such conduct.

goodness." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XVII, p. 321.) Moral Philosophy then is a scientific inquiry into our character, as expressing itself in right or wrong conduct, with a view to find out its significance, contents and conditions.

Conduct expresses character which is governed by laws.

Character is manifested in conduct, and hence Moral Philosophy is concerned also with the latter. But conduct by itself is not the object of moral judgment; it is judged as right or wrong only as revealing a character. No doubt, when we have to judge others, we have no other alternative than to judge them by their conduct; but this conduct is taken by us as expressing a character, without which our moral estimates would be devoid of meaning. Now, the question is whether this character or conduct is subject to fixed laws. If the question be answered in the negative, then there can be no moral science, for science has to do with a fixed constitution governed by laws and not with a chaos moved by caprice. If, on the other hand, the answer be affirmative, then the difficulty apparently is, to reconcile morality with an inflexible order of things. Moral quality attaches, as we shall see later on, to voluntary acts. If voluntary acts be not free, but the inevitable outcome of prior conditions, then we can scarcely hold a man accountable for his doings and praise or blame him. (*Vide Chap. XX.*) As D'Arcy observes, "If everything must be, it is absurd, or at least needless, to speak of what ought to be." (*Short Study of Ethics*, p. xxv.) Duly considered, however, there is no inconsistency be-

tween free choice and the reign of law. Though every individual act is free, yet it is governed by laws, psychological and moral. Because a man chooses to help a beggar, he is not free from the laws of association, of the feelings and of the moral side of his nature. The aim of moral science is to determine the principles which regulate our moral conduct.

➤ Ethics is a normative or regulative science, investigating the standard or ideal of moral judgments. Whenever we pronounce an act as right or wrong, we evidently employ a standard, by reference to which we form the estimate. And, as no valuation is possible without the application of a norm, an inquiry into the character of the standard is of fundamental importance in Ethics. According to some writers, Ethics, though a normative science, is not a practical one: it is concerned with the investigation of the (moral) standard, and not with the means necessary for its realization. "It must content itself," says Mackenzie, "with understanding the nature of the ideal, and must not hope to formulate rules for its attainment." (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 9.) As ethics, however, has to deal with activity or practice, and not with abstract thought or theory, it may in this sense be called a practical science. "Ethics," writes Seth, "is often called practical, as opposed to theoretical philosophy or metaphysics. The description is correct if it is meant that Ethics is the philosophy or theory of practice." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 6.) We study the facts of our moral life with a view to discover their implications and laws.

Ethics is a normative science, inquiring into the moral standard.

It may also be called a practical science, as it is concerned with activity or practice.

Moral science presupposes moral facts,

which are the judgments of right and wrong and the connected sentiments.

Universal admission of moral distinctions :
(1) Subjective evidence or the testimony of personal consciousness :

(2) Objective evidence or the testimony of others, whether considered (a) individually or

§ 2. **Moral Fact and Moral Science.** A science presupposes materials which are to constitute its subject-matter. *Moral science*, accordingly, implies *moral facts*, which we must examine in order to construct a philosophy of moral consciousness. "Life or practice," as Seth observes, "always precedes its theory or explanation; we are men before we are moralists." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 6.) The moral facts which underlie moral science are the *judgments of right and wrong* with the connected moral sentiments.

That the distinction between right and wrong is real and universal may be proved both by (1) *the subjective* and (2) *the objective method*. (1) Every individual recognises, by an appeal to his consciousness, that he distinguishes between right and wrong: when an individual performs what he believes to be right, he feels self-approbation; and when he thinks he has acted wrongly, he feels shame or remorse. Even the sceptic cannot help admitting the reality of moral distinctions. Hume, for example, writes, "Those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions may be ranked among disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable that any human creature could ever seriously believe that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one." (*Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, Essays, Vol. II, p. 223.)

2. (a) When we observe *others* we also find that they experience approbation or shame for acts viewed by them as right or wrong.

(b) Every *community* or society rewards certain acts as right and punishes others as wrong.

(c) Every *language* possesses terms implying the distinction between right and wrong; and language is but a record of thought.*

From the above facts it is evident that the distinction between right and wrong is prevalent everywhere and always. "There is no one" says Kant, "not even the most consummate villain, provided only that he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we set before him examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following good maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even combined with great sacrifices of advantages and comfort), does not wish that he might also possess these qualities. Only on account of his inclinations and impulses he cannot attain this in himself, but at the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations which are burdensome to himself."

(b) collectively, as constituting society;

(c) testimony of language.

Though men may differ with regard to particular acts, yet they always admit moral distinctions.

* Butler writes—"That we have the moral approving and disapproving faculty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters: from the words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many others of like signification in all languages applied to actions and characters: from the many written systems of morals which suppose it; since it cannot be imagined that all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical: from our natural sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and intending it: from the like distinction every one makes between injury and mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the consideration of human laws. It is manifest great part of common language, and of common behaviour over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty." (*Dissertation on Virtue.*)

Metaphysic of Morals, Abbott's Translation, p. 74.)

It is immaterial for the present purpose whether all men are agreed or not as to any particular act being called right or wrong. The *same* distinction may not be accepted by all; but the *distinction* between right and wrong is admitted on all hands.

Moral facts are the concrete judgments, while moral science deals with the abstract principles.

Martineau.

The difference between moral science and moral facts corresponds to that between a science and its subject-matter. Moral science or Ethics, as already mentioned, tries to explain the moral facts by discovering the principles underlying them. To do this, Ethics must employ the instruments of every scientific research, namely, accurate observation and the logical methods of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction. As Martineau writes, "The current judgments constitute a body of *ethical facts*; and it is the aim of *ethical science* to strip from them their accidental, impulsive, unreflective character; to trace them to their ultimate seat in the constitution of our nature and our world; and to exhibit, not as a concrete picture, but in its universal essence, the ideal of individual and social perfection. To interpret, to vindicate, and systematise the moral sentiments, constitutes the business of this department of thought." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. I. p. 1.)

Moral science is possible through a careful examination of our moral constitution and relations.

The possibility of moral science can scarcely be disputed. An adequate survey of the facts of our moral life and a thoughtful analysis of their contents and conditions would reveal laws and elements calculated to throw sufficient light on our moral

experience. If the aim of science is to explain facts by principles and to combine them in the form of a system, then assuredly ethics can achieve these results. By a careful and impartial estimate of the facts of our moral consciousness and of the relations in which we stand to the universe, we may discover the grounds of our moral life and arrange them in a system. Locke observes: "The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves, as understanding, rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration: wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences, as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences." (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, Ch. III, § 18.)

Locke.

§ 3. **Scope of Ethics.** Ethics as a science of human character enquires into its contents and conditions. Such inquiry embraces, accordingly, an examination of the facts of personal consciousness as well as the circumstances which influence them. It is thus a survey of human nature as it is revealed in us and of the relations in which it stands to other connected facts. If duties are relative to cir-

Province of ethics includes examination of moral consciousness, moral relations and opportunities for moral action.

cumstances as well as to persons to whom they are due, then an examination of the circumstances and the character of individuals becomes essential to throw an adequate light on moral facts. Again, as duty or 'ought' involves an ideal or standard to which we are to conform our conduct, an inquiry into the character of this ideal or standard is of fundamental importance in Ethics. The province of moral philosophy thus includes the observation of self and others and an estimate of the circumstances and laws which require individuals to act in directions conceived as right. We are concerned, however, in Ethics, not with all the aspects of self and circumstances, but only with those that bear on our moral life.

and an inquiry into the nature of the moral standard.

Ethics has thus to do with knowledge and being, connected with morality.

It observes facts and theorizes about their implications.

It thus inquires into the internal

Ethics is thus a science of knowing and of being; but it deals merely with the knowledge of moral distinctions and the forms of existence competent to employ such knowledge. It is at once an observational and a speculative science: at the outset it is concerned with an inquiry into the nature and relations of the facts of our moral consciousness, while in its later development it investigates the ulterior significance of these facts, inquiring into their implications. In aiming at a true determination of the conditions of our moral life, it does not restrict its inquiry to mere introspective analysis, but extends it to cover the determination of external relations and the ascertainment of legitimate inferences. The conditions of our moral life, coming within the scope of Ethics, are thus partly internal

and partly external, which may be either natural or social, psychological or metaphysical. It takes a comprehensive view of all those relations and principles without which the facts of our moral life would be devoid of meaning. The facts of moral consciousness which come within the sphere of Ethics are mentioned in detail in Chapter V. ✓

It may be mentioned in this connection that Ethics is primarily concerned, not with moral acts, but with judgments upon them. It tries to explain and systematize the moral verdicts of mankind by tracing them to their principles and conditions. As such verdicts always involve reference to an ideal or standard, the determination of its true character constitutes the cardinal problem of all ethical inquiry. (*Vide* Chapters IX-XII). Herein lies the difference between Ethics as a normative science and the natural or positive sciences. A normative science investigates the norm, standard or ideal by which we judge facts, while a positive science examines the facts themselves as they occur. ✓ Astronomy, Physics or Chemistry, for example, is a positive science, while Logic, Ethics or Æsthetics is a normative science. It might be said that (1) a judgment is also a fact and (2) a fact, likewise, presents itself to us as a judgment. But it may be replied that (1) a judgment, though a fact, is a complex fact, involving the application of a standard. (2) A fact may also be said to be known to us through a judgment: matter gravitates, is a fact and it is also a judgment. But, as Muirhead points out, "there is a distinction

and external natural and social, psychological and metaphysical grounds of moral life

It is concerned not directly with moral acts but with judgments upon them.

A normative science inquires into a standard by which facts are judged while a positive science inquires into the facts themselves.

Moral judgments are complex facts involving the application of a standard.

between a judgment *of* fact and a judgment *upon* fact, corresponding to the distinction between 'judgment' in its logical sense of 'proposition' and a 'judgment' in its judicial sense of 'sentence.' It is with judgment in the latter sense that Ethics has to do. It deals with conduct as the subject of judicial judgment, not with conduct merely as a physical fact. It is concerned primarily with the laws that regulate our judgments of right and wrong, only secondarily with the laws that regulate conduct as an event in time." (*Elements of Ethics*, pp. 19-20.)

As a science,
Ethics in-
quires into
principles and
has nothing
to do with
details or
rules.

Seth.

It should be remembered, however, that like every science, Ethics is concerned only with the general conditions and principles in their universal essence and not with the individual acts or duties in their concrete variety. "The task of the ethical thinker," says Seth, "is not to construct a system of rules for the conduct of life—we do not live by rules—but to lay bare the nerve of the moral life." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 13.) As duties are always relative to circumstances, an attempt at an abstract enumeration of them can never serve any useful purpose; it leads rather to casuistry and self-deception. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 2 and Chap. XIV, § 9.) "Many of those who take up the study of Ethics," writes Mackenzie, "expect to find in it some cut-and-dried formulas for the guidance of their daily lives. They expect the ethical philosopher to explain to them, as I once heard it put, what they ought to get up and do to-morrow morning. And no doubt it is true enough in a sense that the ethical philoso-

Mackenzie.

pher, if he is good for anything, will explain this. He will explain to them the spirit in which they ought to apply themselves to the particular situation before them to-morrow morning." (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 349.)

The department of Ethics which is concerned with the application of moral principles to concrete cases for the determination of duties and the improvement of character is usually known as *Applied Ethics*. While the utility of applied ethics always depends on the accuracy of the prior theoretical department, establishing universal moral principles, the validity of these principles themselves is determined by the practical test of concrete application and verification by an appeal to the untutored consciousness of mankind. "While we must insist," observes Mackenzie, "that it is not the task of Ethics to furnish us with copy-book headings for the guidance of life, we must equally insist that it is its task to furnish us with practical principles—to bring the nature of the highest good to clear consciousness, and to indicate the general nature of the means by which this good is to be attained. It thus tells us, not indeed the particular rules by which our lives are to be guided, but what is of infinitely greater practical importance—the spirit in which our lives are to be lived." (*Ibid.*, p. 350.)

Applied Ethics is concerned with the application of principles to cases for moral improvement. Theoretical and Applied Ethics are inter-connected.

Mackenzie.

§ 4. **Objections to the Study of Ethics.** Two principal objections have been urged against the study of Ethics:—

Objections to the study of Ethics:

First objection.

I. Ethics disturbs our implicit faith in conscience and so leads to moral sophistry.

Refutation.

Science improves common knowledge :

rational conviction is more stable than blind faith.

In this critical age science is the only secure foundation of correct conduct.

Moral science enables us successfully to solve moral problems.

I. It has been said that the study of Ethics has an "unsettling" effect upon the student : by shaking his simple and primitive faith in conscience, it encourages the tendency to reflect and refine upon common duties, thereby opening the door to casuistry, self-deception and even self-seeking.

This objection to the study of ethics is evidently frivolous. A science improves, and does not annul, common knowledge. When blind acquiescence is replaced by rational conviction, the performance of right is ensured. A decision arrived at by reflection is likely to be more correct and stable than one formed off-hand. Muirhead remarks, "To set aside the immediate impulse to act in accordance with a moral rule in favour of a careful analysis of the conditions of the case, and of the probable effects of our action, is not always evil. On the contrary, it may be a form of conscientiousness which, in the complex state of civilisation in which we live, requires in every way to be encouraged. Nor has it anything in common with the casuistical desire to find in the circumstances an excuse for neglect of an obvious duty." (*Ethics*, pp. 13-14.) It may even be said that the habit of careful estimate fostered by moral philosophy is rather a safeguard against self-deception for which casuistry is but another name. (*Vide* Chap. XIV, § 9, foot-note.) The casuistical spirit seeks an escape from the duty of action on the pretext of present difficulty ; but knowledge supplied by moral science enables one successfully to solve difficult moral problems, thereby rendering

the performance of duty comparatively easy and certain.

II. It may also be said that, even if Ethics do not disturb the primitive moral convictions, still it is of little practical value, since life is governed not by philosophy but by passions. The arguments brought forward by moral philosophy in favour of or against a course of action—however efficacious they may be in sober moments—are scarcely of any avail when we are swayed by clamorous passions in the ordinary affairs of life. "When the soul is suddenly called upon to face some awful moment, to which are joined great issues for good or evil in its moral history, it is not by 'going over the theory of virtue in one's mind,' not by any philosophical consideration of the origin and validity of moral ideas, that the right determination can be given." (Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 350.) Hence it may be urged that moral philosophy, though it may be of some scientific value or of speculative interest, does not really promote the cause of morals.

This objection to the study of Ethics assumes a separation between theory and practice which does not really exist. Life is indeed governed by the natural impulses and propensities, habits and tendencies, intuitive judgments and convictions, and not by idle theory or speculation. But can it be said that these impulses and habits and convictions remain unaffected by our reflection on the character and conditions of morality? Has an atheist or a sceptic the same inclination towards right or wrong as we

Second objection.

II. Ethics being theoretical is of no practical value : Life is ruled by passions and not by philosophy.

Refutation :

There is no absolute separation of theory and practice :

theory or reflection modifies practice or conduct.

Philosophy, by quickening reflection, exercises a wholesome influence on character and conduct.

It is specially important, in this sceptical age, to establish on a firm footing the fundamental moral ideas.

Green,

Negative

and positive uses of moral philosophy.

find in a theist or a dogmatist? Philosophy always exercises a powerful influence upon conduct. Discursive reason, though prompted to activity by intuitive intelligence, has always a reflex action on it. Reflection modifies our views and convictions, affects our inclinations and re-moulds our habits. And the importance of philosophy is increased in this sceptical age when adverse criticism is disposed to undermine the primitive moral convictions and fundamental moral ideas. If philosophy can only vindicate these, then surely it justifies its existence as a highly practical science. Green rightly observes, "Though not in the emergency itself, yet in preparing the soul for it, a true philosophy may have an important service to render. It will be a service, indeed, rather of the defensive and negative than of the actively inciting kind—a service which in a speculative and dialectical age needs to be rendered, lest the hold of the highest moral ideas on the mind should be weakened from apparent lack of intellectual justification." (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 346.) And, we may add, if the negative and positive sides of our nature are vitally connected, then philosophy is no less useful in supplying an inspiration for virtue by shaping our moral ideals.

"Divine Philosophy! by whose pure light
We first distinguish, then pursue the right;
Thy power the breast from every error frees,
And weeds out all its vices by degrees."

Gifford (Juvenal).

§ 5. Uses of the Study of Ethics. Ethics has (1) a negative or destructive and (2) a positive or constructive side ; and in either case it has (a) a theoretical and (b) a practical value.

Utility of Ethics:

1. **Destructive Value:** (a) *Theoretical Aspect.* A science has been described as but a criticism of common sense. Moral science, accordingly, criticises vague, and sometimes inaccurate, popular notions of right and wrong, existing social institutions, and even the crude beliefs in the ultimate source of morality. The result of this criticism is to dispel many an erroneous notion and to remove many an inconsistency.

1. Negative or destructive use :
(a) Theoretically, Ethics exposes erroneous moral notions ;

(b) *Practical Aspect.* As a result of the exposure of error, "some familiar distinctions, some effete prohibitions and injunctions, some crude notions of the nature of moral authority and moral sanctions, will have to be given up" : with the removal of incorrect ideas, the possibilities of wrong action are lessened.

and (b) practically, it leads to the rejection of evil tendencies, condemned by it.

2. **Constructive Value:** (a) *Theoretical Aspect.* Ethics places on a secure footing all that is valid and essential in the moral sphere. The critical side prepares the way for the constructive : by separating the irrelevant and the unessential, it brings into prominence the relevant and the essential ; the spirit is distinguished from the form, the permanent from the transient.

2. Positive or constructive use : (a) Theoretically, it establishes on a firm footing valid moral ideas and principles ;

(b) *Practical Aspect.* A clear knowledge of the primary conditions of morality prepares the way for the proper estimate of moral acts and their due performance as occasion arises. Theoretical

and (b) practically, it prepares the way for a virtuous life by strengthening vir-

Ethics is the secure foundation of Practical or Applied Ethics. The Socratic doctrine, 'knowledge is virtue' is true at least to a certain extent.

(The utility of Ethics is thus indicated by Fowler: "Hardly any one in the present day would question the importance of reviewing our rules of conduct, of considering the grounds on which they are based, of comparing them with the rules obtaining in other societies or among other sections of men, and of justifying them, where correct, and amending them, where incorrect. We doubt not that the student who follows the course of this work will perceive how essential and how inevitable in any progressive society is such a procedure. But there are in every civilised state certain classes of persons to whom an independent and scientific study of morality is of special interest and utility. Such, amongst others, are ministers of religion, statesmen, jurists, and all who have to do with the education of the young. One, at least, of the main subjects which Christianity proposes to itself, is to ameliorate the moral and social condition of mankind; and to attempt to effect this object, without some knowledge of the constitution of human nature and the tendencies of our acts, is often worse in its results than to leave it unattempted altogether. To the Christian minister, then, the study of Moral Philosophy would seem to be an essential branch of education, but it is no less essential to the other classes we have named. How can the statesman undertake the work of either legislation or administration without considering

tuous dispositions.

Fowler:

Ethics specially useful to

Theologians,

Statesmen,

the effects of his measures, not only on the external welfare, but on the habits, feelings and dispositions of the people whom he governs? Or, again, how can the jurist assign to offences their appropriate punishment, or discriminate the delicate boundary which distinguishes between the cases in which the law ought and ought not to interfere, unless he be previously acquainted with the motives which actuate men and the varied results which are likely to follow from his interference? That the educator of youth should be fully cognisant of the mysterious windings of human character, that he should be able to trace, in all their ramifications, the consequences of his example, his teaching, his censures, and his approbation, that the development of the moral character of those who are under his charge is his principal business, are surely positions which require no proof. (The study of the grounds and principles of morals is not one of those branches of science which merely gratify a barren curiosity; it is a living and fruitful subject, which ever has been, and ever will be, fraught with the most important results to the highest interests of mankind. For it is the tendency of a scientific study of morals, not only, by discovering the grounds of the current morality, to conciliate greater respect to the laws, customs, and sentiments which are already established, but also, by an impartial deduction from first principles, to amend what is baneful, to supplement what is defective, and so to bring the moral theory itself nearer and nearer to perfection.) (*The Principles of Morals*, Ch. I, pp. 20-22.)

Jurists,

and Teachers

Ethics secures due obedience and loyalty, and leads to true progress.

CHAPTER II.

METHODS AND THEORIES OF ETHICS.

Method is systematic procedure or procedure on principle.

It is useful theoretically and practically.

§ 1. What is Method? Method may briefly be described as a systematic procedure for the attainment of a definite end. Whether our end is theoretical or practical, acquisition of knowledge or its application, orderly procedure is more conducive to the desired result than hap-hazard treatment. Often the difference in men and manners, not to speak of theories, lies more in method than in anything else. Men, who are equally intelligent, attain very different results according as they are what we call regular or irregular in their habits, *i. e.*, methodical or immethodical in their conduct. "The power of judging aright and of distinguishing Truth from Error, which is properly what is called Good Sense or Reason," says Descartes, "is by nature equal in all men; and the diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of Reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same objects." (*Discourse on Method*, Veitch's Translation, p. 1.) Similarly in practice or theory, even when correctly conceived, we often notice that a difference in procedure brings about very unlike results. Consistency or inconsistency, accuracy or inaccuracy, comprehensiveness or incomprehensiveness

mean much in theory or practice. Method is explained by the authors of Port-Royal Logic as "the art of disposing well a series of many thoughts, either for discovering truth when we are ignorant of it or for proving it to others when it is already known."

Account of Method in Port-Royal Logic.

"Thus there are two kinds of method, one for discovering truth, which is called analysis, or the method of resolution, and which may also be termed the method of invention; and the other for explaining it to others when we have found it, which is called synthesis, or the method of composition, and which may be also called the method of doctrine. We do not commonly treat of the entire body of a science by analysis, but employ it only to resolve some question." (Baynes' Translation, pp. 308-309.)

Two principal Methods :
(1) Analysis and

(2) Synthesis.

Method, accordingly, may be employed either for the acquisition of knowledge or for its communication. In either case, the essence of method lies in system or, as Kant puts it, "procedure according to principles." (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's Translation, p. 516.) Method then is essential to science which is characterized by accuracy and system. Though analysis and synthesis are the essential conditions of method, yet it requires something more to satisfy the conditions of scientific inquiry. The principal conditions of sound method are :—

Method essential to Science.

Conditions of sound Method :—

(1) *Correct Observation.* We should carefully and accurately study the facts which constitute the subject-matter of a science. In such study we should be guided by the following considerations : (a)

(1) Careful study of facts :



(a) Direct
observation
or testimony.

Direct apprehension or testimony should always be preferred to indirect. The great danger of observation is the confusion of perception with inference : in many cases we mistake a conclusion for a percept. ✓ We imagine, for example, that we have a direct knowledge of the goodness or badness, benevolence or cruelty of an individual when really we infer it from his conduct. Similarly we should rely more on a testimony which is based on direct observation than on report : "hear-say evidence," as the law lays down, "is no evidence at all". Whenever possible we should derive our facts from direct study instead of from report. "As soon as my age permitted me to pass from under the control of my instructors," writes Descartes, "I entirely abandoned the study of letters, and resolved no longer to seek any other science than the knowledge of myself, or of the great book of the world. I spent the remainder of my youth in travelling, in visiting courts and armies, in holding intercourse with men of different dispositions and ranks, in collecting varied experience, in proving myself in the different situations into which fortune threw me, and, above all, in making such reflection on the matter of my experience as to secure my improvement." (*Discourse on Method*, p. 10.) (b) We should study with an unprejudiced mind, for bias often colours an object observed. We are often disposed to construe objects according to our views. Men think that their experiences determine their ideas ; but their ideas have often a reflex effect on their experience. In the matter of free-will

Descartes.

(b) Impar-
tial estimate.

controversy, for example, the necessarian may think that the strongest motive determines an action, while the libertarian may contend that the strength of the motive itself is determined by the free direction of attention. Here we should try to ascertain by careful observation and analysis whether the strength of a motive is really the cause or the effect of the direction of attention. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 6.) One, merely by the force of his will, may imagine this or that view to be correct. (c) Observation should be duly regulated so as to include within its compass only the relevant facts, or facts bearing on the question at hand, and not to cover indiscriminately any and all facts. The difference between observation and perception is that while the one is regulated, the other is casual; observation is but well-regulated perception. As observation is thus under the control or guidance of a leading idea or principle, the facts observed must always be determined by it. Thus while the zoologist may bring apes and men within the compass of his study, by reason of their similarity in respect of organic structure, the moralist is led to exclude the former from his province as devoid of any moral significance. The theologian again may bring the entire universe within the range of his study, as all things from the choir of heaven to the humblest objects on earth declare the glory of the Creator. Thus the relevancy or irrelevancy of a topic in every case must be determined by our end in view and the sphere of our study. "Where the habit of Method is present and

(c) Examination of relevant facts.

Observation is regulated perception.

effective," says Coleridge, "things the most remote and diverse in time, place and outward circumstance are brought into mental contiguity and succession, the more striking as the less expected." (*Encyc. Dict., Method*, § ii.) ✓

Two forms of observation :

Introspection and Sense-perception.

It may be mentioned in this connection that observation may assume either of two forms, according as its objects constitute the facts of the internal world of mind or of the external world of Nature and Society. Introspection in the one case and sense-perception in the other are the means employed to gather facts by direct observation. And if introspection prevails in the mental and moral sciences, sense-perception preponderates in the sciences of nature. Without entering into an examination of Comte's objection to introspective inquiry, we may only mention here that its possibility is proved by the very appeal to consciousness to render the objection itself intelligible.

(2) Analysis and Synthesis.

(2) *Analysis and Synthesis.* Mere observation of facts, presented to the mind, is not adequate, however, for the purposes of a science. Most of the facts known in adult life are of a complex character. To adequately explain them, therefore, we must break them up into their constituent elements and discover the laws of their combination. It is thus necessary to have recourse to the two methods of analysis and synthesis. Analysis implies the separation of elements which are found together in a concrete object or experience, while synthesis means the combination of elements for the reconstruction of such a

Analysis is separation and Synthesis, combination of elements.

product. Synthesis is not "the unabstracted concrete": it is "combining *after* analyzing; it is using the results of analysis with a view to construction." (Bain, *Logic*; Part II., p. 397.)

Analysis and synthesis assume two distinct forms owing to a difference in the materials on which they are employed. *Physical or chemical analysis* implies the actual separation of elements which go to constitute a compound, while *logical or mathematical analysis* implies the ideal separation of elements entering into a complex fact or notion. Similarly physical or chemical synthesis is the actual composition of elements for the production of a desired compound; while logical or mathematical synthesis is the ideal reconstruction of a complex notion out of elements discovered by prior analysis. Synthesis in either case supplements analysis to verify its results: the correctness and adequacy of analysis are proved by the subsequent synthetic reconstruction of the complex fact out of the elements and according to the laws already discovered by analysis. And "one of the most fruitful sources of error in philosophy has been over-hasty synthesis and combination without sufficient previous analysis of the elements combined." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. X., p. 18.)

Physical analysis and synthesis distinguished from logical.

Synthesis is a test of analysis.

It may be mentioned in this connection that logical or psychological analysis always involves abstraction. Confining the term 'abstraction' to its etymological sense of the withdrawal of attention from certain factors, we may mention that such withdrawal

Analysis and abstraction.

is an essential factor of psychological analysis. To resolve, for example, a percept or a moral act into its constituent elements we must successively withdraw our attention from certain features in order to notice others. To resolve a ball into its colour, form, size, weight, etc., we must alternately withdraw our attention, for the time being, from the other features. Similarly, to analyse a moral act into its motive, outward execution and result, we should, for the time being, turn our attention away from the other aspects or factors. When, by successive acts of abstraction, we exhaustively consider all the constituent elements of a complex fact, then it may be said to be analysed. Thus abstraction may be described as incomplete analysis, while analysis is thorough-going abstraction.

Abstraction
is imperfect
analysis.

(3) Use of
logical prin-
ciples.

To explain
facts we must
discover their
general prin-
ciples.

(3) *Employment of Logical Principles.* "The particular uses of *method*," observes Bentham, "are various : but the general one is, to enable men to understand the things that are the subjects of it," (*Introduction to Morals and Legislation*, XVI, 1, note.) To understand things, however, it is not sufficient that we should merely observe and analyse them ; it is further necessary to discover the principles which govern them. Principles or laws connect one fact with others of the same kind and thus enable the mind to comprehend them by reference to their general features and causal connexions. To understand is to assimilate and to discover causal links which bring similar facts together.

Thus the principles of induction and deduction must be employed to arrive at correct generalizations and deductions from them. All the experimental methods, with the connected processes of elimination, hypothesis and classification, should, therefore, be used to elucidate physical and psychical facts. In the case of our moral life, for example, we may thus try to determine whether it is the motive, outward action or the result which constitutes the proper object of moral judgment. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 2 and Chap. VI, § 1.) In the earlier stages of scientific enquiry induction predominates, while in the later stages a science becomes more deductive. In the case of morals, we first inductively establish the elements and laws of our moral life and then deduce therefrom the correct forms of moral conduct. Verification proves the accuracy of both the inductive and deductive processes. An appeal to consciousness is thus generally the final test in psychological and moral investigations. To establish the facts and principles of moral life we may now supplement induction with deduction and now bring induction to the aid of deduction: we may thus employ sometimes the inverse deductive or, what is called by Mill, 'the historical method', and sometimes the direct deductive or what is named by him 'the physical method.' It may be mentioned in this connection that the several logical processes, being attempts on the part of the mind to arrive at truth, are inter-connected. Even analysis involves induction and synthesis, deduction. "While

Inductive and deductive processes must, therefore, be employed to arrive at valid conclusions.

The several logical processes being sub-servient to truth are inter-connected.

Synthesis," observes Bain, "has throughout a reference to the deductive and combining processes of science, Analysis relates to generalization or induction." (*Logic*, Part II. p. 402.) ✓

(4) Thoroughness.

(4) *Comprehensiveness*. Our treatment of a subject should be comprehensive and full and not incomplete and imperfect. Every science must take an exhaustive survey of *all* the facts coming within its province and try to explain them, not merely in isolation, but in their mutual connection and bearing. To explain, for example, the phenomena of human will without any reference to the other facts of our moral life can scarcely be accepted as valid. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 6.) Our exposition of a subject should neither be incomplete nor imperfect.

To explain a fact we must consider it in all its bearings.

The principles of Method according to Descartes :

(1) Independent, patient and impartial investigation.

Descartes thus lays down the conditions of a valid Method :—

"The *first* was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such ; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.

(2) Due subdivision of topics into their parts.

The *second*, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.

(3) Systematic and progressive examination.

The *third*, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the

more complex ; assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.

And the *last*, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted." (*Discourse on Method*, Veitch's Translation, P. 19.)

(4) Comprehensiveness.

§ 2. **Method and Theory**—While method indicates the procedure of investigating and explaining facts, theory refers to the explanation itself. Method, as mentioned above, may be analytical or synthetical, the one suited to the discovery of elements and principles, while the other generally adapted to their explanation. By an orderly investigation we may rise from facts to principles and finally to a governing hypothesis which is expected to throw adequate light on them ; and next by a synthetic procedure we may try to explain the facts with the help of such hypothesis. When an hypothesis is thus established, it becomes the central principle for explaining the facts and comes to be known as a theory. "The deduction of known truths from an hypothesis," writes Carveth Read, "is its Verification ; and when this has been accomplished in a good many cases, and there are no manifest failures, the hypothesis is often called a Theory ; though this term is also used for the whole system of laws of a certain class of phenomena, as when Astronomy is called the 'theory of the heavens' (*Logic*, P. 244.) We thus speak of the atomic theory, the theory of gravitation, idealistic, materialistic or

Method and Theory distinguished.

egoistic theories. Method then indicates the regular means employed for the elucidation of certain facts, while theory stands for the result of such inquiry—the hypothesis or body of principles supposed to explain them. "Method," says Thomson, "is rather a power or spirit of the intellect, pervading all that it does, than its tangible product." (*Laws of Thought*, p. 68.) Theory, on the other hand, as the etymology of the word (from Gr. *theoria*, implying contemplation, reflection or speculation) suggests, stands for a body of general principles traceable to some hypothesis and capable of explaining a group of facts. The close connection between theory and science is due to the importance of hypothesis in all scientific inquiry. When a theory is proved beyond doubt and is generally accepted as certain, it is called a science. It may also be mentioned in this connection that both theory and science ultimately rest on facts which are particular in character and taken to be more certain, as evidenced directly by the senses and so leaving no room for inference and consequent doubt. It is by a careful and systematic examination of facts that theories are arrived at and sciences established.

§ 3. **Methods of Ethics.** The methods employed for the explanation of the facts of our moral life have chiefly been of the following types:—

(1) The method is Psychological or Unpsychological according as the examination of internal or external facts is made the basis of ethical investigation. In the one case, we begin with a survey

Method is the process and theory, the result.

Theory leads to Science,

and both are ultimately based on facts.

Principal Ethical Methods :

(1) Method is psychological or unpsychological, according as it

of the facts of personal consciousness, while in the other, with a theory of the universe, to account for moral facts. "Ethics," writes Martineau, "may pursue their course and construct their body of doctrine either from the moral sentiments outwards into the system of the world; or from the system of the world inwards to the moral sentiments. The former method may be called the *Psychologic*; the latter we will for the present oppose to it by the mere negative designation of the *Unpsychologic*." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. I, P. 4.)

is based on introspection or theory of the universe.

The *geometrical method* of Spinoza or the *a priori method* of Leibniz is allied to the unpsychological method indicated above. All these are more or less dogmatic in character and are ultimately based on a theory of the universe. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 3.) The *dialectical method* of Hegel, though primarily derived from an examination of the facts of consciousness, becomes dogmatic and unpsychological when it is taken to be the key to the universe. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 7.) The *critical method* of Kant is essentially psychological.

Geometrical, *a priori* and dialectical methods are essentially unpsychological.

Critical method is psychological.

(2) In the case of either Psychological or Unpsychological theories the inquiry may be conducted either strictly along the lines of the positive and descriptive sciences or by speculative reflection about the character of the ideal or standard involved in morality. In the one case, we proceed merely by examining the facts as they are known to us by introspection or outward observation, de-

(2) Method is positive or teleological according as it is based on mere examination of facts or on a conception of ideal or standard which is taken to be

the key to our moral life.

scribing them and tracing their natural history; while, in the other, we proceed by critical analysis and thoughtful reflection to discover the true significance of moral life. Thus the Positive Method restricts its inquiry to the *actual* while the Teleological pushes its inquiry into the *ideal*. The one generally leads to Hedonism, while the other to Perfectionism. (*Vide* Chapters IX, X and XI.) The one, admitting merely the positive experiences of pleasure and pain and the influence of natural and social surroundings, attempts only such an explanation of morality as may be possible by reference to these; while the other, recognising the operation of an ideal or norm, makes it the central principle of explanation.

The physical and biological method of Spencer and the genetic and historical method of Stephen are positive in character.

True ethical method should be teleological, Seth.

The *physical and biological method* of Herbert Spencer as well as the *genetic and historical method* of Leslie Stephen is allied to the positive method indicated above. If, however, the essence of our moral life lies in the pursuit of an ideal, then ethics must be treated as a normative, instead of as a positive, science. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 1 and Chap. XI, § 3.) "Human life," says Seth, "is unintelligible apart from the idea of purpose; the teleological and the ethical views are one. Since moral life is a series of choices, and character or virtue is, as Aristotle said, a certain habit or settled tendency of choice, the ethical question may be said to be, What is the true object of choice? What object approves itself to reflective thought as unconditionally worthy of our choice? What ought we to choose?" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 12.)

(3) Method is philosophical

(3) The ethical method is Philosophical and

Metaphysical. To adequately explain the moral facts, we must consider them in all their bearings. "Ethics," says Sorley, "looks at life as a whole. It attempts to organize the whole of our experience from its own point of view. In this it is distinguished from most other sciences, which are deliberately restricted to a limited group of facts, or to a special aspect of facts, and which owe their strength to this restriction." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XVII, p. 322.) To explain, for example, the fact of duty or obligation we should consider it with reference to our constitution, our relation to others and opportunities, as well as to the character of the authority which is believed to be its source. To isolate a fact from the rest of the universe is generally to exclude all explanation; and this is pre-eminently true of moral facts which vitally connect us with the universe. In spite of the repudiation of metaphysical inquiry in ethics by Leslie Stephen and others, the connection between ethics and metaphysics must be admitted to be very close. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 5.) An attempt to explain moral facts, without any reference to the real constitution of the world and its requirements, must end in a failure. Our conception of duty cannot be the same if we believe in a mere phenomenal world, as if we take it to be the field of trial appointed by Divine Intelligence. "While the natural sciences," observes Muirhead, "may be said to be practically independent of metaphysics, the conclusions of philosophy as to the nature of the world at large

and metaphysical.

Moral inquiry is closely connected with our view of the world.

and man's relation to it are of the utmost importance to ethics, and cannot be neglected in a complete exposition of its subject-matter." (*Elements of Ethics*, pages 35-36.) ✓

True ethical method should be observational, logical, psychological and metaphysical.

In all ethical inquiry we should employ the methods of correct observation, logical analysis and synthesis, inductive and deductive inference, mentioned above, for elucidating moral facts and determining their true significance. We should thus examine, not merely the facts of personal consciousness, but also the constitution of the world and our relation to it. Ethical inquiry should be logical, psychological, and metaphysical in character; it should be both observational and speculative, introspective and reflective. "The great distinction," observes Fowler, "between the earlier and the later mode of dealing with moral and social phenomena consists chiefly in this, that later enquirers possess in the results and methods of the more advanced sciences means of analysis and principles of classification wholly unknown to the earlier philosophers." (*Principles of Morals*, Part I, p. 12.)

Opinions on Ethical Methods:

I Sidgwick's view.

§ 4. Different Views on Ethical Methods :—

I. *Sidgwick's View.* Method of Ethics is taken by Sidgwick to mean "any rational procedure by which we determine what is right for individual human beings to do or to seek to realise by voluntary action." Conceiving Ethics to be primarily and specially concerned with "what ought to be," he divides the Ethical Methods into—

I. The method of those writers who regard Ethics as concerned with "an investigation of the true Moral Laws or Rational Rules of Conduct." This is known as the Intuitional view.

I. Method admitting moral laws.

II. The method of those who view Ethics as "an investigation of the Summum Bonum (the chief good) of man and the means of attaining it." "Since, however, to every difference in the end accepted, some difference in method generally corresponds," this latter method is again subdivided into—

II. Method admitting supreme end,

(1) The method of those who conceive the supreme end of life as Perfection or Excellence of human nature (this doctrine being allied to the Intuitional view);

which may be conceived as either (1) perfection,

(2) The method of those who conceive the summum bonum to be Happiness, which may be conceived as—(a) that of the agent's own (Epicurean or Egoistic Hedonism) or (b) that of the community or the greatest number (Utilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism). Perfectionism, however, is not similarly divisible, according to Sidgwick. "The case," he observes, "seems to be otherwise with Perfection. At first sight, indeed, the same alternatives present themselves: it seems that the Perfection aimed at may be taken either individually or universally; and circumstances are conceivable in which a man is not unlikely to think that he could best promote the Perfection of others by sacrificing his own. But no moralist has ever approved of such sacrifice, at least so far as Moral Perfection is concerned; no one has ever directed an individual to promote the virtue of

or (2) happiness.

Happiness again may be either (a) the agent's own or (b) that of others.

others except in so far as this promotion is compatible with, or rather involved in, the complete realization of Virtue in himself. So far, then, there is no *prima facie* need of separating the method of determining right conduct which takes the Perfection of the individual as the ultimate end from that which aims at the Perfection of the human community." (*Methods of Ethics*, pp. 9-10.)

Criticism of
Sidgwick's
view.

Sidgwick
confounds
ethical meth-
ods with eth-
ical theories.

Difference,
in theory does
not necessari-
ly mean
difference in
method.

Ethical
Method

in the Psy-
chology and

With regard to Sidgwick's account we may mention that he practically describes as many Methods of Ethics as there are Ethical Theories or Schools of Moralists. But, however much moralists may differ in their interpretation of the facts of our moral life, the methods adopted by them in the study of those facts are not necessarily so various. In fact, "the method of science," as remarked by Prof. Seth, "is always the same, namely, the systematization of our ordinary judgments through their reduction to a common unifying principle, or through their purification from inconsistency with one another." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 35.) And Ethical Method must essentially be the same, whatever may be the consequent Ethical Theory. "As a Science of Observation, Moral Philosophy is subject (1) to the laws of evidence, which require that facts be carefully ascertained, distinguished, and classified; and (2) to the rules of logic, which require that generalization be reached by legitimate induction from ascertained facts," and valid conclusions drawn from self-evident truths or well-established generalizations. Conformity to these principles implies that in the study and explanation

of ethical facts we should attend not merely to what goes on in our own minds, but also to the conduct and judgments of others, and that we should analyse the complex facts of moral experience to ascertain and generalize the moral principles, from which such facts may again be synthetically deduced.

In its later development, Ethical Science necessarily becomes speculative. Here, no doubt, "it is dependent for its start, and also for the final test of all its results, upon the accuracy and completeness of the underlying Science of Observation." (Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, p. 2.) To test the nature and correctness of the implications of moral facts, Ethics is necessarily driven to frame legitimate hypotheses from which such facts can be deduced. In its higher applications, Ethics is concerned, for example, with the ultimate nature and source of the moral law, the relation in which we stand to it, the source and end of our existence, etc. Such a region of enquiry is properly denominated metaphysical, because it transcends the sphere of consciousness. "As metaphysical inquiry," writes Calderwood, "seeks an explanation of the origin of known existence, and of its continuance under government of laws recognised in the several departments of science, the ultimate test of all metaphysical speculation must be found in the facts from which the inquiry takes its rise. Merely to start from facts is not a sufficient security for the accuracy of subsequent speculation. This security is found only by careful *return* upon the facts out of

in the
Metaphysics
of Ethics.

which the metaphysical problems arise. These, then, are the two fundamental canons of metaphysical speculation : (1) To start from facts in search of the solution of the problems to which they give rise ; and (2) to return to the facts for test of every solution proposed." (Calderwood, *Moral Philosophy*, p. 222.)

It is evident from the foregoing remarks that Induction mainly guides the earlier or observational part of Ethics, while Deduction, the later or speculative. Applied Ethics and Metaphysical Inquiry are but legitimate deductions from facts or principles already ascertained. "In moral philosophy there is uniformly a double test,—the true in theory must be the consistent in practice." (Calderwood, p. 16.)

Modern
Ethics is psy-
chological,

It is to be noted here that the above account of method has reference to Modern or Psychological Ethics in which appeal to, and interpretation of, the facts of consciousness constitute the cardinal feature. Any theory of the universe or life is deduced from a study of these facts. Ancient (Greek) Ethics, on the other hand, was unpsychological, facts of moral life being interpreted in the light of presuppositions about the constitution of the universe. According to this view, the moral nature of man is conditioned by his sensuous or rational nature, which is but the expression in him of the principle which constitutes the essence of the universe.

while
Ancient
Ethics,
unpsycho-
logical.

II Stewart's
View.

(1) Imagina-
tive or tele-
ological and
(2) positive

II. *Stewart's View.* Stewart distinguishes Ethical Methods into (1) "the way of imaginative representation" and (2) "the positive way," according as the aim is to determine the true ideal of life or to

explain the character of the actual type or standard, employed by men, and the process by which it has been evolved in the race. With regard to the former method, Stewart observes: "The way of imaginative representation recommends itself to—indeed, is forced upon—those whose reflection dwells on the significance of man's being what he is—a self-conscious subject. Man's Type for them is intuitively apprehended, being present in self-consciousness. It is 'Eternal Consciousness present in my consciousness.' This is the True Self, which constitutes the world—makes it the intelligible system that it is. Plato is the master of those who set forth the Type imaginatively." The latter method again may wear either of two distinct forms, according as (a) it is confined to the investigation and description of the actual standard, as it is presented to consciousness at any stage of human culture, or (b) it is employed to discover the course of evolution of the moral standard in the human race and thus to indicate the lines of further moral advance. The former (a) of these two methods is called "descriptive," while the latter (b), "genetic." Those who employ the "positive" method turn, says Stewart, "to the natural history of mankind for data out of which to construct a positive theory of man's Type. This 'theory' may either set forth the genetic process by which the Type has been evolved, or amount to nothing more than a descriptive account of the Type as it now appears; in either case the moral life—the life of conduct willed for the sake of the Public Good—being taken

method.
The latter
again may be

(a) either
descriptive,

or (b)
genetic.

as central, the range of view is enlarged, and other than moral elements are included within the survey." (*Vide* Article on 'Ethics' in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Tenth Edition, Supplement, vol. 28, p. 301.) ✓

Criticism of Stewart's view.

Imaginative method should be supplemented by metaphysical and philosophical.

Mere positive method, inadequate in Ethics.

We may mention here that "the way of imaginative representation" is the teleological method described above (*Vide* §3); and it must be supplemented by metaphysical and philosophical inquiries to reveal the true character of our moral life. The "descriptive" and "genetic" methods fall, no doubt, under "the positive method"; but, however instructive they may be in revealing the features of such a life as they appear in individual and social consciousness, they fail to explain the essential conditions of morality which involve a reference to an ideal or norm. Merely the descriptive or psychological method is inadequate to discover the true significance of moral life. This can only be effected by critical reflection and valid inference employed on the materials supplied to us. In fact, the genetic method, in attempting to trace the evolution of morality, tries to explain the actual by the ideal which indicates the course and limits of development. (*Vide* Chap. XI.) "Ultimate ends," as Sidgwick says, "are not, as such, phenomena, or laws, or conditions of phenomena. How can an inquiry into the history of our beliefs affect our view of their truth or falsehood? The historian who pronounces on the 'relative truth' of any current beliefs, implicitly claims to know the really valid practical principles partially hidden from the holders of such beliefs: and my point is

that the study of the historical sequence of beliefs cannot by itself give him this knowledge". (*Mind*, 1886, p. 217.)

III. *Martineau's View.* Martineau first distinguishes between the psychological and unpsychological methods, mentioned above. (*Vide* § 5.) His subdivision and treatment of the methods will be noticed in the next section.

II Martineau's view.

Vide § 5.

§ 5. **Theories of Ethics.** Theories of Ethics, as explained above, are determined by central principles which adequately explain all the facts of our moral life. (*Vide* § 2.) Moral facts are explained by laws, which in their turn are traced to principles or cardinal truths, systematizing all moral experience. But all moral principles or truths are but different expressions of the moral standard, which is really the key to our moral life. An ethical theory aims at explaining and systematizing moral facts by reference to a standard. Ethical theories, therefore, should ultimately be classified and explained with regard to the different conceptions of the moral standard. An ethical theory may thus be regarded as Jural or Teleological, according as it adopts moral law or end as the standard in morals. As an adequate classification of ethical theories rests on a full and methodical enumeration of the moral standards, adopted by different writers, the classification of standards is a pre-requisite to the classification of theories. Theories are intelligible only by reference to the standards. Hence we have preferred to classify and explain the standards in detail in chapters ix to xii

Ethical Theories

classified by reference to the moral standard :


Jural and Teleological Theories.

Vide chapters IX-XII.

to a sketchy and imperfect treatment of theories here. We refer, therefore, the reader to those chapters for the classification and examination of the different standards and so of the corresponding theories. The classification may briefly be indicated in a tabular form thus :—

Table of
classification.


Classification of Ethical Theories.



³ Holmwood et al. (1997: 104) suggest that '... according to a group of adults, there are differences among phonemes' (1997: 3).

Martineau in his *Types of Ethical Theory* has classified Ethical Theories thus :—

Martineau's
classification
of Ethical
Theories.



Psychological Ethics is of modern origin, because an appeal to consciousness has become the final test in moral and psychological investigations since the time of Descartes. Psychological insight is not wanting at times among ancient thinkers ; but it has been adopted as a systematic procedure only by modern philosophers. When a psychological theory admits, on the testimony of consciousness, the elementary and peculiar character of our moral experience and tries to explain and systematize it on that assumption, then it is called *idio-psychological* (from Gr. *idios* one's own, peculiar) ; when, on the other hand, an attempt is made, by an appeal to consciousness, to resolve our moral experience to some other, the theory is called *hetero-psychological* (from Gr. *heteros*, other, different). A hetero-psychological theory is named *hedonistic* (from Gr. *hedone*, pleasure, enjoyment), *dianoetic* (from Gr. *dianoia*, intelligence, thought), or *aesthetic* (from Gr. *aisthesis*, perception), according as the moral quality is resolved into agreeable or disagreeable experience, knowledge, or sense of beauty. Hedonistic theories again may be either purely empirical or modified by the doctrine of evolution and heredity. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2.) Unpsychological theories try to explain moral facts by reference to some hypothesis about the constitution of the universe. When moral facts are deduced from a real and abiding ground of the universe, the theory is called *metaphysical* (from Gr. *meta* after, *physika*, physics) ; while, when the facts are explained by reference to mere physical

phenomena, the theory is named *physical* (from Gr. *physis*, nature). A metaphysical theory is *transcendental* (from Lat. *trans*, beyond, *scendo*, to climb) or *immanent* (from Lat. *in*, in, and *manere*, to remain), according as the real ground is believed to go beyond, or wholly exhausted in, the revealed world.

Martineau's classification of ethical theories, though indicating important differences in ethical systems, is yet a mixed one, involving two principles—one of method and the other of theory. Differences in method often lead, no doubt, to differences in theory: different roads generally lead to different termini. But this does not mean that method is the same as theory, any more than a road is the same as a terminus. The way in which we proceed affects to a great extent the end which we arrive at. This merely shows the close connection between method and theory, and not their identity. This connection has led Sidgwick to introduce theories in his classification of methods and has, likewise, led Martineau to introduce methods in his classification of theories. It is this confusion which has led some writers to treat Martineau's classification as a classification of Methods instead of Theories. Though, however, method is intimately connected with theory, yet they are not so connected as to be altogether inseparable. This is proved by the fact that sometimes the same theories are arrived at by different methods, as different roads may at times lead to the same terminus. Hedonism, for example, though regarded by Martineau as conditioned by the psychological method,

Criticism of Martineau's view.

His classification is a mixed one.

Theories and methods, though connected, are not identical.

may no less be arrived at by the unpsychological. The atomic theory of Epicurus no less justified such a doctrine than the empiricism of Hartley and Bain. The phenomenalism of Heraclitus or Protagoras is not established quite in the same way as that of Comte or Hume. Martineau himself admits this when he writes—"Although the same schemes of doctrine have reappeared among us that gave distinction to the names of Parmenides and Zeno, Protagoras and Epicurus, yet little or no use can be made by the moderns of the reasoning of their Hellenic prototypes; the logical locomotion is in the opposite direction; and though there is the same ferry to cross, the boat is moored on the wrong side for us, and another must be taken. How little conviction, for instance, is now produced by the Platonic arguments for the immortality of the soul! so that precisely the readers in deepest sympathy with the author's feeling and conclusion are the first to lament the hazardous dependence of a sublime moral truth on the precarious assumptions of a metaphysical realism. And how foreign to the genius of Bentham and Mill are the maxims and reasoning of Heraclitus, to prove that motion and semblance, without rest and substance, constitute the universe!" (*Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. I, p. 9.)

CHAPTER III.

ETHICS AND THE SCIENCES.

§ 1. Place of Ethics among the Sciences.

We have already seen that the possibility of Moral Science cannot be denied without contradicting the facts of personal consciousness and ignoring the principles of Logic and Metaphysics. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 2 and Chap. II, § 3.) The conditions of a science are correctness, generality, and system; and all these conditions may be satisfied in moral inquiry, leading to the construction of moral science. As every science has a definite province of its own, so Ethics has its own sphere of inquiry, viz., the facts and principles of our moral life. But, however much we may arbitrarily restrict the different provinces of nature and mind for scientific convenience, they really run into one another thereby revealing the unity of their origin and harmony in their constitution. We can never erect a Chinese wall between Nature and Mind, any more than between Physics and Metaphysics, or, say, between Hygienics and Ethics. All the departments of nature and mind, and so all the sciences, are thus directly or indirectly connected with one another. Hence the importance of general culture for the due understanding of any subject or topic. Thus physics is connected with chemistry, chemistry with physiology and biology, and these again with psychology and ethics. But,

Possibility
of Moral Sci-
ence.

All the sci-
ences are in-
terconnected:

but, for practical convenience, we consider only those which are very intimately related.

Ethics, as a normative science, is allied to Logic and Æsthetics.

as it is never practicable for us to examine the entire universe or discuss all the sciences to explain a particular fact or science, we are naturally led to consider only those facts or sciences which are intimately connected with the inquiry in hand.

[Ethics, as we have seen, is a normative and, in a certain sense, a practical science, to be distinguished from what are called positive and theoretical sciences: (*Vide* Chap. I, § 1.) As a normative science, it is allied to Logic and Æsthetics, all of which inquire into a norm, standard or ideal, which we strive to attain. If our being is complex, involving several organs and faculties, and their due cultivation is not only enjoined on us by our Maker but also required for our own well-being and comfort, it is evidently imperative that we should always try to improve our nature and condition. (*Vide* Chap. XVI.) Ethics, therefore, as the science of obligation, occupies a very prominent place among the sciences, for all of them ultimately depend on the moral nature of the individual, which it is the business of ethics to unfold. A bad man is a bad physicist, a bad carpenter, a bad astronomer, a bad lawyer, and a bad teacher. One, not having a due sense of duty, is not expected to do well what he may undertake to perform. He is likely to be hasty and negligent in his work and so to spoil his business. Neither science nor trade can thrive under him. Thus the study of character and so of Ethics is of supreme importance to all; and it is pre-eminently so to scientific pursuit, which requires patience,

Ethics, as the science of character, is closely connected with scientific study.

Ethics modifies character (*Vide* Chap. I § 5) and, through character, affects scientific research.

devotion, and self-sacrifice. Ethics evidently comes within the Human Sciences which include, besides the normative sciences mentioned above, such positive sciences as Psychology, Sociology, Economics, Theology, Pedagogics, and Metaphysics. The sciences pertaining to the human organism, such as Biology, Anatomy and Physiology are not directly connected with these human sciences which are specially concerned with the mind, the distinctive endowment of man. As the moral nature of man is the central fact of his personality, so Ethics is the centre and guide of the other sciences.

Ethics, being a part of the Human Sciences, is very closely connected with them.

§ 2. **Sciences connected with Ethics.** The preceding remarks must have made it clear that, though Ethics may in a sense be said to be connected with all the other sciences, yet it is specially connected with some, which may be regarded as cognate in character—all pertaining to the mind. We shall, accordingly, confine our attention in this chapter to the relation of ethics to these sciences. And with regard to these, we shall *first* consider the sciences on which Ethics depends and next the sciences which depend on it. (I) The sciences on which Ethics depends are (1) Psychology, (2) Metaphysics, and (3) Sociology; while (II) the sciences dependent on Ethics are (1) Politics, (2) Economics, and (3) Pedagogics. (III) Ethics and Theology, as we shall see, are interdependent. Let us consider these topics one by one.

Ethics is specially connected with the mental sciences.

(I) Ethics depends on Psychology, Metaphysics, and Sociology:

while (II) Politics, Economics, and Pedagogics depend on Ethics.

(III) Ethics and Theology are interdependent.

Moral inquiry involves

§ 3. **Ethics and Psychology.** Ethics is closely connected with Psychology. As moral distinctions

Careful and
impartial
examination
of the facts
of consciousness
at every
step.

have a meaning only in relation to a mind, and the ground of such distinctions is found in an ideal standard apprehended by it, an examination of the facts of consciousness becomes essential to a theory of morals. "Almost all ethical schools," writes Sidgwick, "would agree that the main object of their investigation must belong to the psychical side of human life; whether (1) they hold that man's ultimate end is to be found in psychical existence regarded as merely sentient and emotional, identifying it with some species of desirable feeling or Pleasure, or the genus or sum of such feelings; or whether (2) they rather maintain that the well-being of the mind must lie solely or chiefly in the quality of its activity—its Virtue. And when we attempt to work out either view into a clear and complete system, we are led inevitably to further psychological study, either (1) in order to examine different kinds and degrees of pleasure and pain, or (2) to determine the nature and mutual relations of the different virtues or good qualities of character, and their opposites." (*Outlines of the History of Ethics*, pp 4-5.) We see, then, that the establishment of moral distinctions, the discovery of ethical principles, and the ascertainment of the conditions of morality must be conducted on a psychological basis. The problem of the Freedom of Will, the enumeration and the classification of impulses, and the significance of duty and of moral law or end can be solved or determined only by a careful examination of the facts of consciousness. Whether, for

example, moral judgments are directed to impulses or outward acts and their results, whether the judgments are based on an estimate of pleasure or moral worth, whether life is regulated by feeling or by reason, and the connected questions of the different kinds of pleasure and grades of moral worth, the relation of feeling to reason, &c, cannot be answered without cautious mental analysis. As Mansel has said, "The value of every ethical system must ultimately be tested on psychological grounds." (*Prolegomena Logica, Preface.*)

While Ethics and Psychology are thus closely connected, their spheres are not co-extensive: Psychology examines all the facts of our conscious life—intellectual, emotional, and volitional; but Ethics is practically limited to the department of Will. Moral facts, no doubt, come within the province of Psychology; but it examines them simply as mental phenomena without any reference to their moral significance. Similarly, Ethics, in elucidating the facts of our moral life, takes into account other connected mental processes; but these are considered only by reference to their moral bearing and not merely as psychical phenomena.

Psychology
is wider than
Ethics.

It may be mentioned in this connection that, though Ethics and Psychology are thus intimately connected, yet the psychological method alone is not adequate for the solution of ethical problems. Psychology, being a positive science, confines its study to the actual, while Ethics, as a normative science, has to do principally with the ideal. Mere

For an
adequate
explanation
of moral
facts, the
psychological
method must
be supple-
mented by the
metaphysical.

psychological inquiry may lead to the discovery of the ideal as it operates in our mind and the connected feelings and tendencies ; but whether the ideal is a creation of our own mind or it is justified by the real order of things can only be known by philosophical and metaphysical investigations. Psychology restricts its inquiry to the examination of the facts of personal consciousness, their mutual relations and order of development ; but this natural history procedure is not adequate, as we have seen, in Ethics. (*Vide* Chap. II, § 3.) Without philosophical and metaphysical investigations, Ethics is at most a poetry and a dream.

§ 4. Psychological Assumptions in Ethics.

Ethical inquiry may be subdivided into two main branches—the Psychology and the Metaphysics of Ethics. While the one mainly studies the facts of moral consciousness with a view to determine their laws and significance, the other principally directs its attention to such transcendent questions as the existence and attributes of God, the Foundation of Virtue, Future Life, the constitution of the Real World, and our relations to these. As the present work is confined to the Psychology of Ethics, it may not be out of place to briefly enumerate here the psychological principles assumed in it.

(1) The central fact of morality is the human personality. The conception of personality, no doubt, varies with different writers. Empiricists take it as but an aggregate of mental experiences—“a bundle or collection of different perceptions”

Ethics
divided
into two
branches :

(a) Psycho-
logy of Ethics

and (b) Meta-
physics of
Ethics.

This work is
psychologic-
al.

Psychological
assumptions :

(1) Person-
ality, not as
an aggregate
of impressions
and impulses,

(Hume), "a thread of consciousness" (Mill), "a reservoir of ideal ends" (Bain). Such a conception of personality, however, is inconsistent and absurd. Even the conception of a 'bundle,' a 'thread,' or a 'reservoir' implies the union of several factors held together by some bond. Such a bond, no doubt, is alleged by the supporters of this view to be supplied by the laws of association. But laws of association can combine materials only when mental energy has been expended on them. Without mental reaction, outward stimuli can never give rise to subjective impressions, to be spun into a continuous 'thread' by Association. The empiricists, in making an unlimited use of the laws of association, forget that they can never create anything new but can only *suggest* factors previously combined by mental activity. It is urged, no doubt, that if, in the material world, chemical laws can explain the production of a compound out of elements mixed together in certain proportions, why can the laws of association not similarly explain, in the mental world, the genesis of a new psychical product out of elements brought together by similarity, contiguity, or contrast? But the analogy, pushed to its legitimate issue, goes against the empiricists themselves. Is mere combination of elements in certain proportions, without any expenditure of energy, adequate to give rise to a chemical compound? If not, if chemical *action* is essential to such a result, then the expenditure of some energy—what may be called mental *action*—is no less necessary to give rise to a new idea

or combination of elements, supplied to the mind. Thus, neither impressions nor ideas, nor any combination of them can be produced without mental energy or activity. The true conception of a subjective experience is that it is a psychosis or mental process brought about by mental activity or expenditure of psychical energy. The essence of our personality is, that it is a repository of power or energy which renders an experience possible. "I cannot conceive," says Sidwick, "a feeling, thought or volition, as mine without conceiving it as referred to a permanent, identical self." (*Mind*, 1883, p 326.)

(2) The character of the mental energy is no less patent from a consideration of the facts of our mental life. We can never have any experience without discrimination and assimilation, which enable us to connect certain facts with others. Even in the case of feeling and volition, discrimination and assimilation are essential, as, without distinction and identification, we can never be specifically affected in any way, nor can we be moved to action in a definite direction. To connect or relate is thus the essence of our being, which is proved by the universal application of the law of relativity. Hence is it we find that Kant, Hegel, and other great thinkers are disposed to hold that synthesis, combination, or correlation is the characteristic of our intelligence, which constitutes our true nature: our reason is essentially of a synthetic or combining character. Without such a synthetic activity, the manifold impressions supplied by the senses would, at best, constitute an incoherent

but as an abiding energy, which is the ground of all experience.

(2) This energy is essentially rational and is synthetic in character.

mass: without relation or connection, the materials would be devoid of any meaning and would never be able to build up knowledge or experience in the proper sense of the term.

Reason or Intelligence, however, may be exercised in either of two ways: (1) There is the *intuitive* exercise of reason apprehending facts immediately present before the mind. And, as such facts may be either the *a priori* principles regulating experience or the *a posteriori* sensuous impressions which constitute, in the language of Kant, the 'matter' of knowledge, the intuitive reason may be either of the higher *a priori* form or of the lower *a posteriori* type. In the moral sphere, it thus apprehends either the first principles of morality, inherent in our nature, or the facts and relations which constitute no less important factors of our moral life. (2) There is the *discursive* exercise of intelligence which enables us to draw inferences from, and systematize, facts previously apprehended by intuitive reason. This distinction between the two forms of intellectual exercise is recognised by almost all great thinkers, ancient or modern. Plato and Aristotle admit it no less than Kant and Hegel. Aristotle, for example, maintains that Philosophy (*sophia*) is the expression of reason which involves both "Intuitive Reason, *nous*, the faculty which supplies first principles (*archai*), and Discursive Reason, *episteme*, which arrives at truth by reasoning from the principles supplied by *nous*." (Mayor's *Ancient Philosophy*, p. 112.)

Two forms
of rational
exercise:

(1) Intuitive

and (2) Discursive.

Intuitive Reason cannot err. Error is restricted to the sphere of Discursive Reason.

It should be remembered in this connection that the possibility of error is restricted only to the exercise of discursive reason, the declarations of intuitive reason being always perfectly reliable. There can be error only where there is inference. What is directly presented to the mind must be accepted as it is. If, for example, a jaundiced person perceives a white object as yellow, his impression must be accepted as valid so far as he is concerned; for, abnormally constituted as he is, the colour to him is yellow. If, similarly, an individual contends that he likes pain and dislikes pleasure or that honesty is wrong and dishonesty right, we cannot possibly refute him, as his position is a fundamental one. We may, no doubt, set our own experience against his; but if he be not convinced, we have nothing more to say to him, and we can in no other way disprove his position. It is otherwise, however, with inferential truths. We can prove or disprove them by the principles of consistency or inductive canons, which it is hard to resist.

(3) Consciousness, as the uniform condition of all experience, involves a knowledge of both subject and object.

Faith in consciousness is the basis of all philosophy.

(3) Consciousness is the uniform condition of all mental and moral experience. It expresses the relation of the subject, or mind knowing, to the object, or thing known, and reveals both with equal certainty and clearness. To deny either is to destroy the relation and extinguish consciousness, which is the only secure foundation of all thought and philosophy. "The testimony of Consciousness," says Calderwood, "cannot be denied without self-contradiction. He who doubts it relies on Conscious-

ness for the affirmation of his doubt." (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 6.)

The interrogation of Consciousness is the basis of all philosophy. Consciousness reveals at any time the permanent mind or ego and its phenomenal manifestation, which is but a means of its revelation. The mind, thinking or feeling or experiencing a passion or impulse, is thus a unitary ego undergoing a certain modification. In interpreting consciousness we should, however, be moved by genuine regard for truth and not by any bias or prejudice in favour of or against a theory. Sometimes things appear to be of a certain character because we are very much inclined to take them to be so. The influence of feeling and attention on consciousness is at times to conjure up ideas and notions which we are anxious to notice.

Interpretation of consciousness must be impartial.

In interpreting consciousness we should accept not merely what is immediately revealed to us but also what legitimately follows from it. Faith in the necessary implications of facts is as much rational as any confidence in them. Thus, if belief in the existence of God or an external world is warranted by the facts of consciousness, then to withhold our faith from it is indirectly to contradict consciousness. The conditions of valid psychological inquiry are thus laid down by Martineau: "(1) It not only assumes reflective self-knowledge to be possible, but gives it precedence, in ethical relations, over other knowledge, and proceeds thence into the scene

In interpreting consciousness, we should believe in its necessary implications.

Conditions of valid psychological method, according to Martineau.

around: and (2) it not only begins from the self-conscious man, as the better known, and treats the phenomena so found as genuine phenomena; but accepts also whatever those phenomena carry; and if they imply in their very nature certain objective assumptions, these reports, as contained within the known phenomena, it trusts as knowledge: in other words, it believes in the inner experiences not simply as appearances within us, but, where they offer testimony, as witnesses of realities without us." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 6.)

(4) The three mental faculties of Intellect, Feeling, and Will are but different exercises of one and the same mind.

(4) The modern threefold classification of mental powers or faculties into intellect, feeling and will, introduced by Tetens and emphasized by Kant, is generally accepted now-a-days by moralists and psychologists. The different faculties of the mind merely imply, however, different exercises of one and the same mind. We do not notice the faculties as independent entities lying in different chambers of of the soul. They are merely inferred from the essentially heterogeneous character of certain mental exercises. When we carefully examine the facts of consciousness we find that they are ultimately resolvable into three prominent classes, viz., (a) those which are characterized by the preponderance of assimilation, discrimination, and association; (b) those which are marked prominently by pleasure or pain; and (c) those which indicate dominant active tendencies in the shape of blind impulses or rational choice. Consciousness, which is the expression of the mind, is ultimately one involving the co-presence of all the

Consciousness is complex involving the

factors—cognitive, emotional, and volitional. Had all these factors been always combined in the same proportion, then it would never have been possible for us to discover their difference. But, as a matter of fact, we find that they are generally combined in varying proportions, revealing their distinctness. We find, for example, thought and moral judgment characterized by the prominence of assimilation and discrimination, though involving, to a less extent, elements of feeling and will in the shape of interest and attention. Similarly, the æsthetic or moral sentiment illustrates prominently the agreeable or disagreeable aspect of experience, though the intellectual elements of assimilation and discrimination as well as the volitional elements of attention and activity are also involved in a subordinate degree. Volition too illustrates the preponderance of the active factor in the shape of striving and choice, though the assimilation and discrimination of means and ends as well as elements of pleasure and pain are also present to a certain extent. Thus, when we characterize a certain mental exercise as intellectual, emotional, or volitional, all that we mean is that the predominant feature is so and that the elements of the other two are not wanting altogether. This is quite in keeping with the unitary conception of the self or ego, which can never be physically partitioned or absolutely separated into parts. If the self is essentially one, its characteristics must always be present, though in different degrees in different cases. A prominent exercise of the one excludes, for the time

exercise of all the faculties in varying degrees.

We classify the faculties by reference to their predominant features as compounds.

being, an equally intense exercise of the other faculties. It is not left to us to increase mental energy as a whole, though we can divert energy from one direction to another. When, therefore, the mind is exercised prominently in one direction, it means that it cannot be exercised to the same extent in other directions at the moment. Intense thought precludes violent feeling and energetic action at the time. Similarly, acute feeling is not compatible with calm thinking and vigorous action; nor does vigorous action permit then cool deliberation and intense feeling. Thus, we postulate the existence of different faculties to account for facts of consciousness characterized by different features. We classify the faculties according to their predominant features as compounds and not according to their separate natures as simples.

It is hardly necessary to mention, after the above account of mental faculties, that they are but diverse exercises of one and the same soul, revealed in different degrees and forms on different occasions. Thus, the conflict of impulses should not be thought as a trial of strength among different agents or entities nor should the restraining influence of Reason or Will be represented as an external control or check of one by another. One mood of mind precludes another of a distinct character, so that rational choice excludes impulsive action and the development of one inclination or propensity naturally affects another previously existing. We should never lose sight of the organic unity of mind as a rational synthetic

The opposition of faculties or tendencies is due to the inconsistency among the different exercises of one and the same mind, of which they are but the expression.

power, manifesting diverse tendencies according to circumstances and requirements.

It is apparent from the foregoing remarks that the three faculties are merely three names, adopted for scientific convenience, to express mental exercises characterized by essentially different features, such as assimilation, discrimination and association in the one case, pleasure or pain in another, and tendency to action, impulsive or reflective, in a third. Hence the old doctrine of faculties has recently given place to that of functions. And, no doubt, a proper conception of functions more clearly reveals, as shown above, the organic unity of mind than the mere acceptance of three distinct faculties.

A question has been raised as to which of the several mental functions is the most fundamental or primordial. Without entering into the controversy here, we may mention that it is generally accepted in all ages that the intellectual functions or rational faculties constitute the distinctive nature of man. And, if a question be still raised as to the relative priority of the several intellectual functions, it may be added that assimilation is usually regarded as the more primordial factor.* It should not,

Faculties
traced to
elementary
Functions

Intellectual
functions—
and among
them assim-
ilation—may
be regarded
as fundamen-
tal and pri-
mordial.

*According to Empedocles, friendship or harmony originally held together the four primitive elements of the universe, until strife or discord entered the *Sphairos* and broke up the unity. Aristotle observes that children at first call all male persons 'father' and all females 'mother', before making any distinction among them. The Hegelian dialectic, though maintaining that analysis and synthesis, disintegration and integration, are vitally connected with one another, also implies the original unity or harmony of 'Being' out of which 'Becoming' develops. And the law of this development or evolution, though involving both the factors, is essentially synthesis, co-

however, be supposed that it can ever operate alone, apart from the other factors. The alleged priority is rather abstract than concrete, imagined by reflection than realized in life. If it ever operated alone, in a rudimentary form, we have no recollection of it; and in our present consciousness we can never separate it altogether from the rest. "Human consciousness," as Mansel says, "in the only form in which it can be examined and described, is a compound of various elements, of whose separate action, if it ever existed, we retain no remembrance, and therefore no power of reproducing in thought. It is impossible to have a distinct conception of an act of pure sensation—i. e. of an affection of the organs of sense only, unaccompanied by reflection upon it; for such an affection, though possibly the earliest step in our mental development, could not at that time be recognised as such, nor leave traces that could be recognised afterwards. Our personal consciousness, like the air we breathe, comes to us as a compound; and we can no more be conscious of the actual presence of its several elements than we can inhale an atmosphere of pure azote. (*Metaphysics*, p. 51.)

(5) The course of mental evolution is from the simple to the complex, from the presentative to the representative.

(5) The general law of mental development is from the simple to the complex, from the actual to the ideal, from the presentative to the representative. It is illustrated in the intellectual, emotional, and

ordination or integration, without which the disintegrated elements fall asunder and remain disunited. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 6.) Compare also Spencer's Law of Evolution. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2.)

volitional sides of our nature, as well as in our moral life. In the department of intelligence, for example, the course of development is from perception to thought, through the intermediate stages of memory and imagination. Sensation, by itself, divorced from perception, is rather an ideal conception, formed by abstraction, than an actual experience in adult life. If sensation alone were possible, it would illustrate the operation of the fundamental intellectual functions on mere presentative factors, supplied by the senses. Perception, which is regarded as the starting point of cognition, illustrates the exercise of the functions on materials which are partly presentative and partly representative, and so more complex* than sensation, which is simply presentative. In the case of Memory, the functions are exercised on purely representative or ideal factors which, however, being merely revivals of past experience, are not so complex as those involved in Imagination. Again, in the case of Thought (including Conception, Judgment and Reasoning), the materials, on which the intellectual functions are exercised, are still more complex, involving abstract and general ideas. Thus, intellectual development from Perception to Imagination (Reproductive and Productive), and from Imagination

It is illustrated in Intellectual,

* We should distinguish between *logical* and *psychological complexity*. Logically, a percept, for example, is more complex than a concept, as the connotation, or the group of important attributes, of the former is greater than that of the latter. Psychologically, a concept, is more complex than a percept, as it is more difficult on the part of the mind to form a general notion by abstraction than merely to apprehend a concrete fact presented to it. Logic, we know, is concerned with mental *products*, while psychology, with mental *processes*.

Emotional,

Volitional,

and Moral
Develop-
ment.Personality
as rational
agency is the
basis of
morality.

to Thought, illustrates the general law of mental evolution from simplicity to complexity, from the actual to the ideal. Similarly, in the case of the Feelings, the course of development is from the presentative Sense-feelings, manifested very early in life, to the representative Emotions and abstract Sentiments (*Æsthetic, Intellectual and Moral.*) And, in the case of the Will, too, the development is from the early movements, performed for immediate gratification, to the later complex forms of activity, involving, more or less, deliberation, resolution, and choice. Thus the course of mental development on all sides is from the presentative to the representative, from the actual to the ideal. And, as we shall see in Chapter V, the course of moral development, involving cognitive, emotional and volitional factors, is quite analogous.

Thus, a careful psychological study reveals mind to be essentially a cognitive energy, having emotional susceptibilities and volitional tendencies. Feeling we may regard as a subjective barometer, indicating generally whether we are moving in a direction conducive to our being's end or away from it. The principle of self-conservation, regarded by Bain and Spencer as a fundamental law of our nature, has, therefore, a significance in our mental and moral constitution. (*Vide Chap. XVII.*) The subordinate place assigned by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel to feeling is quite in keeping with its function in our constitution: it is, as Aristotle says, but the passage from preception to desire. It constitutes

the zest of life and supplies urgency to our desires. Volition, as we shall see later on (*Vide* Chap. XX), is essentially rational or discriminative. Personality, then, as the centre of rational activity, is the basis of our mental and moral life; it involves, as Calderwood observes, "self-conscious being, self-regulated intelligence, and self-determined activity." (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 12.)

§ 5. **Ethics and Metaphysics.** The relation of Ethics to Metaphysics is very close. We can never estimate the true worth of the facts of our moral life without judging them by reference to the real constitution of things: to prove these facts as valid or to prove them as illusory equally involves an appeal to the true order of the universe. "The opinion which we entertain as to man's life as a whole and its relation to the universe at large," says D'Arcy, "must influence our practice of the art of life (i.e. our conduct), and consequently the view which we take of the science of conduct." (*Short Study of Ethics*, p. xxvii.) The division of the sciences, as we have said, is more or less arbitrary, adopted only for the sake of human convenience. Nature knows no limits which separate one of its departments from another. In fact, they run into one another, suggesting, as the modern doctrine of conservation of energy tends to show, that they are but different aspects of one reality. However much we may try to shut our eyes to this ultimate reality and relegate it to the sphere of the Unknowable, it abides and furnishes the final explanation of the uni-

Close connection of Ethics with Metaphysics. To adequately explain moral facts, an appeal to the real constitution of the world becomes necessary.

All Sciences
ultimately
lead to
Metaphysics.

verse, knowledge, and conduct. Hence we find great thinkers, who are not content with half-hearted or partial explanations, inevitably drawn to metaphysical inquiries in connection with the special subjects of their study. The mathematician, for example, though treating of quantitative relations alone, is thus not infrequently led to inquire into the real characters of space and time, which are the ultimate bases of his science and which fall properly within the province of metaphysics. Similarly, psychology leads to metaphysics. Though it is now generally the tendency to treat psychology as simply a positive science, concerned only with mental phenomena, yet to ignore altogether the vital principle or psychical energy, of which the phenomena are but the expression, is to deprive them of their very meaning and essence. Thus, Adamson rightly maintains that to separate mental processes from their context in mental life is to destroy their distinctive feature. (*Vide Mind, Old Series, Vol. IX, p. 435.*) Mental facts, as such, can never be presented in the fashion of objects: they are always facts *of mind*.

All the sciences are in the last resort intimately connected with metaphysics; but its connection with the normative sciences is still more close. As the normative sciences investigate the worth which should regulate our conduct, a determination of the true character of the worth or standard, by reference to the real constitution of the mind and the world, is of vital importance for the proper regulation of conduct.

The Normative Sciences, to be of real value, should be based on Metaphysics.

If the laws of logic, ethics, and æsthetics be not countenanced by the real constitution of the universe, then these sciences are to be regarded as altogether fictitious, if not mischievous. "When we ask", says Mackenzie, "what constitutes the value or active worth of human life we are soon led into the question of the essential nature of human personality and its place in the universe of actual existence. It is possible, no doubt, to proceed a certain length in Logic, Æsthetics, and Ethics without insisting upon an answer to the ultimate problems of ontology; but they all lead us on inevitably into these problems." (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 31.)

Empiricists and hedonists, as well as their later descendants the evolutionists, generally repudiate metaphysical inquiry which is regarded by them "as a barren region haunted by shadowy chimeras" (L. Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 447), or at most as a "rationalized myth." (Stewart, *Encyclo. Brit.*, XXVIII.) Admitting nothing else besides phenomena, which ultimately turn out to be but subjective dreams, the upholders of this view do not even inquire into their grounds, subjective or objective. We thus find Leslie Stephen contending that "metaphysical inquiry has no special relation to ethics and can only be forced into relation with it by ingenious sophistry." (*Ibid.*, p. 454.) But how can we properly interpret human life without knowing its capacities and its relations to the world and to the Creator. As Muirhead remarks, "No one could say that our ethical analysis of conscience will remain unaffected

Metaphysics is repudiated by empiricists and evolutionists.

But adequate explanation of moral facts necessitates metaphysical inquiry.

whether we believe with the Epicureans that the world is an accidental concourse of atoms or hold with the Stoics that it is the reflection of divine intelligence." (*Elements of Ethics*, p. 35.) Phenomenalists forget that phenomena without noumena are mere names devoid of any meaning: changes are always relative to something undergoing them. We may, no doubt, in the beginning of an inquiry, confine our attention to phenomena and their relations; but a thorough explanation must always carry us to an examination of the real constitution of the world. Hence we find that at the outset every science is more or less positive or descriptive: but as we proceed and try to discover the true character and significance of the facts under observation, it becomes more speculative and metaphysical. Metaphysics has often been regarded by 'scientific' men as a dream and "a leap in the dark"; but they forget that, without such a dream or leap, there could be no room for science itself. Science and metaphysics would equally be swept away from the field of human inquiry, if there be no room for hypothesis and speculation. The scientist should look well to the security of the branch on which he is sitting, when trying to lop off metaphysics on the ground of speculation. Thus, like other sciences, ethics at the outset is observational, while later on, it becomes speculative or metaphysical. It starts with an examination of the facts, revealed in personal consciousness and society, and then tries to discover their significance and conditions by reference to legitimate hypotheses.

Phenomena are intelligible only by reference to noumena.

Hypothesis is essential to both Science and Metaphysics.

Ethics though psychological at the outset, becomes metaphysical later on, to adequately explain moral facts.

Metaphysical enquiry thus supplements the psychological and sociological, to throw adequate light on the facts of our moral life. "Ethics has not merely to trace the origin, history, and connections of the judgments of worth; it must also investigate their validity. Their place in the moral consciousness and their influence on life depend upon their claim to validity or to authority, and this claim needs explanation and criticism." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XVII, p. 319.)

We may briefly mention in this connection the relation of Ethics to Philosophy. (1) When Philosophy is taken in the sense of Metaphysics or Ontology, the relation is what has been explained above. (2) When, however, Philosophy is taken in the mere positivistic sense of a comprehensive study of the entire group of phenomena, constituting what we call Nature, then also the relation is no less close. We can never adequately explain the moral facts, without a due consideration of the circumstances and relations connected with them. In fact, a narrow estimate of our environment and opportunities gives rise to contracted and even perverted moral notions and principles. The more accurate and comprehensive is our study of the universe, the better is our moral estimate. The progress of Physics, Botany, Physiology, and Astronomy, for example, by widening our mental horizon, has contributed materially towards more liberal and catholic views of morality. The narrow teleology of Paley regarded man as the centre of the universe, to whose wants and enjoy-

Relation of
Ethics to
Philosophy is
also close.

Philosophy as
a comprehensive
science of the uni-
verse enlarges
our mental
horizon and
elevates our
character.

ments everything else was considered as but a means. A broader view of Nature and a more accurate estimate of its parts reveal, however, that man has a place side by side with the other grades of life whose claims are no less sacred than his. Thus philosophy, by furnishing a broad estimate of the universe, enlarges and elevates our moral notions as well.

The positivistic conception of metaphysics, however, cannot be accepted as final. In spite of Comte's declaration that the metaphysical period of philosophic speculation is but an intermediate stage preparing the way for the positive (*Vide* Chap. X, § 13), metaphysics is always felt to be a necessity of human intelligence, constituted as it is. Whether, in metaphysical speculation, the human intellect is entangled in antinomies and contradictions, as mentioned by Kant, is to be carefully ascertained by an impartial estimate of facts. Does not Kant himself peep into the 'noumenal' world, when he declares that it is the cause of the phenomenal impressions, furnished to the mind? If 'causation' is but a category of the human intellect, a mere human mode of thought, applicable only to phenomena, how can it be applied to noumenon in conceiving it to be the source of 'the manifold of sense'? The 'unknowable' must be 'knowable' to a certain extent before anything can be said of it. Agnosticism involves gnosticism. Moreover, if the denial of metaphysics rests on the ground that inference plays a prominent part in it, then are not the existence of all science and the prosecution of all inquiry jeopardized on

Comte's
denial of
metaphysics
is untenable.

Positivism,
Criticism, and
Agnosticism,
as theories of
the universe,
must ultimately rest
on Meta-
physics.

exactly the same grounds. Phenomenalism, Positivism, Agnosticism and all other 'ism's can have no title to existence without valid inference and hypothesis. And, if these be allowed within the sphere of what is supposed to be merely phenomenal, why may not they have a place in the region warranted by it and without which it loses its meaning? To suppose the mind to be a gorgon, transforming everything before it into an idea or phenomenon, is not consistent with rational faith and is the basis of nihilism, which is a nonsensical doctrine. If, instead of isolating the mind from the rest of the universe and adopting the Kantian view of the 'forms' and 'categories,' we take these as true guides, and not merely as subjective tendencies, then a realistic and teleological interpretation of the world is the inevitable result, which harmonizes well with our rational expectations. The rejection of metaphysics involves the exclusion of all rational inquiry which should be the basis of science and philosophy alike. A distrust of our faculties in one sphere induces distrust also in other spheres and thus opens the door to universal scepticism, which is neither science nor philosophy.

In our account of the Moral Standards (Chapters IX—XII), we have tried to show that ethical systems have always a metaphysical basis. We have, therefore, generally given an account of the systems in their entirety, instead of in their partial aspect as exposition of mere moral facts.

§ 6. Ethics and Sociology. Sociology is a

Mental tendencies and laws correspond to the objective constitution of things.

Moral Standards and Theories have been explained in this work in close connection with their metaphysical conditions.

Sociology was not originally distinguished from Politics.

Politics aims at the regulation of society, while Sociogloy aims at explaining the constitution, laws, and development of social groups.

Mechanical conception of society has gradually given place to organic conception.

term originally coined by Comte to designate the Science of Society. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 13.) It treats of the laws and constitution of social organisms and the principles of their development. Though, before Comte, social phenomena were more or less carefully studied by several writers, such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, Montesquieu, and Adam Smith, yet Sociology as a science was not properly distinguished from Politics. Sociology studies the origin and relationship of social groups and traces the course of their development through modifications of customs and institutions. If Politics is concerned with the regulation, Sociology is concerned with the natural history, of social groups. Aided by archæological research and statistical investigations, it tries to show how the latest complex forms of social organizations have developed out of the primitive simpler forms of tribal existence. It thus tries to explain how the different classes, professions, and institutions of civilized communities have emerged out of the earlier savage and crude forms of social combinations, and how corresponding changes in customs and ceremonies, in moral and religious notions, have been brought about. It may be mentioned in this connection that, in the history of social science, a striking change has gradually been introduced in the conception of society. The mechanical conception of society advocated by Hobbes and Bentham (*Vide* Chaps. IX & X) has gradually been replaced by the biological and teleological conceptions of Spencer and Hegel. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2 and XII, § 6.) Society is no longer

regarded as a mere aggregate of individuals complete by themselves ; it is an 'organism' or 'tissue' vitally related to its parts—the individuals. Social fibres throb in the individual constitution which apart from them loses its character and meaning.

The relation of Ethics to Sociology is intimate. As Sidgwick observes, "We only know the individual man as a member of some society ; what we call his virtues are chiefly exhibited in his dealings with his fellows, and his most prominent pleasures are derived from intercourse with them ; thus it is a paradox to maintain that man's highest good is independent of his social relations, or of the constitution and condition of the community of which he forms a part." (Article on 'Ethics' in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th edition, Vol. VII, p. 574.) An understanding of the moral constitution of man necessarily leads us to consider his relation to society ; and the proper aim and meaning of society acquire a significance by reference to this moral constitution. As man is by nature a social being and endowed with moral attributes, it is not possible to separate the one aspect from the other. As Martineau says, "A man of the wood is no man at all ; he is potentially human, but not actually so" : without the social environment his moral nature is as much incapable of development as a piano placed at the bottom of the sea is incapable of producing music. (1) On the one hand, we find that the stage of social development is conditioned by the moral worth of the individuals ; their moral

Sociology is closely connected with Ethics. Human virtues are illustrated in society.

As human nature is essentially social, the moral and social problems are implicated in one another.

Moral worth of individuals determines social progress :

and the character of social environment influences individual moral constitution.

insight and culture necessarily affecting the progress of society. History shows that the elevation or depression of societies has always been in proportion to the depth and extent of the moral inspirations of individuals. (2) On the other hand, it is no less true that society in its turn reacts on the moral constitution of individuals. The degree of civilization materially influences our conceptions of the several virtues, for example, the heroic, the just, the truthful, the benevolent, etc. In savage life, for example, chivalry and courageous endurance of suffering are viewed as the highest virtues. A transition from a barbarous or semicivilized to a highly organized state transforms not merely the place of these virtues but the conception of justice as well. Justice is no longer left to the impassioned revenge of the wronged person (e. g., in duel), but to the passionless verdict of an impartial tribunal appointed by society. Similarly, as our culture enables us more and more to enter into the feelings of others, the range and intensity of benevolence increase.

Social evolution is intelligible by reference to an ideal supplied by Ethics.

Ethics as the science of morals is thus intimately connected with social science. While the latter, by the study of the actual, ascertains the laws governing society and aims at determining the course of its development; the former by presenting the ideal leads it onward and invests it with a new meaning and significance. While the evolution of law and government furnishes important data for ethical speculation, moral facts in their turn constitute

valuable materials for the serious consideration of sociologists. The true meaning of social evolution is found only in an ideal towards which it is tending. Sociology, as a study of the actual, becomes significant by reference to Ethics, which supplies the ideal. The march of events in any case indicates progress when interpreted with regard to an end, viewed as its goal. Social evolution, accordingly, implies an end or ideal which is furnished, not by the historical method of Sociology, but by the teleological method of Ethics.

Though Ethics and Sociology are thus closely connected, yet we should not overlook their difference. (1) Sociology merely reports the way in which society develops, but Ethics really supplies an ideal meaning to such development. The one is a positive science, while the other is a normative one. (2) The one primarily studies men collectively as constituting social groups, while the other considers them chiefly by reference to their moral constitution as revealed in personal consciousness. (3) The one examines the objective manifestation of mind in social products, while the other enquires into subjective processes as revealing a good or bad motive. (4) The one is generally of speculative interest, merely satisfying our curiosity about the constitution and development of society, while the other is of practical value as indicating the course in which individual and social activities *should be* directed. These distinctions are, however, overlooked by evolutionists, who regard Ethics as but a

Points of
Difference
between
Ethics and
Sociology :

(1) Sociology is a positive, while Ethics, a normative science.

(2) The one studies social groups, while the other, personal consciousness.

(3) The one examines social products, while the other, the motive.

(4) The one is ordinarily of speculative interest, while the other is of practical value.

Evolutionists regard Ethics

as but a
branch of
Sociology.

But the ideal
can never be
evolved out
of the actual.

branch of Sociology. The moral nature of man is viewed by these writers as but a product of social evolution, conditioned by natural selection and heredity. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2.) But, as we shall see (Chap XI, § 3), the ideal can by no means be evolved out of the actual. "We do not find our ideal in the facts; we judge them by it and try to put it into them. A thing is not good because we see it done; but we say that it is good because we see that it ought to be done. And we do not get a standard and measure of goodness from observation of the way in which events have happened or do happen, or from conjecture regarding the way in which they are about to happen." (*International Journal of Ethics* Vol. XVII, p. 323.)

Politics, as
the science of
Government,
aims at the
regulation of
human con-
duct for
human well-
being.

Political re-
gulation, to
be effective,
must be in
accordance
with moral
principles.

States have a
moral life.

§ 7. **Ethics and Politics.** Politics as the science of Government is concerned with the due regulation of human conduct for the promotion of human well-being. Political activity is but a form of social activity operating systematically and authoritatively. The legislature and the executive constitute the machinery by means of which human activity is controlled for general safety and welfare. But any control exercised, to be effective, must be in accord with our moral nature. Laws and institutions, not based on moral principles, can never endure long, for the most potent of all forces is the moral force of the world. "States, like individuals," observes Garner, "have moral natures, and in their multi-form relations and activities should consider them-

selves bound by the rules of the moral law, which is nothing more than the sum total of the doctrines of duty and virtue. In the course of their life they cannot safely ignore the ethical considerations which lie at the basis of all their obligations and responsibilities. Indeed, we are coming more and more to accept the view that the State rather than the church is the proper organ for the fulfilment of the moral ideas of mankind. In practice the most highly civilized States now act on this principle, and every good constitution aims to be the objective realization of the moral concensus of the nation." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XVII, p. 202.)

Ethics and Politics are thus very closely connected with each other. "In fact," says Sidgwick, "the term Ethics is sometimes used, even by modern writers, in a wide sense, so as to include at least a part of Politics—viz., the consideration of the ultimate end or Good of the state, and the general standard or criterion for determining the goodness or badness of political institutions. It is, however, also current in a narrower sense—equivalent to the qualified term "Private Ethics," which is sometimes preferred—as a study of the Good or Well-being of man, so far as this is attainable by the rational activity of individuals as such." (*History of Ethics*, pp. 2-3.) And, even in this narrow sense, the relation of Ethics to Politics is very close. Personal moral conviction affects our political ideals; and the end of politics is to promote common well-being, an important factor of which is the satis-

Politics is closely connected with Ethics, whether taken in its wide or narrow sense.

Ethics is the
supreme
science,
regulating
other sciences
which aim at
influencing
human
conduct.

Mac Iver.

faction of moral expectations. The wide sense of Ethics, mentioned by Sidgwick, is really derived from the narrow sense: the goodness or badness of political institutions is ultimately determined by our moral notions. As the moral standard is supreme, regulating all other standards brought in relation to it (*Vide* Chapter XIII), so Ethics, as dealing with the moral standard, is the highest science, regulating all other sciences which are calculated to influence human conduct. If the human constitution is complex, it brings man into different relations which form the subject-matter of different sciences. Thus there are domestic, social, political, and ecclesiastical relations, none of which can be judged in the abstract, divorced from the concrete moral nature of man. Conduct in any sphere must be under the controlling influence of morality. "Ethics," says Mac Iver, "recognizing the various claims made by the various societies upon men, should seek to determine, in the light of the single and chief end of man which these in different ways fulfil, the place of each in the life of conduct. There would thus be but one science of conduct, and whatever problems might arise would at least be recognized as within the limits of that science, as purely ethical problems. It is in fact as absurd for politics to set up absolute rules to decide what the citizen ought to do, as it is for economics to make absolute rules for 'economic man.' The citizen and the economic man so considered are abstractions. It is only the science of ethics which,

considering the whole nature of man, can or should determine how far the claims, valid *in abstracto*, on the citizen or economic unit, hold for the man who is an individual, a political, and a social being at once." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol XX, p. 76.)

The close connection of the two sciences has led certain writers to overlook their difference and to regard the one as but a corollary of the other. Two extreme views are thus held: (1) It is contended by some that Ethics is but a branch of Politics, the moral is but a form of the legal. Thus Hobbes and Bain explain the moral by the legal, the right by what is enforced. Political authority is regarded by the supporters of this view as also the source of moral authority. (*Vide* chap. IX, sects. 12 and 14.) But this view, as we shall see, is quite untenable. (*Vide* Chap. IX, sects 13 and 15.) (2) It is maintained by others that Politics is but the perfection of Ethics,* the legal is but the expression of the moral. Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel, for example, regard Politics as but a part of Ethics and try to explain political doctrines by moral principles alone. If Plato tried to realize the moral ideal in his ideal commonwealth, Hegel went to the extreme of regarding the State as but the objective realization of the Moral Principle. A State is thus conceived as

The close connection has led to the identification of the two sciences.

(1) Some deduce Ethics from Politics,

(2) while others deduce Politics from Ethics

* "Politics Aristotle regards not as a Science separate from Ethics; but as the completion and (almost) verification of it in a true philosophy of humanity." (Wallace's Aristotle, p. 111.)

essentially moral, instead of juridical in nature. But to merge the State in Morals, Politics in Ethics, is to miss the distinctive characters of both. Though, as we have seen, Ethics and Politics are closely connected, yet there are important differences between them. The points of difference are:—

Points of difference :

(1) Ethics investigates the good of the individual, while Politics, that of the community.

(1) The business of Ethics is to settle the ideal or the good of the individual, while that of Politics is to determine the ideal or the good of the community. A conception of the former would, no doubt, affect that of the latter. Man, as Aristotle observes, is a 'political animal'; and his moral notions naturally shape his political ideals. "The object of the political association is not merely a common life but noble action." (Aristotle, *Politics*, iii, 9.)

(2) The one considers the voluntary acts of individuals, while the other, the joint efforts of a community.

(2) While Ethics mainly confines its attention to the voluntary efforts of individuals, Politics chiefly considers what can be attained by the joint or united acts of the members of a community. The one studies men individually to determine the conditions of moral perfection, while the other studies men collectively to ascertain the conditions of general well-being.

(3) Ethics considers what is right, while Politics, what is right and expedient.

(3) Politics, while considering, like Ethics, what is right and proper, takes further into account the question of feasibility and expediency: all right acts are not equally enforceable, nor are all wrong acts equally punishable. Political insight "requires a deep knowledge of human nature and human necessities, and of the things which facilitate or

obstruct the various ends which are to be pursued by the mechanism of civil institutions." (Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.) In the political sphere men are guided, not by abstract theories of rightness, but by the concrete requirements of propriety and expediency. Massingham, in his twenty years' retrospect as a member of Parliament, observes, "Need I add that Parliament is no place for the idealist? It is the workshop of compromise, the temple within which men bow to the Expedient." (*The Statesman*, March 3, 1907.)

(4) Politics thus considers primarily the outward acts and their effects, while Ethics considers the inward springs (motives) and the intention. The one is rather objective, while the other, subjective, in its method or procedure.

(4) Ethics considers the motives, while Politics, the outward acts and their results.

(5) Politics aims at attaining its end by the employment of threats and punishments, while Ethics leaves the attainment of virtue to the free and willing obedience of individuals. If political laws lose their force without their attendant *sanctions* or penalties, moral laws are impaired by any association with these.

(5) Ethics attains its end by freedom, while Politics, by coercion.

(*Vide* Chap. XVIII.) To introduce a consideration of self-interest into a motive, is to detract from its moral excellence, while such a procedure is the only valid course open in politics that its laws may be observed. The State tries to regulate human conduct by restraining the passions and inclinations which are in conflict with general welfare. "Government," says Burke, "is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a

Burke.

No

right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but that even in the mass and body as well as in the individuals the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted, their will controlled, and their passions brought into subjection." (*The French Revolution.*)

Some maintain that Politics is concerned only with expediency and is so independent of Ethics.

Macchiavelli.

The preservation of the State is said to be the only duty of a sovereign.

If, as we have seen, the connection between Ethics and Politics has led certain writers to obliterate their distinction and finally to identify them, the difference between the two sciences has led others to sever them altogether and to repudiate any connection between them. The supporters of this view contend that Politics is governed by expediency alone and so it has nothing to do with Ethics. *Macchiavelli*, for example, denies that Politics has any connection with Ethics, and maintains that the political maxim always is, 'The end justifies the means.' The customary rules of morality, however binding on the common people, have, according to him, no authority over princes whose sole duty is 'the preservation of the State' at any cost. No State, he says, can possibly be governed by strict moral principles: "In as much as it needs a good man to re-organize the political life of a city, and a bad man to become by violence lord of a republic, it is therefore very rarely found that a good man will desire to acquire rule by bad means, even for a good end, or that a bad one, having acquired rule, will act justly or think of using

for good the authority he has won by evil." Fraud, falsehood, and violence are all eligible, according to Machiavelli, for the attainment of political ends: "You have to understand this," he observes, "that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all these things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in order to maintain the State, to act contrary to fidelity, friendship, humanity and religion."

We must remember, however, that the strength and safety of a State depend, not on arbitrary and vigorous rule, but on its moral basis. "The state," says Wundt, "is the supreme educator, the teacher of an intelligent and moral discharge of duty. In every sentence of the penal code there speaks the voice of an objective moral conscience; the norms of private law are urgent exhortations to the exercise of just dealing and the observance of contract; the laws aiming at the protection of the legal system itself bring home to every citizen his duty toward the community." (*Ethics*, Vol I, p. 277.) The fact is that the State and the Individual, Law and Morality, Politics and Ethics, are interconnected, and so act and react on each other. If the strength of a State rests to a great extent on the fidelity and honesty of the people, the security and prosperity of the people likewise depend on the vigour and integrity of the State. As Vishnusarma says—

“नरेशे जीवलोकोऽयं निमीलति निमीलति ।

उदेत्युदीयमाने च रवाविव सरोरुहम् ॥”

(*Hitopodesha*, *Bighraha*, 148).

But the security of a State rests on its moral basis.

The sovereign and the people are interdependent.

"The people are the lotus-leaves, their monarch
is the sun—

When he doth sink beneath the waves they
vanish every one.

When he doth rise they rise again with bud and
blossom rife,

To bask awhile in his warm smile, who is their
lord and life." (*Arnold's Translation*, p. 112.)

As Laws ultimately rest on Morality, so Politics, on Ethics.

All political questions, whether domestic or foreign, are ultimately moral problems.

Garner.

As laws reflect and modify morality, so politics is influenced by and in its turn influences ethical speculation. Though, however, there is this mutual influence, yet we find that Politics is determined more by Ethics than Ethics by Politics. The State may at most indirectly influence the morality of its people; but, in order that a State may live and thrive, it must have a moral basis which should regulate all its dealings, whether towards its own people or towards others. "The whole problem of government, both as regards its internal and external relations," says Garner, "is largely one of political ethics. The acquisition of new territorial domains, the desire for external power, the government of subject peoples, the regulation of immigration, the liquidation of public debts, the maintenance of monetary systems, the care of the poor, the treatment of bankrupts, the punishment of criminals, the protection of vested rights, the maintenance of the public health and safety, and many other governmental functions involve fundamental moral questions such as cannot be ignored if the Biblical truth that

righteousness exalteth a nation has any meaning. The maxim *salus populi suprema lex esto* [the welfare of the people is the highest law] has sometimes been interpreted as a justification for the sacrifice of moral principles to those of public expediency ; but it will rarely, if ever happen that the supposed law of political necessity will require the wanton disregard of conceded moral standards. The principle of justice no less than that of political expediency should be a rule of political life and the above maxim may well be interpreted in connection with another of scarcely less fundamental significance : *Fiat justitia pereat mundus*. [Let justice be done, even if the world be destroyed.]

"In its relations with other sovereign communities the State, no less than individuals, should be governed by the injunctions of the decalogue. The territorial expansion of the State, the extension of commercial advantages, the observance of treaty obligations, intervention in behalf of oppressed peoples and many other questions of international politics are at bottom also questions of international morality. Want of frankness and comity, the practice of deceit, bad faith and duplicity, disregard of international obligations are all moral vices no less reprehensible because committed by the State than by individuals. Thus the bases of all State action, whether viewed from the standpoint of domestic policy or international conduct, are the precepts of morality, which should serve as guiding principles. All the relations with which politics has to do,

says an acute writer, lie within the domain of ethics. Duty, loyalty, honesty, charity—these are the forces that underlie and support the State, that give to law its most effective sanction, that cross and modify the egoistic struggle for gain." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XVII, pp. 203-204.)

Ethics and Economics are closely connected.

The principles of Economics must have a moral basis.

§ 8. **Ethics and Economics.** Economics as the science of the production and distribution of wealth is also closely connected with Ethics. The human constitution, as we have said, is a complex whole influenced by various considerations, one of which is the love of gain. As, however, the moral nature is supreme in the human constitution (*Vide* Chap. XIII), economical considerations must be under the regulation of the moral. We never judge rectitude by gain, but we do judge gain by rectitude. "While economics," writes Sorley, "deals with actual processes (or, in some cases, hypothetical processes) and has no other interest than to understand the way in which wealth is as a matter of fact produced, distributed, and consumed, ethics is concerned with an ideal of worth or goodness, and its interest is to know what things are good and what evil, and amongst the former what their degree of goodness is. When ethical principles are applied to economic material we should be able to arrive at some results both as to the worth of the product—wealth—in comparison with other things which may have worth for man, and also as to the worth or moral quality of the various processes which, in different industrial orders, are involved in its production and distribu-

tion." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XVII, p. 320.)

The hedonist, however, is disposed to reduce Ethics to Economics, virtue to questions of profit and loss (*Vide* Chap. X). But even from the hedonistic point of view there is a difference between Ethics and Economics. The one investigates the *summum bonum* of man, while the other consults only what is conducive to his material prosperity. Unless, therefore, hedonism is maintained from the gross materialistic stand-point (*Vide* Chap. X, § 5), the difference between these sciences cannot be ignored. The main points of difference are:—(1) Economics is concerned with the actual, while Ethics with the ideal. The one studies facts as they are, with a view to understand the ways in which wealth is produced and distributed, and generalizes principles therefrom which may be employed to increase the material prosperity of individuals and nations. The other investigates the ideal by which we are to determine the propriety of conduct in any sphere—social, political, or economical. (2) Economics has to do with the material resources and prosperity of the people, while Ethics has to do with their spiritual resources and well-being. The one discusses principles which contribute to physical enjoyment and comfort, while the other inquires into the conditions of a truly virtuous and peaceful life. And if mental satisfaction or perfection be the goal of our being, then Economics, the science of the useful application of wealth, must be ancillary to Ethics, the

Hedonism tends to reduce Ethics to Economics; but even from this stand-point there is a difference between these sciences.

Difference between Ethics and Economics:

(1) Economics is a positive, while Ethics, a normative, science.

(2) Economics consults material prosperity, while Ethics, spiritual welfare.

(3) Economics encourages self-seeking, while Ethics, self-sacrifice.

science of the highest good, to which wealth may at most be but a means. (3) Economics fosters self-acquisition and self-gratification, while Ethics encourages self-renunciation and self-improvement. No amount of consideration for 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' without a conviction of 'duty', can hold the love of gain in due check. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 10.) And if the end of our life is not merely pleasure but perfection, then evidently Economics must be under the regulating influence of Ethics.

The rights of production and distribution of wealth ultimately rest on moral rights.

The dependence of Economics on Ethics is also patent from the fact that the rights of production and distribution of wealth themselves ultimately rest on a moral basis. The right to the rational exercise of one's powers entitles him to the fruits of his labour. Thus the rights to property ultimately rest on the moral rights of personality; and the rights of exchange and distribution are also derived from the same moral rights. One naturally has a right to dispose of what he has produced in a way approved by his conscience. Even the socialistic contention to equalize property and position rests on the moral rights of individuals. The love of gain, to be useful to the individual and the community, must be regulated not merely by considerations of expediency but also by the dictates of conscience.

Pedagogics is subject to Ethics.

§ 9. **Ethics and Pedagogics.** Pedagogics as the science and art of teaching as a profession comes also under the regulation of Ethics. Education is

not merely the imparting of information to a student, but also the due direction of his feelings and the proper moulding of his character. It aims at the healthy development of all our faculties—physical, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral. And it should not proceed merely by charts and books, but also by an appeal to Nature and circumstances. The greatest teachers of mankind have freely drawn materials from the fountains of Nature and Mind to instruct and elevate humanity. How often is the import of true education missed by simply referring to books and delivering lectures at regular intervals! "As if it were by universities and libraries and lecture-rooms, that man's Education, what we can call Education, were accomplished; solely, or mainly, by instilling the dead letter and record of other men's Force, that the living Force of a new man were to be awakened, enkindled and purified into victorious clearness!" (Carlyle, *Essays*, Vol. III, p. 161.) An educator should also be perfectly familiar with the laws of the human mind, so that he may employ his art with success. If, for example, the course of mental development is from the presentative to the representative, then the more concrete branches of study should first be taught before the more abstract sciences, and illustrations should freely be borrowed from common life to elucidate abstract principles. If, similarly, attention is a general condition of all mental development, then a teacher should know how to awaken interest and so to regulate attention in any sphere.

Education aims at the healthy development of all our faculties.

"Men must be taught as if you taught them not,
And things unknown proposed as things forgot."

(Pope.)

It is a difficult task, to be done with care and conscientiousness.

Carlyle.

Thus the task of an educator is indeed very difficult and responsible, as he is entrusted with the rearing of young minds—the hopes of families and nations. Even from the economic stand-point, the work of the teacher falls, as Mill observes, within highly 'productive labour.' A teacher should proceed, therefore, with care and consideration and should vary his art to suit the requirements of different cases. How light, but how imperfect, is the work made when it is regulated merely by routine and stereotyped system. Carlyle in his *Essay on the Signs of the Times* very aptly remarks, "Not the external and physical alone is now managed by machinery, but the internal and spiritual also. Here too nothing follows its spontaneous course, nothing is left to be accomplished by old, natural methods. Everything has its cunningly devised implements, its pre-established apparatus; it is not done by hand, but by machinery. Thus we have machines for Education: Lancastrian machines; Hamiltonian machines; monitors, maps and emblems. Instruction, that mysterious communing of Wisdom with Ignorance, is no longer an indefinable tentative process, requiring a study of individual aptitudes, and a perpetual variation of means and methods, to attain the same end; but a secure, universal, straightforward business, to be conducted in the gross, by proper mechanism, with such intellect as comes to hand." (*Essays*, Vol II, p. 101.) Educa-

tion, to be effective, must be characterized by devotion and have behind it the moral force of a personality: "The teacher, not only of morality but of literary or scientific subjects as well," observes Sir Gooroodass Banerjee, "must be a man of high character. For in order to be able to engage the serious attention of his pupils, which he must do to make his teaching effective, he should *command respect*; and he cannot do so without possessing a high character." (*A Few Thoughts on Education*, Second Ed., p. 158.)

Thus a true comprehension of Pedagogics as a science and art reveals only its intimate connection with Ethics. We must correctly understand what we are about and realize our responsibility, before we can expect to be even the minor followers of the profession. A sound education is the main source of peace, security, virtue, and happiness. "Educate or govern," says Ruskin, "they are one and the same word. Education does not mean teaching people to know what they do not know. It means teaching them to behave as they do not behave. And the true 'compulsory education' which the people now ask of you is not catechism, but drill. It is not teaching the youth of England the shapes of letters and the tricks of numbers; and then leaving them to turn their arithmetic to roguery, and their literature to lust. It is, on the contrary, training them into the perfect exercise and kingly continence of their bodies and souls. It is a painful, continual, and difficult work; to be done by kindness, by watching, by warning, by precept, and by praise,—but above all—by example." (*The Crown of Wild Olive*.)

Education should always have a moral basis.

Ruskin.

§ 10. **Ethics and Theology.** To understand the relation of Morals to Religion, of Ethics to Theology, we should have a definite notion of both. As we have already considered what Morality or Ethics implies, let us briefly notice here the meaning and characteristics of Religion and Theology. By *Religion* we are to understand, not this or that form of religion, but the essence of religion in general : it is thus not necessarily theistic, pantheistic, polytheistic, or positivistic ; but a form of feeling and activity controlled by our faith in a Supernatural Being or Beings. Religion involves, accordingly, cognitive, emotional, and volitional factors, and manifests itself in the form of faith in a Deity or Deities, more or less definitely conceived, revered, and worshipped with different degrees of energy, love and awe.

Religion
explained.

“ Religion ! what treasure untold
Resides in that heavenly word !
More precious than silver and gold,
Or all that this earth can afford.” (*Cowper.*)

“ Religion,” as Flint observes, “ is man’s belief in a Being or Beings, mightier than himself and inaccessible to his senses, but not indifferent to his sentiments and actions, with the feelings and practices which flow from such belief.” (*Theism*, p. 32.) *Theology* is the science of Religion. Theology may be either Natural or Revealed. *Natural Theology* investigates the grounds and contents of Natural Religion, *i. e.*, religion as it is determined simply by the light of nature ; while *Revealed Theology* is a

Theology
explained.

careful study of Revealed Religion, *i. e.*, religion as conditioned by a special or direct communication from the Divine Being. If Revealed Theology, examines the composition, genuineness, authenticity, text, and development of the Scriptures, with a view to determine the character and purity of a religious belief, Natural Theology analyses the facts of personal experience in order to discover their religious significance. The method of the one is mainly critical and historical, while that of the other chiefly psychological and metaphysical. In determining the relation of Ethics to Theology, we shall specially keep in view Natural Theology and Natural Religion.

In the ordinary life of an individual, morality and religion are so intimately connected with each other that they are with difficulty recognized as distinct. Morality influences religion; and religion in its turn affects morality. "Morality, law and religious worship," says Wundt, "are, in the first instance, inextricably commingled. Hence we find, almost universally, that legislation and the superintendence of public morals are originally priestly functions; and this outward unification of the various factors that go to make up the ethical and religious norms, their representation by one and the same individual, is in complete accordance with their confusion in the popular consciousness." (*Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 121.) But though concretely morality and religion generally go together, yet abstractly they are distinct. A man may be content

Religion and Morality, though closely connected, are yet distinct.

with the simple discharge of the duties of life without any hankering after the divine ; similarly an individual may go on performing religious rites and ceremonies with but little regard to morality. As a matter of fact, however, they are closely connected. Conscientious discharge of the duties of life usually involves faith in a Righteous Governor ; and religion also usually carries with it the obligation to do what is required by the Deity : a virtuous life is usually a pious life, and a truly pious life is usually a virtuous life.

Though, however, the relation is very close, yet it must be admitted that religion in an elevated form is usually conditioned by morals. Influence flows more palpably from morals to religion than from religion to morals. There have been forms of religion scarcely exerting any influence on morals. In Polytheism, for example, the gods are often regarded as :mere personifications of the different departments of Nature and are at times represented as moved by ignoble ends. Such a religion generally fails to awaken the moral instincts of mankind. Not so, however, if the initiative is taken by moral inspiration. Moral nature, carried to its final development, cannot but reveal the August Presence calling forth our religious sentiments : the consciousness of Duty inevitably leads to the discovery of a Righteous Source, who is the centre of our moral and religious aspirations alike. Religion has thus been defined by Matthew Arnold as "morality touched with emotion."

Morality influences Religion more than Religion, Morality.

It is no doubt true, some writers base moral distinctions on religion: religion, according to them, supplies the dynamics to moral action. Consistently with this position, it is maintained that the command of the Deity is the ultimate source of morality: His arbitrary will is the final standard of right. To know our duty, therefore, we must consult the will of God. Knowledge of God and His will, and fear and reverence for Him, thus underlie morality. This view, with certain modifications, is advocated by Duns Scotus, Occam, Descartes, Locke, and Paley. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 17.) To this view it may be replied that (1) the nature of right as well as of wrong is viewed by us as necessary and immutable. To suppose them to be reversible by God is practically to annihilate the distinction. The wrong or the bad is repugnant to His very nature. Every being must act according to his nature, and no power can produce the self-contradictory. It does not involve any limitation of the power of God to say that He must act according to His nature: the right is right because it is so, it is in harmony with His nature; it is not right because it is so willed by Him. (2) That the notion of right is intelligible by itself is evident from the fact that children at a very early age recognize moral distinctions, though failing to grasp the meaning of religious truth. "Childhood itself," as Martineau says, "is full of its moral enthusiasms and indignations, quick with its shame and compunction, bright with its self-approval." (*Study of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 21.) In

Some writers contend that Religion is the source of Morality:

the will of God is taken to be the moral standard.

This view is untenable:

(1) Moral distinctions are necessary and immutable; they ultimately rest on divine nature.

(2) Moral distinctions are self-evident; they are apprehended earlier than religious truths.

(3) If rectitude be but obedience to divine will, then virtue would merge in prudence.

fact, moral education pre-supposes a moral nature to which appeal is made. (3) If the will of God be the origin of morals, then the motive for virtue or the avoidance of sin would consist in the hope of reward or the fear of punishment. In that case, the difference between Prudence and Rectitude, Wisdom and Virtue, would disappear. (*Vide* Chapter IX, § 18 and Chapter XVI, § 6.) Moral distinctions would thus be unintelligible by themselves, and so our consciousness would be belied.

Morality improves and purifies religion.

Martineau.

Hence it would appear that religion is not necessarily the source of morality. A conception of God, not conditioned by morality, may include power and thought in His attributes. But such a conception, though entering into some forms of religion, would scarcely satisfy the cravings of the human mind. Not till we realize God as Holy do we come to the true type of religion. "Hence it is", says Martineau, "that Ethics must be treated before Religion: not that they are an absolute condition of its beginning: not that they always involve it as their end; but that they implicitly contain the resources whence Religion, in the higher form which alone we can practically care to test, derives its availing characteristics, its difficulties, and its glories." (*Study of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 19.) Thus morality, though independent of religion, affects it in an important way. A low or elevated moral tone degrades or exalts our religious belief. As human nature is more or less reflective, it cannot continue long in a state of

blind acquiescence. When we reflect on the proper grounds of religious belief, we find that they contain by pre-eminence elements of love and reverence and only in a subordinate degree elements of fear and awe. "Religious thought and feeling," say Calderwood, "rest on a rational basis, and are capable of being elevated and purified by application of our original belief to the guidance of our life, in harmony with personal obligation and responsibility." (*Moral Philosophy*, pp. 268-269.)

Calderwood.

We should remember, however, that though religion is not necessarily the source of morality, yet religious belief, when operating in the human mind, is not indifferent to its moral tendency. A low form of religion arrests the due development of our moral nature, while an elevated form facilitates its proper evolution. "While the form of religious consciousness," observes Wright, "is normally determined by the degree of moral development, occasionally their positions may be reversed and religion may serve to direct and determine the course of moral development. This occurs when a people, occupying a certain level of moral development, have brought to them, from the outside, a form of religion appropriate to a higher level. In such cases the religion may act as a potent force of moral uplift, drawing the native morality up to its own plane." (*International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XX, pp. 91-92.)

Religion, though independent of morality, modifies it when co-existing with it.

Thus morality and religion are really very closely connected with each other: morality may in fact be regarded as the practical expression of genuine

Thus Morality and Religion, Ethics and

Theology, are closely connected.

One inquiry inevitably leads to the other.

reverence ; and religion may likewise be viewed as the inevitable conviction of a virtuous life. The corresponding sciences of Ethics and Theology are, therefore, implicated in each other. An examination of the theoretical grounds of Morals brings us to Theology ; while an inquiry into the conditions of theological belief leads us to Ethics. Reflection on the natural and moral constitution of the universe begets faith in Providence, who is believed to be the source of all goodness, happiness, and perfection. It is well said in the Koran that "whoever knows himself acquires a knowledge of his Creator." Theology, in discussing the ways and attributes of Providence, has often to refer to Ethics ; and Ethics, in explaining the grounds of our moral consciousness, has not infrequently to fall back on Theology. Theology is really the legitimate metaphysics of a sound Moral Philosophy. Thus Theology and Ethics, Religion and Morality, help each other. "A noble conception of Divine economy," says Fowler, "is one of the surest guarantees of a virtuous life, as, on the other hand, an exalted morality is almost certain, sooner or later, to dissolve a corrupt theology." (*Principles of Morals*, Part I, p. 18.)

§ 11. **The Scope of this Work : Distribution of Topics.** Ethics, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. I, § 3), is concerned at the outset with an examination of the facts of our moral life with a view to discover their conditions and laws, while in its later development it becomes speculative inquiring into the ultimate sources and issues of such a life. Though

Ethical inquiry is divided into two branches :
1. Psychology of Ethics.

Ethics and Metaphysics are closely connected, yet, for convenience of treatment, ethical inquiry, as mentioned above (*Vide* § 4), is subdivided into two main branches, one being chiefly psychological and the other metaphysical. The Psychology of Ethics is mainly concerned with an analysis of the facts of moral consciousness and the discovery of their conditions and laws. The Metaphysics of Ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with an inquiry into the ultimate assumptions of moral facts, and discusses such questions as the Foundation of Virtue, Origin of Evil, and the Future State (*Vide* Chap. II, § 4). The present work is restricted to the Psychology of Ethics. Following the psychological division of mental faculties, the treatment is distributed under three heads—Cognitive (Book III), Emotive (Book IV), and Conative (Book V) Factors. As our moral constitution is also mental, it betrays on analysis the co-presence of all the factors which constitute the essence of our mental life. Thus there are moral judgments and sentiments and activities, all vitally connected together as elements of a single moral experience. Book I of this volume is Introductory, giving an account of the character, scope, and methods of Ethics and the relation which it bears to the allied sciences. Book II gives a General View of our moral constitution by explaining the character of the moral quality, the elements of moral consciousness, and the general course of moral development. Book VI finally tries to show how the elements and principles,

1. Psychology of Ethics.

2. Metaphysics of Ethics.

This volume is devoted to the Psychology of Ethics. It is divided into six Books:
 Book I.—Introductory.
 Book II.—General View.
 Book III.—Cognitive Factors.
 Book IV.—Emotive Factors.
 Book V.—Conative Factors.
 Book VI.—Concrete Moral Life.

explained in the prior Chapters, are illustrated in the Concrete Moral Life of an Individual. It aims at exhibiting synthetically what is established analytically in the previous Books.

BOOK II.

GENERAL VIEW.

CHAPTER IV.

MORAL QUALITY.

§ 1. **Character of Moral Quality.** The moral quality is *sui generis*: it is as simple as truth, or beauty, or pleasure. As Sidgwick remarks, "The notions of right and wrong, as peculiar to moral cognition, are *unique and unanalysable*." Being elementary, it can never be defined; and if one be not conscious of it, its existence can never be proved to him. The recognition of the quality being universal and necessary and self-evident, it may be regarded as immediately or intuitively known. Children very early in life betray the consciousness of this quality; they even resent a command which runs counter to their moral sentiment.

Moral quality is unique and elementary.

Opinions, however, vary with regard to the character of the moral quality. Some writers, disputing the truth of the above remarks, contend that the moral quality is derivative and not original: the right is viewed by them as but an aspect of the agreeable or the true or the beautiful. Thus the moral quality is resolved into some other experience—(1) sentient (namely, pleasure or pain), (2) intellectual (namely, truth or error), or (3) æsthetic (namely, beauty or deformity.)

Some writers regard the moral quality as derivative;

but this view
is untenable.

Consciousness
reveals that
the marks of
moral
quality are
not found in
any other
experience.

This reduction of the moral quality to a non-moral experience is, however, not justified by the facts of consciousness. The characteristics of moral consciousness—the recognition of obligation, the sense of responsibility, shame and remorse—can never be satisfactorily explained by reference to non-moral experience. Morality is essentially limited to the department of Will; but pleasure, truth, and beauty, and their opposites, have not any necessary connection with this department. Truth necessitates assent, pleasure attracts the mind, and beauty captivates the heart; but morality has a *claim upon* us. Duty implies an *objective authority* requiring us to act in a certain direction; but pleasure or truth or beauty does not imply such authority. The acceptance of truth, pleasure, or beauty may constitute prudence, but not virtue; and, similarly, the rejection of any one of them may amount to folly, but it can never be called a sin, unless viewed in its moral aspect. Pleasure, truth, and beauty, with their opposites, are consistent with a necessary constitution of the universe; but right or wrong implies free choice on the part of an agent (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 6). The feelings of approval and disapproval, merit and demerit, accordingly, can never be directed to pleasure or pain, truth or error, beauty or deformity. Thus the facts of moral experience admit of epithets which can never be applied to what is non-moral. Even Mill and Bain may be said to practically admit the truth of these remarks, when they declare that mere sentient experience

(pleasure) cannot account for duty: to explain it, Mill assumes differences of quality among pleasures, and Bain assumes external authority. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 14 and Chap. X, § 9.) Hence pleasure by itself is incompetent to explain the right. Truth or beauty, likewise, fails to manufacture what we call right. For these reasons it is clear that moral quality is not simply hedonistic, intellectual, or æsthetic quality, metamorphosed or disguised: the moral quality is simple and unique; it is *sui generis*.

If the *etymology* of a word be a guide to its original import, then the moral quality appears to be a simple and primitive fact. The word 'morals' comes from the Latin '*mores*', implying custom or habit. The word 'ethics' comes from the Greek *ethos*, implying also custom or habit. The Sanskrit word *dharma* (धर्मः) and the corresponding Hindi, Bengali, and Uriya derivatives similarly imply usage, custom, virtue. Thus moral or ethical is what is habitual or customary. Here two possible explanations may be given: (a) what we call moral is but the habitual or customary, so that the moral quality is derivative, being but the product of custom: or (b) custom or habit is but the expression of morality: the moral quality being original, it is the root or basis of custom. Of these two possible interpretations, the former (a) is evidently inadmissible on the following grounds:—

(1) Custom can never be regarded as a primitive datum giving rise to fixed dispositions or inclina-

Etymology of the terms 'moral' and 'ethical' supports the declaration of consciousness.

'Moral' or 'ethical' primarily means customary or habitual.

Custom is the expression and not

the source of
our
prevailing
tendencies.

tions; custom is but the expression of ruling propensities or desires, and desires or inclinations are not originally the outcome of custom: inclination gives rise to custom; custom does not create the primary inclinations.

Evil
practices,
though
customary or
habitual, are
never called
'moral.'

(2) Immoral customs or evil practices are never called moral, thus showing that mere customariness does not constitute morality; the moral is customary, but the customary is not necessarily moral.

For these reasons it appears that morality is a primitive fact on which custom or habit is ultimately based. The moral quality being simple and original is intuitively known. The necessary and universal acceptance of this quality as a self-evident fact gives rise to uniform practice according to it; and thus the moral becomes also the customary or habitual.

Use of the
Negative
Inductive
Method.

Moral quality
is not found
in inanimate
things,
nor in
natural
phenomena,

nor in mere
vital
processes.

Moral
quality,
though
connected
with human
nature, is not
found

§ 2. **Moral Quality inherent in Motives.** Let us employ the Negative Method to determine inductively the fact with which the moral quality is vitally connected. The moral quality is evidently not found in inanimate things, such as stars and planets, rocks, rivers, and plains. It is not found in natural phenomena, such as rain, sunshine, and hurricane. It is not found in mere vegetable or animal existence: we never praise or blame plants and animals for their growth and activities. It is, we find, essentially connected with human nature. But, if we examine the different sides of human nature, we find that all of them are not essential to moral quality. We never judge from the moral standpoint our feelings or passive experiences, such as

the pleasures of music, the pains of indigestion, or the sufferings due to accident. We never praise a piece of good news, nor condemn a loss incurred in the general course of events. The moral quality is thus connected with the active side of our nature. But when we examine the different forms of activity manifested in us, we find that the moral quality is really connected with what is voluntary. We never approve or disapprove of the reflex, spontaneous, and instinctive movements, such as winking, romping, and sucking. A voluntary act, again, has, as we shall see (*Vide* Chap. V, § 3), different elements, all of which are not essential to morality.

in mere feelings or passive experiences,

nor in non-voluntary movements.

The moral quality is found in impulses or motives : The inner springs of action, not the outer acts, nor their results, are the objects of moral criticism. But a spring of action by itself or operating alone possesses no moral quality. Its moral quality is revealed only in its relation to another competing impulse. Morality is limited to the sphere of voluntary action. There can, however, be no voluntary action, in the proper sense of the term, where the conditions of choice are not present ; and the conditions of choice are not present so long as two conflicting impulses as *simultaneous possibilities* are not present before the mind. As Martineau puts it, "Their moral valuation intuitively results from their *simultaneous appearance*." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 45.) Our moral estimates are always comparative, and imply an act of choice. A single impulse satisfies the requirement of a spontaneous action,

Moral quality is found in motives, involved in voluntary acts.

Voluntary action implies choice and so a conflict of impulses.

but not of choice or volition. "The moral quality," says Martineau, "which we get to know does not really belong to *each* object, but is inherent in the pair as a *dual* object; and not only could not be *cognized*, but would not *exist*, till they fell into combination." (*Ibid.*, p. 48.)

Moral quality must be either good or bad.

There is no indifferent moral quality.

When there is a conflict of impulses, we know one as the higher and the other as the lower. If we choose the higher, we act rightly; and if we choose the lower, we act wrongly. Thus the moral quality manifests itself either in the form of what we call right or in the form of what we call wrong; there is no such thing as *indifferent* moral quality. If an act is moral it must be either good or bad; there is no intermediate class of morally indifferent acts. The Stoics, no doubt, regarded health, honours, wealth, etc., as morally indifferent—*res mediae* or things lying between good and bad; but this is rather a classification of things than that of acts, (*Vide* Chap. XII, §2.) The contrast is interesting between this view and that of Aristotle according to whom virtue lies in the middle or mean, the extremes being bad. (*Vide* Chap. XII, §5.)

Forms of moral quality :

(i) Formal and material rightness : formal rightness is said to be connected with the

§ 3. **Forms of Moral Quality.** Distinctions have sometimes been drawn between different forms of rightness and wrongness; but such distinctions are not tenable in Ethics.

(i) The scholastic *distinction*, for example, *between formal and material goodness* in untenable in morals. An act, which is the outcome of a virtuous motive, is said to be formally good; while an

act, though not the outcome of such a motive, is said to be materially good, *if it be conducive to the well-being of others*. Hutcheson, for example, remarks, "An action is *materially* good when in fact it tends to the interest of the system, so far as we can judge of its tendency, or to the good of some part consistent with that of the system, whatever were the affections of the agent. An action is *formally* good when it flowed from good affection in a just proportion." Similarly Sidgwick writes, "An act is 'formally' right, if the agent in willing is moved by pure desire to fulfil duty or chooses duty for duty's sake; 'materially' right if he intends the right particular effects." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 206.) Since, however, the object of moral judgment is the motive (and not the effects of an action), an act, however beneficial in its results, can never be characterized as right, when the motive is not so. The so-called material rightness is no moral excellence at all.

motive, while material rightness, with the result.

Hutcheson.

Sidgwick.

But material rightness is not moral excellence.

(ii) Similarly, the *distinction between subjective and objective rightness*, as drawn by Sidgwick, is also untenable. Subjective rightness, he says, is determined by personal conviction; while objective rightness, by the actual felicific results. And he writes, "Conduct may be objectively wrong though subjectively right: and we continually judge conduct to be objectively wrong because it tends to cause pain and loss of happiness to others,—apart from any effect on the subjective rightness of their volitions." (*Methods of Ethics*, pp. 394-395.) The expressions 'subjective' and 'objective' rightness are both mis-

(ii) A similar distinction between subjective and objective rightness. Sidgwick.

This distinction is likewise objectionable.

leading. Rightness is never wholly subjective: it is not a matter of mere arbitrary opinion or conviction; it is the revelation in consciousness of the superior moral worth of one of two competing impulses. But for the presence of moral quality, there would be no moral estimate; and superior moral worth always carries with it authority or command, which is objective and not merely subjective. Again 'objective rightness' is also misleading. There is no rightness in an act *per se* or its result, apart from the motive of the agent. (*Vide* Chap. V, § 3.) In fact, the 'objective rightness' of Sidgwick, like the 'material goodness' of the schoolmen, is properly speaking outside the sphere of morality altogether: it is a question of wisdom or prudence, and not of virtue or honour. Sidgwick himself admits that "the moral sense of mankind regards the subjective rightness of an action as more important than the objective." (*Methods*, p. 208.)

Sidgwick's admission.

'Objective rightness' may have a meaning by reference to the providential regulation of events.

There is a sense, however, in which we may use the expression 'objective rightness.' When it is used to express the fitness of things and events as determined by divine justice and wisdom, it may indicate moral quality as revealed in His activity. Morality is essentially subjective in the sense that it has a meaning only by reference to the processes of a mind. And 'objective morality' becomes intelligible only by reference to subjective. Apart from mental determinations morality loses its import: mere objective processes or their results are as devoid of moral significance as the passage of a meteor in the sky or

the conversion of a desert into a fertile tract by earthquake. So far as objective morality is concerned, natural events are but means to the realization of the divine end; and in this respect even human agency is but an instrument in the hands of Providence. The divine purpose is realized through natural phenomena as well as through us. This does not mean, however, that there is no room for human freedom. Objective necessity, as we shall see, does not exclude subjective freedom. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 8.) The objective morality of Hegel and Vico implies providential regulation of events according to the principles of justice and benevolence. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 5 and Chap. XX, § 8.)

Hegel and
Vico.

§ 4. **Superior Claim of Moral Quality.** Moral quality belongs, as mentioned above, to *voluntary* acts and not to things, nor to mere passive experiences or spontaneous acts. The active side of our nature, coming under the regulation of will, may be divided into—(a) physical, (b) intellectual, and (c) moral. Acts which are purely physical (*e. g.*, jumping and running) or purely intellectual (*e. g.*, solving a problem or thinking of an absent friend) are devoid of moral quality; but even such acts may acquire a moral quality when they come within the moral sphere. For example, jumping over the breast of another to take away his life or planning the injury of another is not merely a physical or an intellectual act; it is moral and wrong. Our nature is complex, and hence no sharp demarcation line can be drawn between the different sides of our

In our complex constitution the claim of morality is supreme.

nature ; no impassable barrier can be erected absolutely separating them. But, in our complex constitution, the supremacy of the moral is patent: on the testimony of consciousness we know that the claims of our physical or intellectual nature must be subordinate to those of the moral. (*Vide* Chapter XIII.)

§ 5. **Terms expressing Moral Quality.** As to the words best fitted to express the moral quality or moral worth, illustrated in particular acts, there is a practical unanimity among modern writers in respect of the terms 'right' and 'wrong.' No doubt, 'good' and 'bad' have sometimes been employed to express moral quality ; but 'good' and 'bad' are generic terms implying anything which is eligible or obnoxious, whether moral or non-moral. If generic terms be substituted for specific ones, confusion is produced in language as well as in thought. The ambiguity of 'evil' is illustrated, for example, in Plato's *Gorgias*, when Socrates represents the doing of injustice as a greater evil and the enduring of it as a less. It may be mentioned here that Martineau prefers the expression 'moral worth' to 'right' and 'wrong'. "'Duty' and 'Right,'" he remarks, "are so habitually used of single problems and concrete cases, where there is *one good* course and *one bad*, that they represent prominently the *dual* antithesis of each separate moral experience, and do not easily lend themselves to the expression of the relative intensities of excellence through the whole system of ethical combinations of motive." (*Types*, II, p. 47.) Admitting the existence of degrees of right and

The terms 'right' and 'wrong' are generally preferred.

'Good' and 'bad' are too wide.

Martineau prefers 'moral worth' as admitting of degrees or grades of moral value.

degrees of wrong, Martineau designates moral quality as 'moral worth' which, likewise, admits of grades or degrees; and he arranges the impulses or springs of action, according to their relative value, in a scale of moral worth. We shall examine this position when we come to consider the Moral Standard. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 24) Hedonism also, estimating moral value by reference to consequences, admits degrees of moral worth corresponding to their amount or quantity (*Vide* Chap. X, § 4.) Reflection reveals, however, that the moral quality of an act is independent of its issue or result. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 7.) The alternatives of a moral problem are either rightness or wrongness, and not the different grades or degrees of either. The question of rightness in any case is not one of preponderance of benefits but of the eligibility of a course for intrinsic moral worth. "No; it is not *better*," says Carlyle "to do the one than the other; the one is to the other as life is to death,—as Heaven is to Hell. The one must in nowise be done, the other in nowise left undone. You shall not measure them; they are incommensurable: The one is death eternal to a man, the other is life eternal." (*Hero Worship*, Lecture II.)

It may be remarked in this connection that the word moral is used (i) in *Literature* in at least three different senses:—(1) In a wide sense, it indicates what is mental, as distinguished from the physical. For example, Burke says, "The last cause of this disobedient spirit in the colonies is hardly less powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral, but laid

Hedonism also admits degrees of moral worth

But moral quality must be either right or wrong, without any variation of degree.

(i) In *Literature* the term 'moral' is used in at least three senses:

(1) as equivalent to mental;

deep in the natural constitution of things." (*Speech on Conciliation with America.*)

Shakespeare, likewise, writes—

" Youth, thou bear'st thy father's face ;
Frank nature, rather curious than in haste,
Hath well composed thee. Thy father's *moral* parts
Mayst thou inherit too ! "

(*All's Well That Ends Well*, I, ii, 21-24.)

Connected with this sense, we have the expression 'moral certainty,' where 'moral' stands for what is probable, subjective or mental certainty being always weaker than the objective or physical.

(2) as standing either for right or wrong ;

(2) In a more limited sense the term implies the presence of moral quality ; it thus stands for what is either right or wrong, and is opposed to what is called 'non-moral' or 'un-moral' (*e.g.*, purely physical or intellectual.)

(3) as implying only what is right.

(3) In the narrow sense 'moral' signifies what is right or good ; in this sense 'moral' is opposed to 'immoral' or 'wrong.'

(ii) In *Ethics* it is used in the second of these senses.

(ii) In *Ethics* or *Moral Science*, the word is always used in the second sense mentioned above : it expresses the generic moral worth—good or bad—and not merely the specific quality of rectitude. The immoral is in a sense moral, since it expresses moral quality and thus comes within the moral sphere.

CHAPTER V.

MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

§ 1. Characteristics of Moral Consciousness.

Consciousness is the general condition of all mental exercise, and involves, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4), the relation of mind to an object. It implies the awareness of a state as a mode of the mind, affected in a definite way by an object. Moral consciousness is that special form of awareness which reveals the moral worth of acts and agents. The peculiarities of such consciousness are:—

(1) It is essentially authoritative in character. Whenever we recognise an act as right or wrong we at once realize that we *should* perform or avoid it. Whatever explanation may be given of obligation (*Vide* Chap. XIV, § 2), its conviction is inseparable from moral consciousness. We can never judge an act as right or wrong and think at the same time that it is indifferent whether we do it or not.

(2) Moral consciousness is chiefly active in character. We are aware of moral quality, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 2), only in actions and not in mere passive experiences. Moral consciousness involves volition or preference of one course of action to another. Whether the ground of such preference

Consciousness is the general condition of mental life.

It is authoritative in involving consciousness of duty or obligation.

It is active

is found in the mind or in external circumstances, we shall examine later on. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 6); but the fact is universally admitted that without active preference there is no room for moral estimate.

social,

(3) Moral consciousness is primarily social. The acts which we characterize as right or wrong, whether egoistic or altruistic, affect the interests of others, more or less: the motive of every good action generally includes a regard for the well-being of others. Moreover, an estimate of our duties usually involves a consideration of the relations in which we stand to others; our duties to parents are not the same as those to neighbours or servants. (*Vide* Chap. XIV, § 5.)

and
reflective,

(4) Moral consciousness is more or less reflective in character. The detection of the moral quality of an action involves comparison of the action with a standard and at times a careful estimate of the motive. Mere performance of acts, without reflection, never furnishes us with a knowledge of moral distinctions. "That which renders beings capable of moral government," says Butler, "is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert." (*Dissertation on Virtue*, p. 334.)

§ 2. Conditions of Moral Consciousness.

Consciousness, as mentioned above, always involves both subjective and objective elements. To perceive or imagine an object, for example, there must be the mental functions as well as the materials on which they are exercised. If either of these conditions be wanting, consciousness would not be possible. Moral consciousness, likewise, depends on (I) subjective and (II) objective conditions.

Consciousness involves subjective and objective elements.

I. *The Subjective Conditions are:—*

I. Subjective conditions: Volition.

(1) A voluntary action must be known to have been performed before there can be any moral estimate. If there be no voluntary action, there can be no occasion for moral consciousness.

(2) There must be a faculty apprehending moral truths or principles. An explicit knowledge of moral principles is not always necessary to moral estimate. Such an estimate is possible even when the principles operate implicitly. But there must be a faculty (Conscience) in us, spontaneously apprehending the principles, in order to render moral consciousness possible.

Conscience.

(3) There must also be the power of applying the principles to cases in order to determine their moral worth. We judge an act as right or wrong according as it is in or out of conformity with the standard known to us. There must, therefore, be an exercise of discursive reason, however prompt and spontaneous it may seem, which enables us to arrive at moral estimates in particular cases. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.)*

Understanding.

*Conscience is but Reason exercised in the moral sphere. (*Vide* Chapter VII). - We have generally employed the term

II. Objective conditions :

Circumstances.

II. *The Objective Conditions* embrace :—

(1) The circumstances which afford an opportunity for moral action. To help a beggar, to respect an elder, or to deprive another of his property, there must be an occasion for action. Abstract discussion of moral problems in the class-room, however useful it may be for theoretical knowledge and subsequent practice of morality, never excites moral consciousness at the time. Such discussion illustrates the representative, instead of the presentative, form of moral consciousness. If there be any presentative consciousness on such an occasion, it must be by reference to our acts or conduct, relative to circumstances, and not merely by reference to reflective analysis. Circumstances give rise to impulses and these lead to an exercise of will which constitutes, as we have seen, the proper object of moral judgment.

'Reason' to indicate the *a priori*, and 'Understanding,' the *a posteriori*, use of our Intelligence. Some writers, no doubt, credit 'Understanding' also with the power of discovering the *a priori* notions or categories. Kant, for example, attributes to 'Reason' a higher function, as supplying the supreme 'Ideas' of Soul, World, and God, which enable us finally to unify all experience; and he attributes to 'Understanding' also the intuitive function of supplying the 'categories' which enable us to form a synthesis of the materials supplied by Sense. But Reason and Understanding, thus distinguished, have essentially the same end, viz., the synthesis and interpretation of experience by means of *a priori* notions or principles: the synthesis in the one case is final, while in the other, provisional. "Pure Reason," says Kant, "does not in its Ideas point to particular objects, which lie beyond the field of experience, but only requires completeness of the use of the understanding in the system of experience. But this completeness can be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions and of objects." (Proleg., § 44, p. 100.) It is better, therefore, to restrict the term 'Reason' to the intuitive exercise, and 'Understanding' to the discursive exercise of our Intelligence.

(2) The relations in which we stand to others, by determining our duties, contribute to our moral consciousness. As already mentioned, our consciousness of the moral quality of an action is always based on an estimate of the relations in which we stand to others. The relations, no doubt, may be included in circumstances, interpreted in a wide sense. But there is a difference between the relations, which enable us to determine what our duty is in any case, and the external circumstances which render the duty still more precise in its scope and mode of execution. Relations.

(3) Reference to an objective standard is also involved in moral consciousness. There are, no doubt, writers who allege that subjective feeling, in the form of pleasure or pain, supplies such a standard. (*Vide* Chap. X.) But, even among the supporters of such a view, it is generally admitted that common well-being or social enforcement, which is something objective and not subjective, is the standard of rectitude. If, therefore, we ignore the extreme forms of the subjective standard represented in the Cyrenaic and the Charvaka system, which are practically no ethical systems at all (*Vide* Chap. X, § 7), we find that an appeal to an objective standard is universally admitted to be a mark of moral consciousness. Standard.

When we take together these subjective and objective conditions of our moral life, we find that its essence lies in the due regulation of the several propensities roused in us by circumstances. Moral virtue, as Aristotle points out, is acquired by Moral consciousness is due to the rational regulation of impulses.

practice, i. e., by the control exercised by Reason or Conscience over the irrational part of our nature, the passions and inclinations. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 5.) Will, which exercises choice over its materials, the impulses, is, as we shall see, essentially rational. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 2.) Moral consciousness is excited by voluntary acts, because they always involve rational regulation. If choice is exercised in a direction approved by Reason (Conscience), the act is regarded as right; while if choice is made in a direction condemned by Reason (Conscience), the act is viewed as wrong. Choice in either case is exercised *with* reason, though it may not be *according to* reason.

Moral consciousness involves cognitive, emotional, and volitional factors.

§ 3. **Contents of Moral Consciousness.** Moral consciousness is the consciousness of moral quality with the concomitants essential to it. Like every other concrete state of mind, it betrays on analysis the presence of (I) cognitive, (II) emotional, and (III) active or conative factors. Let us then try to form an estimate of the contents of moral consciousness by reference to all that are involved in these constituents.

I. The cognitive factor includes—

I. *The Cognitive Factor.* The cognitive factor includes the knowledge of moral distinctions and all that is implied in this. When analysed it reveals the presence of the following elements:—

(1) Knowledge of moral quality, i.e., the moral judgment.

(1) The apprehension of *moral quality* which is the basis of *moral judgment*. As explained in the last Chapter, this moral quality is unique and unanalysable, and cannot, consistently with the facts

of consciousness, be regarded as a modification of some other experience—sentient, intellectual, or æsthetic. The moral quality is a simple fact universally admitted; it cannot but be recognised when it is present.

(2) We judge *persons* and not things or outward objects. Objects, however agreeable or disagreeable, fail to satisfy the conditions of moral judgment. We never applaud the rain which blesses creation with nutriment, vigour, and happiness, nor do we condemn the drought which brings inanition, decay, and misery. Such phenomena have, no doubt, often been regarded as visitations on men for their moral experiences; but, by themselves, they are wholly characterless. Do we ever praise sweets because they are agreeable, and blame what is bitter because it is disagreeable?

(2) We judge persons and not things.

(3) We judge *acts* and not passive experiences. The smell of a violet, the agreeable experience of warmth in winter, or the pain of toothache can never be said to have any moral quality.

(3) We judge acts and not passive experiences.

(4) The acts which constitute the objects of moral judgment must be *voluntary* and not spontaneous. An act which is the outcome of a single impulse can never be characterized as right or wrong. The act, for example, of a somnambulist, of a mad man, or of one under the sway of a governing impulse is devoid of moral quality. To the presence of moral quality a conflict of impulses is essential: without such conflict, there is no choice; without choice, there is no moral character.

(4) Voluntary acts, involving conflict of impulses, are the objects of moral judgment.

(5) We judge motives and not outward acts nor their results.

(5) Outward acts, however, are not the objects of moral judgment; we really judge the *motives or impulses or rather the inward choice or decision*. Voluntary action ordinarily includes—(a) motive, (b) overt act, and (c) result; and the logical Method of Difference shows, as indicated above, that moral quality is connected with the first (namely, motive) and not with the other two: keep the first, and the moral quality is preserved, though the other two factors be absent or they vary; but take away or modify the first, and the moral character likewise disappears or changes, though the rest may remain unaltered. As Martineau says, "The moment which completes the mental antecedents touches the character with a clearer purity or a fresh stain; nor can any hindrance, by simply stopping execution, wipe out the light or shade: else would guilt return to innocence by being frustrated, and goodness go for nothing when it strives in vain." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 26.)

(6) Consciousness of obligation.

(6) *Consciousness of Obligation* or sense of *Duty*. To recognize an act as right is at the same time to own it as morally binding or obligatory. The moral law, as described by Kant, is categorical and imperative: there is no meaning in "right", unless it involves the "ought".

(7) Recognition of moral rights.

(7) The recognition of moral *Rights*. Duties and Rights are correlatives, being but different aspects or expressions of one and the same fact.

(8) Reference to a Standard either as

(8) *Consciousness of Obligation* and *Right* involves reference to a *Standard* conceived as—

(i) a *Law or Laws* of morality enjoining certain lines of conduct, or (a) Law

(ii) an *End or Ideal* viewed as (a) *Perfection*, or as (b) *End* or (b) *Pleasure*, or (c) *Happiness*, which should be the goal of a moral agent.

(9) The recognition of *Merit* or *Demerit* in an agent. Whenever we pronounce an act as right or wrong, we are led also to praise or blame the agent for his conduct. (9) Recognition of merit or demerit.

(10) The admission of *Virtues* as the principal forms in which moral excellence or good character manifests itself. (10) Admission of Virtues.

(11) Consciousness of *Responsibility*. To recognize obligation is to admit an authority which imposes it and holds us responsible or accountable for its performance. (11) Consciousness of responsibility.

II. *The Emotional Factor*. The Emotional Factor includes the moral sentiments of approbation, disapprobation, compunction, shame, etc. Our constitution is such that every exercise has an accompaniment of characteristic sensibility. When any moral act is performed, a moral judgment is passed upon it; and the judgment is invariably accompanied by a feeling of well-done or ill-done. It may be mentioned in this connection that the moral sentiments are entirely dependent upon moral judgments. If a judgment be incorrect the accompanying sentiment must be misleading. II. The emotional factor includes the moral sentiments.

III. *The Active or Conative Factor*. This factor of moral consciousness includes (a) the impulses or III. The active factor includes (a) the

impulses and
(b) volition
or choice.

springs of action as well as (b) the act of *choice* from among them.

(a) Without the impulses there would be no incentives to action, and hence no room for morality. The impulses may be arranged psychologically by reference to their points of similarity or dissimilarity as mental phenomena; and they have also been classified by some (for example, Martineau) ethically, by reference to their relative moral rank or worth. It is to be remembered in this connection that judgments, moral or prudential, with their accompanying sentiments become also important impulses to action.

(b) Choice, as explained above, is essential to volition. Without it there is no moral character.

An adequate
account of
moral con-
sciousness in-
volves a refer-
ence to the
Moral
Faculty
and the prob-
lem of
Freedom of
Will.

It may be mentioned here that a satisfactory explanation of moral consciousness involves an inquiry into the nature and function of the *Moral Faculty or Conscience*, as well as an examination of the psychological and metaphysical grounds of our moral life. Moral Philosophy inquires into the character of Conscience—whether, for example, it is an original faculty intuitively recognizing moral principles or it is a derivative power which is the outcome of experience and education. An inquiry into the psychological conditions of our moral nature necessitates a solution of the problem of *Freedom of Will*; and an examination of the metaphysical grounds leads us to inquire whether the moral principles are countenanced by the real constitution of things or not.

§ 4. The Development of Moral Consciousness.

The development of moral consciousness is explained differently by (I) Empiricists and (II) Intuitionists.

I. Empiricists try to evolve the moral consciousness out of unmoral experience. They show how the child, originally destitute of moral ideas, comes to have them as the outcome of education and training: the social environment, acting upon the egoistic and ego-altruistic dispositions of an individual, gives rise to his moral nature. Without entering here into this question in detail, which will be taken up in Chapters VII and XVII, it may be remarked that, on grounds already set forth in the last chapter, such a development is not countenanced by the facts of consciousness.

I Empiricists try to evolve moral consciousness out of non-moral experience.

But the attempt fails.

II. The development of moral consciousness may at first sight seem to be inconsistent with the Intuitionist Theory of Morals: if the knowledge of moral quality is original, it might be supposed that such knowledge is perfect from the very beginning of life, thus precluding any necessity of development. It should, however, be remembered that there is a difference between an innate idea and its consciousness; an *à priori* idea may lie dormant in the mind unless and until culture and circumstances draw it out; and there must be different degrees of development of an innate idea corresponding to the different grades of culture and complexity of circumstances. That this is not a mere idle speculation, but a fact, is borne out by the development of the other sides of our nature. Our instinctive propensions and passions and

II. Intuitionists maintain that the latent moral nature gradually unfolds itself with the multiplication of experience.

This is proved by the gradual development of instinctive tendencies.

Moral consciousness presupposes some development of intelligence and the presentation of appropriate circumstances.

Experience is a condition but not the sole cause of mental and moral development.

The Course of Moral Development :

affections do not all develop at once. Their development is conditional on (a) the requirements of our life, and (b) the presence of suitable circumstances fitted to call them forth. The development of anger, for example, implies the apprehension of provocation, and the development of sympathy, the concurrent development of imagination ; conjugal love does not appear until puberty, and reverence cannot develop without the development of thought and moral nature. Similarly, moral consciousness, though original, can develop only (a) when the mind is capable of grasping it and (b) when appropriate circumstances are presented.

It is no doubt customary with the writers of the Empirical School to say that if experience be necessary to develop a fact, it may as well create it. But the remark is evidently wide of the mark : it is not correct to say that, because something is a 'condition' of an effect, it is therefore to be regarded as its sole 'cause.' Soil, for example, is essential to the development of a tree ; can it be said, therefore, that soil alone is the cause of a tree ? Bain asks— "May not the exactness, the purity, the certainty of an innate principle be impaired by its alliance with the inferior elements of actual sensation ?" (*Mental Science*, p. 186.) But sarcasm is not criticism.

It is apparent, therefore, that though moral consciousness is original, yet it admits of development. *The Course of its Development* may be traced thus :—

(1) In infancy or babyhood there is evidently no indication of the recognition of moral quality. It is not the time of action, in the full sense of the term ; it is the time for organic and mental growth—the growth of body in strength and size, and the growth of mind in knowledge. Infancy is but a life of sensibility and spontaneity : impressions are received, and reflex and random movements, performed. These, however, constitute valuable materials for the future development or manifestation of the higher faculties. Until conflict of impulses is felt, there is no room for choice, and so no room for morality. Thus in infancy the moral faculty lies dormant. "It should be noted," says Stout, "that what is congenital in the human being does not necessarily appear in the new-born infant. The nervous system of the new-born infant is very far from being fully grown. Much comes to it by mere physiological growth as distinguished from learning by experience." (*Manual of Psychology*, p. 378, footnote.)

(1) In infancy moral consciousness lies dormant.

(2) (a) When a child understands a conflict of impulses, it is in a position to distinguish between human acts and natural events ; and the child may now be said to be on the threshold of moral consciousness. It is no doubt true, a child is at times disposed to characterize even natural phenomena as good or bad, virtuous or vicious ; but this is apparently due to a confusion of the two kinds of phenomena (human and natural). That this is the case is evident from the fact that motives are

(2) The first stage of moral development is marked by the appearance of volition : human acts are distinguished from natural events.

attributed to the natural agencies praised or blamed

(b) In this stage a voluntary act is judged in its entirety, as a concrete whole, with but an implicit reference to motive.

(b) It is to be remembered in this connection that, owing to the absence of adequate reflective power and the earlier development of the perceptive faculty, the child is as yet unable to analytically separate the several elements of a moral act, namely, motive, overt action, and result. This, however, does not support Professor Sidgwick's position "that in the normal development of man's moral consciousness, both in the individual and in the race, moral judgments are first passed on outward acts, and that motives do not come to be considered till later." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 366.) Rather, the entire act is considered as a unit and judged as right or wrong. But, nevertheless, there is an implicit consciousness that motive is essential to morality. As Martineau says, a child or a savage "does not, and need not, analyse the case; but that he is differently affected when nothing but the motive impulse is changed, analyses it for us, and betrays where the moral differentia lies." (*Types*, II, pp. 56-57.)

(c) A child at this stage is influenced to a great extent by its environment.

(c) It is further to be noted here that, in this stage, the imitative impulse being strong and the reflective power weak, the child would be influenced more by what others praise or blame than by what is discovered by personal insight and reflection.

"As polished steel receives a stain

From drops at random flung,

So does the child, when words profane

Drop from the parent's tongue." (*Byron*)

Such a tendency should not be construed to imply

that the child learns the meaning of right or wrong from others. That the light is really in us from the beginning is evidenced by the fact that a child readily admits the true moral quality of an act, when dissociated from extraneous considerations, and that all the weight of authority, the charm of allurements, and the ties of affection are necessary to keep down the primitive light and give a false view of the act. In the first stage of moral development, then, a child judges *concrete* acts as right or wrong.

3. (a) As the reflective power develops, the boy or girl gets behind acts and finds rules or laws by reference to which the acts are judged. But, for reasons indicated above, positive law is not yet distinguished from moral law ; nor custom, from reason ; and such a confusion is easy when there is no conflict between them. A certain development of intelligence is needed to break through the films of habit and discover the rationale of practice.

(b) It is to be borne in mind in this connection that, at this stage, a boy or girl begins to *discover* that the presence of motive is essential to morality. This knowledge is implicit at first ; and it gradually becomes explicit as doubtful instances are examined and decided.

4. (a) The third stage of moral development is reached when laws or rules are traced to principles ; customs, to their ultimate grounds. The principles, which, by spontaneous and implicit operation, previously entered into our moral estimates, are now explicitly discovered by reflective analysis.

(3) The second stage is reached when rules are discovered as justifying moral acts ; positive law is, however, not yet distinguished from moral.

(b) Motive is now suspected to be essential to morality.

(4) Adequate moral development implies a clear apprehension of (a) moral principles

and (b)
motives as
essential
conditions of
morality.

(b) Motive is now clearly recognized as the proper object of moral judgment; and moral law is thus distinguished from positive law. Free choice among the impulses is clearly seen as the *sine qua non* of morality, and moral laws are viewed as universally valid. The laws, which, in an earlier stage of development, might have been regarded as accidental or peculiar to a community, are now understood as applicable to all persons alike.

Moral
progress is
from the
concrete to
the abstract,
from the
accidental to
the universal.


Thus the development of moral consciousness implies that, while the recognition of motive, choice, or the moral standard is vague and implicit in the earlier stages, it is explicit later on. As Dr. Bosanquet says, the development is from "Moral Ideas" to "Ideas about Morality," from an implicit knowledge of moral quality to an explicit grasp of moral principles. Like the general course of mental development, it is a progress from the presentative to the representative, from the concrete to the abstract, from the relative to the absolute, from the accidental to the universal; but it is a progress in the sense of revelation, not in the sense of creation. It is to be distinctly remembered, however, that the above stages indicate normal moral development. The course of development runs smooth when the films of custom and practice give way before the growing vision of reason, and the acquired strength of character leads an individual onward in the path of progress. When, on the contrary, for perversity of will, the allurements of circumstances, or the inertia of habit, an individual

Moral
development
varies with
the variation
of its 'condi-
tions.'

deflects from the right track, the development of his moral nature is retarded or arrested.

Before concluding this section, let us briefly refer to the circumstances which bring about a variation in moral development in different cases. The factors which determine mental evolution determine also moral development. The factors which contribute to mental development may be indicated thus :—

Factors of mental and moral development.



Thus the mental development of an individual is determined partly by his natural tendencies and aptitudes and partly by the influence of natural and social surroundings. The natural endowment includes the fundamental functions of intellect, feeling, and will, as well as the instinctive tendencies to self-preservation and continuance of the race. These are inherent in the human constitution from the very beginning, in order that it may be duly adjusted to

Original and inherited tendencies affect mental and moral development.

its surroundings, which is a condition of its continuance and happiness. If we take into account the influence of heredity, we find also in the later generations of mankind certain inherited tendencies to think, feel, and act in ways conducive to their well-being. But whether we believe or not in heredity, the presence of original tendencies and natural differences is admitted on all hands. All children are not equally intelligent, benevolent, or mindful of their duty. Bain, for example, observes with regard to retentiveness, "All the facts show that constitutions differ as to power of Adhesiveness, under exactly the same circumstances. In every class of learners, on every subject, there are the greatest inequalities. This Natural Adhesiveness usually shows itself in special departments—aptitude for languages, for science, for music, etc.; but it also shows itself in a more general form, or as applied to things generally. Hence part of it may be attributed to an endowment of the system, as a whole; while part depends on local endowments, as, for example, the musical ear." (*Mental Science*, p. 88.) And, if mind and body are intimately connected, we must suppose that, corresponding to original physiological differences, there are also primitive psychical dispositions.

The influence of surroundings on our mental and moral development is also very great. The influence, for example, of the natural environment is no less patent in the case of the Lake Poets than in the case of the hardy Highlanders or the hunting Esqui-

Bain's
admission.

Natural and
Social sur-
roundings
also affect
such develop-
ment.

maux. And the influence of society on mental and moral development is also evident from the difference we notice between civilized and uncivilized races or communities. Society may exercise its influence either intentionally through instruction or unintentionally through example and the imitative impulse. The latter influence of society, though often subtle, is more potent. Our conduct is often moulded more in harmony with examples than with precepts. As the intellectual atmosphere in any case exercises a wholesome or baneful influence on the intellectual progress of individuals, so the moral atmosphere furthers or retards their moral progress. Thus we have what is called the *Ethos* of a people, which represents the moral atmosphere as determined to a certain extent by definite rules and to a certain extent by current moral opinions, sentiments, and practices. Such an *Ethos* may, no doubt, be interpreted from the Hegelian standpoint as an expression of the Ethical Principle at work in the universe. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 6.) But we must remember that it is often modified by the tastes and inclinations of individuals, not merely guided by moral considerations. The moral atmosphere of a community may be purified or vitiated by individual efforts*; and so we see that the *Ethos* is not stationary but

The *Ethos* or moral atmosphere.

* The example of a Socrates, for instance, is elevating, while that of an Aristippus is degrading. Smith in his *History of France* writes of Philip, Duke of Orleans: "The new Regent, Philip Duke of Orleans, had married one of the illegitimate daughters of Louis XIV. He possessed superior abilities, eager ambition, great personal courage, and a warm, amiable, generous

changing. Generally, no doubt, the *Ethos* helps the development of our moral nature and leads to moral progress ; but at times when the moral tone is low, it may repress or pervert moral development.*. The moral development of an individual may thus be furthered or retarded by personal efforts as well as by the influence of natural and social surroundings. In fact, any variation in any of the factors indicated above affects the moral development of an individual. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 3 and § 5.)

Moral consciousness is regulative.

§ 5. Importance of Moral Consciousness.

The importance of moral consciousness lies in the supreme place of our moral nature as distinguished from the other sides of our constitution. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 4 and Chap. XIII.) Human constitution is a complex structure involving several factors, each of which may seek its own satisfaction to the exclusion of the rest. Thus the passions, the desires, the affections and the sentiments may all urge us to act in different directions for their own gratifica-

temper ; but at the same time he was totally destitute of religious and moral principle, and his habits of life were shamelessly dissolute. His example had a most pernicious and deplorable effect upon the tone of society in France." (P. 466.)

* The moral atmosphere, for example, of Imperial Rome, of France under the Regency, or of England at the time of the Restoration was corrupt and so it exercised an injurious influence on the moral development of individuals. Adam Smith writes, "Fashion too will sometimes give reputation to a certain degree of disorder, and, on the contrary, discountenance qualities which deserve esteem. In the reign of Charles II a degree of licentiousness was deemed the characteristic of a liberal education. It was connected, according to the notions of those times, with generosity, sincerity, magnanimity, loyalty, and proved that the person who acted in this manner, was a gentleman, and not a puritan." (*Moral Sentiments*, Part V, Chap. 2, p. 237.) See Lecky's *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 333.

tion. It is, however, not possible for us to act simultaneously in all these directions; nor is it consonant with our happiness to act now according to some and now according to another of these without any regard to consistency or harmony. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 1.) We find, accordingly, provision made in our moral nature for preserving the unity of our constitution. The supremacy of conscience (*Vide* Chap. VII, § 5.) implies that all other sides of our nature must be subject to its regulation, so that when an individual goes against it he loses the peace of his mind.

"Trust me, no tortures which the poets feign
Can match the fierce, th' unutterable pain
He feels, who, night and day devoid of rest,
Carries his own accuser, in his breast."

(Juvenal, Gifford.)

Thus our moral consciousness enables us to preserve the harmony of our constitution, which otherwise would be disturbed by the conflict of different ends and tendencies. So long as Conscience tightly holds the reins, the mental chariot has a chance of running on a smooth track. If, however, the unruly horses—the passions and inclinations—be once allowed to have their way, they would dash the chariot against the warning-posts of Nature and break it to pieces.

The moral constitution promotes the well-being of the individual as well as that of the community: it is the basis not only of inner but also of outer harmony. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 6 and § 7.) Our entire life is a compromise or adjustment of

Moral consciousness reflects the requirements of Nature and so promotes general well-being.

different interests and tendencies ; and the essence of moral life is due adjustment. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 5.) Under the regulation of Reason or Conscience all the natural tendencies of our nature have their legitimate spheres of activity. Self-love and Benevolence, Passions and Affections, Interest and Honour may, therefore, all be gratified consistently with the requirements of our moral nature, which thus secures the good of the individual and of the universe alike. Self-love, for example, when duly controlled, promotes at once individual and general interests. We can well see in this principle a wise economy at work : the burden and responsibility of individuals are distributed and lightened by its operation, when it is modified by conscience and softened by affection. It is when self-love transgresses its legitimate limits and encroaches upon the rightful interests of others that it prepares the way for selfishness, which brings about its own ruin in attempting to injure others. And in such a case, however much a propensity may secure temporal interests for a while, it can never bring peace and happiness.

“Not all the glory, all the praise,
That decks the hero's prosperous days,
The shout of men, the laurel crown,
The pealing anthems of renown,
May conscience' dreadful sentence drown.”

(Mrs. Holford).

It preserves
the purity
and harmony
of our nature.

Our moral consciousness thus always aims at
preserving the purity and integrity of our nature.

BOOK III.

COGNITIVE ELEMENTS.

CHAPTER VI.

MORAL JUDGMENT.

§ 1. **Object of Moral Judgment.** It has been already explained in the last chapter that moral judgments are directed to *personal acts*. As Mackenzie says, "The moral judgment is not properly passed upon a *thing done*, but upon a *person doing*." (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 135.) We have seen that the real object of moral judgment is the motive or the inward decision and not the outward act, nor the result. "The morality of an action," says Dr. Johnson, "depends on the motive from which we act. If I fling half-a-crown to a beggar with intention to break his head, and he picks it up and buys victuals with it, the physical effect is good, but, with respect to me, the action is very wrong." Similarly, if a competent surgeon, to the best of his belief and judgment, performs an operation to cure a patient, and the patient dies, the act of the surgeon is to be judged as right and not wrong.

The object
moral
judgment is
the motive.

§ 2. **Nature and Method of Moral Judgment.** The consciousness of the moral quality of an act involves careful discrimination and assimilation in a prominent form ; and hence such consciousness is of

Moral judg-
ment is
inferential.

the character of intellectual exercise and not of sensibility. Passive experience of impressions can never contribute to the mind a knowledge of the moral quality of an act. Examination further reveals that such knowledge is not of the character of Perception, but of the character of Judgment. Perception may simply give us a knowledge of the performance of an action ; but a knowledge of its moral quality involves comparison of the act with a standard, and this implies judgment. As Calderwood says, "Perception itself includes only such facts as are capable of being known by simple observation. Thus, perception gives knowledge of an extended surface, but not of its measure ; knowledge of a signal, but not of its meaning ; knowledge of an action, but not of its moral character. Knowledge of the measure of a surface, of the meaning of a signal, and of the character of an action, are examples of knowledge requiring the application of a standard, whether the standard be universal or adventitious." (*Moral Philosophy*, pp 38-39.) The recognition of the moral quality of an act may, therefore, be explained thus—

- (1) Perception of an act performed ;
- (2) Recognition of the first principles of morality which constitute the standard of right ;
- (3) Comparison of the act with the standard and the consequent judgment that the act is in conformity or out of conformity with it. "The moral judgment," as Mackenzie observes, "is not simply of the nature of what is called a judgment in Logic. It is

It involves the application of a standard to a particular case.

not merely a judgment *about*, but a judgment *upon*. It does not merely state the nature of some object, but compares it with a standard, and by means of this standard pronounces it to be good or evil, right or wrong. This is what is meant in saying that the moral point of view is normative." (*Ethics*, p. 127.) Thus the moral judgment is not intuitive but inferential. It is not, however, to be surmised from this that the recognition of moral quality is a generalization from experience. If the first principles of morality be *a priori*, they provide for an intuitive apprehension of the moral quality. Every moral judgment, according to Aristotle, is "a practical syllogism in which a general principle of morality forms the major premise, while the particular application is the minor." (Wallace's *Aristotle*, p. 106.)

Aristotle's
moral syllo-
gism.

The above account of moral judgment seems to be inconsistent with the view of Bradley, who holds that "moral judgments are not discursive", but "intuitive." (*Ethical Studies*, p. 176.) Beneath this verbal difference, however, there is an identity of meaning. Bradley interprets "*intuition*" as the opposite of "*reasoning*" or "*explicit inferring*." (P. 175.) And it is, no doubt, true that our ordinary moral judgments do not explicitly involve inference; but nevertheless an inference is always present. In ordinary experience we have an implicit knowledge of principles, which we readily apply to cases to determine their significance; and this truth is illustrated in the moral as well as in the unmoral

Bradley's
account.

sphere. It is thus that we estimate distance in visual perception ; determine an issue in the social, domestic, and political affairs, or judge the moral quality of an act. It is only in difficult cases that we bring the principles before our mental gaze to ascertain the validity of our estimates. "In practical morality", says Bradley, "we *may* reflect on our principles, but I think it is not too much to say that we *never* do so, except where we have come upon a difficulty of particular application." (P. 176.) Implicit knowledge alone is sufficient for the discharge of the common duties of life ; explicit knowledge being due to philosophic reflection and essential to science. Thus moral principles are always involved in moral judgments ; but they are present *in* the mind in simple cases, while *before* the mind in complex cases or in reflective examination.

It is apparent from the foregoing account of moral judgment that it is not always a sure clue to the true moral quality of an act ; for, if the principles of morality be incorrectly applied to the cases which we are to judge, then the resulting moral judgments must necessarily be erroneous. It is further clear from this that the moral judgment, like other judgments, is characterized by intellectual quality, and not by moral quality. It is either valid or fallacious, correct or incorrect. It may indicate a blunder, but not a sin—unless we wilfully and dishonestly distort a moral judgment by making a wrong application of a moral principle. In the latter case, *viz.*, when, to delude ourselves or others, a wrong judgment is

Implicit
of moral
principles
is sufficient
for ordinary
moral
judgment.

Moral
judgment
is not
necessarily
correct.

It is charac-
terized by
intellectual
quality alone,

unless there
is a perva-
d moral
judgment.

formed to suit our inclination, the moral judgment is really a moral act, instead of a mere judgment. Moral judgments, therefore, are as such devoid of moral quality and are marked by the logical character alone.

§ 3. **Postulates of Moral Judgment.** The preceding remarks make it plain that every moral judgment presupposes the following factors:—

Postulates of moral judgment :

(1) Volition

(1) There must be a voluntary action ; and the essence of such action, as we shall see (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 2), is self-determination. We never praise or blame an individual for what he is constrained to do : we hold him accountable only for what is due to his choice—what he might not have done. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 6.)

(2) There must be an apprehensive faculty in us giving us a knowledge of the circumstances as well as of the standard by reference to which we determine our duty in any case. Thus Reason, both in the form of Conscience and Understanding, is implied in all moral estimates. (*Vide* Chap V, § 2.)

(2) Reason : Conscience and Understanding.

(3) There must be a standard connected with higher authority which renders the performance of right, and the avoidance of wrong, action obligatory. Without the admission of an objective standard moral judgment loses its meaning and importance. (*Vide* Chap. XIV, § 3.)

(3) Moral Standard.

(4) There must be an agent or personality capable of apprehending moral principles and relations and of acting according to such knowledge. If personality be dissolved in 'a series of feelings', then with it the essence of morality would disappear. What meaning

(4) Personality.

can there be in obligation when there is no real agent capable of acting either according or contrary to it? Moreover, the very conception of a mental state involves reference to an agent, manifesting itself in this form. (*Vide* Chap III. § 4.)

Moral
judgment is
not essential
to moral
quality;

§ 4. **Relation of Moral Judgment to Moral Quality.** It may be mentioned here that though the moral quality of an act is known to us through a moral judgment, yet such a judgment is not essential to the presence of moral quality. An act is in or out of conformity with the moral standard, whether we think it to be so or not. A moral problem implies, no doubt, that there is a conflict between two impulses which reveal their relative moral worth; but the attention of an agent may not be directed to the moral aspect of the problem at all: the moral quality is there; but it may be only implicitly present and hence not apprehended by the agent. When, for example, an individual is prompted by self-interest and benevolence, he may dwell on the possibilities of good to himself or to others, without thinking at the time of the relative moral values of the two courses of action; and, in such a case, his choice would determine the moral quality of his action, 'though he knew it not.'

but moral
judgment
when present
affects moral
quality.

It is to be noted also that though a moral judgment is not essential to the moral quality of an act, yet when such a judgment is present, it is not indifferent to the moral quality. A judgment implies a belief; and if there is the belief that an act is wrong then the motive for its performance is

illegitimate ; and hence the act performed must be wrong, however beneficial its results may be. As Descartes says, "The most just actions become unjust, if those who do them think they are such." If, on the other hand, there is the belief that an act is right, which is really not so (being out of harmony with the moral standard), the act performed is to be viewed as wrong, for misplaced belief is no security for wrong-doing. Thus, when a moral judgment precedes the performance of an act, the act is to be regarded as wrong, if there be discrepancy between its moral character and the moral estimate.

This account of the relation of moral judgment to moral quality is at variance with the view of Kant, who regards reverence for moral law as the sole legitimate motive for a virtuous action. "Virtue," he writes, "is not merely a self-constraint (for that might be an effort of one inclination to constrain another), but is also a constraint according to a principle of inward freedom, and therefore by the mere idea of duty, according to its formal law." (Abbott's Translation of *Practical Reason*, p. 305.) Thus, according to Kant, moral judgment is essential to moral excellence ; and without such a judgment there can be no moral excellence at all : an act performed from any other motive than reverence (which involves a moral verdict) being strictly speaking not virtuous. As Kant observes, "The agreement of an action with the law of duty is its *legality* ; that of the maxim with the law is its *morality*. *Maxim* is the *subjective* principle of action, which

According to Kant moral judgment is essential to moral quality.

the subject makes a rule to itself (viz., how he chooses to act)." (Abbott, p. 282.) It must be admitted, however, that Kant advocates a degree of rigorism which would annul many genuine virtues of human life. Under pressure of such a rigorism one might naturally exclaim with Schiller—

"Willing serve I my friends all, but do it, alas,
[with affection ;
And so gnaws me my heart that I'm not
[virtuous yet."

But then
many noble
virtues would
be excluded.

Sidgwick's
testimony.

(*Vide* Chap. IX, § 20 and § 21.) An act is right when the moral conditions are satisfied ; and the subjective estimate is not one of these conditions. Sidgwick remarks, "It is not, I conceive, commonly held to be indispensable, in order to constitute an act completely right, that a belief that it is right should be actually present in the agent's mind : it might be completely right, although the agent never actually raised the question of its rightness or wrongness." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 207.) And he adds, "It seems that some kinds of virtuous acts may be done so entirely without deliberation that no moral judgment was passed on them by the agent. This might be the case, for instance, with an act of heroic courage prompted by an impulse of sympathy with a fellow-creature in sudden peril. But it is, I conceive, clearly necessary that such an act should not be even vaguely thought to be bad." (*Ibid.*, p. 225.)

Wilful sup-
pression of
judgment is,
however,
wrong.

It is to be remembered, however, in this connection that any wilful suppression of moral judgment, with a view to give an aspect of naturalness

to a moral act and thus to justify it, is inconsistent with sincerity, which is the essence of moral life. Such an attempt is but an excuse for wrong-doing and is quite analogous to perverted moral judgments to be considered later on. Like the perversion of these judgments, their suppression is really a moral act characterized by insincerity and turpitude.

§ 5. **Ideal Moral Judgment.** In the majority of instances, the path of duty is clear, though not smooth; and hence it is not very difficult to arrive at a correct moral judgment. The *Moral Nautical Almanac*, of which Mill speaks, no doubt enables men to guide their lives in simple cases by reference to its records. As Mill says, "All rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong, as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 36.) It is to be remembered, however, that the *Moral Almanac*, like every almanac, is based upon facts: its generalizations are but *discoveries* of the requirements of our *moral nature*.

Ordinarily moral judgments are readily formed.

Moral Nautical Almanac.

If the path of duty seem to be difficult in many cases, it is rather because it is difficult to follow it than because it is difficult to discover it. Perplexities in determining the right course are sometimes self-created: the pleadings of hostile inclinations often tempt the mind to imagine difficulties when really there are none.

Difficulty in many cases lies rather in the execution than in the determination of duty.

“ And puzzled, blinded thus, we lose
 Distinctions that are plain and few :
 These find I graven on my heart :
 That tells me what to do.”

(Wordsworth, *Rob Roy's Grave*.)

In some cases, however, problems of duty are really complex, which necessitate a careful examination of circumstances before moral estimates are arrived at. In such cases it is incumbent upon us to coolly and carefully weigh the *pros* and *cons* before forming a judgment. As rational beings we are under an obligation to cultivate our intelligence and to examine a situation with due care, patience, and discrimination. Any *wilful* haste or negligence in this direction implies the possibility of an error which may be avoided and which may bring us guilt and shame. Thus impulsive acts are not always excusable, because many so-called impulsive acts are really voluntary. Led by a strong inclination one may turn his attention away from the other side of the question, and thus he may commit a wrong for which he seeks to discover an excuse: transgression is thus construed as compulsion.

When it is said that, in comparatively difficult cases, moral judgments should be formed after due care and deliberation, it is not meant that the deliberative process should be prolonged beyond measure. For the discharge of the common duties of life, we should be neither too hasty nor too slow in our judgments. As haste may become an excuse for ‘commission’ so dilatoriness may become an excuse

In difficult cases moral judgments should be formed after due care and deliberation ;

but the deliberative process should not be unduly prolonged.

for 'omission'*: we may pause and reflect and analyse and calculate until the energy is dissipated and the opportunity, gone. As Shakespeare says—

".....The native hue of resolution

Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought."

(*Hamlet*, III, i.)

A virtuous course of action may thus finally be abandoned or modified to suit one's inclination. Janet very rightly remarks, "From a practical point of view, it is not well to indulge in too much reasoning. An over-subtle analysis of moral difficulties, a too curious investigation into the *pros* and *cons*, is more apt to obscure the conscience than to enlighten it. The latent sophistries of passion and personal interest will be able to conceal themselves under the apparent impartiality of a too greatly prolonged examination: and reason, while thinking that it is pleading the cause of wisdom, is often the unconscious advocate of our hidden weaknesses. Another danger, too often resulting from deliberation in moral affairs, is the discouragement of the will, leaving it in suspense between the two sides of the question, incapable of choosing either one or the other. Doubtless one should do all in his power to avoid acting under a mistake; but still, there is a rule superior to this, which is, that one must act." (*Theory of Morals*, p. 268.)

Janet's
testimony.

* Sin is described in the *Mahanirvana Tantra* as of two sorts:

अनुष्ठानं निषिद्धस्य त्यागो विहित कर्मणः ॥ १४ ॥

"Doing what is forbidden or improper and omitting what is enjoined or proper." 14.

Perverse moral judgments are really moral acts and are doubly wrong.

The chief source of perversity is the inclinations.

§ 6. **Perverse Moral Judgments.** Perverse moral judgments, as described above, should be distinguished from merely incorrect ones. The former are really moral acts and may be characterized as doubly wrong: in the first instance the acts, which are justified by such judgments, are wrong; and secondly, the perverted judgments are additional acts of self-deception for which also we are responsible. "Self-deception," as Carlyle says, "once yielded to, *all* other deceptions follow naturally more and more." (*Hero Worship*, Lecture V.) A seemingly innocent act may thus involve a double guilt. It is also apparent from the previous remarks that the main source of error or perversity is to be found in the influence of contending impulses or dispositions. That this is really the case is evident from the fact that the possibility of error is greater with regard to the future than with regard to the past. When we are inclined to do something, then all the charms of passion—

"Like a stately ship
Of Tarsus, bound for the isles
Of Javan or Gadire,
With all her bravery on, and tackle trim,
Sails fitted, and streamers waving,
Courtied by all the winds that hold them play"
(Milton, *Samson Agonistes*)

—fascinate us, and thus distort our vision and lead us astray. But when an act has been performed, the passions are laid to rest, thereby enabling us to see things in their true light. This truth is illus-

trated in the impartial verdict of a disinterested spectator or in the dispassionate judgment of history. The greatest danger of erroneous judgment lies in the case of agents, their friends and opponents, who, being in the midst of battle, are all, more or less, influenced by the clamour of passion.

§ 7. Sincerity Essential to Moral Judgment.

Let us conclude this Chapter by noticing another familiar instance of erroneous moral judgment. Not infrequently *two* distinct acts, related as means and end, are viewed as *one*, which is sought to be justified by reference to the moral quality of either of them. For example, a person may steal to support his family or, like St. Crispin, to help the poor. Here two distinct acts—stealing and helping—are connected as means and end; and covetousness, want, or sympathy may lead a person to regard the two acts as single and to justify it by reference to the moral quality of benevolence. And thus an Augustus Cæsar or a Septimius Severus may “flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill.” (Bacon, Adv. ii, xxiii, 46.) Similarly, a person may save the life of another to make him an instrument of immorality. Here the two acts of saving a life and employing it as an instrument are related as means and end; and they may be construed as one and thus justified by reference to the moral quality of the former. It might be argued, for example, that the saving of life is right; and one who saves it has the absolute right to do as

Attempts are at times made to justify the moral quality of an act by means of another, connected with it by way of means or end.

But we should remember that sincerity is the essence of moral life.

he likes with it. Such may be the sophistical pleading of inclination; but the fallacy of such a procedure is patent. The moral quality of one act can never justify the moral quality of another. Nay, in such cases, when two acts are viewed as means and end, the inferior moral quality of the one spoils the superior quality of the other as well, much as a discordant note may mar the excellence of its companion. The truth is that, in the moral sphere, sincerity of purpose counts for everything. The moral life, like the mental, is a unity; and one, who is at heart disposed to follow his inclination, but, to avoid the pangs of his own conscience or to delude others, is ready to gloss over the act with specious reasons, plays false with himself and commits the grossest wrong. In the words of Polonius—

“ This above all,—to thine own self be true ;
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou can’st not then be false to any man.”

(*Hamlet*, I, iii.)

And, to make this precept, not merely worldly useful, but also spiritually elevating, we may add that then a person can never be false to *any one*.

CHAPTER VII.

THE MORAL FACULTY : CONSCIENCE.

§ 1. **Conscience and Moral Faculty.** "Conscience," Dugald Stewart writes, "coincides exactly with the moral faculty, with this difference only, that the former refers to our own conduct alone, whereas the latter is meant to express also the power by which we approve or disapprove of the conduct of others." (*Active Powers*, Pt. I, Ch. 2.)

Dugald Stewart's distinction of Conscience and Moral Faculty

As, however, the mental exercise is essentially the same, whether concerned with the moral estimate of our own conduct or with that of others, the two terms tend to be used synonymously ; and such an usage is further justified by the fact that the moral principles employed in both the cases are the same : we do not apply one set of moral principles to judge our own acts and another set to judge the acts of others : the principles are the same always, being universal, necessary, and self-evident in character.

is untenable, for the principles employed in both the cases are the same.

It may be mentioned here that hedonists sometimes draw a distinction between Conscience and Moral Faculty, the one being viewed as essentially emotional and the other as intellectual. Mill, for example, remarks, "Our moral faculty is a branch of our reason, not of our sensitive faculty ; and must be looked to for the abstract doctrines of morality,

The hedonistic distinction is also false.

Mill's account of moral faculty

reduces it to
ere pru-
nce.

not for perception of it in the concrete." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 3.) Though there is thus an apparent agreement between this view and that set forth in these pages, yet really there is none. Viewing moral quality as derivative, these writers assign to the moral faculty the function of a calculating machine: it computes the balance of pleasure and records the courses of action calculated to secure it. But there is nothing moral in this calculation—neither in the process nor in the materials. As Laurie puts it—"It merely casts up the columns of conduct ledger"; and such a process can no more be called moral than the calculation of an accountant preparing his balance-sheet. Seth properly observes, "With the critical significance of moral alternative vanish also the infinite possibilities of moral life: all its lights and shadows, all the strangely interesting 'colours of good and evil' disappear, leaving only the blank monotony of a prudential calculation." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 141.) Such a faculty has nothing to do with conscience or morality. "The crown, labelled as the prize of Conscience, is found to be sitting on the brows of Intellect." (Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, II, p. 96.) Conscience is taken by Mill to be essentially emotional—"a pain, more or less intense, attendant on a violation of duty." We shall examine this view in § 3.

Conscience is
Reason in-
tuitively
discovering
moral prin-
ciples.

§ 2. **Conscience Defined.** Conscience, accordingly, may be defined as the faculty which enables us to distinguish between right and wrong: it discovers the fundamental principles of morality by

the application of which to particular cases we decide questions of right and wrong. It is, so to speak, the light which discloses the moral qualities of acts, and guides our conduct in the moral sphere.

As Byron has said—

“ Yet still there whispers the small voice within,
Heard through gain's silence, and o'er glory's din :
Whatever creed be taught or land be trod,
Man's conscience is the oracle of God !” (*Island*)

In fact, the etymology of the term (Lat. *Conscientia*, from *con*, with, and *scire*, to know) has been interpreted by some as implying knowledge of moral laws together with the knowledge of the law-giver (God). Others, with no less truth, explain the etymology as signifying knowledge of moral principles with the knowledge of self. According to the latter view, the knowledge of moral principles is closely connected with the knowledge of self: the principles being due to our constitution, we know them when we know the mind. Thus conscience is a power of insight intuitively apprehending the principles on which morality is based: as Kant says, “All moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason.” (Abbott's edition. p. 28.) Martineau also very aptly remarks, “To the very nature of moral discernment it is essential, that it be spontaneous, ready to meet the first occasion of moral experience, and that it be not therefore itself a product of experience. The more we appreciate what *obligation* means, the more shall we rest in the psychologically indigenous character

of its conditions, without any hankering after a process of derivation for them." (*Types*, II, p. 73.)

Different
views of the
nature of
Conscience :

✓ § 3. **Nature of Conscience.** Moralists differ in their view of the nature of this faculty. (1) Some take it as emotional, while (2) others consider it as intellectual. (3) Others again contend that it involves both feeling and intellect.

(1) Con-
science is
emotional.

(1) The supporters of the first view maintain that we are pleased or displeased with a certain quality which we consider as right or wrong ; and it is this feeling which is the essence of conscience. This is the doctrine of 'moral sense' (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 3.), specially in the form it is advocated by utilitarian writers. They, however, do not admit the moral quality to be original ; it is but derived from the experience of pleasure or pain. Mill, for example, writes, "The internal sanction of duty is a pain, more or less intense, attendant on a violation of duty. This feeling, when disinterested and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience." (*Utilitarianism*, pp. 41-44.) The view that conscience is emotional is, however, not supported by the facts of consciousness. We do not blindly accept what is right or wrong : the right carries its own evidence with it : it does not merely influence us ; it *convinces* us.

This view is
untenable,
for moral
quality does
not merely
influence us ;
it *convinces*
us.

(2) Con-
science is in-
tellectual.

✓ (2) It thus appears that conscience is an intellectual faculty. It supplies us with the ~~know-~~ledge of moral principles which, when applied to

concrete cases, enable us to distinguish between right and wrong. This view is countenanced by the facts of our moral life and is quite in keeping with the character of the human constitution in which reason is paramount or supreme. Obligation, responsibility, and remorse, to be of any meaning, must rest, not on blind feeling, but on clear knowledge. Hence great thinkers in all ages—such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Butler—have admitted conscience to be essentially intellectual.

(3) Some writers contend that conscience partakes of the character of both feeling and intelligence. This view is advocated by Hume, Leslie Stephen, Martineau, and others. It is no doubt true that moral sentiment usually accompanies moral judgment; but knowledge of morality, though coloured by feeling, does not necessarily imply it. The emotional factor does not, properly speaking, belong to the faculty which reveals the moral principles and thus constitutes the psychological basis of moral distinctions. Conscience thus appears to be an intellectual or rational exercise of the mind, supplying it with a knowledge of the standard of morality.

§ 4. Conscience Infallible. Conscience, as explained above, is concerned with the discovery of the principles of morality; and thus it is to be distinguished from the discursive exercise of intelligence by which moral judgments are arrived at. (*Vide* Chap. III, §4.) Conscience is intelligence intuitively revealing the moral principles. This intuitive exer-

This view is justified by the facts of consciousness which indicate the supreme place of reason in the human constitution. Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Butler.

(3) Conscience is a mixed faculty, involving both feeling and intelligence.

Hume, Leslie Stephen, and Martineau.

But feeling, though accompanying moral estimate, is not an integral part of it. Conscience as a faculty of insight is essentially rational.

Conscience is to be distinguished from Understanding.

cise of intelligence is not the same as the inferential process which enables us to find out the moral qualities of particular acts. If a moral judgment be incorrect, the error lies in the inferential process, in the application of a moral principle and not in its apprehension. Some writers, no doubt, are inclined to hold that conscience reveals the moral qualities of concrete acts. Trace of such a view is to be found even in Butler: "There is," he writes, "a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own actions...This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper and actions is Conscience." (Sermon I.) This view, however, is not tenable, since men differ very much in their moral estimates, but their consciences cannot be said similarly to vary. Moral nature is essentially the same in all; and conscience, as its organ, must thus be constant. Mill rightly observes, "Our moral faculty, according to all those of its interpreters who are entitled to the name of thinkers, supplies us only with the general principles of moral judgments." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 3.)

Conscience always discovers aright the moral principles, which it is its function to do.

It is apparent from the above remarks that conscience cannot err. "An erring conscience," says Kant, "is a chimera." (*Metaphysics of Ethics*, p. 217.) Conscience being intuitive in character, it always performs its function aright in properly discovering the moral principles. It follows from this that conscience cannot be educated and that it is supreme in authority. Every instinct in us is ap-

pointed to its own end ; and every organ or faculty has an innate aptitude for apprehending facts suited to it. The jurisdiction of an organ or faculty is thus limited to its own appropriate materials ; and within this sphere no other organ or faculty can claim to enlighten or educate it. As Martineau says, " Moral objects cannot be tasted, seen, or heard ; nor are sapid, visible, audible objects appreciated by the moral sense." (*Types*, II, p. 9.) And as it is not left to us to train the eyes to apprehend light, or to train the ears to apprehend sound, so is it beyond our reach to train conscience to discover moral principles. And if conscience is infallible, it is also supreme : discovering the moral principles aright, it is always competent to guide our conduct. As Calderwood remarks, " That conscience intuitively recognizes moral law, that it is supreme in its authority, and that it cannot be educated, are three propositions which hang or fall together." (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 71.)

§ 5. **Supremacy of Conscience.** Bishop Butler has established beyond doubt the supremacy of conscience. " Had it might," he writes, " as it has right, it would have absolutely governed the world." Conscience is, no doubt, supreme in as much as it regulates or guides all the other powers of the mind.

Conscience regulates the other powers of the mind.

Butler.

" Conscience, what art thou ? thou tremendous power !
 Who dost inhabit us without our leave,
 And art within ourselves, another self,
 A master self, that loves to domineer,
 And treat the monarch frankly as the slave." (*Young*.)

The supremacy of conscience lies in its teaching function.

The authority of conscience is derived from that of the moral principles discovered by it.

It is to be remembered, however, that the supremacy does not consist in any superior force or power, compelling the other operations or impulses of the mind to act in particular directions; the supremacy consists in the teaching function of conscience. It supplies us with the light by which we are to guide our life. This supremacy is derived from the supremacy or ascendancy of the moral laws which are categorical and imperative in character. There is no supremacy in the very nature of conscience as a faculty, apart from the principles revealed by it. It does not frame the law, it merely discovers the law; and thus its authority cannot be viewed as simply personal and subjective. Martineau rightly observes, "If it be true that over a free and living person nothing short of a free and living person can have higher authority, then is it certain that a 'subjective' conscience is impossible. The faculty is more than part and parcel of myself; it is the communion of God's life and guiding love entering and abiding with an apprehensive capacity in myself. There we encounter an 'objective' authority, without quitting our own centre of consciousness; an authority which at once sweeps into the widest generality without asking a question of our fellow-men; for an excellence and sanctity which *He* recognises and reports has its seat in eternal reality, and is not contingent on our accidental apprehension: it holds its quality wherever found, and the revelation of its authority to one mind is valid for all." (*Types*, II, p. 105.) Thus the suprem-

acy or authority of conscience is but an abbreviated expression for the supremacy or authority of the moral principles discovered by it,—principles which are universally valid, since they ultimately rest on Divine Nature and reveal His authority.

§ 6. Conscience, an Elementary Faculty.

Conscience is thus an elementary rational exercise concerned with the discovery of moral principles. Some writers, however, are averse to admit that conscience is simple. Some deny its existence altogether, while others treat it as an outgrowth of several factors. Bentham, for example, tells us that "Conscience is a thing of fictitious existence, supposed to occupy a seat in the mind." (*Deontology*, Vol. I, p. 137.) But to ignore is not to explain. Schopenhauer declares that conscience is made up of—"one-fifth fear of man, one-fifth superstition, one-fifth prejudice, one-fifth vanity, one-fifth custom." But it may be remarked with Aristotle that such a mathematical calculation is not possible in mental and moral science. The absurdity of such analysis is virtually admitted by Schopenhauer himself when he mentions that many persons will be surprised at it. Utilitarian writers generally try to show that conscience is a product of development. "Conscience," according to Bain, "is an imitation within ourselves of the government without us." (*Emotions and Will*, p. 313) We shall see in Chapter XVII how the moral sentiment is explained as a growth out of egoistic, ego-altruistic and altruistic feelings associated with social enforcement. This developed moral

Conscience is an elementary faculty.

Bentham denies its existence.

Schopenhauer treats it as a composite faculty.

Generally utilitarians regard—conscience as a product of development.

Bain.

sentiment is the conscience of Bain and his followers. And Bain remarks, "When the young mind is able to take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them, a new motive is added, and the conscience is then a triple compound, and begirds the actions in question with a threefold fear." (*Emotions and Will*, p. 286.) Mill, too, identifies conscience with the conscientious feelings. The fallacy of such a procedure is patent enough : it is but an instance of *hysteron proteron*. The conscientious feelings really presuppose conscience and do not give rise to it. An exercise first, and then its sensibility : sensibility may reveal but it does not constitute a faculty.

Mill identifies conscience with the moral sentiments.

All these attempts are futile and fallacious.

Utilitarian difficulty of explaining moral authority.

It is often attributed to social enforcement.

But morality is not arbitrary.

A special difficulty is felt by utilitarian writers in accounting for the authority of conscience. They generally explain it by reference to social enforcement. Bain, for example, mentions, "Utility alone is not the standard, but utility made compulsory". This explanation, however, is evidently unsatisfactory. Enforcement can never be arbitrary ; and even if it were so, we could never accept it as the *moral* standard which implies not merely command but conviction as well : to quote Bain's own words, "There can be no such thing as a standard overriding the judgment of every separate intelligence." (*Emotions and Will*, p. 262.) And if, as Bain declares, the ground of enforcement is not utility, it is moral worth ; and thus conscience is assumed and not evolved. Again, how is it that the 'imitation' extends its

requirements indefinitely, aiming at nothing short of perfection, while the government itself—domestic, social, or political—is satisfied with a definite measure of requirement only? Similarly, Spencer's account of the genesis of conscience as the outcome of ancestral experience, registering the conditions of being and well-being alike, is untenable. Heredity can never create a faculty, though it may weaken or strengthen a tendency already existing. "Mere sentient susceptibility, filtered however fine, gives no moral consciousness." (Martineau, *Types*, II, p. 76) Leslie Stephen, rising above the mechanical view of society, regards it as an organism and considers its 'health' as the true ethical end. Deeming health and happiness as coincident, he defines conscience as "the utterance of the public spirit of the race, ordering us to fulfil the primary conditions of its welfare"; and he adds that "it acts not the less forcibly though we may not understand the source of its authority or the end at which it is aiming." (*Science of Ethics*, pp. 350-351.) It may be replied that if conscience "acts forcibly," without convincing us, it is rather a malady than a guide. The truth is that a rudiment, whether conceived as health or happiness, existence or vitality, or a combination of these, can never evolve Duty: the unmoral cannot give rise to the moral. Association or Heredity cannot call into being a new elementary idea, any more than it can teach the eyes to hear, or the ears to see, or convert prudence into conscience.

Evolutionists regard conscience as a product of evolution and attribute its authority to heredity, transmitting ancestral experience.

Spencer.

Leslie Stephen.

Organic necessity, however, can never explain moral authority, which is self evident in character.

Conscience, therefore, is a simple faculty; and its authority is original.

'Conscience' is popularly used in different senses. It is used as equivalent to—

1. (a) Moral judgment;

(b) personal conviction

2. Moral sentiments.

Thus, properly speaking, Conscience or Moral Faculty is original, intuitive, and universal: it is Reason discovering the first principles of morality.

§ 7. **Popular Use of 'Conscience'.** Popularly, however, Conscience stands for diverse experiences connected with its primary function.

1. (a) As ordinarily attention is directed more to the concrete cases than to the abstract principles underlying them, 'Conscience' is often used in the sense of moral judgment. "Conscience", Sidgwick writes, "is the accepted popular term for the faculty of moral judgment, as applied to the acts and motives of the person judging; and we must commonly think of the dictates of conscience as relating to particular actions." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 99.) Thus, an enlightened conscience is distinguished from an unenlightened, the Christian conscience from the Pagan, and an infallible from an erring conscience.

(b) Connected with this usage we find 'conscience' employed in the sense of individual or personal conviction, as against the social, in matters of right and wrong. Thus we exhort a person "to trust to his conscience" or to oppose current opinion "for conscience' sake."

2. 'Conscience' is sometimes used in the sense of the moral sentiments, as when we speak of an upbraiding conscience, a tender conscience, or a sensitive conscience. "Conscience," as Whewell remarks, "is the reason, employed about questions of right and wrong, and accompanied with the sentiments of approbation and condemnation, which, by

the nature of man, cling inextricably to his apprehension of right and wrong" (*System of Morality*, Lect. VI); and these concomitant feelings are at times mistaken for conscience itself.

3. Occasionally a mixed reference is involved in 'conscience', implying both judgment and sentiment, as when we allude to an acute conscience, a scrupulous conscience, or a hardened conscience. All these uses, however, illustrate the common tendency that we are ordinarily disposed to contemplate the individual and the accidental, rather than the universal and the essential. It is the business of science to distinguish between them and thus to determine the central and true meaning of a term. The moral judgment and sentiment are, no doubt, connected with the exercise of conscience; but they are only the accidental and phenomenal concomitants associated with its essence.

§ 8. Conscience, Conscientiousness, and Over-conscientiousness. The word '*Conscientiousness*' is closely connected with the popular use of the term 'conscience'. (1) It implies, no doubt, a clear estimate of moral principles, free from bias or prejudice; but (2) it indicates oftener a careful survey of circumstances to ascertain a course of duty. "Moral life," Seth remarks, "consists of particulars, of 'situations', of definite circumstances and individual occasions; and an indeterminate or vague morality is no morality at all." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 180.) Thus, an anxious and scrupulous estimate of circumstances to decide a question of duty is

3. A combination of judgment and sentiment.

'Conscientiousness' is used in different senses, such as—(1) an impartial estimate of moral principles; (2) a careful survey of facts to determine duty in any case;

(3) an anxious examination of one's own character,

D'Arcy's account.

ordinarily taken to be a mark of conscientiousness. (3) 'Conscientiousness' further implies the habit of reflecting upon one's own motives to determine the excellence of character. The different senses in which the term has been used are well indicated by D'Arcy. He writes—"Conscientiousness ought to mean the habit of acting with due regard to conscience, so that the conscientious man would, in general, mean the good man. But this is not the meaning which the term usually bears. There is a certain amount of disagreement about the definition of conscientiousness among ethical writers, arising from a variation in the common use of the word. In ordinary language, the conscientious man means sometimes simply the just, or righteous, man; sometimes the man who is very careful to be exact in his conduct; sometimes the man who is painfully anxious in the examination of his motives. . . . It seems best to use the word in the sense of the habit of care in the estimation of the circumstances of action." (*Short Study of Ethics*, pp. 154-155.)

'Over-conscientiousness' is an extreme or morbid form of conscientiousness, disposed to subtle analysis and reprehensible inaction.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the several forms of conscientiousness indicated above may outgrow their limits and give rise to morbid conditions which come under what is known as '*Over-conscientiousness*.' As D'Arcy says, "What the healthily conscientious man would decide in a moment, the morbidly conscientious man may find too hard for decision." Over-analysis and subtle examination may thus induce inaction and serve as an excuse for idleness or negligence. As already

explained in the last chapter, our judgments should neither be hasty nor tardy. Over-conscientiousness is no security for a virtuous life. "With so circumspect a step," writes Martineau, "it makes no way ; and though it never wanders, never flies. For ever occupied in distinguishing, it acquires the habit of fear instead of love,—nay, above all things, *fears to love*. Its maxims are maxims of avoidance, which shape themselves into negatives, and guard every avenue with the flaming sword of prohibition, 'Thou shalt not !'" (*Types*, II, p. 60.) Far better do we find to be those who, not being influenced by such idle scrupulosity, are moved by sincerity of purpose and have earnestness and enthusiasm enough to give effect to it. "With all their sins of omission and commission," says Green, "such men may be nearer the ideal of virtue than others, who pride themselves on conformity to a standard of virtue (which cannot be the highest, or they would not credit themselves with conforming to it), and who so hug their reputation with themselves for acting conscientiously that in difficult situations they will not act at all." (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 323.) Thus, the truly conscientious man is really a good man. His life is fruitful and not barren ; it is a career of honest activity and not of subtle analysis. His moral nature is at once exalted and in touch with the common affairs of life. It might be said of such a person what Wordsworth said of Milton :

But the truly conscientious person is honest and active, not neglecting the common duties of life.

"Thy soul was like a star and dwelt apart ;

... ..

So didst thou travel on life's common way,
In cheerful godliness ; and yet thy heart
The lowliest duties on herself did lay."

(*Sonnet to Milton.*)

§ 9. **Conscience and Consciousness.** Let us conclude this chapter with a brief reference to the relation of 'Conscience' to 'Consciousness,' both of which terms are derived from the same root. Consciousness, being a general condition of our mental life, covers all psychoses and thus includes conscience or moral experience. But the term 'consciousness' has been used (1) now in a wide sense and (2) now in a limited sense.

'Consciousness' is ambiguous :

1. In a wide sense, it is co-extensive with mental life ; and so it includes conscience.

1. In a wide sense it stands, as just mentioned, for the entire mental life known to us ; conscience is, therefore, but a branch of it, being equivalent to moral consciousness. The different faculties of the mind are but different modes of conscious life, which appropriate to themselves different names—such as Intellect, Feeling, Imagination, Conscience—for convenience of reference. "The ground for the division of mental faculties lies in the special nature of the psychical activities." (Jungmann.) *Vide* Chap. III, § 4.

2. In a narrow sense, it is equivalent to the cognitive energy as manifested in perception

2. In a limited sense, consciousness is the cognitive energy of the mind as it is primarily and prominently illustrated in our knowledge of the external world, that is, in perception. Thus viewed, 'Conscience' and 'Consciousness,' though analogous, are distinct : the one is concerned with the principles

of action; and the other, with the principles of knowledge: the exercise of the one has reference to human relations and opportunities for action; and the exercise of the other, to outward objects and circumstances determining cognition. Muirhead observes, "Conscience is only another side of consciousness. It is in the field of practice what consciousness is in the field of knowledge. This fundamental identity is already indicated in the words themselves. Consciousness (*conscire*) is the sense we have of ourselves, as realised in the mode of activity we call knowledge; conscience (also *conscire*) is the sense we have of ourselves as realised in conduct." (*Elements of Ethics*, pp. 238-239.)

and its supplementary processes. 'Conscience' and 'Consciousness' are thus complementary, furnishing the mind with the conditions of moral life and sense-experience.

Even thus viewed, there is a parallelism in their function and development: (a) As without the interpreting power of conscience, moral relations are unmeaning, so without the interpreting and constructive power of consciousness, the external world is but a chaos devoid of meaning. (b) As in the one case, the principles of morality determine the limits of moral construction, so the principles of knowledge determine the possibilities of cognition in the other. (c) As the one reveals the antithesis of self and not-self in the form of the ego and God, the other reveals the same antithesis in the form of the ego and Nature. As Martineau says, "In order to reach a real ground of obligation. . . it is necessary that our psychology should be dualistic in its results, recognising, as in its doctrine of perception, so in its doctrine of

'Conscience' and 'Consciousness' are similar in their functions and development.

Martineau.

conscience, both a *Self* and an *other than Self*. In perception, it is *Self and Nature*: in morals, it is *Self and God*, that stand face to face, in the subjective and objective antithesis." (*Types*, II, p. 5.) (d) As, finally, moral progress implies better insight into the conditions of moral life and increased subordination of the requirements of circumstances to the demands of moral nature, so progress in knowledge implies better insight into the conditions of knowledge and adequate interpretation of facts on more rational grounds. These similarities in the exercise of the moral and perceptive faculties reveal but their common basis: they are merely diverse exercises of the same Reason revealing the conditions of our life—moral and intellectual. 'Conscience' and 'Consciousness' are cognate terms because they indicate branches of a common stock or nature.

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CHAPTER VIII.

PERPLEXITY OF CONSCIENCE.

§ 1. **Problem of the Chapter.** Certain difficulties arise from the above theory of conscience. If, for example, conscience intuitively discovers moral principles, how is it that men often differ in their opinion of the moral quality of an act? Not only do we find differences as to the moral worth of a particular act, but we find at times a wavering between two courses of action which seem to be equally eligible. How can there be 'a conflict of duties' at all, if they rest alike on the unimpeachable authority of conscience? Are we to conclude that the moral principles, which constitute the basis of moral distinctions, are themselves contradictory? Such a supposition is scarcely possible, since they are but different expressions of moral excellence, and they are all equally imperative. And, even if such a conflict were possible, which of the conflicting principles are we to follow? Again, if, as we have seen, conscience cannot be educated, is there no room for moral training? And, if there can be no culture, how is progress possible in the moral sphere? Furthermore, if there be moral progress, is there no fixed and absolute standard in morals? Such problems may naturally disturb our faith in the above theory of conscience; and a satisfactory solution of them is necessary to its acceptance. Such diffi-

How to reconcile an intuitive Conscience with conflict of duties, moral training, moral progress, and conflicting moral views?

culties may incline one to think that the preceding account of conscience is defective. We have seen that popularly the term conscience is used in a very loose and wide sense, so as to cover all moral experiences whatever; and thus the expression 'perplexity of conscience' has come to mean any practical difficulty in the moral sphere. And it is incumbent upon every student of Ethics to reconcile such difficulties with his view of the moral faculty. Let us, therefore, notice here some of these difficulties, as well as the objections brought against the above theory of conscience, with a view to establish it on a firmer basis.

Moral hesitation is due to either (1) bias or (2) confusion.

§ 2. **Conflict of Duties.** The so-called 'moral conflict' or 'conflict of duties' suggests that one may be pulled as it were in opposite directions by the rival claims of hostile impulses. Such situations, however, arise, not from the conflicting declarations of conscience, but from confusion due to circumstances or inclinations. As Green observes, "There is no such thing really as a conflict of duties. A man's duty under any particular set of circumstances is always one, though the conditions of the case may be so complicated and obscure as to make it difficult to decide what the duty really is." (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 355.) If, for lack of discrimination, we fail to readily decide a case, it reveals but a dull intelligence and not a faulty conscience, which always discovers moral principles aright. Of course, at times we may be in doubt as to the appropriate moral principle

applicable to a particular case. But such doubt is due to either (i) the influence of inclination, or (ii) the failure on the part of intelligence to properly estimate a situation or to grasp the spirit and scope of a moral law. Let us consider these two sources of hesitation one by one.

(i) The most fruitful source of casuistry is the influence of inclination. "Appetite", says Aristotle, "can lead to a minor premiss being applied to one rather than another of two major premisses existing in the mind." (*Nic. Eth.* VII, ii, 2.) When, for example, a strong desire carries an individual against even an obvious duty, he generally brings forward reasons to support his inclination, and may exclaim—

(i) Bias is the most fruitful source.

"I do perceive here a divided duty." (*Othello*.)

A judge moved by compassion, a parent led by affection, or an enemy swayed by malice, may thus waver between courses of action which sober reflection shows not to be equally eligible. Thus it is that in common life, or in diplomacy, acts or sayings, which, coolly judged, make one ashamed, are regarded as plausible enough. Persons sometimes give evasive or ambiguous answers which are worse than lies, since they involve falsehood, cunning, and deceit at the same time.* Expressions are to be judged, not

* "Lying assumes many forms—such as diplomacy, expediency, and moral reservation; and, under one guise or another, it is found more or less pervading all classes of society. Sometimes it assumes the form of equivocation or moral dodging—twisting and so stating the things said as to convey a false impression—a kind of lying which a Frenchman once described as 'walking round about the truth.'" (*Smiles' Character*, p. 207.)

by any secret construction which one using them may put upon them, but by the sense in which he intends they should be taken by others. Similarly one, not disposed to help or punish another, may question the validity of such an act. Personal bias is thus a fruitful source of casuistical judgments; and here we find the value of Adam Smith's moral standard—the Sympathy of an Impartial Spectator.

(ii) Instances of 'moral conflict' due to confusion :

(a) Apparent conflict of Benevolence, Veracity, and Self-regard.

Spinoza and Kant deny any exception to veracity, while Mill & Martineau admit such an exception.

(ii) On many occasions, however, an individual may fail to grasp the precise character of a situation or the true spirit and scope of moral principles, and thus may hesitate to decide between two courses of action. When, for example, a robber or a mad man seeks information as to the whereabouts of an individual in order to kill him, are we to speak truth? Here apparently there is a conflict of Benevolence, Veracity, and Self-regard; and which of them should we adopt as our guide? We find on the one side the transcendent estimate of veracity as a virtue by Kant, who regards "a lie as an abandonment or, as it were, annihilation of the dignity of man"; while Mill remarks—"That even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions, is acknowledged by all moralists; the chief of which is when the withholding of some fact (as of information from a malefactor, or of bad news from a person dangerously ill) would preserve some one (especially a person other than oneself) from great and unmerited evil, and when the withholding can only be effected by denial." (*Utilitarianism*, pp. 33-34.)

Dr. Martineau supports the latter view on the ground that such persons, being really outside the social organism, can never claim the benefit of the common understanding implied in speech, which is that what is affirmed is thought. According to him, veracity rests on (a) this postulate of speech, and (b) reverence for the real order of things. "Besides the agreement between thoughts and words," he writes, "there is the agreement between thoughts and things." And both these grounds justify, according to him, falsehood to such men. He remarks, "On the area of every human society, and mixed with its throngs, there are always some who are thus *in* it, but not *of* it, who are there, not to serve it, but to prey upon it, to use its order for the impunity of disorder, and wrest its rights into opportunities of wrong. Assassins, robbers, enemies with arms in their hands, madmen, are beyond the pale; and the same principle applies to those who try to turn the postulate of speech to the defeat of its own ends, and through its fidelity compel it to play the traitor.....If, beneath a mask which I detect, I see the features of a 'false brother', and know that he seeks access to the truth in order to desecrate it, and that the more I give him command of the right relations with things, so much the more will he plunge into the wrong ones, then I am not disloyal to the real order of affairs in the world if I keep it from him, even by telling him something else: on the contrary, I uphold the inmost spirit of that order, by preventing its being turned into an ac-

According to Martineau veracity rests on (1) mutual understanding and (2) reverence for the real order of things.

Neither of these grounds applies, according to him, to assassins, robbers, madmen, or enemies.

complice of crime ; and I should be a traitor to it, if I delivered its loaded arms into a villain's hands.Whoever has no care for reality except as a fulcrum in action against its law, is at enmity with nature no less than with man ; and her secrets are not for him. Reverence itself, therefore, seems to authorise concealment of fact from such as he."

(*Types*, Vol. II, 261-3.) Sidgwick similarly remarks, "Just as each man is thought to have a natural right to personal security generally, but not if he is himself attempting to injure others in life and property : so if we may even kill in defence of ourselves and others, it seems strange if we may not lie, if lying will defend us better against a palpable invasion of our rights : and Common Sense does not seem to prohibit this decisively." (*Methods*, p. 315.)

Paulsen, likewise, refers to the 'Lie of Necessity.' (See his *System of Ethics*, pp. 672-681.) He thinks that the rigorism of moralists is "perhaps influenced by the curious notion that the stricter their systems, the better it will be for the morality of mankind..... As though men always first referred to a handbook of morals before opening their mouths !" (P. 681.) We may say, happily it is not so, for then they might have been led astray.

The above argument rests on the assumption that an individual, whose impiety leads him to go against his moral nature, is to be treated for the time being as an alien in the moral commonwealth ; and hence its privileges cannot be extended to him. Thus a person who wants to make a wrong use of an

Sidgwick

and Paulsen
hold similar
views.

Criticism of
the above
view.

information cannot, it is urged, claim it on moral grounds. But it may be replied that if the moral quality of one's action be thus made to depend on the use which may be made of it by another, then the moral quality would be the most precarious thing in the universe. Again, if an individual be excluded from the moral commonwealth on the ground of some moral transgression, then few would ultimately be left to constitute it.

"Virtuous and vicious every man must be,

Few in th' extreme, but all in the degree." (*Pope*.)

No man is perfect; and, if human nature is imperfect, how can it properly be a part of the moral commonwealth at all? Further, a robber or an enemy may, according to this view, be treated as an alien by those whose interests suffer by his conduct, but not necessarily by those whose interests are promoted or not affected by it. If, as Martineau remarks, "enemies with arms in their hands" be outside the moral pale, then was Regulus wrong in keeping his word by returning to Carthage, and was Cæpio justified (1) in instigating the followers of Viriathus to murder their chief and then (2) in not paying them his promised reward? Was Socrates wrong in refusing to escape from prison when a scheme for his escape was matured by Crito, and was Crito right in bribing the jailor to mature such a scheme? However much we may feel for the lots of men like Regulus and Socrates, our moral sympathies are never with what is evil. In fact, we feel for such

The moral quality of one's action can never depend on the conduct of another.

If imperfection be a ground of exclusion from the moral commonwealth, then few would be left to constitute it.

Instances of Regulus,

Cæpio,

Viriathus,

Socrates,

Crito.

We feel for such men only for their moral elevation.

Retaliation becomes the moral rule on the assumptions of Martineau.

Utility broadly interpreted supports veracity.

individuals because of their moral elevation; and, had they acted otherwise, they would have forfeited not only our regard, but also our sympathy. Because a person is disposed to rob or kill, are we to deceive him with falsehood? Then, when a person wants to deceive us, we may as well be justified in killing or deceiving him. The maxim of conduct thus becomes 'tooth for tooth and eye for eye.' Are we justified in employing moral evil to ward it off? Such a procedure is condemned by our moral nature; and utility cannot justify it.

Again, so far as the effects of action are concerned, they are generally of a mixed character. If your veracity leads to the loss of a life, your conduct supplies an ideal which blesses humanity with peace, good-will, and happiness. If utility be taken as the test, how can we be sure that the injurious effect of falsehood does not outweigh its possible good result? A life may be saved; but even this life is liable to be rendered less pure by the baneful influence of a bad example; and the possible injury to society is great indeed. Does not your falsehood rather prove your pusillanimity, since, to save your whole skin, you avoid the more honest, but perhaps the more difficult, way of serving the object of your solicitude? "The question," as Green remarks, "is not really between the value of either of you and the value of a rule, but between the importance to be attached on the one hand to your pain or deliverance from pain, and that to be attached on the other to the moral life of society which every lie must injure, and

to the integrity of your character as a person self-subordinated to the requirements of social good." (*Prolegomena*, p. 345.) If a robber or a reprobate be allowed to have his way, the immediate injurious effect of his action is more than out-balanced by the moral awakening which follows. Even the material effects, considered in their entirety, are often ultimately beneficial, as is apparent from instances like those of Virginia and Lucretia. Thus, it is wrong to use speech contrary to its own end; and falsehood can not be defended either on utilitarian or on intuitional grounds. "The free man," says Spinoza, "never acts with evil artifice, but always in good faith." Indeed veracity alone is consistent with genuine freedom; mendacity is but bondage. Kant rightly characterizes falsehood as, "by its mere form, a crime of man against his own person, and a baseness which must make a man despicable in his own eyes." Truth is sincerity. As Mahammed says, "Speak truth to your own heart." (Ameer Ali's *Spirit of Islam*, p. 173.)

Cases of
Virginia and
Lucretia.

Testimonies
of Spinoza,
Kant, and
Mahammed.

It may be mentioned in this connection that no *moral right* can rest on an immoral basis. One, who does not mean to respect the moral order, cannot consistently claim the fulfilment of duties towards himself. It is on this ground, I think, that an immoral injunction ceases to be an injunction altogether. When, for example, an elder or superior requires the performance of a wrong action, such requirement itself is immoral and so void. It is void for two reasons: (a) As the title of a superior or an

(b) Apparent
conflict of
personal
conviction
and external
authority.

elder to respect, rests ultimately on moral principles, he forfeits this title whenever he ignores them; and thus a guardian or a master loses his position, for the time being, when he requires his ward or servant to do something wrong. Moral superiority declines as immorality grows. (b) The particular command being immoral becomes morally nugatory; and an individual acting according to it takes upon himself the responsibility for its performance. As Aristotle says, "Friends and truth being equally dear, we are bound to prefer the truth."

Moral problems should be solved by reference to concrete circumstances, which require the application of moral laws.

It is to be remembered, however, that the above instance does not constitute an exception to Piety. It does not come under it at all. Questions of duty are always to be decided by reference to concrete circumstances; and the circumstances in the above case do not warrant obedience to authority. There is no conflict of principles at all, such as veracity, and benevolence, piety and reverence, or affection and justice; a case requires but the application of one principle. Thus, Mill's remark that Intuitionism is unable to decide between conflicting moral laws is wide of the mark. He writes, "In other systems, the moral laws all claiming independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 38.) If there is no conflict, no umpire is needed. It is a mistake to suppose that the moral principles, because distinct and supreme, conflict with one other. They severally express different aspects of moral excellence which, harmoniously blended, constitute the ideal of

The moral laws being but different expressions of moral perfection, never come in conflict with one another.

character. Every moral law is supreme within its own sphere; and such supremacy never leads it to extend its authority to the jurisdiction of another. Their spheres are distinct and complementary. And if ever any confusion arise as to which of the laws is applicable to a particular case, it is due to Understanding and not to Conscience. Faulty discrimination of circumstances can no more be referred to Conscience than colour-blindness, to Hearing. Calderwood very appropriately remarks, "If perplexity arise as to the time when or the case where a principle of morality should have application, while other principles are unapplied, this perplexity affects neither the validity nor the authority of any principle; it involves a question of present duty. If it be clear that present duty requires attention to the claims of justice, it does not on this account follow that the agent is thereby liberated from the law of benevolence, or entitled meanwhile to violate any other law, or regard it as shorn of its authority." (*Moral Philosophy*, pp. 61—62.) It is the casuistic spirit which often leads an individual to suspect a conflict of principles or exceptions to them and to devise rules for solving imaginary difficulties. (*Vide* Chap. XIV, § 9, foot note.) The rules of casuistry, however, generally fail to relieve the mind; they rather tend to draw it into deeper mire. Being abstract, they lose sight of the concrete peculiarities of a case and foster self-deception which construes a transgression as an exception. "Fixed boundaries," as Paulsen observes, "do not exist in morals. The

Casuistry,
instead of
solving, in-
creases, moral
difficulties.

law draws hard and fast, and therefore arbitrary, lines, while morality has everywhere to do with gradual transitions. The particular case must necessarily be decided by the individual's own insight and conscience, and with a view to the concrete conditions. Morality cannot give him a scheme which shall enable him to settle the matter with mechanical certainty. It can merely indicate the general points of view from which the decision is to be rendered." (*System of Ethics*, Thilly's Translation, p. 678.)

Bias often
leads to con-
fusion.

The two cases (i) and (ii), mentioned above, though theoretically distinct, may not be practically isolated. We have already seen (*Vide* Chap. VI) to what extent passions and inclinations warp our judgments; and many a confusion in morals might be avoided but for this baneful influence.

"Where interest fortifies an argument,
Weak reason serves to gain the will's assent;
For souls already warped, receive an easy bent."
(Dryden)

Even a Judhisthir, an Aristides or a Manlius Torquatus may waver when swayed by a strong desire. Hence we can well understand the responsibility, which every one is under, in arriving at a correct solution of a moral problem. When an advocate pleads a cause which he believes to be false*

Honest deci-
sion success-
fully solves
moral prob-
lems.

* It can hardly be said that the advocate merely reports the false affirmations of others: since the whole force of his pleading depends upon his adopting them and working them up into a view of the case which, for the time at least, he appears to hold."
—Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, p. 316, foot note.

or when a subordinate executes an immoral order we can very well detect the suborning influence of gain. And if greed or affection may at times induce undue compliance, vanity or passion may on other occasions lead to insubordination or wanton disregard of the claims of propriety. Consequently, in the moral sphere, we should be scrupulous enough, though not over-scrupulous. "The good," D'Arcy writes, "is to be found in the case itself, and the first business of the perplexed mind is to know as simply as possible what the case is. The mere effort to determine this, as simply and in as conscientious a manner as possible, is of itself often sufficient to solve the problem." (*Ethics*, p. 217.) No doubt, honest conviction may lead one to take one view of a situation, while it may lead another to hold a different view. From this we are not to conclude that there is no fixed moral quality of an act. What we call a moral act is not the overt action, nor its result, but the inward decision; and the value of this decision in any case depends on the character of the motive chosen. When, therefore, this motive varies, the moral act, though outwardly the same, varies also; and its moral estimate must necessarily vary. Casuistry, the hand-maid of perverse inclination, derives its force mainly from (a) the confusion of outward action with inward decision, and (b) the tendency to judge others, not from their stand-point, but from our own. Personality is the central element in morality. "It is noteworthy," says D'Arcy, "how large is the personal factor in every case of

Honest decision successfully solves moral problems.

perplexity. Where no clear rule applies, it is almost impossible for another to judge correctly concerning the morality of the decision which the perplexed person may make; for its morality depends on the actual amount of his knowledge, the clearness of his natural powers of insight, the amount of knowledge which he ought to possess, and the relations which the circumstances bear to the rest of his life. And who could penetrate these recesses?" (*Ibid.*, p. 219.)

The above remarks indicate merely the main lines along which a satisfactory solution of moral problems may be sought. To attempt even an enumeration of the numerous problems, which casuistry may start, would be absurd, since opportunities and inclinations are various and their combinations are practically infinite. Let us, therefore, conclude this topic with a brief reference to another instance of apparent conflict, viz., that between Humility or Politeness and Veracity. Is it consistent with veracity to adopt modest or polite expressions? When, for example, in acknowledging a compliment or praise, a person mentions that he does not deserve it or that it is due merely to the goodness of others, does he transgress the rule of veracity? How should he act in such cases? The reasons set forth above suggest an answer. (a) In using a modest or polite expression, we do not intend to deceive others. Not only is there no such intention on our part, but (b) others expect such expressions from us, taking them at their proper value. Thus modesty or politeness does not imply any violation

(c) Apparent
conflict of
Humility or
Civility with
Veracity.

of good faith or mutual understanding. "The customary politeness", as Paulsen remarks, "is the oil which prevents, so far as possible, the creaking and pulling of the machine." (*System of Ethics*, p. 680.) It should not, however, be inferred from this that it is always right to act up to the expectations of others; for, in so doing, many a time we go astray. In this case, however, the expectation is based, not on unreason and interest, but on reason and good-will. (c) As already remarked, there is greater risk to our moral nature from the self-regarding propensities; hence any step which tends to curb pride or vanity is itself a moral gain. (d) Moreover, the imperfections and limitations of our faculties should always throw serious doubt on the real presence of any merit or excellence which may, through kindness, be attributed to us. Thus is it that great minds, conscious of their littleness, have always given Humility a high place in the list of virtues.

Polite expressions, likewise, are not intended to deceive others. "Courtesy," as Carlyle observes, "is not a falsehood or grimace; it need not be such." (*Heroes and Hero-Worship*.) Polite expressions, no doubt, do not always bear the same meaning, and sometimes they undergo a gradual process of change or perversion of their signification; but, in polite society, current expressions have generally acquired a fixed connotation. "When a man declares that he 'has great pleasure in accepting' a vexatious invitation, or is 'the obedient servant' of one whom he regards as an inferior, he uses phrases which were probably once deceptive.

If they are so no longer, Common Sense condemns as over-scrupulous the refusal to use them where it is customary to do so. But Common Sense seems doubtful and perplexed where the process of degradation is incomplete, and there are still persons who may be deceived: as in the use of the reply that one is 'not at home' to an inconvenient visitor from the country." (Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, pp. 314-315.) Sincerity of purpose and a pure regard for good are the only means of solving moral difficulties. If, therefore, a gentleman, receiving an official communication from Government, imagines that the Chief Secretary is really his most faithful subordinate, then he alone is responsible for his ignorance or obtuseness. "I have seen," says Burke, "very assuming letters, signed, 'Your most obedient, humble servant.'.....Kings and nations were trampled upon by the foot of one calling himself 'the Servant of Servants'; and mandates for deposing sovereigns were sealed with the signet of 'the Fisherman.'" (*Reflections on the French Revolution*.)

Thus casuistry does not invalidate a moral principle; nor does it indicate a conflict among such principles. It reveals only our inability to readily apply a law to a particular case.

§ 3. **Diversity of Moral Judgments.** Diversity of opinion in morals seems to be inconsistent with the admission of universal, necessary, and self-evident principles intuitively discovered by conscience. If the principles are the same and the act judged is the same, why should its moral estimate vary?

How to reconcile diversity of moral judgments with the intuitive apprehension of moral quality?

Again, if diversity is a fact, how should an individual act? An individual is apparently placed between the horns of a dilemma, when he is called upon to decide between conflicting views. Is there not a conflict of duties in such a case? This question may be considered either from (i) the standpoint of the agent himself or from (ii) the standpoint of an outward observer. Let us consider first (i) the subjective estimate and then (ii) the objective.

Diversity may be due to either (i) subjective or (ii) objective estimate.

(i) The subjective estimate depends on the attitude of the agent; and he can seldom be in doubt as to the moral quality of his own action. Every one is conscious within himself whether he follows his conscience or a hostile inclination, though he may try to conceal the fact from others. Thus, so far as the agent is concerned, there is generally no room for variation in estimate. Two possible instances may, however, be supposed: (1) when there is doubt as to present duty; and (2) when, having performed an action, we alter our moral judgment. As the first case (1) has already been considered under 'Conflict of Duties', we have to consider only the other. (2) When, subsequent to the performance of an act, its moral estimate varies, the variation may be due to either (a) confusion or (b) the disturbing influence of inclination. The one (a) is illustrated when we confound the circumstances subsequent to performance with those which were present when the act was performed. Thus, one may feel remorse in finding an individual drowned, whom he tried to rescue, but who died in the struggle.

(i) Subjectively, variation may be due to (1) 'conflict of duties' or to (2) confusion of consequences with the motive.

(2) Such confusion may be either (a) purely intellectual or (b) due to the perverting influence of inclination.

Such a confusion sometimes staggers even the best men, who, observing the dreadful and unforeseen consequences of an act, may be led to repent for it. A careful examination, however, reveals the error and convinces one that the moral quality of an act, as determined by sincerity of purpose, is the same throughout. The other case (*b*) is illustrated in perverse moral judgments already considered. (*Vide* Chap. VI, § 6.) And such judgments do not prove that there really is any honest doubt as to the moral quality of an act; they do but illustrate the common practice that we are disposed to hide our shame not only from others, but also from ourselves. All these cases go, therefore, to show that an agent ordinarily knows aright the moral qualities of his acts; and there can scarcely be any room for reasonable doubt in him. (*Vide*, Chap. IX, § 27.)

Subjectively there is little room for honest and reasonable doubt.

(ii) The objective estimate of moral worth may, no doubt, in many cases vary; and the ground of such variation is twofold:—

(1) External observation can reach only the overt act which may conceal from view the inward impulse of which it is the expression. And, as moral judgments are formed by reference to motives, and not outward acts (*Vide* Chap. IV § 2), such judgments must necessarily vary with a variation in the motives inferred. When, for example, we observe a person beating another or struggling with him, we form one estimate if we think the motive to be malice, and quite another, if the motive be correction. When we take into consideration the idiosyn-

(ii) Objectively variation is due to the difficulty of reading aright the motives of others.

(1) It is difficult to know the motive of an act;

crasies of the observer and the observed as well as the tendencies to misconstrue and dissemble, unfortunately so common in civilized societies, we wonder why men agree so much, and not why they differ, in their moral valuation.

(2) The difficulty of judging aright another's action increases when we try to discover, not merely the motive according to which the act has been performed, but also the impulse which has been rejected. We have already seen (Chap. IV) that a moral act must be the outcome of a conflict of impulses ; and an act is right or wrong, according as the lower or the higher motive is rejected. Thrift, for instance, is good as compared with lavish expenditure, but not so when compared with genuine benevolence. Now, as this rejected motive seldom finds any expression in conduct, it is always uncertain to infer it from the act performed. Thus, to interpret aright the moral quality of another's action, is doubly uncertain. The saving propensity, for example, may be construed by one observer as niggardliness, and by another as economy ; and even, in the latter case, judgment would vary according as it is supposed to be the outcome of a conflict with waste or with benevolence. When to these possibilities of error we add the influence of the feelings and passions, in the shape of affection, malice, vanity, etc., we can well understand why men differ so much in their moral estimates of the conduct of others.

Thus the diversity of moral judgments is due, not to the recognition of discordant moral principles,

(2) and it is still more difficult to know the impulse rejected.

Diversity is due to different

applications
of moral
principles.

but to the diverse applications of the same principle or (what comes to the same thing) the application of different principles. A correct application yields one judgment, while an incorrect application, quite another. As Bradley remarks, "Different people in the same society may judge points differently, and we sometimes know why. It is because A is struck by one aspect of the case, B by another; and one principle is (not *before*, but) *in* A's mind when he judges, and another in B's. Each has subsumed, but under a different head; the one perhaps justice, the other gratitude." (*Ethical Studies*, p. 177.) Of course, so far as the real moral worth of an act is concerned, it must be either right or wrong; but the estimate may vary: an act which is really right may be judged as wrong, and an act which is really wrong may be judged as right.

Sources of
diversity are
(i) intellec-
tual, (ii)
emotional, or
(iii)
volitional.
(i) Confusion.

And the ultimate explanation of conflicting estimates, subjective or objective, is to be found in the wrong use of (i) intelligence, (ii) feeling, and (iii) the active impulses and will.

(i) The intellectual conditions of diversity have just been indicated. They are due to confusion, and often lead to erroneous judgments. When, for example, a cheat or a pick-pocket boasts of his dexterity, his attention is directed to his intellectual superiority; and he confounds intellectual with moral excellence. But no sooner is his attention drawn to the moral quality of his act than he becomes ashamed of it. The same fact is illustrated in the law of theft in ancient Sparta or in modern diplomacy.

(ii) Feelings also frequently bias our judgments. The partiality of love is well symbolized in the blindness of Cupid. Sympathy and antipathy, the moral and religious sentiments, resentment and malice, often pervert our judgments. That many a wrong action is excused because supported by prevalent religious and moral sentiments is ordinarily illustrated in religious sacrifices and immoral customs. Thus, the contention of the Rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz that the emotions debase the will by obscuring clear knowledge is not altogether groundless.

(ii) Bias and prejudice.

(iii) Impulses, too, bias our judgments: our desires and aversions often lead us to act wrongly and to practise self-deception; and thus they lend support to wrong customs based on feeling. That the hydra-headed passions blind us to our faults is illustrated in many evil practices tolerated by individuals and communities; for example, the Vendetta in Corsica, the cattle lifting in Kaffraria, robbing the Lowlander in the Highlands, and the Thuggee in India. What we are strongly inclined to do, we generally try to justify. When inclination is strong, excuses are not wanting. Thus, Will sometimes becomes a party to erroneous judgments. Often, to avoid the pangs of Conscience, men practise self-sophistication and thus form perverse judgments which, as explained above (Ch. VI), are moral acts in disguise. And often do the intellectual, emotional, and active elements combine to support a wrong.

(iii) Inclination and faulty will.

These factors usually exert their perverting influence on (1) wrong acts and (2) egoistic impulses.

(1) We are disposed to excuse what is wrong.

(2) We try to justify what we seek.

It is a noteworthy fact that these elements generally exert their perverting influence on (1) wrong acts, and (2) egoistic impulses. And the reasons are obvious. (1) As

“Virtue abhors to wear a borrow’d face,”

vice is usually painted in bright colours. Diversity of opinion is connected more with the excuse of what is wrong than with the condemnation of what is right. As wrong actions torment the mind with the consciousness of guilt, attempts are often made to gloss them over ; but no such artifice is needed in the case of a right action which stands on its own merits. “Men,” says Calderwood, “excuse deceit, without condemning integrity ; they take advantage of others, without condemning honesty ; they applaud cruel vengeance, but still admire benevolence. There is thus a want of consistency in the excuses presented for falsehood, dishonesty, or vengeance, since all of them present a plea for a temporary exception from an admitted general rule of conduct. That this is so becomes evident when we find that those freely advancing these excuses still hold themselves to be wronged when they have been deceived, or when their property has been appropriated by others.”* (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 75.) (2) Again, as self-regarding impulses are generally the causes of digression, they usually set the mental faculties to work, to gloss it over : they thus lead us

* “Theft in Greenland is almost unknown ; but the wild Eskimo make very free with strangers’ goods—though it must be allowed that the value they attach to the articles stolen is some excuse for the thieves.” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, VIII, p. 545.

astray and also warp our judgments. What one condemns in another, he may excuse in himself. Thus, though the moral principles are the same in all, yet their significance and application may vary with age, temperament, inclination, education, and experience; and so an act which is regarded as right by one individual may be viewed as wrong by another. Epictetus observes, "The same general principles are common to all men.....Where, then, arises the dispute? In adapting these principles to particular cases."

§ 4. **Moral Training.** Moral training also seems to be inconsistent with the Intuitional Theory of Morals. If conscience be intuitive, how can it be educated? And if it admits of education, how can it be infallible? Again, if conscience is capable of improvement, when are we to trust to its declarations and when not? Does not, therefore, doubt or conflict arise from the admission of moral training?

It may be mentioned at the outset that moral training does not necessarily mean the education of conscience. It is the vague and popular use of the term that has led to the confusion. We have already seen (*Vide* Chap. VII) that conscience always discovers moral principles aright, and so it cannot be educated. And yet there is ample room for moral training. The essence of such training is found in the clear recognition of duty and its due performance. It consists in properly regulating intelligence, feeling, and will for the ready acceptance of the claim of moral law. And such regulation may be either

Moral training does not mean the education of conscience.

It consists in the due regulation of intelligence, feeling, and will for virtuous conduct.

It may be
(i) of the
positive form
of promotion
or (ii) of the
negative form
of inhibition.

Moral train-
ing is effected
by—

(1) Suitable
ideals (influ-
ence of ex-
ample and
company),

(i) in the *positive* form of promotion, or (ii) in the *negative* form of inhibition. For example, while we encourage honesty or veracity, we condemn deceit or mendacity. To form a healthy moral life, we dispel erroneous notions, undermine misplaced beliefs, extinguish evil desires, tone down violent passions, and curb a perverse will; and at the same time we encourage the formation of correct ideas, build sound beliefs, foster righteous dispositions, and strengthen a virtuous will. And these results are effected thus:—

(1) The presentation of suitable *ideals* helps the development of moral nature. Examples and anecdotes thus bring out the latent moral principles which would otherwise lie dormant. "It is the objective image of the nature sleeping within us that wakes it up and startles it into self-knowledge. The living exhibition in another of higher affections than we have known, far from remaining unintelligible to us, is the grand means of spiritual culture,—the quickener of conscience and the opener of new faith." (Martineau, *Types*, Vol. II, p. 63.) And it should be remembered here that concrete examples are more effective in this respect than abstract precepts.

"Example is a living law, whose sway

Men more than all the written laws obey." (*Sedley*.) The parable of the good Samaritan, the story of the Saint, and the life of a Howard, a Florence Nightingale, or a Vidyasagar are far more potent in enlarging our notions of right and elevating our character than

all the sermons put together. Herein lies also the importance of good company. "Men imagine," says Emerson, "that they communicate their virtue or vice only by overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every moment." (*Essay on Self-Reliance.*)

(2) The presentation of appropriate circumstances before an individual makes him think and feel in certain ways and thus enables him correctly to realize duties, which otherwise might have been unknown or but imperfectly understood. "Concrete experience," says Martineau, "is the nursery lesson of ethical and philosophical conviction." (*Types*, Vol. II, p. 257.) Occasions and opportunities are often our best instructors; and in regulating them we guide thoughts, feelings, and impulses, and thus, to a great extent, control moral education. Hence the use of confronting a boy or youth with actual circumstances, taking care, however, not to put too much strain upon his feeble and pliant will. "Capacity for the nobler feelings," says Mill, "is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 15.) We should remember that

(2) opportunities for action,

"If good we plant not, vice will take its place,
As rankest weeds the richest soils deface."

(3) due
application of
moral prin-
ciples,

(3) The practice or ability to correctly apply the first principles of morality to concrete cases leads to valid estimates of duties. As cases may be subsumed either correctly or incorrectly, an important part of moral training consists in educating the understanding or intelligence to make a right application of a first principle. And this would not only banish erroneous notions and dispel confusion, but would properly regulate the moral sentiments. If men do not arrive at valid estimates of duties, mere infallible conscience means but little.

(4) due
control of the
impulses,

(4) An essential part of moral training consists in the regulation of the impulses according to the dictates of conscience. Among the impulses which move us to action on any occasion, there are some that are eligible, while there are others which are condemned by conscience. Now, it requires a strong and obedient will to suppress the lower impulses and to accept the higher ones as the lines of action. Thus the most important part of moral education in childhood is, as Sir Gooroodass Banerjee observes, "*To be trained to reduce precepts to practice.*" (*A Few Thoughts on Education*, p. 19.) It is practice which can thus train the will in the proper control of the impulses of our nature; and the importance of such control is evident from the fact that many persons act in the wrong direction, knowing it to be such, the will being weak. When impulses are thus duly controlled, a comparatively solid foundation is laid

for virtuous character, and the source of many a confusion in morals is effectively removed. No more will there be any faith in the efficacy of mere outward penances, sacrifices, ablutions, or formal homage to the Deity; and no more would a person argue himself into immorality, as is described in the following lines:

"Some scruple rose, but thus he eas'd his thought,
I'll now give six pence where I gave a groat;
Where once I went to Church, I'll now go twice,
And am so clear too of all other vice."

(Pope, *Moral Essays*.)

(5) The proper regulation of the moral sentiments is also an important part of moral training. These sentiments are not always sure tests of the moral qualities of acts, and they are at times misdirected. (*Vide* Chap. V, § 3 and Chap. XVII, § 3 and § 5.) Hence the proper regulation of these sentiments is an important safeguard against wrong-doing. Feelings generally exercise a potent influence on conduct, so that the remark of Adam Smith, that "the great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects" (*Moral Sentiments*, Part V, § 3), is not altogether untrue. And, as the moral sentiments are connected with the supreme (moral) side of our nature, their due regulation cannot but have the most salutary effect on human conduct.

(5) due regulation of the moral sentiments.

(6) Repeated performance of duty clears our moral vision and emancipates the will from the thralldom of inclination. Exercise strengthens a faculty; and thus conscience, freed from the blinding

(6) formation of virtuous habits.

effects of passion, discovers wider applications of moral laws and so conceives nobler ideals; feelings become refined; and will also, uniformly virtuous.

It may be mentioned in this connection that virtuous habits constitute a solid foundation of good character. Good habits, even when thoughtlessly or reluctantly begun, gradually improve character and incline the mind towards virtue. As Shakespeare says—

“Assume a virtue, if you have it not.

That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat,
Of habits devil, is angel yet in this,
That to the use of actions fair and good
He likewise gives a frock or livery,

That aptly is put on.” (*Hamlet*, III, iv.)

This explains the great importance of all those influences which, by uniformly working upon the mind, mould a virtuous character. Hence the value of a good home, a good teacher, or an enlightened society can never be over-estimated. “Most powerful of all preservative moral forces,” writes Harrold Johnson “is the true parent, with veracity, integrity, and affection in the home impregnating hourly and daily imperceptibly through the years; there is no armor like to this with which to front the bludgeonings and the subtler and deadlier allurements of life. But next to the wise parent there is no other influence to which we may with greater security entrust the child with all its fine sensitiveness than to that of the true teacher.” (*International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1907, p. 479.)

It is apparent from the foregoing that moral training does not mean the creation of a moral nature where there was a blank before. We have seen (Chap. IV) that the moral can never be evolved out of the unmoral. In fact, every education, in the proper sense of the term, is concerned with drawing out the tendencies or faculties which were latent before. Culture can never make a beast a man, any more than it can convert a block of wood into a slab of marble. "Some persons fancy," writes Plato, that instruction is like giving eyes to the blind; but we say, that the faculty of sight was always there and that the soul only requires to be turned round towards the light." (*Republic*, Bk. VII.) Moral training thus postulates moral nature. Education must be in accordance with the laws of our mental and moral constitution, to ignore or overlook which means no progress. The course of moral training must, accordingly, be in harmony with the drift of mental development. And, as such development is from the simple to the complex, from the presentative to the representative, moral education should also proceed from simple or evident cases of duty to those which are more and more complex or subtle. For the development of the moral nature of the child, examples, being presentative, are more efficacious than fables or tales which appeal to imagination; and the latter again are more efficacious than mere precepts or sermons which involve an appeal to thought. And as, in the field of cognition, precepts are more impressive than notions, so, in

Moral training thus consists in the adoption of suitable means for the proper development of moral character.

morals, 'examples are better than precepts.' Moral training conducted in this way leads to true moral progress. But does not such progress imply a moral conflict, viz., that between the earlier and later notions? Let us enquire, therefore, into the true significance of moral progress, and consider whether it leads to moral conflict.

§ 5. **Moral Progress** Moral progress is quite consistent with the Intuitionist Theory of Morals. It implies development, and enlargement of views, and is thus opposed to stagnation. Moral progress may be either (i) theoretical or (ii) practical, each being illustrated in a negative as well as in a positive form.

(i) The theoretical progress is indicated, positively, in a widening of the mental horizon and in broader and nobler conceptions of duties, and, negatively, in the rejection of erroneous beliefs and sentiments. (a) Impartial and careful examination of the grounds of moral estimates removes many an error and many a confusion, and thus leads in many cases to the rejection of earlier beliefs. But this does not involve a conflict, since the old beliefs are abandoned, and new ones take their place. (b) Again, when nobler ideals or new circumstances call forth higher impulses or enlarge our views of duties, the later estimate, though going a little farther, does not contradict the earlier. The smaller and weaker orb fades, as it were, before the larger and brighter. Thus, when the moral horizon widens, benevolence will include within its pale the

Moral progress implies enlargement of moral views.

It is either (i) theoretical or (ii) practical.

(i) Theoretical progress is indicated

(a) negatively, by the rejection of crude beliefs and incorrect ideas ;

and (b) positively by the development of elevated moral ideals.

whole mankind, and even the animal creation, while the earlier estimate might have included only friends and neighbours, or members of the same clan. The later thus includes the earlier, though the earlier is not co-extensive with the later. As Lowell observes—

“New occasions teach new duties ;
Time makes ancient good uncouth.”

(ii) Moral progress on the practical side implies (a) the weakening of the lower propensities and vicious habits, and (b) the strengthening of the higher impulses and virtuous tendencies. By a legitimate exercise of will we properly regulate the motive forces, so as to secure the ends of morality. Such progress frees the mind from the bondage of passion and ends in the due and ready performance of the duties of life. The mind thus comes more and more under the influence of supreme ideals which tend to elevate the character.

Thus moral progress is quite in keeping with the admission of self-evident and universal principles of morality. Though the principles are the same in all, their contents are not necessarily the same. Wider application and deeper insight reveal higher ideals than what were known before. Though the central conception is the same, the breadth of its meaning varies with the extent of experience and reflection. As Martineau remarks, “Even amid the passions of war natures hardened by obstinate antipathies will yield and melt before the experience of a nobler type of feeling than they have yet conceived ; as

(ii) Practical progress is indicated (a) negatively by the weakening of the lower propensities and (b) positively by the strengthening of the virtuous tendencies.

Moral progress thus widens our moral horizon.

may be seen by the well-attested and softening surprise shown by the wounded Egyptians in the late war, when they found themselves treated by their captor with as tender a care as his own soldiers : that victory should thus instantly quench the angry heats and flood the heart with cooling pity, is more than they had ever dreamed, and will make it hardly possible for them, without compunction, to go and do otherwise." (*Types*, II, p. 64.) Thus, if, in an earlier stage of moral progress, differences and distinctions are drawn, owing to comparatively narrow estimates of duties and rights, in the fully developed stage, the world is viewed as a 'City of God,' in which all its members are bound together by sacred ties.

A question may be raised in this connection, viz., that if moral progress is a fact, to what extent are we responsible for our acts? Are we to condemn an action which later reflection or mature experience shows to be unjustifiable? We have already seen that sincerity of purpose counts for everything in morals. Unless, therefore, there is wilful neglect in the development of one's moral nature, one should be judged according to his conviction : he should be criticized from his standpoint, and not from ours, nor even from his when his earlier views are modified. When, for example, a mother, not having an adequate knowledge of the sanitary conditions of life, gives her son a hearty meal when he is just recovering from severe illness, her conduct can scarcely be condemned, as it is actuated by affection and the

Case of a
mother
feeding her
son.

belief that it would do him good. If, however, subsequently, acquiring an adequate knowledge of the conditions of health, she is led by her fondness to do the same thing, then her conduct cannot be excused, as it is the expression of her weakness. With the widening of the mental horizon, the moral problem changes, the impulses which are in conflict being different in the two cases. In the one case, the conflict is between affection and apathy; while in the other, between fondness and protection.

What, it may be asked in this connection, are we to think of a religious fanatic who puts heretics to the stake? It has been argued by some writers that we should approve of his conduct, as it is the outcome of his conviction. We should judge him, it is said, from his stand-point, and not from ours. But, in a case like this, we can well see the perverting influence of inclination, fostered by custom and training. Sympathy and compassion are so very natural affections of the human heart, that they cannot, in any case, be drowned altogether but by the baneful influence of a hostile proclivity, which seeks shelter under the religious sentiment. Intolerance can thus be traced to some base propensity lurking in the bosom of religious enthusiasm. In France, for instance, the dreadful religious wars, which witnessed the massacres of Amboise and St Bartholomew, were the expression rather of political ambition than of religious fervour. The religious sentiment in its purity can no more be united with barbarity than benevolence with malignancy, or food with poison. "All the

Case of a
religious
fanatic.

worst evil among us," says Ruskin, "is a betrayed or corrupted good. Take religion itself: the desire of finding out God, and placing one's self in some true son's or servant's relation to Him. The Devil, that is to say, the deceiving spirit within us, or outside of us, mixes up our own vanity with this desire; makes us think that in our love to God we have established some connection with Him which separates us from our fellow-men, and renders us superior to them. Then it takes but one wave of the Devil's hand; and we are burning them alive for taking the liberty of contradicting us." (*Crown of Wild Olive*, § 54.) Thus, the act of a religious persecutor, unnatural as it is, can not be defended on moral grounds. But for his connivance, he would discover that he is really urged by some inferior propensity and not simply by reverence for the Supreme Being. Even if he is moved by considerations of celestial happiness, whether to himself or to others, his motive is not purely religious, but gainful. And the happiness question in all its bearings is, in the language of Carlyle, "a good enduring back-log whereon to chop logic, for those so minded." (*Essay on Schiller*.) The question of the moral quality of an act should not, however, be confounded with that of personal responsibility, which depends on other circumstances, such as character, education, and temptation. (*Vide* Chap. XXI.) But, whatever may be the degree of his responsibility, his action can never be regarded as right, as it is the outcome of an inferior motive and so out of harmony with moral

law. In contemplating the horrors of religious persecution, one is naturally led to exclaim—

“God! that the worm that Thou hast made,
Should thus his fellow worm invade;
Think deeds like this good service done,
And deem Thine eye looks smiling on.”

Thus an unerring and supreme conscience does not preclude moral training and moral progress. Bain observes, “The universal Conscience and Reason, of which Dr. Whewell speaks as infallible, must reside in some men endued with Conscience and Reason. We ask, who are these infallible men or this infallible Council?” (*Emotion and Will*, p. 267.) Bain evidently commits here the fallacy of ‘shifting ground.’ Surely, ‘infallible conscience’ does not mean ‘infallible men.’

Infallible conscience does not mean infallible men.

§ 6. **Conscientiousness and Weakness.** Let us conclude this chapter with a brief notice of another paradox connected with our moral life. We sometimes find that though men are scrupulous enough in the discrimination of their duties, yet they have not the courage or strength of will to execute what they consider as right and proper. And it may be asked, what value is there in conscientiousness, if it is no security for energy? We have seen, however, that the conditions of moral life are found, not in conscience alone, but in will and active impulses as well. If, then, through weakness of the latter, the revelations of the former are not adopted as guide, that does not prove that conscience is useless. Without such revelations there

Conscientiousness is but one of the conditions of virtuous life, which requires also a vigorous will.

can be no guidance and so no moral life. As well might we argue that there is no need of a field-marshal, since he has not strength enough to overthrow an enemy. Again, the discrepancy between criticism and energy is not confined to morals; it is illustrated also in religion, art, literature, and even Nature. The age of criticism is not the age of creation. "The autumn which gathers and stores the fruits of culture has no longer the prolific vitality of the summer that moulds and paints them; and every time when economic diligence takes stock, is a time of declining freshness, when the sap of nature has grown slack." (Martineau, *Types*, Vol. II, p. 60.)

Honesty
should be the
motto of a
virtuous life.

The above exposition of the moral problems, which seem to perplex the mind, indicates that moral difficulties are often self-created. An honest heart, like the magnetic needle, always aims at what is right. If at times one be perplexed, it is because he is often swayed by extraneous considerations.

"The man of pure and simple heart
Through life disdains a double part;
He never needs the screen of lies
His inward bosom to disguise."

(Gay.)

CHAPTER IX.

THE MORAL STANDARD.

(I) THE STANDARD AS LAW.

§ 1. **Central Moral Problem.** The chief question in ethics is the character of the Moral Standard. We have seen (*Vide* Chapter VI) that a moral judgment always involves the application of a standard, by reference to which we pronounce an act as either right or wrong. The fundamental inquiry in morals, therefore, is—What is it that enables us to characterize an act as right or wrong? What is the test or type of rectitude? A question of test is, no doubt, involved, more or less, in every judgment. When we say, for example, that 'the table is round', 'John is tall,' or 'sugar is sweet,' we use notions which serve as a test to measure some particular aspect of an object: our estimate of 'the table', 'John,' or 'sugar' depends on the proper understanding of 'round', 'tall', or 'sweet': a judgment is rightly or wrongly understood, according as the test or notion is correctly or incorrectly apprehended. Though, however, a test is thus involved in every judgment, yet there is a peculiarity in morals which renders an inquiry into its character of special importance. The moral standard, like the logical or the æsthetical, is an ideal towards which we move; but there is no reference to such an ideal in every judgment, nor is there an effort implied for its attainment. Judgments as the outcome of com-

The fundamental question is one of test or standard.

Every judgment involves a test.

Peculiarity of the moral standard.

The test in positive sciences is the *actual* :

in normative sciences, the *ideal*.

Supreme importance of the moral standard, as regulating our life.

parison, assimilation, and discrimination, necessarily involve a test; but the character of the test varies in different cases. In the *positive sciences* (*Vide* Chapter I, § 3), the test is but a notion gathered from experience, which enables us to assimilate and differentiate things; while in the *normative sciences*, the test is an ideal or type to which we wish to approximate in order to be free from the defects we encounter in common life. The former, accordingly, are content with the mere discovery of the laws which govern phenomena, while the latter aim at defining the standard or ideal which should influence our conduct. In morals, the determination of the standard is pre-eminently important, as it settles the momentous questions of virtue and sin, of happiness and misery, of hope and despair, of beatitude and mortification, in short, of life and death—of life in death and death in life. “For, as much as it has been disputed,” says Bishop Butler, “wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public: it is that, which every man you meet puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it their business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good.” (*Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue*).

§ 2. **Standard Ordinarily Implicit.** In common life, the notion or test, involved in a judgment, is tacitly assumed and at most but vaguely conceived. It is the business of Science, however, to determine the character of the test in order to render a judgment clear and precise. Thus reflection makes explicit and definite what to ordinary consciousness is implicit and vague. Moral Science, accordingly, tries to determine the nature of the test or standard which underlies a moral judgment. But Science, too, in its infancy often resembles popular thought. Hence we find in Common-Sense Philosophy an appeal to Conscience as a concrete faculty as the final standard in morals. This is the doctrine of the *Moral Sense* in which the Moral Faculty and the Moral Standard coalesce. The doctrine of 'Moral Sense' is sometimes adopted with the belief that the intuitional position is thus made impregnable. In fact, Shaftesbury was led to advocate the view to obviate the defects of rational morality supported by Clarke.

In ordinary life, the standard, though spontaneously employed, is not *before* the mind.

Common-Sense Philosophy :

Theory of Moral Sense which identifies the Standard with Conscience.

§ 3. **Moral Sense.** The moral sense is a faculty of internal perception which immediately recognizes the moral qualities of acts. "No sooner," writes Shaftesbury, (1671-1713), "are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned (and they are most of them discerned as soon as felt), than straight an inward eye distinguishes, and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable, the admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, or the despicable." (*The Moralists*, II, p 415.) Similarly, Hutcheson (1694-1747) speaks of the Moral Sense as

An internal sense intuitively apprehending moral quality. Shaftesbury.

Hutcheson.

Moral Excellence con-
founded with
Beauty.

Boniform
Faculty.

Henry More.

Greek con-
ception.

Intuitive
knowledge
being always
valid, 'Moral
Sense' con-
tradicts it-
self and leads
to moral
scepticism.

Perplexity
among men.

analogous to the Sense of Beauty. Though, however, he speaks of these two senses as distinct, yet in actual treatment he often mixes them up. In fact, they often run into each other, as when he refers to "the moral beauty or deformity of actions" (*Enquiry*, p. 176) and describes the 'Moral Sense' as that "which makes rational actions appear beautiful or deformed." (*Enquiry*, p. 121.) It is not improperly, therefore, that these writers have usually been regarded as supporters of 'moral aesthetics' and their Moral Faculty has been described as the *Æsthetic Sense*. The 'Moral Sense' of the eighteenth century corresponds to the *Boniform Faculty* of the seventeenth which, according to Henry More (1614-1687), apprehends the "sweetness and flavour" of moral excellence. This view of the moral standard approaches the Greek conception that the Good and the Beautiful are ultimately one.

§ 4. Criticism of Moral Sense Theory. (1) As men do not always agree in their moral estimates, how can we, in the face of such difference, admit the existence of a Moral Sense, analogous to the external senses? We know that immediate knowledge or direct apprehension is always infallible. If, for example, I perceive the colour of this paper as white, it can never be proved to me to be otherwise; and if a person, suffering from jaundice, sees the colour as yellow, it can neither be proved to him as different. Can we similarly conclude that an act which seems to be right to one is right to him; while if it appears to be wrong to another, it is so to him? Then nothing is really good or bad, only thinking makes it so.

(2) Again, it not infrequently happens that an act, which appears at first to be right, may subsequently appear as wrong, and also *vice versa*. How are we to reconcile such conflicting estimates with intuitive apprehension?

Perplexity in one's own case.

(3) If in (1) and (2) we admit that one of the estimates is wrong, how can the error be detected and brought home to an individual? And if it be possible, then it must be by an appeal to reason which alone can override a decision of sense. Further, does not the very possibility of error imply that moral estimates come within the range of inferential knowledge? If so, it proves the position vindicated in this work; and moral valuation can never be credited to an intuitive faculty.

Consistently with 'Moral Sense,' an error can never be detected;

the possibility of detection implies an abandonment of the theory

(4) Moreover, morality is not a matter of arbitrary opinion, but of rational conviction. Contrition and regeneration illustrate what a revolution can be wrought in the soul by reason. There would be very little room for them in a theory of Moral Sense.

'Moral Sense' is inconsistent with penitence and conversion,

(5) The theory of Moral Sense would imply that the sense is acute where it is not needed and obtuse or nearly absent where it is wanted most. A depraved nature would scarcely feel any shame at wrong doing, and so the moral sense may be said to be absent there; and, as Kant observes, "in order to imagine the vicious man tormented with a sense of his transgressions, it must first represent him as morally good in the main trend of his character." (Abbott's Translation, p. 128.)

and also with the demands of our moral nature.

'Moral Sense'
does not
exclude
rationaliza-
tion.

(6) Even if we admit that the Moral Sense is agreeably or disagreeably affected by moral beauty or deformity, still it does not follow that the apprehension is wholly intuitive. If the conditions and principles of beauty can be discovered by reason, then those of moral quality may no less be known by it.

Grounds are
ordinarily
implicit,

§ 5. The Theory of Moral Sense, Unscientific.

even in Sense
perception.

The truth is that ordinarily attention is directed to the fact of apprehension and not to its conditions; but nevertheless these conditions are implicitly present in thought and they determine the result. Hence the faculty is usually taken to be the standard itself. This is illustrated even in sense-perception: the object perceived is at once set to the credit of a sense-organ, without any reference whatsoever to its intellectual conditions. But to appeal to a concrete faculty, instead of to general conditions and principles, is to remove a subject-matter from the domain of reason and science alike. To hold that this or that act is right because it is so perceived by a faculty is to strike reason dumb and set up arbitrary opinion in its place. If a faculty sits as a judge over the individual cases as they arise, without being guided by general principles or a definite standard, then it is but an autocrat whose verdicts can never be codified; caprice in such a case takes the place of law, bewilderment takes the place of science.

'Moral Sense'
is inconsistent
with Science.

§ 6 General Classification of Ethical Theories. Moral Philosophy, therefore, can never be satisfied with Perceptual Intuitionism; it must try,

Perceptual
Intuitionism,
inconclusive.

like every other science, to discover the general principles which underlie all rational estimates. The inquiry into the moral standard thus resolves itself into an inquiry into the nature of the test or ideal which enables us to decide questions of right and wrong. In starting this inquiry, however, we are confronted with divergent, and sometimes conflicting, views. At the outset we find that (1) the moral standard is conceived by some as a *law or laws*, conformity to which is essential to a virtuous life; (2) others take the standard as an *end or summum bonum* which we strive to attain in order to be morally good or perfect. The first may be called the *Jural* view and the second the *Teleological*: the one is concerned with *laws* laying down the limits of our moral life; the other, with the *end* defining the goal of moral activity. The importance of the question requires that we should discuss the principal answers given by moralists, before arriving at a definite conclusion of our own. It would be inconsistent with the scientific spirit to put forward a definite view on this cardinal point without previously considering what other thinkers have said on it. Let us, therefore, first examine the different accounts of the moral standard with a view to determine its true character. And, in reviewing the systems, let us proceed methodically, adopting a principle of classification.

§ 7. Classification, subject to two Conditions.

In classifying moral theories we adopt the logical, instead of the chronological, order. And two things

Moral Science makes the Standard explicit.

The Standard is differently conceived :

(1) Law :

(2) End.

(1) Jural Theory.

(2) Teleological Theory.

Importance of the question requires a review of principal theories.

The Review is methodical

and logical.

The classification of theories does not

proceed
chronologic-
ally :

nor does it
include mixed
theories.

Moral Law
as standard
is generally
admitted.

here should be borne in mind :—(1) We shall refer to the types of the different theories, irrespective of their historical place or importance. Though every system has its place in the historical development of thought, yet science considers the essential features alone, apart from the limitations of time, place, and circumstances. History has to deal with the concrete and thus to take cognizance of the order of development; but science, annulling the conditions of time and clime, deals only with the general and the essential. We shall, accordingly, allude to moral theories, illustrating our classification, without any reference to chronology. (2) There are some mixed theories (*e. g.*, those of Cumberland, Butler, Gay, Paley) which cannot be brought under a definite head mentioned in the classification. The classification is scientific or philosophical, while the concrete systems are historical developments. Moralists never constructed their systems by reference to logical possibilities or scientific classifications, but by reference to facts and their interpretations of them. With these preliminary remarks let us proceed to examine the different theories of the moral standard.

(I) THE STANDARD AS LAW.

§ 8 **Universal Admission.** The notion of moral law as the standard of rectitude is universally accepted by mankind. Whether it is but a step towards a higher conception, we shall consider later on; but the fact remains that the standard as law is generally admitted, though at times it may be

dominated by other ideas owing to extraneous considerations. It is true, no doubt, that the ancient Greeks were moved more by the idea of the Good than by that of Law; but this was mainly because, in the Greek-city-states, the active co-operation of free citizens developed the idea of community of interests and common well-being. But even among them, in spite of the conception of an ideal of common good or of the *summum bonum*, the notion of unwritten moral laws was not wanting. "At a very early period," observe Janet and Seailles, "the Greeks had formed the conception of a moral law, which commands and forbids like the civil laws, but differs from these in that it is unwritten. Socrates energetically upholds, in opposition to the Sophist Hippias, the doctrine of unwritten laws; and this notion must have been already familiar, since Sophocles put it into the mouth of Antigone in the play. In the *Crito*, Plato expresses the idea of absolute obligation which is inherent to the moral law." (*History of the Problems of Philosophy*, ii, p. 45.)

even by the
Greeks.

§ 9. Meaning of Law. A law is the expression of a uniform relation existing among the facts of a certain class. It indicates a definite and systematized order formulated in language. When, for example, we speak of the 'Law of Gravitation,' we mean that there is a fixed relation among material objects by reason of which they attract each other directly as the product of their masses and inversely as the square of their distance. Similarly, the Law of Definite Proportions or of Identity or of Veracity implies a settled relation

Law explained,
ed,

e. g. Gravitation.

Laws define the constitution of the universe.

among certain facts. If, therefore, every object of the universe—and the universe itself—is made up of parts or features, which bear a certain fixed relation to one another, then there must be laws governing those relations. And as the constitution of an object is determined by these uniform relations, the corresponding laws define this constitution. Thus, there are artificial and natural laws, according as the constitution is determined by man or otherwise; and, likewise, there are political, physical, mental, and moral laws.

The Positivistic conception of law as phenomenal succession or co-existence is inadequate.

§. 10. **Positivistic Interpretation of Law Inadequate.** To the positivist, phenomena and their relations of succession and co-existence being the only objects of knowledge, the search for causes is not only fruitless but fallacious. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 13.) "Every proposition which is not reducible, in the last resort, to the simple statement of a fact, particular or general, must be without real and intelligible sense." (*Phil. Pos.* VI, p. 703.) We can, according to this view, apprehend, no doubt, laws of external facts, but these laws denote simply "their invariable relations of succession and resemblance." (*Ibid.* I. p 5.) We should not, therefore, be led to imagine that corresponding to the phenomenal relation there is an objective nexus. "Seeing how vain is any search into causes," Comte writes, "our real business is to analyse accurately the circumstances of phenomena, and to connect them by the natural relations of succession and resemblance." (*Phil. Pos.*, Miss Martineau's Translation, II, p 5.) Is a law, then, but a deter-

minate order among phenomena? Does not a determinate order imply an objective connection—an operative cause, however much Comte may cry against it as mystical or metaphysical? The fixed relation is not of my creation; I cannot undo it, nor can I alter it. A natural law—whether physical, mental, or moral—is a discovery and not an invention. When, for example, the law of gravitation or of Identity is detected, it is not thereby brought into existence: it existed before and would continue to exist, 'though I knew it not.' To maintain the contrary is merely to sound a note of scepticism, which is not in accord with the voice of reason. Thus, the true meaning of a law is a determinate relation of facts, revealing a certain constitution and having an objective basis. (See § 26.)

Law implies a fixed order and thus an objective connection.

§ 11. **Special Classification of Ethical Theories.** Having considered what is implied in law, we now come to the examination of Jural Theories. They may be classified by reference to their estimate of the special character of the standard (*Vide* Chap. II, § 2 and § 5); and the standards may be classified thus:—

Classification of Jural Theories:

(i) Standard as Law... (Jural Theory)	I. Human (Political)	... {	1. Arbitrary.
			2. Rational.
	II. Divine (Theological)	... {	1. Arbitrary.
			2. Rational.

The legal or jural standard is conceived as either (I) Human or (II) Divine. In the one case the law

(I) Political-
(II) Theologi-
cal.

imposed by a sovereign is viewed as the standard of rectitude; and in the other, the law of God, as revealed in Conscience or the Scriptures, is taken as the standard. And in each of these two cases, the standard may be regarded as either (1) arbitrary and capricious or (2) based on reason and the very nature of things. Let us, therefore, examine types of these different theories one by one.

(I) *Political Theories* :

1. *Hobbes.*

Personal pleasure is the end of every action.

Primitive condition of man is one of general strife: this is 'the state of nature'; Natural Rights.

§ 12. (1) Arbitrary Human Standard. The chief supporter of this view is **Hobbes** (1588-1679). According to him, good is the object of every man's desire; and this good consists in personal pleasure. The end of every action is the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain. Even the so-called disinterested impulses are primarily self-regarding. Originally men existed in a State of Nature which was a state of universal discord and war. The *Natural Right* of man (*Jus Naturale*) is to use his power as he likes for his own life and comfort: every one has a right to everything—"even to another's body"; and every one is justified in gratifying his appetites and desires as he pleases. This natural state is, accordingly, a state of fierce competition: "Only that is every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it."

"For why?—because the good old rule
Sufficeth them, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can." (Wordsworth.)

No moral distinctions in the natural state.

In this state of natural war, "right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place." There being no supreme authority, there is no law; and hence force and fraud are the two rampant virtues in such a condition. If any

one doubts this natural state of war, he can only look at the conduct of men even when there is social restraint : "When taking a journey he arms himself ; when going to sleep he locks his doors ; when even in his house he locks his chests ; and this when he knows there be laws and public officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him." Thus, as Hobbes says, **man is by nature a wolf to man** (*homo homini lupus*). As, however, the natural state of war is extremely miserable and precarious, reason devises some constraint which finds expression in the *Law of Nature* (*Lex Naturalis*). If *Right* is liberty, *Law* is obligation or constraint. The "first and fundamental law of nature," or general rule of reason, is—"seek peace and follow it" ; though, if peace be unattainable, one may reasonably "seek and use all helps and advantages of war." From this "endeavour" to secure peace, follows the second law of nature that every individual shall lay down his absolute right to all things, for mutual benefit : every person is to content himself with so much liberty against others, as he would allow them against himself. Society, therefore, owes its origin to the misery and insecurity of the natural state of war and the consequent rational desire for peace. Government or social regulation, accordingly, comes into existence either by "institution" (*i. e.*, by mutual compact) or by "acquisition" (*i. e.*, by the might of the strongest). Society has thus an essentially egoistic basis : "All society is either for gain or glory ; that is, not so much for love of our fellows as for the love of ourselves." (*De Cive*, Works, Molesworth's Edition, Vol. II, p. 5.) As the end of society is protection against rapacity, that form of society is the best which is the strongest ; and, hence, according to Hobbes, the best

Natural state is unbearable.

Reason dictates peace : the *Laws* of Nature.

Society is an artificial institution, due to compact or victory.

Egoistic basis of society.

Absolute monarchy is the ideal form of government.

Royal verdict is the moral standard.

Family, and not individual, is the unit of society. Sir Henry Maine's testimony.

Compte's testimony.

Hobbes moves in a vicious circle when he derives society from

form of Government is absolute monarchy. Moral distinctions have a place only in society; and the command of the sovereign, acting under responsibility to God, is the final standard of rectitude which men must obey so long as it affords them protection, since to disobey it would be to bring back anarchy and, with it, the natural state of war and misery.

§ 13. Criticism of Hobbes' Theory. (1) The unit of society is not the individual, but the family. As Sir Henry Maine observes, "Archaic law is full, in all its provinces, of the clearest indications that society in primitive times was not, what it is assumed to be at present, a collocation of *individuals*. In fact, and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an *aggregation of families*. The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the *unit* of an ancient society was the family, of a modern society the individual." (*Ancient Law*, Chap. V, p. 135. Sir Frederick Pollock's Edition.) Comte, in defending that the family is the unit of society, observes, "There is a conclusive evidence against the utilitarian origin of society in the fact that the utility did not, and could not, manifest itself till after a long preparatory development of the society which it was supposed to have created." (*Positive Philosophy*, Miss Martineau's Translation. Vol. II, p. 127.)

(2) Hobbes practically admits this; and, in fact, he is guilty, according to his own view, of anachronism, when he speaks of Natural Rights and Laws and of Social Contract. Contract is but a

transference of rights by mutual agreement: it does not create rights when really there was none; it merely changes their incidence. In truth, Hobbes borrows the notions of 'Right', 'Law', and 'Contract' from society and then transfers them to an imaginary condition called by him the State of Nature. He really assumes what he subsequently deduces: the notion of individuals with their natural 'rights' and 'laws' (duties) is, in fact, borrowed from modern society. "The individual," says Maine, "is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account...Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of individuals." (*Ibid*, p. 172.) The contractual relation is thus a later phase of development out of the reciprocity of rights and duties previously existing among the members of a family or a clan.

(3) Human nature is certainly not so egoistic as to justify the assumption of a natural state of war in which our wolfish forefathers, unmoved by any tender feeling, foamed and gnashed and smote:

"'Twas blow for blow, disputing inch by inch,
For one would not retreat, nor t' other flinch."

(*Byron*, D. J. VIII, 77-78.)

The natural ties of affection are, indeed, no less strong:

natural
rights and
laws and
contract.

The notion of
individual
with rights
and duties is
a later
development.

Maine's
testimony.

The natural
state of war
is a fiction.
In human
nature
sympathy is
no less strong
than self-
love.

"Oh ! the tender ties,
Close twisted with the fibres of the heart !
Which broken, break them, and drain off the soul
Of human joy, and make it pain to live." (*Young*)

Egoistic interpretation of disinterested affections and sentiments by Hobbes.

Hobbes' definition of '*Pity*' as "the imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity", his account of '*Gratitude*' as a "lively sense of future benefits," excited by benefits already received, his reduction of '*Charity*' to mere love of power, and analogous interpretations of '*Religion*' and '*Reverence*' illustrate how the most sacred and disinterested emotions are not free from the perverting influence of adverse criticism. It may, I think, be freely said that we live more for the sake of others than for our own.

Life illustrates rather self-sacrifice than self-seeking.

Hobbes virtually admits that society and morality are due to reason.

Laws of Nature are but moral laws.

(4) Hobbes practically admits the ascendancy of Reason when he explains the *laws* of nature by reference to it. It is the laws of nature or precepts of reason which, according to Hobbes, give rise to society and hence to morality. In fact, the first law of nature and some twenty others that are deduced from it express but the primary virtues of mankind. As Prof. Robertson remarks, "Laws of Nature in one aspect, they may equally be called the Moral Law—as the summary of good manners, habits or virtues among men." (*Blackwood's Philosophical Classics*, Hobbes, p. 141.)

The moral standard is self-evident

(5) The moral standard as an external code cannot commend itself to Reason. Mere command

cannot create what is right ; we must be convinced of its moral excellence.

(6) An external code as an embodiment of arbitrary commands often includes moral, political, and ceremonial observances. And, unless pharisaically construed, they cannot be equally valid in the moral sphere.

(7) Even if we accept the dicta of a sovereign and act up to them, we do not reach the moral sphere. Acts performed out of fear of punishment or out of expectation of reward may be prudent, but not virtuous. There may be legality in such a case, but no morality. The theory of Hobbes is but a revival of the doctrine advocated by the ancient sophist Thrasymachus who is described by Plato as exclaiming, "I proclaim that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger." (*Republic*, Book I, 354-355. Jowett's Edition of *Platonic Dialogues*, III, p. 206.)

§ 14. (2) **Rational Human Standard.** Bain's system may be taken as a type of this view. "Morality," as Bain (1818-1903) says, "is an Institution of society, but not an arbitrary institution." (*Moral Science*, p. 440.) According to him, the reason of rectitude is to be found in human happiness : right acts are those that bring happiness to mankind ; but this proposition cannot be simply converted. Happiness is wider than morality : all useful acts are not moral. "A certain amount of bodily exercise in the open air every day would be generally useful ; but neither the law of the land nor public opinion compels it. Good roads are works of great

and not arbitrary.

An external code ordinarily contains moral, social and ceremonial laws, all of which are not equally obligatory from the moral standpoint.

Conformity to such a code explains prudence but not virtue. Hobbism is a revival of Sophism. Thrasymachus.

2. *Bain.*

Morality is a social institution conducive to human happiness ;

but happiness is not co-extensive with morality.

Morality is not spontaneous, but the outcome of coercion.

utility ; it is not every one's duty to make them." (*Ibid*, p. 438) Thus Utility or Human Happiness alone cannot constitute the moral standard. "Morality," he writes, "is not Prudence, nor Benevolence, in their primitive or spontaneous manifestations ; it is the systematic codification of prudential and benevolent actions, rendered obligatory by what is termed penalties or Punishment ; an entirely distinct motive, artificially framed by human society, but made so familiar to every member of society as to be a second nature. None are allowed to be prudential or sympathizing in their own way. Parents are compelled to nourish their own children ; servants to obey their own masters, to the neglect of other regards ; all citizens have to abide by the awards of authority ; bargains are to be fulfilled according to a prescribed form and letter ; truth is to be spoken on certain definite occasions, and not on others...A moral act is not merely an act tending to reconcile the good of the agent with the good of the whole society ; it is an act, prescribed by the social authority, and rendered obligatory upon every citizen. Its morality is constituted by its authoritative prescription, and not by its fulfilling the primary ends of the social institution. A bad law is still a law ; an ill-judged moral precept is still a moral precept, felt as such by every loyal citizen." (*Ibid*, pp. 455-456.) The machinery employed for enforcing useful acts may take either of two forms : it may be either penalty or punishment for neglect, or praise or reward for performance. Of these two forms, the first is more efficacious ; and it gives rise to what Bain describes as "obligatory morality" or "duties strictly so called." (*Ibid*, p. 436.) Thus, "Morality is an Institution

Morality is due not to utility, but to authority.

Enforcement may be by punishment or reward, the former being more efficacious and thus the source of 'obligatory morality.'

of Society, maintained by the authority and Punishments of Society." (*Emotion and Will*, p. 257.)

§ 15. **Criticism of Bain's Theory.** (1) Bain's theory, though professedly rational, is really not so. Happiness, which is intelligible to us, is not taken by him as the standard; the standard is social enforcement or authority. Merely to appeal to authority is not, however, to explain "moral enactments," but to affirm them; it strikes Philosophy dumb. Thus Bain circuitously arrives at the position of Hobbes:

Bain's position is practically the same as that of Hobbes.

"Right lives by law, and law subsists by power;
Disarm the shepherd, wolves the flock devour."

(Dryden.)

(2) If the ground of enforcement is found in utility, then we run in a never ending circle:—All useful acts are not moral. Why? Because they are not enforced. Then, the morality of an act is "constituted by its authoritative prescription." But why are some acts enforced? Because they are useful. Thus social utility is explained by authority; and authority, by social utility.

If utility explains authority, then the argument moves in a circle.

(3) According to Bain's view, virtues in the proper sense of the term would be excluded from the moral sphere: an act, if not the outcome of coercion, is not properly moral. The "entirely distinct motive, artificially framed by human society," to which Bain refers, instead of conferring moral quality on an act, would rather detract from moral excellence. An act performed out of fear of

Bain's theory leaves no room for the natural or unprompted virtues of mankind.

Coercion accounts for prudence and not morality.

punishment, however beneficial it may be to society, is but prudential and not moral.

(4) The very statement that "penalty or punishment" renders an act moral involves a *petitio*. The efficacy of penalty or punishment lies in its retributory justice and not merely in the infliction of pain. In fact, when the pain inflicted is inconsistent with justice or out of proportion to the merit of a case, our sympathy is rather with the person punished than with the avenging authority. Punishment, to be of any value, must be in accordance with the dictates of conscience. If people be not convinced that they are justly punished, they would resent the penalty and would even be disposed to dispute the authority inflicting it. Thus penalty or punishment, instead of evolving morality, really involves it.

(5) If the moral standard be really established authority, then moral progress becomes impossible. Moral progress is due either to the influence of society or to that of an individual. (a) We know it is seldom initiated by authority; nay, authority is not infrequently exercised in repressing it. The lives of saints and martyrs illustrate to what extent social authority contributes to it. The Son of God Himself was crucified and Socrates was condemned to drink the hemlock. "Mohammed, like Jesus, was followed from the commencement of his career as a preacher and reformer by the hostility and opposition of his people. His followers also, in the beginning, were few and insignificant. He also was preceded by men who had shaken off the bondage of idolatry, and

To take 'punishment' as the ground of morality is to commit a *petitio*, for punishment involves the notion of justice or rectitude.

Bain's theory excludes moral progress; because—(a) society is ordinarily conservative and so hostile to change, e. g., persecutions;

and (b) individuals, who imbibe their moral ideas from society, can never go beyond its requirements.

listened to the springs of life within. He, too, preached gentleness, charity, and love." (Ameer Ali's *Spirit of Islam*, p. 170.) (b) Moral progress can neither be due to private influence. How can an individual come to have a better insight into moral conditions at all? If conscience be but "an imitation within ourselves of the government without us," then how can the "imitation" extend its requirements beyond what is wanted by society? How can the ectype go beyond the prototype? And if it does, then it derives its inspiration from some other source. The fact is that, as Carlyle observes, "Man is not the creature and product of Mechanism; but in a far truer sense, its creator and producer: it is the noble People that makes the noble Government; rather than conversely." (*Essay on Signs of the Times*, Miscellaneous Essays Vol. ii, p. 110.)

(6) Bain confounds the functions and provinces of Morality with those of Politics. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 7.) "Morality," he writes, "is in every respect analogous to Civil Government, or the Law of the Land. Nay, farther, it squares, to a very great extent, with Political Authority." (*Moral Science*, p. 435.) He, accordingly, mentions, "Parents are compelled to nourish their own children.....A bad law is still a law; an ill-judged moral precept is still a moral precept, felt as such by every loyal citizen." (*Ibid*, pp. 455-456.) In Politics we may accept the maxim that 'the king can do no wrong'; but in morals—

Bain confounds Ethics with Politics.

"Should vice expect to 'scape rebuke,
Because its owner is a duke?" (Swift.)

Bain's position is analogous to that of James Mill : a revival of the Hellenic view ;

The position of Bain is virtually the same as is held by James Mill in his "Fragment on Mackintosh" ; and these positions are but revivals of the Hellenic view of morality. As Seth remarks, "The moral ideal of the classical world was a political or social ideal, that of the modern world is individualistic. To the Greek, whether he was philosopher or not, all the interests of life were summed up in those of citizenship ; he had no sphere of 'private morality.' The conception of the State was so impressive, absorbing even, to the Greek mind, that it seemed adequate to the interpretation of the entire ethical life." (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 16-17.) The corporate life of Greek citizens led them to conceive the political standard as the ideal of a good life. And a true State, according to Plato, must be governed by virtue and wisdom, and not by passion or valour. The State not only afforded them protection, but gave them due training and supplied ideals—physical, intellectual, and moral—through gymnasia, theatres, and councils. The games and dramas, dialogues and discourses, festivals and processions, provided by the State, helped to mould the Greek character into an ideal not altogether inconsistent with our moral nature. But with the development of the individualistic ideas, the function of the State has also changed : individuals now take care of what was previously done by the State. If now any State undertake to rule in the old way, it would

but it is inapplicable now, since the modern society is individualistic in basis.

be regarded by "loyal citizens" as undue interference: and thus the modern State is practically reduced to a police force. With such a change in the functions of the State and the individual, it is scarcely appropriate to revive the old notion of a political standard as the standard in morals.

§ 16. Divine Law as Standard, How Known.

In the case of the Divine Law we have to consider not merely its character—whether arbitrary or rational—but also the means of its promulgation. The source of positive or political laws is definitely known to us. But how do we come to know the laws of God? Different answers have been given to this query:—

Sources of our knowledge of the Divine Law :

(1) Some hold that the Divine Laws are known through revelation; so that the Scriptures—the Vedas, the Mishna, the Bible, or the Koran—supply the rules of our moral life. The divine code is above reason and is to be implicitly accepted in regulating our life:

1. *Revelation.*

The Scriptures are above reason.

"Most wondrous book! bright candle of the Lord!
Star of Eternity! The only star
By which the bark of man can navigate
The sea of life, and gain the coast of bliss
Securely." (Pollok, *Course of Time*.)

In the case of the Jewish people, for example, the nucleus of such a code was originally supplied by Moses; and it has subsequently been enriched by the inspired utterances of other prophets and the gemaric interpretations by doctors. The divine laws are assumed to be comprehensive in character

The Talmud and its significance.

and to cover (if not explicitly, at least implicitly) all the concrete cases of our lives. Thus, as a jurist would consult his code to determine the problems of civil law, so a Jewish doctor would consult his Talmud to solve the moral problems of life; and as, in the civil sphere, one is guided by analogy and precedents when no explicit laws are found, so in theocracy an individual, in doubtful cases, is to regulate his life by scriptural examples and analogical inference. According to this view we are created morally blank by nature, though we may be trained into morality by the revealed laws of God. The motives for obeying the divine laws are "trust in the promises and fear of the judgments of the Divine Lawgiver." "Christianity inherited the notion of a written divine code acknowledged as such by the "true Israel"—now potentially including the whole of mankind, or at least the chosen of all nations,—on the sincere acceptance of which the Christian's share of the divine promises to Israel depended. And though the ceremonial part of the old Hebrew code was altogether rejected, and with it all the supplementary jurisprudence resting on tradition and erudite commentary, still God's law was believed to be contained in the sacred books of the Jews, supplemented by the records of Christ's teaching and the writings of His apostles." (Sidgwick's *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, p 112.)

Human nature, though becoming moral, is not originally so.

Christianity.

2. Intuition.

The Divine Law is intuitively known,

(2) Others hold that we have been created moral beings, the laws of God having been engraved in our hearts: we have but to look within to dis-

cover these laws; and in no case can there be any honest doubt as to their character and scope. They are universally admitted as binding upon all men irrespective of caste or creed and are accepted as soon as they are apprehended. But there is difference also among the supporters of this view as to the form the divine law assumes. (a) Some (*e. g.*, Kant) hold that the moral law in its universal essence is revealed to Conscience, so that virtue consists in reverence for the universal form of the moral law itself. (*Vide* § 20.) (b) Others (*e. g.*, Martineau) contend that the moral law is embodied in the relative moral worth of conflicting impulses involved in voluntary action; and virtue consists in acting according to the higher impulse. (c) Others again (*e. g.*, Calderwood) maintain that the fundamental laws of morality, though reducible to a single principle, are intuited by Conscience; it is by the application of these laws to concrete cases that they are judged as right or wrong, so that virtue consists in acting according to the requirement of a moral law in a particular case. We shall see below (*Vide* § 26.) that these views are closely connected.

(a) either in its universal essence,

(b) or as involved in a conflict of motives,

(c) or in the form of different moral laws.

(3) A third class of writers (*e. g.*, Grotius, Cumberland, Paley) hold that the laws of God, though revealed in the Scriptures, are not arbitrary but rational and benevolent. The holiness and benignity of Providence have led Him to divulge His just and beneficent laws through inspired prophets to mankind. These laws are perceived by the human reason as at once righteous and gracious. If, there-

3. Revelation supplemented by Utility.

The divine laws are rational and benevolent;

so, when revelation is silent, we may consult utility.

fore, we come across cases which are not covered by the revealed laws, then in these instances we can ascertain our duties by watching the tendencies of our acts: if these promote the well-being and happiness of mankind, then we may safely infer that they are right, since the tendency of divine laws is always so. Thus, according to this view, utility supplements revelation in constituting the moral standard. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 15.)

The question of 'sources' is passed over.

As, however, we are concerned here, not with the sources of our knowledge of the moral standard, but with the character of the standard itself, we shall not pause to discuss the relative claims of revelation, intuition, and experience. In fact, we shall pass over this aspect of the moral problem altogether, since Ethics, as a rational inquiry into the conditions of our moral life, is not directly connected with revelation. Let us, therefore, consider the character of the Divine Law as Standard.

II. Theological Theories.

1. Descartes.

God is properly the only substance.

Spirit and Matter are created substances.

Thought is the attribute of Spirit, and Extension, the attribute of Matter.

§ 17. (1) **Arbitrary Divine Standard.** We take Descartes (1596-1650) as representing this standpoint. According to Descartes, God is the primitive substance and, in a certain sense, the only substance, because He alone does not depend on anything else for His existence, while Spirit and Matter are but created substances. As Spirit and Matter depend on God for their existence, so do all their qualities and relations. The defining property of Matter is Extension, and the defining property of Spirit is Thought, whether intellectual or volitional. Thus the mathematical properties and relations of extension, which constitute the subject-matter of Geometry, depend no less on Divine Will for their existence, than

the laws of intelligence and the laws of will which compose the subject matter of Logic and Ethics. God is thus the author of all truths—mathematical, logical, or moral. All these depend on His arbitrary will; they are but His “arbitrary decrees.” “To him that considers the immensity of God,” Descartes observes, “it is manifest that there can be nothing which does not depend on Him, not only no existent thing, but no order, no law, no ground of truth or goodness.”

All properties and relations depend on God.

Divine will is the source of all truths.

An analogous view with regard to the moral standard was held by Duns Scotus (1266-1308), William of Occam (1280-1347), and Locke (1632-1704). “The true ground of morality,” writes Locke, “can only be the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has in His hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest offender.” (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book I, Ch. III, Sec. 6.) “This is the only true touchstone,” he adds, “of moral rectitude; and by comparing them to this law it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as duties or sins they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the Almighty.” (*Ibid.*, Book II, Ch. XXVIII, Sec. 8.) William of Occam likewise observes, “There is no act which is wrong except as it is forbidden by God, and which cannot be made right, if commanded by God.” Dr. Johnson, Pascal, Waterland, and Candillac were also inclined towards the same view.

Locke.

Divine will is the “touchstone” of morality.

William of Occam.
Divine command the test of rectitude.

§ 18. Criticism of the Cartesian View. (1) To make the arbitrary will of God the moral standard is to take away the distinctive feature of

Morality is not arbitrary but self-evident.

morality : morality is characterized not by dogmatism, divine or human, but by self-evidence. We are convinced in every case of the intrinsic excellence of rectitude.

(2) To make Divine Will the standard is practically to deny God's perfection. Prior to the institution of morality, His nature, therefore, was morally blank and could never be the object of love or reverence ; and, even after such an institution, He becomes an object rather of fear than of veneration.

(3) To obey a moral law simply because it is a command, to declare—

“ My author and disposer, what thou bidd'st,

Unargued I obey” (Milton, *P. L.*, VI, 636-37), implies fidelity, no doubt, but not virtue. To obey divine law because “ God has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life ” (Locke, *Ibid.*), is to give evidence of prudence and not of moral goodness. In fact, this view is not essentially different from that of Hobbes : arbitrary enforcement, whether divine or human, is practically the same—though the command in the one case is backed by infinite power and in the other, by restricted authority. And we, accordingly, find Descartes, too, endorsing the divine right of kings : he writes, for example, “ Justice among sovereigns has other bounds than it has among private people ; and it seems that in junctures God gives the right to those to whom He gives the might.” (*Letters to the Princess Elizabeth.*) The later prophets of the Hebrews

The theory involves the denial of divine perfection.

The theory explains prudence but not morality.

It is analogous to Hobbism.

Descartes supporting the divine right of kings.

similarly regard the king as the son of Jehovah.

(4) The untenableness of the position is revealed when we find its supporters making admissions which are inconsistent with it, but consistent with the facts of our moral life: conviction then breaks loose from the restraints of theory. Thus, Descartes speaks of divine perfection, "possessed of every excellence." It is divine veracity which, according to him, justifies belief in reality: "God is absolutely true and the Giver of all light. It is, therefore, impossible that He should deceive us, or, in the literal and positive sense, be the cause of our errors, to which, as experience shows, we are subject." (*Princ. Phil.* P. I. § 29, Vol. III. p. 81.) Locke, likewise, holds, "God has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best." (*Essay on the Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. XXVIII, Sec 8.) Thus, we see, that Divine 'perfection' or 'goodness', and not His arbitrary will, ultimately determines what is right.

This view of the moral standard is but a revival of the Hebrew conception, according to which the commands of Jehova are absolutely binding on the Israelites. The relation of Israel to Jehova is based on a jealous attachment on either side and a covenant, the terms of which are faithful obedience on the one side and protection and preservation on the other. The laws of Israel—whether moral, political, or ceremonial—begin with "Thus saith the Lord." But even among the Israelites this conception gradually gave way to the idea that the

The intrinsic excellence of rectitude is at times admitted by the supporters of this view: Descartes;

Locke.

This view is a revival of the Hebrew notion.

Covenant.

Influence of
Stoicism on
Descartes
and Locke.

commands of Jehova were just and so they might be approved by the people: "The judge of all the earth" would "do right." The views of Descartes and Locke were modified to a great extent by the teachings of the Stoics and of Grotius. We, accordingly, find both of them not infrequently referring to rational moral principles or 'Laws of Nature' and to happiness which attends their observance. Locke, for example, speaks of "the unchangeable rule of right and wrong which the law of God hath established." (*Ibid*, Book II, Chap. VIII, Sect. 11.) Descartes likewise mentions that "The most important knowledge is the knowledge of God as the author of all things, as the all-perfect Being, of whom our mind is an efflux." And he suggests the three following means for the attainment of the highest happiness: "Clear knowledge of the right, a firm will to do the same, and a repression of all wishes and desires directed towards objects beyond our reach. Only by the intervention of the will can knowledge gain the mastery in us, and the animal spirits become obedient to it. While without this, the sensuous feelings or the emotions confuse our thoughts, and cause us to over-estimate external goods, it enables us to dwell in the inner pleasures of the soul, which are eternal like the soul itself, since they are built up on the firm foundation of the knowledge of truth." (*Hoffding's History of Modern Philosophy*, I, pp. 240-241.)

§ 19. (2) **Rational Divine Standard.** Let us next consider the view according to which also the Divine Law is the standard ; but it is a law which is based on Divine Holiness and revealed in our Conscience. A law is moral, not because it is arbitrarily enforced by the Deity, but because it is consonant with His holiness and justice. Honesty, for example, is right, not because it is so willed by God ; it is rather so willed because it is right. It should not, however, be inferred from this that the Divine Will is finite or limited, inasmuch as it cannot change the right into wrong or the wrong into right. As Cudworth observes, no power can produce the self-contradictory ; and it does not involve any limitation of divine power, if He cannot do what is inconsistent or absurd. A circle cannot be a square at the same time, nor can justice be injustice. Moreover, divine nature is complex, characterized by holiness, wisdom, benevolence, and omnipotence. Such being the case, there must be the natural restraint arising from His complex constitution. Nay, if, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. V), the moral element is by its nature supreme, then Divine Holiness must be the guiding principle, determining His beneficence and every other exercise of power. Divine omnipotence is thus not at all inconsistent with divine perfection : the test of omnipotence is not merely what is abstractly possible, but what is, as described by Leibniz, concretely 'compossible.' The moral law is thus an expression of divine perfection, and it carries the weight of His preference. It, accordingly, carries its

The moral laws as based on Divine Holiness are immutable.

Immutability of moral laws is not inconsistent with divine omnipotence.

What is inconsistent is absurd and so impossible. Divine action must be in accordance with His nature which is complex

and in which holiness is supreme.

Moral laws are self-evident and authoritative ;

evidence in itself and is owned as imperative as soon as it is known. Wherever there is an apprehensive capacity capable of appreciating moral worth, there the moral law is revealed in its entire plenitude and grace. The moral laws are thus intuitively discovered by Conscience; and this, as we have seen (*Vide* last Chapter, § 4), does not preclude the necessity of moral culture. This view is adopted with certain modifications by many writers; and let us take the theories of (A) Kant (1724-1804), (B) Martineau (1805-1900), and (C) Calderwood (1830—), to illustrate our remarks.

and they are intuitively discovered by Conscience.

Different forms of this view:

(A) Kant.
(B) Martineau, (C) Calderwood.

(A) Kant.

Reason is supreme in man, whether in perception or in morals.

Moral law, intuited by reason, is categorical imperative and so absolutely binding;

it aims at the regulation of will and not of anything else.

The good will acts simply out of regard for the moral law, whose essence is its universal form.

Will is Practical Reason.

§ 20. (A.) The Standard according to Kant.

The rational faculty, according to Kant, is supreme in man: it alone can construe the blind materials supplied through the senses into an intelligible whole of experience; and it alone can truly guide our life through the mists and fogs of passion. Reason supplies the moral law which should be the regulator of our moral conduct. The moral law being categorical and imperative is not directed to an external end, such as pleasure, wealth, or knowledge; for any such end can give rise only to a hypothetical imperative of the character—*If* the end be desirable then a definite course of action should be adopted. The moral law, accordingly, is intended to be the guide of the will itself; and this is an internal and not an external end. The good will is thus, as it were, self-contained—its spring of action is found in its very nature of rational choice—choice according to the universal principle of reason acceptable to all men, 'Act so that your line of action may become a law universal.' "Will with Kant is simply reason in its practical aspect. Moral action

is reason willing reason, reason acting on a motive derived entirely from itself, as opposed to action on a motive of passion, which as such necessarily comes to it from without. But, if this be true, if every motive of passion must be set aside, what is left? Nothing, it would seem, but the pure form of universality with which reason invests every matter that is brought into relation to it. Reason willing reason is reason making its own form its sole interest, irrespective of everything else." (Caird's *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, II, pp. 177-178.) The good will has thus its guide in itself: it is autonomous. If, however, a will follows the solicitations of sense, then its exercise is determined, not by itself, but by objects external to its rational nature: in such a case the will becomes *heteronomous*.

As its guide is in itself, it is autonomous. Will acting out of desire is heteronomous, being determined by an alien factor.

"Nothing can," Kant writes, "possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and the other *talents* of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called *character*, is not good. It is the same with the *gifts of fortune*. Power, riches, honour, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called *happiness*, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and adapt it to its end...

Good Will, which constitutes character, is the uniform condition of moral excellence; good will alone is unconditionally good: Talents, gifts of fortune, even happiness may become bad, if not regulated by good will.

Goodness of will does not depend on consequences.

Good will is intrinsically good; like a jewel, it shines with its own light.

Will, to be good, should not be a mere idle wish, but a genuine determination.

An act, to be virtuous, should be done *from* duty and not merely in *conformity* with it;

e. g., a prudent trader cannot be said to be strictly honest.

A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay, even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to nor take away anything from this value." (*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, First Section. Abdott's Edition of Kant's *Ethics*, pp 9-10)

An act, accordingly, which is performed for the satisfaction of some desire or inclination is not properly virtuous according to Kant, even though the act be in harmony with the moral law. "Although many things are done in *conformity* with what *duty* prescribes it is nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done strictly *from duty*, so as to have a moral worth." (*Metaphysic of Morals*, Abbott, p. 23.) A dealer, for example, who deals justly with his customers in order that his trade may thrive, cannot be said to be truly honest, though he seems to be so. When, therefore, in a concrete case, the will has to choose from the two alternatives—"its *a priori* principle, which is formal,

and its *a posteriori* spring, which is material" (*Ibid.*, p. 16) —it must reject altogether the material principle if it is to be virtuous. "An action done from duty derives its moral worth, *not from the purpose* which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the *principle of volition* by which the action has taken place without regard to any object of desire." (*Ibid.*, p. 16.) Such an act "must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the *law*, and subjectively *pure respect* for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations." (*Ibid.*, p. 17.) When the will is thus a law to itself it can properly be said to be free or autonomous: "A free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same." (*Metaphysic of Morals*, Abbott, p. 66.)

Before entering into an appreciation of the theory of Kant, we should mention that we take it to be a type of the Divine Standard, because he holds that the moral law "must postulate the *existence of God*, as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum* (an object of the will which is necessarily connected with the moral legislation of pure reason)." (Kant's *Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason*, Chap II, Abbott's Edition, p. 221.) According to Kant, "In the *summum bonum*, which is practical for us, i. e., to be realized by our will, virtue and happiness are thought as necessarily combined." (*Ibid.*, p. 209.) As the connection, however, is not analytical, it must be synthetical; and it must be due to "the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct

A virtuous act should thus exclude the influence of desires and be the outcome of pure regard for moral law.

Properly speaking free will and good will are the same.

Kant's theory represents the Divine Standard: Divine existence is a postulate of Conscience:

The synthetical connection of virtue and happiness

in the notion of the *summum bonum* implies the existence of God.

from nature itself, and containing the principle of this connexion, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality...The *summum bonum* is possible in the world only on the supposition of a Supreme Being having a causality corresponding to moral character." (*Ibid.*, pp. 221-222.) The existence of God is thus regarded by Kant as a postulate or necessary assumption of Pure Practical Reason. Though repudiating metaphysical inquiry in the theoretical sphere, practically he enters into metaphysics in his Ethics. As Seth observes, "Kant does not separate the science of ethics from the metaphysic of ethics, which is, for him, the only legitimate metaphysic." (*Eihical Principles*, p. 24.) And Kant mentions, however obscure and vague an ordinary person's conception may be with regard to the character and the contents of cognition in the theoretical sphere, he has a comparatively clear estimate of the real character and conditions of his moral life. The use of Philosophy in the latter sphere is merely to render explicit that "obscurely thought metaphysic which dwells with every man as a part of his rational capacity (Kant's *Metaphysic of Ethics*, Chap. I, Rosenkranz Edition, ix, 219); and, with Kant, "It is morally necessary to assume the existence of God." (*Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason*, Abbott's Ed., p. 222.)

Kantian purism indicates the necessity of curbing the passions. Kant's view of the antagonism between

§ 21. Criticism of Kant's view. (1) Kant's purism emphasizes the necessity of curbing the selfish propensities which often lead us astray. But the antagonism implied in his system between reason and sensibility indicates an incorrect estimate of our mental and moral constitution. (a) When, to establish the 'heteronomy' of a vicious will, he de-

scribes the desires as external to the self, he overlooks the fact that desires are desires only in relation to the self: they are but mental modifications and not objects outside the ego. Nay, even if the self be considered in its rational aspect, then also desires cannot be excluded from it: desires are cravings implying a rational estimate of the difference between a subjective want and the objective fact which is expected to satisfy it. Thus (*Vide* Chap. XIX, § 4), Kant's antithesis of reason and sensibility overlooks the obvious psychological truth that the mind is an organic unity. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.)

(b) Our moral constitution is composed not merely of reason and will, but also of the desires and impulses. If reason supplies the 'form,' the desires must supply the 'matter,' to render moral experience possible. The mere universal form of the moral law is to us but an abstraction which acquires a meaning only by reference to concrete impulses constituting a moral problem. To extinguish these desires is to deprive the moral law of its sense by which it operates; and when its vitality is thus gone, it would naturally fail to inspire in us the reverence which is alleged to be the mainspring of a virtuous life and which otherwise might have influenced our conduct. An exercise of will is possible only when it is moved by desires or impulses; to exclude all impulses is to render the will inoperative. This pure will of Kant has, accordingly, been well described by Jacobi as "a will that wills nothing." Thus the purism of Kant is tenable neither psychologically nor morally.

Reason and Sensibility is untenable—

(a) *psychologically*, for desires, being mental modifications, are not foreign to the self;

and (b) *morally*, because desires, being the materials for volition, are essential conditions of moral action.

Kant's
rigorism
leaves no
room for
many noble
virtues of
common life ;

and it makes
virtue rather
forced and
artificial.

Emerson.

(2) Even if the above objection were removed, still Kant's rigorism will have the effect of excluding many noble virtues from the moral sphere and of substituting, not infrequently, an abnormal and arrogant estimate of moral worth. Are we to hold that a mother or a nurse wearing her health out in watching her patient, a soldier sacrificing his life for his country, a philanthropist placing his life and fortune at the service of mankind, or a chivalrous knight staking his life and at times his honour in befriending the weak and the oppressed is not virtuous because the acts are the outcome of the fullness of the heart and not of reverence for the moral law? To prefer the latter to the former in such cases would be to exalt a rather perverted form of virtue and to set a premium on moral pride. Virtue, like many other good qualities of the soul, looks so exalted when it is illustrated in its natural aspect of unconscious greatness, that some writers have been led to treat virtue as spontaneous altogether. Emerson, for example, writes, "Our moral nature is vitiated by any interference of our will. People represent virtue as a struggle, and take to themselves great airs upon their attainments, and the question is everywhere vexed, when a noble nature is commended, whether the man is not better who strives with temptation. But there is no merit in the matter. Either God is there or he is not there. We love characters in proportion as they are impulsive and spontaneous. The less a man thinks or knows about his virtues, the better we like him."

(*Essay on Spiritual Laws*.) Though, however, this is an extreme position, yet there is an element of truth in it which is well expressed by Wordsworth in his *Ode to Duty*—

"There are who ask not if thine eye
Be on them ; who, in love and truth,
Where no misgiving is, rely
Upon the genial sense of youth :
Glad hearts ! without reproach or blot ;
Who do thy work, and know it not."

(3) Again, according to Kant's theory, progress in the moral sphere would tend to detract from the moral worth of acts. As character is improved, men think less of the conflict between duty and inclination, and they are led to act in the direction of the eligible course without any thought of the moral law or any concomitant sentiment of reverence. Kant's position thus becomes paradoxical: virtue, which aims at surmounting the conflict between reason and passion, would cease to exist when the conflict is overcome. The decline or conquest of the strife does not necessarily mean the intensification or even the presence of reverence for the moral law on the occasion of the execution of a duty. An individual in such a case may simply be content with discharging his duty, without any consciousness of reverence for the moral law. Thus, to be virtuous, according to Kant, the conflict, which virtue aims at conquering, must continue: if we are not strongly susceptible to the influence of desires, there is not the occasion for reverence for moral law which

(Kantian view overlooks the importance of moral progress which tends to make virtue more spontaneous or natural and the consciousness of reverence for moral law less prominent.)

requires their suppression. Kant's 'pure respect for moral law,' like Bain's 'entirely distinct motive,' illustrates an error in an extreme direction.

Kant's theory is ascetic, requiring the suppression of sensibility which even has a proper place in our moral nature.

(4) Kant's theory is really ascetic in character; and it accordingly condemns a certain part of our nature—in fact, all the ordinary springs of action—as wholly bad and so requires that it should be stifled. It thus not merely renders our moral life practically inoperative, but also, without any warrant, passes judgment against propensities and inclinations which must have their due share of fruition in order to render life possible. Who will deny that love and hate, fear and anger, benevolence and self-love have a place in our moral constitution and have thus legitimate occasions for their exercise? To maintain the contrary is blindly to condemn our constitution. Not only so, but the transition from such an attitude to bigoted intolerance or fanaticism is easy and natural: one who holds such a view is apt to rate his own conviction high and impose upon the world, naturally differing from him, his own views under the name of reformation or progress. "It is a false idea," observes Channing, "that religion requires the extermination of any principle, desire, appetite, or passion, which our Creator has implanted. Our nature is a whole, a beautiful whole, and no part can be spared. You might as properly and innocently lop off a limb from the body, as eradicate any natural desire from the mind. All our appetites are in themselves innocent and useful, ministering to the general weal

Asceticism easily leads to fanaticism.

of the soul. They are like the elements of the natural world, parts of a wise and beneficent system, but, like those elements, are beneficent only when restrained." (*Self-Denial*, Works, II, p. 102.)

(5) Kant's principle is rather negative than positive: the form of the moral law may enable us to determine what we should not do, rather than what we should. It is, no doubt, true that to determine the negative limits is no small gain, since these enable us to avoid what is wrong and thus to pursue the right. But the dynamics of moral life is made up not merely of constraint but also of inspiration. Every moral problem involves the dual antithesis of right and wrong: if one of the two conflicting courses be wrong, the other must be right; and if we shun the one, we seek the other: our repugnance to the one course is accompanied by our reverence for the other. And this reverence is ordinarily connected with the motive in harmony with the law. Now, to ignore the higher impulse as an actuating principle of virtuous conduct and to refer merely to our repugnance to what is wrong out of respect for the abstract law, is to deprive our moral life of the fertile source of rectitude. Kant's principle is, in fact, barren: it is altogether silent as to the contents of duty or virtue.

Kant's principle is barren: it is rather prohibitory than actuating.

§ 22. Kantism ('Criticism') and Vedantism.

As the Ethics of Kant and that of the Vedanta have important points of similarity and difference, it may be well to briefly refer to them here. Let us first notice the points of similarity:—

Kantism and Vedantism compared.

Points of similarity:

(1) According to both the systems, morality involves a conflict of reason and sense, in which the latter is to be subordinated to the former.

(1) Both the systems admit that the essence of the moral problem lies in the conflict of reason and sensibility and that virtue consists in subordinating the latter to the former. "If," Kant writes, "I were only a member of the world of understanding, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principles of autonomy of pure will ; if I were only a part of the world of sense, they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations." The Vedantic doctrine of *Karma* and the moral preparation enjoined by it, likewise, assume a conflict of reason and sense which must be overcome for *mukti* or salvation.

(2) Duty should be done for duty's sake.

(2) Both the systems require that duty should be done for duty's sake. "In order that an action should be morally good," says Kant, "it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, but it must also be done *for the sake of the law*, otherwise that conformity is only very contingent and uncertain ; since a principle which is not moral, although it may now and then produce actions conformable to the law, will also often produce actions which contradict it." (*Preface to the Metaphysic of Morals*, Abbott, pp. 4-5) Vedantism, likewise, requires that virtuous acts should be performed without any attachment and without any desire for the 'fruits' or consequences of actions. We should act in the right direction because it is a duty and not because it is agreeable or beneficial.

(3) Personality as such should always be respected.

(3) Both the systems require that we should respect personality as such without any reference to the particular desires or inclinations. In the later stage of his moral theory Kant had recourse to his doctrine of 'kingdom of ends' to get an inspiration for moral conduct. Finding his formal moral principle to be

barren of all contents, he tries to discover some content for it in the true dignity of human nature. All other things besides moral excellence have only a relative value and so may be regarded as at most useful; but moral excellence, being an end in itself, possesses an absolute value, and so *dignity*, in the proper sense of the term. This dignity or ultimate worth it naturally lends to the personality where it is manifested. Hence we find Kant's second moral formula—'Always treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of others, as an end and never as a means.*' A person cheating or robbing another acts wrongly because he uses him only as a means for his own advantage. "All objects, though their existence depends not on our will, but upon nature, have nevertheless, unless they are rational beings, only a relative value as means, and therefore are called *things*; while rational beings are called *persons*, because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, *i. e.*, as beings who ought never to be used merely as means; and in relation to whom, therefore, our arbitrary will has a limit put upon it. Such beings are objects of reverence." (Caird's *Kant*, Vol. II, p. 219.) Kant thus arrives at his conception of a *Kingdom of Ends* in which all moral beings are united together by reason of their common subjection to the universal moral law which is at once applied to one's

*With regard to the first and the second ethical formula, Hoffding remarks, "Kant held that the latter formula was deducible from the former, but this is impossible, if the first is to be taken purely formally. Both formulæ presuppose that we actually feel ourselves to be members of a kingdom of personal beings. Moreover, if the law exists for the sake of personal beings and not *vice versa* it is, if anything, the first formula which may be deduced from the second!" (*History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 86.)

own self and to others. In this kingdom of ends or social community of persons, every one is in his turn an end and means to the rest. Thus individuals, as members of families, communities, and states, are held together as members of a moral commonwealth, every one furthering the moral end in his own way. "By a kingdom," says Kant, "I mean the systematic combination of a number of diverse rational beings under common laws. Now, such laws will determine the ends of the rational beings in question, so far as they are universally valid ends. Hence, when we abstract from all the personal differences of rational beings, and likewise from all the content of their private ends, we get the idea of a complete and systematically connected whole of all ends (a whole of rational beings as ends in themselves, as well as of the special ends which each of them may set up for himself), i. e., a kingdom of ends such as is possible according to the principles already laid down.....To this kingdom of ends every rational being belongs as a *member*, who, though universally legislative, is yet submitted to the laws he enacts. At the same time, he belongs to it also as a *sovereign*, because as legislative he is submitted to no will but his own." (*Ibid.*, pp. 224—225.) From this we get Kant's third formula, 'Act in conformity with the idea that the will of every rational being is a universally legislative will.' Thus, according to this latest view, duty is due to our reverence for the dignity of human personality; and in this respect the Kantian view resembles to a certain extent the Vedantic. "With the Vedantists," writes Max Muller, "the feeling of a common interest, nay, of the oneness or solidarity of the human race, was most natural. Their whole philosophy was built on the

conviction that every human being has its true being in Bráhmaṇ, and this feeling, though it is chiefly metaphysical, breaks out occasionally as a moral power also. We say, We should love our neighbour as ourselves. The Vedantist says, We should love our neighbours as our self, that is, we should love them not for what is merely phenomenal in them, for their goodness, or beauty, or strength, or kindness, but for their soul, for the divine Self in all of them."* (*Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy*, pp. 168-169.)

(4) According to both the systems, morality is restricted to the sphere of the relative and the phenomenal; so that as man rises to the sphere of the absolute and the supersensuous, he becomes free from the restraints of the moral law. As the essence of morality, according to these systems, lies in the conflict between reason and sensibility, there is left no room for moral restraint when sense is transcended. From the Vedantic stand-point, an individual may thus be liberated even during this mortal life of his (*Jivan-mukti*). "What is of importance to remember in these ancient fancies," observes Max Muller, "is that the enlightened man may become free or obtain Mukti even in this life (*Givan-mukti*). This is indeed the real object of the Vedanta Philosophy, to overcome all Nescience, to become once more what the Atman always has been, namely Brahman, and then to wait till death removes the last Upadhis or fetters, which, though they fetter the mind no longer,

(4) The sphere of morality is the relative and phenomenal.

*Max Muller observes on this point, "It shows an enormous amount of intellectual labour to have reasoned out that we should love our neighbour, because in loving him we love God, and in loving God, we love ourselves. The deep truth that lies hidden in this, was certainly not elaborated by any other nation, so far as I know." (*Ibid.*, p. 170.)

remain like broken chains hanging heavy on the mortal body. The Atman, having recovered its Brahmahood, is even in this life so free from the body that it feels no longer any pain, and cannot do anything, whether good or bad." (*The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 180.) *Vide* Chapter XII, § 4 and § 7.

Points of
difference :

In spite of the above points of similarity, there are important points of difference, which may briefly be indicated thus :—

Kantism is
phenomenal-
istic, while
Vedantism is
realistic.

(1) The 'criticism' of Kant is entirely phenomenalistic ; his *noumenon* holds but a feeble tenure in his philosophy. In Vedantism, on the other hand, ethics, religion, and metaphysics are inseparably blended together. The freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God are, according to Kant, but the postulates of Practical Reason—hypotheses warranted by moral experience ; but from the Vedantic stand-point these are as much real as any other fact of personal experience. If Brahman or the Supreme Being is real then with Him these are also realities inseparable from His expression.

(2) Kantism
requires the
extirpation,
while
Vedantism,
the regula-
tion, of
sensitivity.

(2) Kant regards sensibility as altogether alien to the rational nature of man and so he insists on its extirpation. The Vedantist, on the other hand, regards sensibility as but a means of the realization of the true self. No part of our nature is absolutely bad from the Vedantic stand-point ; it becomes bad only when it transcends its legitimate sphere of exercise. It is the due regulation or control of the senses and the passions (and not their extirpation) that constitutes the essence of virtue, as it tends to free us from the fetters of this world and to promote our true life in Brahman. Thus we may describe the Vedantic Ethics as rather austere

than ascetic. But Kant's system, as we have said, requires that, to be virtuous, one should act from a pure regard for the universal form of the moral law and not from inclination. The presence of a desire or natural propensity mars, as he says, the worth of an act. "It is a duty," he writes, "to maintain one's life; and, in addition, every one has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the often anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life *as duty requires*, no doubt, but not *because duty requires*.... To be beneficent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations, e.g. the inclination to honour, which, if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty, and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem. For the maxim lacks the moral import, namely, that such actions be done *from duty*, not from inclination. Put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others, and that while he still has the power to benefit others in distress, he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own; and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility, and

performs the action without any inclination to it, but simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine moral worth." (*Metaphysic of Morals*, Abbott's Translation, pp. 13-14.) Thus, while Kant's system teaches self-mortification, Vedantism teaches abstemiousness. The one requires that sense should be annulled, while the other, that it should be thwarted, for a virtuous life; the one requires the extinction, while the other, the regulation of sense. As Kant says, "In order that an action should be morally good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, but it must also be done *for the sake of the law*." (*Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.) We find, on the other hand, in the *Geeta*—

“पृथ्व्यो गन्धः पृथिव्याश्च तेजश्चास्मि विभावसी ।

जीवनं सर्वभूतेषु तपश्चास्मि तपस्विषु ॥८॥

बौजं मां सर्वभूतानां विद्धि पार्थ सनातनम् ।

बुद्धिर्बुद्धिमतामस्मितेजस्तेजस्विनामहम् ॥९॥

बलं बलवतां चाहं कामरागद्विवर्जितम् ।

धर्माविरुद्धोभूतेषु कामोऽस्मि भरतर्षभ ॥१०॥

“I am the pure odour in the earth and the brightness in the fire ; the vital principle in all beings and the austerity (*tapas*) of ascetics. Chap. VII, 9.

“Know, O son of Pritha ! that I am the eternal seed of all things that exist. I am the intellect of the intelligent and the splendour of the splendid. 10.

“I am also the strength of the strong, free from desire and passion (emotion). I am desire in living things, not forbidden by holy laws, O prince of Bharatas !” 11. (Davies' Translation.)

All that Vedantism requires is that one, to be virtuous, should not act with a desire for the ‘fruits’ or consequences of his acts. Action with inclination, accord-

ing to Vedantism, is not inconsistent with virtue, if performed without a desire of consequences; but such action is excluded from the category of morality by Kant.

(3) As a consequence of this difference in the estimate of the true character of our moral life, we find also a difference in the way in which duties are conceived as performed. To Kant, a feeling of 'inner constraint' enters into the very meaning of Duty, so that, "Duty is the action to which a person is bound" (*Ibid.*, p. 279), it is "Compulsion to a purpose unwillingly adopted." To the Vedantist, however, duty is inseparable from life, and it is cheerfully accepted as a means of salvation or emancipation. To extinguish the impulses would be to render life inoperative; we are to duly regulate them, so that we may act without any craving for the fruits or consequences of our acts. Kant's ethics requires, as mentioned above, that, to be virtuous, one should continue in a lower plane of moral culture. It is in such a condition alone that one can feel the force of conflict and thus earn merit for acting out of regard for the moral law and rejecting the solicitations of sense. This explains the ridicule of Schiller in his well-known lines about the 'Scruples of Conscience' and the 'Decision' at the end of his distich-group "The Philosophers":

"The friends whom I love I gladly would serve, but to
this inclination incites me;
And so I am forced from virtue to swerve since my act,
through affection, delights me.
The friends whom thou lovest thou must first seek to
scorn, for to no other way can I guide thee;
'Tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform the
acts to which duty would lead thee."

(3) Duty, in the one case, is reluctantly, while, in the other, cheerfully, performed.

While Vedantism, as we have said, has a place for every legitimate exercise of a faculty or inclination, provided it is not vitiated by a desire for benefit or advantage. We shall consider Vedantism more fully in chapter XII in connection with the systems of Spinoza and Hegel to which it is more closely related as an ontological doctrine.

(B) *Martineau.*

Moral quality attaches to voluntary acts which involve a conflict between impulses, one of which is higher and the other, lower in moral worth. Duty consists in accepting the higher and rejecting the lower.

The relative moral worth of the impulses constitutes the moral scale.

§ 23. (B) *The Standard according to Martineau.* According to Martineau, moral quality is found only in voluntary acts, which involve a conflict between two impulses. When there is such a conflict, conscience intuitively recognizes one of the impulses as higher and the other as lower; and our duty always lies in acting in the direction of the higher and rejecting the lower. If now we take a comprehensive survey of the various moral problems which beset our lives, we discover not merely the several impulses or springs of action, which come into competition, but also their relative moral rank. And, according to Martineau, "The following list presents the series in the ascending order of worth; the chief composite springs being inserted in their approximate place, subject to the variations of which their composition renders them susceptible."

Lowest.

1. Secondary Passions;—Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.
2. Secondary Organic Propensions;—Love of Ease and Sensual Pleasure.
3. Primary Organic Propensions;—Appetites.
4. Primary Animal Propension;—Spontaneous Activity (unselective).
5. Love of Gain (reflective derivative from Appetite).

6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings).
7. Primary Passions ;—Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.
8. Causal Energy ;—Love of Power, or Ambition ; Love of Liberty.
9. Secondary Sentiments ;—Love of Culture.
10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration.
11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social ;—with (approximately) Generosity and Gratitude.
12. Primary Affection of Compassion.
13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence.

Highest." (*Types*, II, p. 266.)

Dr. Martineau gives a list (*Vide* Chap. XIX, §3) of the elementary springs of action, primary and secondary (such as Wonder, Fear, Vindictiveness), and mentions that there are many compound springs which are the outcome of combinations of these elements according to the laws of association. The chief compound springs (such as Love of Gain, Generosity, Gratitude) are included in the above list ; but as it is not practicable to enumerate the various compounds which are ever making their appearance owing to the shifting circumstances and the varied susceptibilities of life, it is neither possible to assign them a determinate moral worth apart from the character of their composition. Martineau, accordingly, holds that "Composite impulses can owe their moral worth and rank to nothing else than the constituents of their formation, and that worth must be proportioned to the aggregate value of those constituents." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, II, p. 235.) And, with regard to the moral estimate in such cases, he remarks, "I care not

The springs of action are either elementary (primary or secondary) or compound.

The moral worth of a compound motive is determined by the aggregate value of its constituent factors.

whether this instantaneous judgment be called intuitive, or be regarded as the outcome of a process too rapid to be traced. I only know it is as ready as if it were intuitive, and comes to the surface as soon." (*Ibid.*, p. 236.)

Thus, according to Martineau, the moral standard is the primitive difference in moral worth among the impulses which come into competition with each other; and the moral quality can not only not be 'cognized' but cannot even 'exist' unless they come into conflict. (*Ibid.*, p. 48.)

"Every action is Right, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher: every action is Wrong, which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower." (*Ibid.*, p. 270.)

According to Dr. Martineau, the ultimate source of our moral consciousness is the Divine Nature: "The relation between the moral consciousness and the Divine authority is one, not so much of *inference* as of identification, the ideas overlapping and being entwined together as functions of the same conception." (*Ibid.*, p. 235.)

§ 24. Criticism of Martineau's Theory.—Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory* contains a luminous exposition of many important moral truths. We shall, however, confine our attention here to an estimate of his account of the moral standard.

(1) Martineau's view is allied to the doctrine of Moral Sense or Perceptual Intuitionism considered above (*Vide* § 2 & § 3); and hence the defects of such a doctrine (*Vide* § 4) are to be found in his system, though it is presented in an improved form. Though moral qualities are revealed in conflicting impulses, yet moral science can never be satisfied with merely recording the moral worth as found and

The moral standard is the original difference of moral worth among conflicting impulses; and it requires that we should act according to the higher.

The moral distinction is ultimately based on Divine Holiness.

Martineau's theory is allied to the doctrine of Moral Sense which is presented in an improved form.

tabulating the result. Unlike popular knowledge, philosophy aims at discovering the rationale of our experience. Moral philosophy, therefore, must trace our moral estimates to the general principles underlying and explaining them. Martineau himself occasionally does so, though he stops short of adopting it as a general principle. He mentions, for example, with regard to 'Fear' that "Its value is, *per se*, indeterminate, depending in each concrete case, ethically, on the affection which is thrown into alarm" (*Types*, II, p. 198); and he likewise remarks that in the case of complex impulses "Our first estimate is subject to reflective correction." (*Ibid.*, p. 236.) If this be so, then the determination of the moral worth in a concrete case rests ultimately, not on intuitive apprehension, but on rational comparison. The truth of this observation will be more clear from the following paragraph and section 26 of this chapter.

(2) The gradation of impulses in a scale, according to their relative moral value, itself implies the operation of moral laws. We discover the relative moral worth of impulses in different cases by a series of judgments subsuming the impulses under distinct moral principles. When the same or similar conflicts are present in different cases, our moral judgments are characterized by uniformity, because they illustrate the employment of common principles. It may, no doubt, be said that these principles or laws themselves are but subsequent generalizations from the observation of cases. . Whether moral laws

But philosophy aims at rational explanation by general principles. Moral philosophy, accordingly, cannot be satisfied with mere tabulation of results.

Martineau admits at times the necessity of such rational estimate, though he does not adopt it as a principle.

The moral scale illustrates the operation of moral laws assigning the motives their determinate place in it.

Moral laws are not purely subjective; but even if they be so, still they explain the cases: science traces cases to principles and not conversely.

Martineau's moral scale is a general scheme proved by facts and illustrating moral principles.

Martineau's moral scale is practically useless, since in every concrete case the choice is between 'the absolutely right' and 'the absolutely wrong,' there being no room for degrees of moral worth.

are thus purely subjective or they are also objective, we shall examine in section 26. But assuming, for the present, that they are subjective, still they, and not the cases, should be the limit of explanation: science traces cases to principles and not principles to cases, even though cases be the ultimate justification of principles. This is virtually admitted by Dr. Martineau, for his moral scale is a general scheme indicating the general relations of conflicting impulses, which are the expressions of corresponding laws. The *means of discovering* the laws is, no doubt, the examination of concrete cases: and Martineau's book is full of psychological analysis and careful examination of such cases, revealing the presence of laws underlying them. After such an examination in a special case, he writes, for example, "From the *ensemble* of these psychological comparisons the rule results, that the *Secondary Affections* must yield the higher place to the *Primary Passions*." (*Ibid.*, p. 205.)

(3) With regard to the above objections it may be said, however, that moral laws, though enabling us to discover the moral qualities of acts, do not bring out the gradations of moral worth which Martineau wants to emphasize. A moral law tells us that, of two conflicting courses, one is right and the other, wrong; but it does not indicate the degree of moral worth which may be present in a particular case. We have seen (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 5) that Martineau prefers the expression 'moral worth' to the terms 'right' and 'wrong' as indicating the moral quality,

because moral worth is "applicable to what presents *gradations* of value." (Ibid., II, p. 47.) But the gradation, to which he refers, is rather of nominal than of any real value, even in his system. We never characterize our moral acts as more or less good, or greater or smaller evil. In any particular case, there are two courses open to us, which are relatively the best and the worst for the time being. As Young says—

"Who does the best his circumstance allows,
Does well, acts nobly ; angels could no more."

Martineau himself is very explicit on the point. He writes, "We find, if our exposition has been correct, a controversy between two competing impulses, of which, be their relative vehemence what it may, we well know one to be better, the other worse,—the one to express the Divine, the other the Satanic claim to us,—the one to constitute the highest, the other the lowest possibility which the crisis opens to us. Between them the interval is unspeakably great, a gulf infinite and impassable ; they are not first and second best, but simply the absolutely right for us to do and the absolutely wrong. The whole problem lies in this alternative ; and if, under the temptation, we fall, we perpetrate the very worst that the moment allows, and take the offer of sin unreservedly and on its own terms. What more could we have done in the guilty service than we have done ? We have performed all that it asked of us. It matters not that there are other

Martineau
admission.

passions viler still, other acts conceivable of deeper turpitude. They had no place in our problem, and were wholly absent from the field; and what alleviation is it, that we did not lapse under a temptation that never tempted us?" (*Ibid.*, II, p. 67.) If this is the true account of a moral conflict, then we decide in every case by the appropriate moral law; and the scale of gradation among impulses is of little value to us.

His scale is too abstract to be of any practical value.

(4) Again, the impulses, as named by Martineau in his moral scale, are too abstract to admit of any moral character. Merely to mention Fear, Resentment, Compassion, or Admiration is not to indicate its relative moral worth. An impulse is always to be judged by reference to the circumstances giving rise to it; and to divorce it from these is to render it morally colourless. Concrete circumstances are the proper sphere of moral experience. Quixotic compassion, for example, is not of the same moral hue as the compassion of a Howard. Resentment, likewise, may take the form of righteous indignation, of unholy wrath, or of vile animosity. Martineau himself admits, "Nor can we assign to Fear, simply as such, a uniform moral value relatively to other springs of action. Fears cannot be appraised without reference to the worth of the objects feared; just as Hope rises to the noble or sinks to the base, and Love may be a grace or a degradation, according to the object that fixes the eye or wins the heart. The egoist will have fears only for himself; the benevolent, largely for others; and the moral quality

His admission.

of these fears will be imported simply from the affections that inspire them." (*Ibid.*, II, p. 198.) In criticising Prof. Seeley's definition of 'Religion' as 'habitual and permanent admiration,' Martineau likewise observes, "To love amiss is no evidence of goodness; and it is possible so to admire as to contradict the very essence of religion. Is there any more 'habitual and permanent admiration' than that of the handsome fop—the Beau Brummel or Count d'Orsay of his day—for his own person, as he stands before the mirror?" (*Study of Religion*, I, p. 14.) Similarly, Martineau mentions, "Even forgiveness is not *unconditionally* approvable, and may cast away a discipline needful alike for the offender and the spectator... We cannot, therefore, insert generosity at an invariable place in our list." (*Types*, II, pp. 243-244.) Thus, a mere list of abstract springs of action cannot enable us to decide cases of right and wrong: we must pronounce a verdict after a rational estimate of concrete impulses.

(5) A complete list of the numerous concrete impulses, influencing human conduct, with their relative moral worth, is not practicable; and even were it possible, it would scarcely be of any scientific interest, since science is interested in the general and not in the particular. But even the list of abstract impulses given by Martineau is not complete. The Moral Sentiments and Prudence, for example, which often influence our conduct have been left out; and Martineau's refusal to include them illustrates, as Sidgwick points out, at least "a psychological

A scale of concrete impulses is in practice

Martineau's scale of abstract impulses is incomplete; and so it cannot serve as a standard

paradox, in conflict with ordinary experience." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 367.) Martineau explicitly mentions that his table is "merely tentative," and admits that "The extreme complexity of the combinations renders the task of drawing up such a table precarious and difficult." (*Types ii*, p. 129.) If, however, Martineau's scale is incomplete, it cannot enable us to solve every moral problem and so it cannot serve as a standard. If rational principles alone can enable us to decide the cases coming within his scale (since, as shown above, divorced from circumstances, the abstract impulses have no absolute moral worth) as well as the cases not covered by it, then the principles, and not the scale, constitute the standard in morals.

Martineau's admission.

The rational principles, by which we judge the cases in and out of his scale, really constitute the moral standard.

(C) *Calderwood*.

The first principles of morality, intuited by Conscience, constitute the moral standard.

Calderwood's supreme moral principle.

The first principles, when applied to particular cases, enable us to arrive at moral estimates.

§ 25. (C) **The Standard according to Calderwood.** According to Calderwood, Conscience intuitively discovers the first principles of morality which, when applied to particular cases, enable us to ascertain their moral worth. "The general principle, which gives validity to an accurate moral judgment, is present in that judgment only by implication, not by formal expression." (*Hand-book of Moral Philosophy*, p. 38.) "The foundation principle of morality," according to him, is "*that it is right in a man to use his powers for rational ends.*" He mentions, "If unity is attainable in morals, it is here." (*Ibid*, p. 33.) If the fundamental moral principles be correctly applied to concrete cases, we get correct moral judgments; otherwise, we arrive at erroneous moral estimates. The ultimate source of morality or, as he says, 'the foundation of virtue' is "The moral purity or perfection of the Divine nature." He

writes, "The relation of the Divine Will to the Divine nature must be such that the former is the sure exponent of the latter. Moral obligation and responsibility imply the exercise of Divine control subjecting us to moral law. We may, therefore, affirm that the source of all morality is in the Divine Will, but this can rank only as a provisional and partial statement, leaning upon the excellence of the Divine nature." (*Ibid.*, pp. 252-253.)

§ 26. **Appreciation of the Above Views.** The views of Martineau and Calderwood may be described as complementary. Had Martineau pushed his theory farther, he would have arrived at the fundamental principles underlying his moral scale; and had Calderwood worked out his theory in detail and gathered and arranged the results of his investigation, he would have been able to prepare a table like that of Martineau. The moral principles, like other general laws, are never known in the abstract: they are known through the concrete cases illustrating their operation. We have no means of knowing the Law of Gravity, the Law of Definite Proportions, or the Law of Identity by itself, apart from its use in this or that case: we never observe these abstract laws floating in the air, as it were; they are known when they are, so to speak, embodied in concrete cases. Such is also the case with moral laws. They are known to us as embodied in concrete cases. We know, however, that the true materials of our moral life are the inclinations or impulses. Hence the moral laws are revealed to us through the conflicts of

Morality ultimately rests on Divine Perfection

The theories of Martineau and Calderwood are complementary.

Laws are revealed in concrete cases.

Moral laws are known in connection with conflicting impulses.

impulses. The impulses constitute, as it were, the flesh and blood through which the vital principle of our moral life runs.

We should remember here the relation which a law bears to its facts. We have seen, while criticising Kant (§21), that a law divorced from facts is to us an abstraction. But this does not mean that a law is merely a creation of our own minds—an ideal or subjective synthesis of facts. A law, as explained above (*Vide* sections 9 and 10), indicates a *nexus naturæ* or an objective connection; but it is revealed to us in relation to the facts which come under its influence. The relation of a law to its facts is not quite the same to us as it is to the Author of the Universe. As finite things or beings are not self-existent, they find their constitution determined by laws which prescribe its form and limits. Thus the Author of the World, being the source of all laws, knows them prior to creation as well as subsequent to it, when they are embodied in created objects; but we can know the laws only when they have been so embodied. We have, thus, no means of knowing the laws apart from the cases in which they are illustrated; but this should not be construed to imply that they are but creations of our own fancy. Moral laws, accordingly, are gleaned from a study of the moral facts which, as we have seen, are conflicting impulses, affording room for choice. (*Vide* Chapter IV, § 2.) As these laws operate in us, our conscious nature detects them in their operation. But, ordinarily, we have an implicit knowledge

A law implies an objective connexion.

God knows laws prior and subsequent to creation; but we know them as embodied in it.

As moral laws operate in us, Conscience intuitively detects them in their operation.

of these laws as they spontaneously work in our own minds; and it is reflective analysis which renders them explicit. They subjectively operate before they are objectively defined. A law is intuited on the occasion of a particular conflict; but it is formulated after careful observation, analysis, and comparison. And if induction enables us to trace the several moral laws to one supreme principle, it merely proves their fundamental unity and reveals their inner harmony and connexion as different expressions of One Supreme Moral Perfection. Induction reveals, it does not create, a law.

Kant also betrays the same tendency, which is illustrated in the systems of Martineau and Calderwood, when he lays down the universal principle of Reason as the final standard in morals. On an examination of the concrete moral experiences, he discovers that the supreme principle in morals, according to which we should act, is—"Act on a maxim which thou canst will to be law universal." He thus traces morality to a single principle. We may, if we like, similarly say 'Act rationally,' or 'Be honest or sincere,' or 'Be consistent in your conduct,' or 'Do to others as you would be done by.' Kant's defect, as we have seen, is that he idealizes his principle which becomes out of touch with the facts of our moral life. As Hoffding says, "It is doing no service to ethics to assign to it a basis lying outside all experience. For it is precisely in the world of experience that the ethical has to live and work." (*History of Modern Philosophy*, II, p. 82.) Neverthe-

Spontaneous intuition should be distinguished from reflective enunciation.

Supreme moral principle indicates the harmony of moral laws.

Kant's theory is allied to the theories of Martineau and Calderwood.

Supreme moral principle.

Kant idealizes his principle, which indicates the goal of moral life.

No

less, as indicating the goal of our moral life—the saintly rest and holy resignation—his standard has a value :

“Duty by habit is to pleasure turn’d ;
He is content who to obey has learn’d.”

(*Sir E. Brydges.*)

When, by the constant discharge of duties, one weakens the evil propensities, he acquires a love of virtue and thus gains a momentum for the unobstructed performance of what is right. But this is the culmination and not the common rule of righteous life. Love of virtue gradually develops by scrupulous adherence to the right path, and ultimately it may become the governing impulse in an honest mind ; but this stage must be reached through the ordinary life of moral probation. (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 3.) When, however, this is made the test of common life, either the attainment of virtue becomes impossible or, if attained, it is attained in a perverted and forced way, which is worse than its ordinary and natural form.

Kant’s standard has thus a significance ; and Martineau’s moral scale may likewise be said to have one. It presents before us in a concrete form the duty which we all are under of cultivating the higher side of our nature. The gradation illustrates the law that we should not merely be content with the discharge of duties as they accidentally arise, but should try to elevate our nature by seeking opportunities for the exercise of the nobler affections. “Is all our care,” asks Martineau, “to be for the comparative *quality* of our incentives, and none for their *quantity*,

Love of
virtue
develops with
righteous-
ness.

Martineau’s
scale, like
Kant’s prin-
ciple,
indicates the
duty of
ennobling
our nature.

i.e., the *proportion of our life and action which they control?*" (*Types*, ii, p. 267.) And he answers, "If there be at the command of our will, not only the selection of the better side of an alternative, but also a predetermination of what kind the alternative shall be, the range of our duty will undoubtedly be extended to the creation of a higher plane of circumstance, in addition to the higher preference within it." (*Ibid.*, p. 268.) Thus, the moral gradation of Martineau, like the universal principle of Kant, though not explicitly supplying the moral laws for the regulation of conduct, indicates the ideal towards which we should move: one, who habitually acts according to his higher impulses, is gradually moved by love of virtue; and he learns to do his duty for duty's sake.

"He holds no parley with unmanly fears;
Where duty bids, he confidently steers,
Faces a thousand dangers at her call,
And, trusting in his God, surmounts them all."

(*Cowper.*)

§ 27. Is Intuition Consistent with Error?

It may seem that the intuitive apprehension of moral principles and the immediate knowledge which we have of our own impulses leave no room for error in moral estimates. We have already discussed this question in connection with the Diversity of Moral Judgments in the last chapter; but let us refer here to one aspect of it more fully in order to avoid any possible misapprehension. We have seen that moral judgments are inferential in character

Intuitive apprehension of moral principles and direct knowledge of impulses do not necessarily exclude error in the moral sphere.

(*Vide* Chap. VI, § 2), and also that the moral principles are always discovered aright by Conscience (*Vide* Chap. VII, § 4). We have also seen that erroneous moral estimates are due to the wrong application of principles. Such wrong application may be (1) either voluntary or (2) non-voluntary. As, however, the first case (1), viz., the wilful distortion of a judgment, has already been considered in connection with perverse moral judgments (*Vide* Chap. VI, § 6), we shall here refer only to the other alternative.

(2). A non-voluntary incorrect estimate, *i. e.*, an error of judgment in the proper sense of the term, thus arises chiefly from a confusion of motives. Such a confusion is not inconsistent with the immediate knowledge of impulses. Without dwelling on the difficulty of introspection, we may say that, even in comparatively simple cases, one may as times be led to doubt whether he acts from fear or good will in excusing a fault, from sheer justice or an admixture of resentment in inflicting a punishment, from envy or emulation in outstripping a rival, from affection or self-regard in helping another. In fact, if trained psychologists differ in their estimates of benevolence, conscience, and virtue—and even of such elementary experiences as pleasure, pain, and moral quality—it is no wonder that ordinary men may at times feel some difficulty in reading their motives. And when the motives present are complex in character, the liability to error is certainly increased. It should not, however, be supposed that mathematical calculation is

Error lies in the wrong application of the principles,

which may be either (1) voluntary or (2) non-voluntary.

(1) Wilful wrong application has already been discussed in Chapter VI, 6.

(2) Non-voluntary wrong application is due to confusion of motives.

In complex cases the chances of error are increased.

necessrry to determine the character of a motive in such cases. As Martineau says, "Psychological proportions may really exist and may tell upon our experience, without being measurable ; and, what is more, we may feel their synthesis and have a good guess at their shares, without being required or able to spread them out in quantitative analysis.And it may be doubted whether, in itself, and until tricks of self-excuse have tampered with its simplicity, this implicit estimate, wrapped up in the feeling, is not more effective as an integer, than when crumbled into its fractional equivalents, positive and negative." (*Types*, Vol. II, pp. 236-237.)

And even in the case of spontaneous estimate, instances of error are not rare. A religious fanatic may thus feel that he is acting nobly while persecuting his fellow men (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 5), or a philanthropist may feel that he has acted wrongly in not attending to the sufferings of certain people through pre-occupation in some other sphere. Cases are not unknown when individuals are staggered at the disastrous consequences of acts which they undertook in good faith, but which they subsequently condemn owing to the deplorable issue. I have known parents feeling compunction for having placed their children under this or that medical treatment, when the illness takes an unfavourable turn ; and individuals have at times been struck with remorse for scrupulously delaying a help which, if timely rendered, might have saved a life. Analysis reveals that error in such cases is due to the confusion of motive

Spontaneous estimate leaves room for error.

which may be due to (a) confusion of motive with issue or (b) imperfect analysis of the former.

with issue. But imperfect analysis is also responsible for erroneous moral estimates in certain cases. One may thus be led to suspect that he is perhaps influenced by affection in excusing the fault of a beloved person, when really the motive is regard for his delicate health which is likely to suffer materially by any chastisement. When we sit down to dissect our motives we should take care to discover all the elements which enter into their composition, in order that a valid estimate may be arrived at; and we should never confound what is actually present with what might have been present in the mind, had the circumstances been different.

Bias or pre-occupation increases the chance of error.

Such errors are found also in other spheres of mental activity.

Spontaneous operation of principles should be

Thus, error in deciphering the character of a motive is not inconsistent with its immediate knowledge; and the liability to such error increases when, through preoccupation or bias, we are disposed to ignore some factors. Erroneous moral estimate, as we have seen, is quite consistent with the rapid and implicit inference illustrated in the common verdicts of mankind. (*Vide* Chap. VI, § 2.) Such rapid inferences and errors are not uncommon in the other departments of our life. The 'perception,' for example, of distance through sight or the knowledge of the character of an individual through misconduct is no less quick and no less liable to error. As in such cases we do not require a knowledge of optics or physiology to estimate distance or character, so in morals we do not require a knowledge of ethics to determine our duty. The spontaneous operation of principles in the general intelligence should be

distinguished from the reflective exposition of them by the philosopher. And such spontaneous operation secures general accuracy, though not altogether excluding the possibility of error.

§ 28. **Does this Position Involve a Vicious Circle?** Let us conclude this chapter with a brief reference to an objection which has been urged by Sidgwick against the kind of Philosophical Intuitionism we have been discussing here. He sounds "a word of caution" against "a certain class of sham-axioms which are very apt to offer themselves to the mind that is earnestly seeking for a philosophical synthesis of practical rules and to delude the unwary with a tempting aspect of clear self-evidence." (*Methods* Bk. III, Chap. XIII, pp. 374-75.) And he says, "These are principles which appear certain and self-evident because they are substantially tautological." (*Ibid.*, p. 375.) The remark of Sidgwick illustrates how prone we are to stigmatize things without discrimination. Tautology implies a repetition of the same meaning in different words; and we must distinguish between the cases where this is inevitable and when it may be avoided—between the cases where it serves a useful purpose and so acceptable and the cases where, instead of serving an end, it becomes injurious in effect and so should be avoided. Tautology is but a form of explanation. Explanation, however, may be attempted (a) either in the case of a simple and elementary notion or (b) in the case of a complex idea. In the latter case (b) we may explain the composite notion by resolving

distinguish
from their
reflective
knowledge

Sidgwick
remarks that
the moral
principles
are tautolo-
gical in
character.

Tautology,
however,
serves
at times a
useful
purpose.

Tautology is a form of explanation which aims at unfolding the meaning of either (a) an elementary or (b) a complex notion.

In the latter case we may avoid tautology ; but in the former, tautology is inevitable, though not necessarily useless.

it into its elementary constituents ; and thus we may avoid repetition or tautology in such a case. But when we come to explain an elementary idea (*a*), it is not possible for us to resolve it into anything else ; and the only course open to us in such a case is to express the same thing in some other form, with the belief that it is better known. Now, in the latter case, tautology is not merely not a fault, but it is the only legitimate procedure. To maintain otherwise is to confound its legitimate with its illegitimate uses and to commit the Fallacy of Accident. Now the moral quality being, as Professor Sidgwick admits, "ultimate and unanalysable," it cannot be reduced to anything simpler ; and hence the moral principles, which express but different aspects of this quality, are finally not synthetical but analytical judgments. Professor Sidgwick admits that "One important lesson which the history of moral philosophy teaches is that, in this region, even powerful intellects are liable to acquiesce in tautologies of this kind ; sometimes expanded into circular reasonings, sometimes hidden in the recesses of an obscure notion, often lying so near the surface that, when once they have been exposed, it is hard to understand how they could ever have presented themselves as important." (*Ibid.*, p. 375.) Tautology is, thus, not a fault of this form of Intuitionism ; if it be a fault, it is equally illustrated in every doctrine based on an elementary principle. Bain, for example, writes, "There can be no proof offered for the position that Happiness is the proper end of all human pursuit,

the criterion of all right conduct. It is an ultimate or final assumption, to be tested by reference to the individual judgment of mankind. If the assumption, that misery, and not happiness, is the proper end of life, found supporters, no one could reply, for want of a basis of argument—an assumption still more fundamental agreed upon by both sides. It would probably be the case, that the supporters of misery, as an end, would be at some point inconsistent with themselves; which would lay them open to refutation. But to any one consistently maintaining the position, there is no possible reply, because there is no medium of proof." (Bain's *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 441.) Sidgwick himself admits that the fundamental notion implied in ought and right "is too elementary to admit of any formal definition." (P. 34.)

Let us see now what Professor Sidgwick regards as the genuine procedure for the attainment of a significant system of morals. He writes, "Can we then, between this Scylla and Charybdis of ethical inquiry, avoiding on the one hand doctrines that merely bring us back to common opinion with all its imperfections, and on the other hand doctrines that lead us round in a circle, find any way of obtaining self-evident moral principles of real significance? It would be disheartening to have to regard as altogether illusory the strong instinct of Common Sense that points to the existence of such principles, and the deliberate convictions of the long line of moralists who have enunciated them. At the same time,

Tautology is involved, more or less, in every theory based on an elementary principle.

Bain's admission.

Sidgwick maintains that, though the notion of right is original and elementary, Utility alone can indicate the concrete duties of life.

the more we extend our knowledge of man and his environment, the more we realize the vast variety of human natures and circumstances that have existed in different ages and countries, the less disposed we are to believe that there is any definite code of absolute rules applicable to all human beings without exception. And we shall find, I think, that the truth lies between these two conclusions. There are certain absolute practical principles, the truth of which, when they are explicitly stated, is manifest ; but they are of too abstract a nature, and too universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by immediate application of them what we ought to do in any particular case ; particular duties have still to be determined by some other method." (*Methods*, p. 379.) Professor Sidgwick, accordingly, holds that, though the notion of right is original and fundamental, yet utility alone can show us the way to the duties of life. But it may be asked, If the idea of right is not involved in utility how can it enable us to ascertain our duties ? Utility may suggest what is desirable but not what is obligatory. (a) And if duties are deduced from utility, it is because utility is already recognised as obligatory. Thus, "the absolute practical principles," which are described as "too abstract" and "too universal," establish the obligatoriness of utility itself, which is taken to be the guide of all duties. (b) If, however, the notion of right be not involved in utility, then it can by no means evolve the obligatoriness of useful lines of action. In either case, we find an un-

But Utility
by itself can
never deter-
mine a duty.

necessary multiplication of principles to explain facts. If the first alternative be true, then, according to the law of parsimony, the aid of utility is superfluous; while if the second alternative, be true, then utility is morally useless, for by itself it fails to provide for duties. Thus the moral principles alone are competent to explain our duties, failing which utility is altogether unavailing. Martineau rightly observes, "If you cannot speak home to the conscience at once, condescend to no lower plea: to reach the throne-room of the soul, Divine and holy things must pass by her grand and royal entry, and will refuse to creep up the back stairs of greediness and gain." (*Types*, p. 77.) Hence is it we find that great thinkers of all ages have referred to the intrinsic worth and regulating function of the moral principles. (*Vide* section 3.) Sidgwick himself mentions, "One important lesson which the history of moral philosophy teaches is that, in this region, even powerful intellects are liable to acquiesce in tautologies of this kind." (*Methods*, p. 375.) As we have said, they are tautologies because they are self-evident. To accept them does not involve a vicious circle; but to supplement them by utility does so, for then we are driven from morality to utility and back again from utility to morality. Thus to reject the first principles as guides is rather to be drawn into the whirlpool of "circular reasonings" and thus to miss the right course for the proper solution of moral problems. One led by mere utility would perhaps form as

Sidgwick transgresses the law of parsimony.

Sidgwick's position may be said to involve a vicious circle.

correct an estimate of Duty as the blind man, mentioned by Locke, did of scarlet colour when he thought it to be like the sound of a drum.

It may, no doubt, be asked that if the principles be intuitive, what is the necessity of explaining them at all? We have referred to this point under the head of Moral Progress in Chapter VIII; but let us add here a few words more to elucidate the point. Intuition implies a capacity which may develop to different degrees and forms according to the varying influence of the environment which calls it forth. Thus the notion of justice, benevolence, or honesty, though fundamentally the same, admits of variation owing to variation of circumstances. Hence the necessity of explanation to render precise and definite an idea which might otherwise remain more or less vague and imperfect. An explanation in the case of elementary experiences implies an appeal to self-consciousness and involves merely the development of factors which were before latent or dormant. Even in the case of light or sound or extension, our ideas are not always clear or accurate; and they may be improved by explanation or instruction. Such explanation, however, is often a re-statement in language of what may be dimly or imperfectly present in other minds. The different forms of statement of one and the same fact have frequently the effect of rendering its idea definite and clear: vague subjective notions are on many occasions rectified by precise objective expressions or descriptions. Thus the explanation of

Intuition
leaves room
for develop-
ment and
explanation.

Such an
explanation
involves an
appeal to
consciousness

and favours
the due
development
of *a priori*
notions and
principles.

elementary moral experiences or of fundamental moral principles in different forms of language, bringing out their different aspects or significance, is not altogether useless. It can never be maintained that verbal propositions are altogether useless. Definitions are verbal propositions; and they have their uses. Tautology, as Goutama observes,* is often a necessary form of proof or explanation to minds not quite familiar with what is usually regarded as an obvious truth: we must adapt our exposition to the needs of the persons addressed—even to their frailties and idiosyncrasies; what is tautology to one is not so to another: a fuller explanation of truth is at times necessary in condescension to human weakness and ignorance.

Tautology is entirely relative: it has its use in instructing imperfect minds.

Gautama's testimony.

* अनुवादापपत्तेयम् । Nyaya System, II, 59. पुनरुक्तदीर्घोऽभ्यासे
नेति प्रकृतम् । अनर्थकोऽभ्यासः पुनरुक्तः अथवानभ्यासीऽनुवादः ।
Vatsyayana Bhashya.

CHAPTER X.
THE MORAL STANDARD.
(II) THE STANDARD AS END.
HEDONISM.

§ 1. **Morality Implies an End : The Question of the Summum Bonum.** We have considered in the last Chapter in § 6 that the moral standard is conceived by some as a law and by others as an end. Having examined the former view in the last Chapter, let us now turn our attention to the latter. It is contended by the supporters of this view that every voluntary action is relative to an end ; and, among ends, there is a gradation, culminating in the supreme end which is the goal of life. When an examinee, for example, makes success at an examination his end, this is really a means to a higher end which, in its turn, may be success at another examination or success in some profession. But this success by itself is not the end of life ; it is but a step towards a still higher end which may be conceived as health, wealth, wisdom, honour, or something else. These again are not desirable in themselves ; they are but means to happiness or perfection, individual or social. Thus happiness or perfection may be regarded as the chief end or the *summum bonum* of life, to which everything else is but a means ; and if this be so, the value of every attainment and every effort is to be judged by reference to this supreme end of life :

Voluntary action implies an end ; and the co-ordination of ends reveals the *summum bonum*.

Good, as Jouffroy observes, consists in the co-ordination of all ends. An examination, profession, or position which fails to secure the supreme end can never be called good. Likewise, no individual action in any sphere of life can be pronounced to be good which is inconsistent with the attainment of the great end of life.

Thus, it is contended by the supporters of Teleological Ethics that acts are to be judged as good or bad, by reference to the chief end of life : if happiness be viewed as the end, an act, which does not secure this, can never be pronounced as good ; similarly, if perfection be regarded as the supreme end of life, an act, which fails to bring us nearer to it, must be judged as wrong. Though, however, life *should be* steered by reference to its supreme end, yet as a matter of fact it *is not always* so done. Often we lose sight of the compass or control over the helm, and thus allow ourselves to be carried away by the passing current or wind. We, accordingly, find men deploring education, vocation, or pursuit, which runs counter to the true end of life, and condemning conduct when it is determined by extraneous considerations.

According to Teleological Ethics, moral quality is to be determined by reference to the *summum bonum*.

An act inconsistent with it is bad.

"As Nature's ties decay,
As duty, love, and honour, fail to sway,
Fictitious bonds, the bonds of wealth and law,
Still gather strength, and force unwilling awe."

(Goldsmith.)

When, for gain or glory, one behaves in a certain way, he may secure his proximate end ; but he may

be moving away from the true end of life. An individual, for example, who behaves in a decent way for fear of the police or public opinion, can never be said to be happy nor perfect, as his own mind is at war with itself. Morality thus aims at an internal end—the supreme end of life—and not an external end which, at most, may be but a means to it. Carlyle thus deplures the baneful influence of extraneous considerations on our moral life: “With respect to our Moral condition: here also, he who runs may read that the same physical, mechanical influences are everywhere busy. For the ‘superior morality’, of which we hear so much, we too would desire to be thankful: at the same time, it were but blindness to deny that this ‘superior morality’ is properly rather an ‘inferior criminality’, produced not by greater love of Virtue, but by greater perfection of Police; and of that far subtler and stronger Police, called Public Opinion. This last watches over us with its Argus eyes more keenly than ever; but the ‘inward eye’ seems heavy with sleep... Wonderful ‘Force of Public Opinion!’ We must act and walk in all points as it prescribes; follow the traffic it bids us, realize the sum of money, the degree of ‘influence’ it expects of us, or we shall be lightly esteemed; certain mouthfuls of articulate wind will be blown at us, and this what mortal courage can front?” (*Essay on Signs of the Times. Miscellaneous Essays II*, p. 115.)

It may further be argued that moral law can never be regarded as the final standard in morals.

Carlyle.

A law is relative to an end; so

A law is but a definite requirement which must be relative to some end. "Good," says Aristotle, "is the final cause: it is what all desire." A law aims at the attainment of some result, which properly explains the law. A law without reference to an end is arbitrary and unmeaning; and hence it can not claim ready obedience from rational creatures. Moral laws must, therefore, be considered as means to an end which, as indicated above, may be regarded as either pleasure, perfection, or happiness. Thus the question of the moral standard is not solved so long as we do not determine the true end of life, which supplies a meaning to moral laws. To stop at the laws is to halt in the middle without reaching our destination.

moral law
cannot be
the standard

Let us, therefore, examine now the accounts given by moralists of the true end of life, which is taken by them to be the moral standard. In reviewing the different systems we shall proceed, as in the previous chapter, methodically, adopting a principle of classification. But, in examining the several ethical systems indicated in the classification, we should not lose sight of the end of our discussion (*Vide* last chapter § 6): we shall examine the systems only so far as they help us in determining the correct ethical standard. A full discussion of the different systems is thus at once beyond the scope of this work and the object which we have in view. We shall, accordingly, review types of the different forms of the moral standard, considered as an end, in order to discover the elements which they may

Methodical
review of
Teleological
Systems with
a view to
determine
the true
moral stan-
dard.

contribute towards a true conception of the moral standard.

§ 2. Classification of Teleological Theories.

Classification
of Teleologi-
cal Theories :

Having already examined the different forms of (i) Jural Theories in the last chapter, let us now examine the several forms of (ii) Teleological Theories. Teleological Theories may at the outset be divided into three classes according as they take (I) Pleasure, (II) Perfection, or (III) Happiness as the end of life.

I *Hedonism*,
which makes
pleasure the
end of life
and so the
standard of
rectitude.

(I) The supporters of the first view hold that pleasure or freedom from pain is the *summum bonum* or the chief end of life ; and we should judge an act as right or wrong according as it tends to produce happiness or misery. Happiness is defined as the balance of pleasure ; and misery, as the balance of pain. " Actions are right," Mill writes, " in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain ; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure." (*Utilitarianism*, pp. 9-10.) This theory is known as *Hedonism* (from Gr. *hedone*, pleasure) ; and its standard may be described as *subjective*, since it makes subjective feeling the test of rectitude.

The standard
is subjective.

II *Perfectionism*,
which makes
excellence or
perfection
the end of
life and so
the moral
standard.

(II) The supporters of the second view maintain that perfection or excellence is the true end of life ; and an act is to be judged as right or wrong according as it tends to make us more or less perfect. This theory may be described as *Perfectionism*, using the term apart from its ordinary intrusive

associations. The *standard*, according to this theory, is *objective*, viz., perfection or excellence to be attained. (*Vide* Chap. XI.)

The standard is objective.

(III) The third view takes happiness to be the standard, interpreting happiness as a combination of perfection and satisfaction. The supporters of this view contend that true happiness consists, not in mere passing enjoyments, but in abiding satisfaction due to the systematization of desires according to the demands of our rational moral nature. According to this theory the rectitude of an action is determined, not merely by perfection, but also by satisfaction: perfection and satisfaction are thus the co-ordinate elements entering into happiness which constitutes the moral standard. A virtuous action tends to promote perfection and satisfaction alike; and if either of these two factors be wanting an act cannot be called virtuous. "Sensibility," as Seth remarks, "enters into the very texture of goodness itself." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 81.) This theory is known as *Eudæmonism* (from Gr. *eudaimonia*, well-being or happiness), and its *standard* may be described as *subjectivo-objective*. [*Vide* § 7 (13) and Chap. XII.] The following lines roughly represent these three views:

III. *Eudæmonism*, according to which the true end of life, and hence the moral standard, is happiness, involving both perfection and satisfaction.

The standard is subjective-objective.

- 1 | "Live while you live, the epicure would say,
And seize the pleasures of the present day;
- 2 | Live while you live, the sacred preacher cries,
And give to God each moment as it flies:
- 3 | Lord, in my view let both united be;
I live in pleasure, when I live to Thee."

(Doddridge.)

Hedonism

شؤون دنيا و آخرت
و لذت و عبادت

Distinction
between
Psychological
and Ethical
Hedonism :

*Psychological
Hedonism*
maintains
that pleasure
is the object
of every
desire and
the end of
every
volition :

§ 3. (I) Classification of Hedonistic Theories.

Before classifying the Hedonistic Theories we should distinguish between Psychological and Ethical Hedonism. *Psychological Hedonism* rests on the assumption that the object of every desire is pleasure or freedom from pain ; and human volition *is always* determined by it. Human nature is conceived as essentially sentient ; and the gratification of sensibility is viewed as the predominant tendency in man. Reason and Will are mere instruments for the gratification of Feeling : the one devises means and the other carries it out for such gratification. Life thus illustrates a continuous hankering after pleasure.

"Whate'er the motive, pleasure is the mark :

For her the black assassin draws his sword ;

For her dark statesmen trim their midnight lamp ;

For her the saint abstains, the miser starves ;

The Stoic proud, for pleasure, pleasure scorns ;

For her affliction's daughters grief indulge,

And find, or hope, a luxury in tears ;—

For her, guilt, shame, toil, danger, we defy."

(*Young.*)

*Ethical
Hedonism*
holds that
pleasure is
the true end
of life, and
hence it
constitutes
the moral
standard.

Ethical Hedonism, on the other hand, maintains that pleasure or freedom from pain is the *proper* end of man. Every moral action *should*, therefore, be directed to secure the greatest amount of pleasure. The moral standard, according to this view, is thus pleasure, individual or social. There is really no logical connection between these two forms of Hedonism. As Sidgwick observes, "No cogent

inference is possible from the psychological generalization that the agent's pleasures and pains are the universal motives, to the ethical principle that his own greatest pleasure is for each the ultimate rational end." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 44.) One may, thus, hold that life is *actually* regulated by feeling, without defending that it *should be so*, or *vice versa*. But, though there is no logical connection, yet, as a matter of fact, we find that the two forms often go together. We shall confine our attention to Ethical Hedonism, referring to the Psychological form only so far as it is connected with it. Hedonistic Theories may provisionally be classified thus, subject to the modification mentioned in §11 :—

Psychological and Ethical Hedonism, though not logically connected, often go together.

Classification of (I) Hedonistic Theories :

I Hedonism. (The Standard as Pleasure.)	1. Egoistic or..... Individualistic	(a) Gross or Sensualistic.
		(b) Refined or Rationalistic.
	2. Altruistic or..... Universalistic (Utilitarianism)	(a) Gross or Sensualistic.
		(b) Refined or Rationalistic.

Hedonism wears an (1) Egoistic or (2) Altruistic form, according as it makes the pleasure of the agent or of the community, the end of life and thus the standard of rectitude. And in each of these two cases, pleasure may be estimated either (a) by reference to sensuous enjoyment or (b) by reference to more elevated and representative emotions. We shall consider these theories one by one.

1. Egoistic.
2. Altruistic.

Each of these two forms may be either (a) gross or (b) refined.

§ 4. Peculiarities of Hedonism. Before proceeding to examine the different forms of Hedonism,

Peculiarities of Hedonism :

we shall notice certain peculiarities which are generally found in them. If we pass over the forms of Utilitarianism advocated by Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Gay, Paley, and others, which cannot strictly be brought under Hedonism, we find that (1) it is usually associated with empiricism and not infrequently with materialism or phenomenalism, and (2) it determines moral quality by reference to consequences and not by reference to impulses or motives. And these features may be said to be psychologically, if not logically, connected with Hedonism. "The science of the age," as Carlyle observes, "is physical, chemical, physiological ; in all shapes mechanical. Nay, our whole Metaphysics itself, from Locke's time downwards, has been physical ; not a spiritual philosophy, but a material one... This condition of the two great departments of knowledge,—the outward, cultivated exclusively on mechanical principles ; the inward, finally abandoned, because, cultivated on such principles, it is found to yield no result,—sufficiently indicates the intellectual bias of our time, its all-pervading disposition towards that line of inquiry. In fact, an inward persuasion has long been diffusing itself, and now and then even comes to utterance, That, except the external, there are no true sciences ; that to the inward world (if there be any) our only conceivable road is through the outward ; that, in short, what cannot be investigated and understood mechanically, cannot be investigated and understood at all... Of any belief in invisible, divine things, we find as few traces

(1) It is
ordinarily
empirical.

(2) It esti-
mates moral
worth by
consequences.

in our Morality as elsewhere. It is by tangible, material considerations that we are guided, not by inward and spiritual. Self-denial, the parent of all virtues, in any true sense of that word, has perhaps seldom been rarer : so rare is it, that the most, even in their abstract speculations, regard its existence as a chimera. Virtue is Pleasure, is Profit ; no celestial, but an earthly thing." (*Essay on Signs of the Times*, Miscellaneous Essays, Vol II, pp. 103-115.)

The observation of Carlyle well indicates the drift of the time and the connection which exists between Hedonism and the traits mentioned above. In this 'scientific age,' to accept anything merely on the testimony of consciousness amounts to superstition, and to determine moral worth without computation is quite arbitrary. The claim of everything to existence must now-a-days be determined by Sense and not by what is believed to be the dubious verdict of Consciousness. Hence, the admission of *a priori* principles is regarded as quite unscientific ; and experience—by which, of course, we are to understand mere Sense-knowledge—is viewed as the sole arbiter of truth. The impulses or motives, known only through consciousness, must likewise be declared to have a shadowy existence ; and to rest moral valuation on them is to make it highly precarious. The effects of action are, on the other hand, sensuous effects which can be definitely measured ; and, hence, these afford a surer clue to the moral quality of an action. Moreover, what bearing has an impulse or motive on morality, which is but a question of profit or loss ? The true

procedure, it is urged, is that we first judge others by reference to the consequences of their acts as they affect us; it is by this analogy that we judge either our own acts or those of others when they affect other persons. Self-judgment is, therefore, a secondary effect, accruing from the natural tendency to judge others as affecting our interests. "The theory of utility," remarks Austin, "has no connection whatever with any hypothesis or theory which concerns the origin of the motive." (*Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, Lect. IV, Vol. I p. 170.) We thus judge acts by reference to their consequences; and if ever we judge motives or impulses we do so only by reference to these perceptible and definite effects. If motives, Bentham observes, "are good or bad, it is only on account of their effects: good, on account of their tendency to produce pleasure, or avert pain: bad, on account of their tendency to produce pain, or avert pleasure. Now the case is, that from one and the same motive, and from every kind of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others that are indifferent." (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Ch. X, p. 102.)

Contrasts
between
Intuitionism
and Hedon-
ism:
(1) The one
determines
moral quality
by motive,
while the
other by
consequences.

If we compare these peculiarities with what has been explained in the previous chapters as essential to moral judgment, we find the following marked contrasts:—(1) If, according to the view adopted in these pages, we determine the moral quality by reference to the motives or antecedents; according to Hedonism, we determine the

moral quality by reference to effects or consequents. (2) If, according to our view we ordinarily judge ourselves before judging others (*Vide* Chap. XXI, § 2); according to Hedonism, we judge others before judging ourselves. (3) If, according to our view, pleasure and rectitude are distinct and may even be in conflict; according to Hedonism, it is pleasure which constitutes moral excellence. And finally (4) if we have defended the presence of *a priori* principles deciding questions of duty; Hedonism knows no method but *a posteriori* calculation and generalization. No doubt, Hedonism has sometimes been combined with the intuitive notion of Right (e. g., by Prof. Sidgwick); but, as the solution of every concrete moral problem is effected by Hedonistic calculation, very little room is left in such theories for the intuitive notion. (*Vide* last Chapter, section 28.) Evolutionary Ethics also tries to unite Hedonism with intuition through Heredity; but such an attempt implies that *ultimately* our moral estimates are empirical generalizations. The experienced conditions of social vitality have begotten in us certain moral intuitions which did not exist in our first ancestors. We shall examine Hedonism as modified by Evolution after considering the above forms of Hedonism, which rest on experience. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2 and 3.)

§ 5. (a) **Sensualistic Egoism.** Materialism is the metaphysics which usually supports this form of Hedonism. It is illustrated in the systems of Mandeville and Helvetius. Mandeville (1670-1733) published

(2) Self-judgment in the one case is the source, while, in the other, it is the issue, of our criticism of others.
(3) According to the one view pleasure and rectitude are distinct; while, according to the other, they are identical.
(4) The one admits *a priori* principles, while the other ignores them altogether.

Evolutional Hedonism.

(1) Egoistic Theories :
(a) Sensualism (usually associated with materialism) *Mandeville.*

Private vices
are public
virtues.

Self-love is
the sole
virtue.

in 1714 a book entitled *The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Public Benefits*, in which he tries to show that the private vices are really public virtues: Selfishness, Luxury, and Enjoyment, for example, contribute to the public good and the prosperity of a State. Self-love is the only virtue: "Man centres everything in himself, and neither loves nor hates, but for his own sake."

"Explore the dark recesses of the mind,
In the soul's honest volume read mankind,
And own, in wise and simple, great and small,
The same grand leading principle in all;
For parent and for child, for wife and friend,
Our first great mover, and our last great end
Is one; and by whatever name we call,

The ruling tyrant, Self is all in all." (*Churchill.*)

Men have
been induced
to perform
acts of self-
sacrifice by
flattery.

The vaunted human dignity is a sham; and virtue is merely an artificial institution, by which the "silly creature man" has been duped by his cunning brethern: "all the moral virtues are no better than the political offspring which flattery begot upon pride." Shrewd politicians by playing upon the 'pride and vanity' of man have induced individuals, devoid of any natural love for others, to perform acts of self-sacrifice; and as no *real* recompense could be offered for such sacrifice the *shadowy* rewards of praise and honour were devised. "Observing that none were either so savage as not to be charmed with praise, or so despicable as patiently to bear contempt, they justly concluded that flattery must be the most powerful argument that could be used to human creatures. Making use of this bewitching engine, they extolled the excellency of our nature above other animals . . . by the help of which we are capable

of performing the most noble achievements. Having, by this artful flattery, insinuated themselves into the hearts of men, they began to instruct them in the notions of honour and shame, etc." Man has thus been won over to virtue by flattery. Mandeville likens society to a bowl of punch, in which the souring element is found in avarice and the sweetening, in prodigality. The ignorance and folly of the common herd supply the water, while honour and nobility furnish the brandy. And he mentions, however objectionable these elements may appear when considered apart, they constitute, when judiciously mixed, a delightful beverage. And he observes —

Society is like a bowl of punch.

"Fraud, luxury, and pride must live,

While we the benefits receive." (*The Gambling Hive.*)

A similar doctrine was preached in France by Helvetius (1715-1771) who was influenced to a great extent by the writings of Locke and Mandeville. Self-love, according to him, is the spring of all action; it is as universal in the mental world as gravity is in the material. The end of every action is thus happiness, which means "the largest possible amount of physical pleasure." If men are to be influenced, it must be by appeal to self-interest and not by sermons and moral discourses. There is thus meaning in political virtues which are regulated by rewards and punishments; the so-called moral and religious virtues are based only on prejudice. We are disposed to do good to others when we find it somehow connected with ours. "None but a blind man or a liar will refuse to admit that the grandfather loves his grand-son only because he sees in him the foe of his own foe (the son who is

Helvetius.

Self-love is the source of all action.

The virtues are due to prejudice.

Love or friendship has an egoistic basis.

waiting for the inheritance)." All love or friendship, according to Helvetius, is based on want or interest :

"And what is friendship but a name,
A charm that lulls to sleep ;
A shade that follows wealth or fame,
But leaves the wretch to weep ?" (*Goldsmith.*)

"Whoever," he writes, "has a want of money, is the born friend of the post of comptroller-general, and of him who possesses it. If a comptroller-general falls into disgrace, we no longer love him, for this reason, that he is the friend who has suddenly become blind, deaf, and dumb." As society is made up of individuals, the satisfaction of each contributing to the general satisfaction ; and it is the business of the legislator to so regulate self-love as to promote the common well-being. Erdmann remarks, "By the perfect frankness with which he makes the satisfaction of the sensible subject the principle of his philosophy, he places himself in the same attitude to the defenders of egoism, as Mandeville did to the English and Scottish moralists." (*History of Philosophy*, II, p. 153.) It may be mentioned here that Bentham's system was moulded to a great extent by the speculations of Helvetius.

Bentham
was indebted
to Helvetius.

Aristippus.

Virtue is
pleasure
relative to
individuals.
No qualita-
tive
differences
among
pleasures.

The egoistic sensualism of Mandeville and Helvetius was but a revival of Cyrenaicism. **Aristippus** of **Cyrene** (435-356 B. C.), adopting the relativism of Protagoras, denied the absolute character of human virtue. Virtue is but pleasure which is relative to individuals. There are no intrinsic differences among pleasures other than those of intensity ; and as physical pleasures are the keenest, they are the most eligible. We should not sacrifice present enjoyment for future

pleasures which are always precarious. We should **fully enjoy the present**,—the sum-total of transient enjoyments constituting, according to him, true happiness, which is undisturbed by any thought of the morrow. An analogous doctrine was taught in India by the **Charvakas**, according to whom morality is but an arbitrary institution of crafty theologians; and the **only virtue is to enjoy the present**. As the Charvakas identify soul with body and recognize "no other hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes," they enjoin on every one the duty of self-gratification regardless of everything else—"Let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt."

Enjoy the present.

The Charvakas.

Morality is the invention of crafty theologians.

Virtue consists in present enjoyment.

"While life is yours, live joyously;
None can escape Death's searching eye:
When once this frame of ours they burn,
How shall it e'er again return?"

*Your life's still will not endure.
Shakespeare.*

It is evident that sensualistic egoism is properly speaking unreflective in character. Restricted to the present enjoyment, it does not form a rational estimate of human happiness by reference to ulterior consequences or the abiding interests of human life. Only so much intelligence is required for the attainment of the desired end as is necessary for the gratification of the senses; a degree of intelligence which is found in an unalloyed form in what we call the lower animals. The accession of Reason in man, which leads him to survey the distant, ignoring the present, is often regarded by the supporters of this view as rather a drawback or malady than an advantage or excellence. As Schiller observes, "Without gaining anything for his Manhood, he, by this first effort of Reason, loses the happy limita-

Sensualistic Egoism is unreflective.

tion of the Animal; and has now only the unenviable superiority of missing the Present in an effort directed to the Distance." (*Æsthetic Letters*.) Thus, according to this view, reflective life is a life of misery, while sensual life is extremely happy. Bliss can be attained only by continuous momentary enjoyments—the summation of immediate gratifications—regardless of what is absent, the past or the future. "What is the loftiest flight of genius, the finest frenzy that ever for moments united Heaven with Earth, to the perennial never-failing joys of a digestive-apparatus thoroughly eupeptic? Has not the turtle-eating man an eternal sunshine of the breast? Does not his Soul,—which, as in some Slavonic dialects, means his Stomach,—sit forever at its ease, enwrapped in warm condiments, amid spicy odours; enjoying the past, the present and the future; and only awakening from its soft trance to the sober certainty of a still higher bliss each meal-time,—three, or even four visions of Heaven in the space of one solar day! While for the sick man of genius, 'whose world is of the mind, ideal, internal; when the mildew of lingering disease has struck that world, and begun to blacken and consume its beauty, what remains but despondency, and bitterness, and desolate sorrow felt and anticipated to the end?'" (Carlyle's *Essay on Schiller*. Miscellaneous Essays, II, p. 200.)

§ 6. (b) **Refined Egoism.** This form of Egoism is illustrated in modern times mainly in the systems of the writers who took part in the German Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. To them "The empirical individual ego, as such, ranks as the absolute, as exclusive authority; for it they forget all else, or rather all else has value for them only in proportion as it relates

to the subject, subserves the subject, contributes to the advancement and internal satisfaction of the subject... In general, the consideration of what is profitable, of the particular end, is what occupies the foreground; utility is the special criterion of truth; what serves not the subject, advances not the interests of the subject, is thrown aside... The happiness of the individual is regarded as the highest principle, as the supreme end (*Basedow*, 1723-1790). Reimarus wrote a work on the 'advantages' of religion, and endeavoured to prove in it that the tendency of religion is not to injure earthly enjoyments, but rather to add to them. In the same way *Steinbart* (1738-1809) laboured in several works to establish the thesis, that all wisdom consists in the attainment of happiness, that is of enduring pleasure, and that the Christian religion, far from forbidding this, is itself a system of eudæmonism." (*Schwegler's History of Philosophy* translated by Stirling, pp. 208-209.) These writers do not understand by happiness sensuous enjoyment, but the more rational and abiding satisfaction of the mind. "The statement of Reimarus, to the effect that the well-being of living creatures is the end of the universe, is strictly limited to human well-being; and so prominently is this latter put forward, that even theoretical propositions are regarded as proved, (established by the "duty of belief"), simply because to accept them increases our happiness. For example, *Basedow* does not prove the immortality of the soul from the simplicity of its nature, but from the fact that immortality would add to its happiness... In *Steinbart* as well as in *Basedow*, however, as is proved by its association with immortality, we are not to understand by happiness physical enjoyment, which was the view of it taken by *Helvetius*.

Refined
personal
happiness is
the supreme
end of life.

*Basedow,
Reimarus,
Steinbart.*

It consists rather in self-approbation, and this explains why both so often substitute for it perfection, and why Besedow considers what produces happiness and what is useful, as one and the same thing." (Erdmann's *History of Philosophy*, II, p. 305.)

It may be mentioned in this connection that the tendency of modern ethics is generally altruistic. "While ancient Hedonism," remarks Seth, "was egoistic, the modern is altruistic for universalistic." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 96.) The universal love and spirit of self-sacrifice taught by Christianity have led men to advocate common brotherhood and well-being, instead of personal pleasure, as the moral end; and this is in accord with the dictates of conscience. When, therefore, egoism is taught in modern times, it is usually presented in an altruistic garb, as we shall notice in connection with the prevailing forms of Empirical Utilitarianism. "In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth," writes Mill, "we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality." (*Utilitarianism*, pp. 24-25.) Even the egoistic sensualism of Mandeville and Helvetius is softened at times by reference to the restraints of reason and common weal. Mandeville, for example, writes—

"So vice is beneficial found,
When it's by justice lopp'd and bound."

(*The Gambling Hive*, p. 11.)

"It is not in feeling the passions, or in being affected with the frailties of nature," he observes, "that vice consists; but in indulging and obeying the call of them, contrary to the dictates of reason." And

Helvetius similarly speaks of right action as having "the tendency to augment the mass of happiness in the community." Thus we find the trend of modern ethics to be mainly altruistic ; and when it becomes reflective, it is professedly so. We, accordingly, take Epicureanism as a type of refined egoism, and briefly refer to it here as illustrating this doctrine.

Epicureanism has often been misrepresented as equivalent to Cyrenaicism. But whatever might be said of the followers of Epicurus (341-270 B. C.), his own teachings were of an elevated character. Unlike Aristippus, he was simple, abstemious, and contented. He holds, no doubt, that virtue or sin has no meaning by itself : either of these has a meaning only by reference to the associated pleasure or pain. But he contends that Reason is the proper guide for the attainment of true happiness. He declares, "When we say that pleasure is the end of life, we do not mean the pleasures of the debauchee or the sensualist, as some from ignorance or from malignity represent, but freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from anxiety. For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the society of women, nor rare viands, and other luxuries of the table, that constitute a pleasant life, but sober contemplation, such as searches out the grounds of choice and avoidance, and banishes those chimeras that harass the mind." Thus, regarding pleasure as the sole ultimate good and pain as the sole evil, he directs that we should seek those pleasures which bring no pain and avoid the pain which brings no pleasure. Physical pleasures, though earlier and, at times, keener than the mental, are generally evanescent and attended with pain. Mental pleasures, on the other hand, are

Epicurus.

Virtue
consists in
happiness.

Happiness is promoted by mental pleasures and the avoidance of misery.

The peace of the mind is disturbed by illusory fears, such as those of the gods and of death.

comparatively pure, abiding, and tranquil. Though granting a place for some physical pleasures, which are essential to life, Epicurus distinctly pronounces that mental pleasures are far more important elements of our happiness. The peculiarity of mental pleasures and pains is that they may be influenced by memory and expectation; and so they may be regulated at will. If we dwell on past pleasures and desist from vain enterprises, then, by augmenting pleasure and diminishing pain, we can make our life happy.

Since our happiness is disturbed to a great extent by fear and hope, we should take care to free the mind from groundless fears and delusive hopes. Virtue thus consists in rather averting misery and suffering than in promoting positive pleasures. Now, the greatest fears which disturb the peace of mankind—(1) *the dread of death* and (2) *that of the gods*—turn out on examination to be baseless. Epicurus, adopting the atomic theory of the universe, explains physical phenomena mechanically by natural laws, undisturbed by the agency of gods. He, accordingly, pronounces divination, prophecy, and oracles as not only useless but mischievous; and he regards death as but a disjunction of atoms. (1) We need not fear death, for, he says, "When we are, death is absent from us; when death is come, we are no more." Likewise (2) we need not apprehend incurring the displeasure of the gods, for they are perfectly happy beings and so they would never trouble themselves about human affairs. Believing in the existence of blessed gods, Epicurus remarks, "The blessed and incorruptible has no troubles of its own, and causes none to others; it is not subject to either anger or favour." These two great tormentors—the fear of death and the dread of gods—being removed, we can

make our lives happy, if, like the blessed gods, we shun conflict and vain pursuit and adopt a life of simple ease, good-will, and serene leisure. Thus, to make ourselves happy, we should withdraw ourselves, as much as possible, from the strife of political life, the vain pursuit of wealth and honours, and even from the fond ties of domestic relations. A mind, thus freed from desires and passions, becomes the home of peace and bliss. Its happiness is increased by (1) the recollection of past pleasures and (2) the joys of friendship. (1) The recollection of past pleasures is itself a chief source of happiness. Epicurus, troubled in the closing years of his life by disease and suffering, thus writes to Idomeus, a friend and companion of his, "I write this to you on the last day of my life, which, in spite of the severest internal bodily pains, is still a happy day, because I set against them in the balance all the mental pleasure felt in the recollection of my past conversations with you." (2) Friendship, though resting on utility, is one of the chief sources of human happiness. A good friend is, as it were, another self, who devotes his life to active beneficence; friends should even be ready to die for each other. Justice, like friendship, is also based on expediency: "natural justice," he observes, "is merely a compact of expediency to prevent mutual harm"; and one should enter into the compact on prudential grounds, to avoid being molested by others.

We should shun conflict and vain pursuit.

Happiness is increased by dwelling on past pleasures and the joys of friendship.

Epicureanism was revived in modern times by Gassendi (1592-1655), who established an Epicurean School in France in the middle of the seventeenth century. The disciples of this school were Moliere, the Duke of Rochefoucault, Fontenelle, and Voltaire, among others.

(1) Psychological Hedonism is untenable: pleasure is the result of the satisfaction of a desire which is directed to an object.

§ 7. Criticism of Egoistic Hedonism.—(1) Psychological Hedonism is based on incorrect psychology. Pleasure by itself is not an object of action, but merely a subjective condition ensuing upon the removal of a want or the attainment of an end, which indicates the relaxation of a tension.

"For every want that stimulates the breast,
Becomes a source of pleasure when redrest."

(Goldsmith.)

"Pleasure," as Aristotle says, "finishes and completes the action." (*Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 5.) The want or the end, implied in a desire, has for its object something else than pleasure which, like a subjective barometer, indicates that the object is attained. We may desire food, wealth, honour, or knowledge, none of which by itself can be called a pleasure, though every one of them, so far as it is an object of desire, yields pleasure. We should thus distinguish between an object of desire and the pleasure derived from its gratification. (*Vide* Chap. XIX, § 4.) Mill overlooks this distinction when he writes, "Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 58.) "Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant may, no doubt, be described as 'two different modes of naming the same psychological fact,' because every concrete psychosis, as a complex phenomenon,

Mill confounds pleasure with the object of desire.

involves different elements: the 'thing' desired is an element which is essential to the presence of a desire, and the pleasure which we 'find' is quite another factor which attends the satisfaction of the desire. But the 'desirable' can never be said to be the same as the 'pleasant.' (See below No. 12.) Sidgwick properly observes, "So far from our conscious active impulses being always directed towards the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain for ourselves, we can find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding impulses, directed towards something that is not pleasure, nor relief from pain; and, indeed, that a most important part of our pleasure depends upon the existence of such impulses: while on the other hand they are in many cases so far incompatible with the desire of our own pleasure that the two kinds of impulse do not easily co-exist in the same moment of consciousness; and more occasionally (but by no means rarely) the two come into irreconcilable conflict, and prompt to opposite courses of action." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 53.) The teacher, the philanthropist, the reformer, for example, do not aim at producing agreeable feelings, whether in others or in themselves; any such desire is rather an obstacle to their work. We should in this connection distinguish between *pleasure as an agreeable feeling* and *pleasures as agreeable objects or things* yielding pleasure. As Mackenzie remarks, "The fact that we desire *pleasures* is no evidence that we desire *pleasure*... That we seek pleasures is a mere tautology. It

Sidgwick's
testimony.

Pleasure as
feeling should
be distin-
guished from
pleasures as
objects.
Mackenzie.

means simply that we seek what we seek." (*Ethics*, pp. 74-75.)

(2) Psycho-
logical hedon-
ism pre-
cludes the
ethical form.

Sidgwick's
testimony.

(2) We have already mentioned (*Vide* § 3) that there is no logical connection between psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. We may even go a step farther and say that the adoption of the former rather precludes the latter: if we always *do* seek our pleasure, then there is no meaning in saying that we *ought to do* so. As Sidgwick says—
 "The adoption of psychological Hedonism in its extreme quantitative form, is so far from leading logically to Egoistic Hedonism as an ethical doctrine that it is really incompatible with it. If it were true, as Bentham affirms (with the verbose precision of his later style) that "on the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case, taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness;" the proposition that a man 'ought' to pursue such conduct is incapable of being affirmed with any significance. For a psychological law invariably realized in my conduct does not admit of being conceived as a 'precept' or 'dictate' of reason: this latter must be a rule from which I am conscious of being able to deviate." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 43.) Moreover, the agreeable, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 1), is not the same as the 'ought,' pleasure is not identical with right. "The good is one thing, the pleasant another; these two, having different objects, chain a man. It is well

with him who clings to the good ; he who chooses the pleasant, misses his end." (*The Katha Upanishad*, 2nd Valli. Max Muller, *The Upanishads*, p. 8.)

(3) Egoistic Hedonism is a suicidal doctrine defeating its own end. It is a patent psychological fact universally admitted that the more one hankers after pleasure, the more does he lose it; and the more is one unmindful of it, the more he gets it. In the *Yoga-vasishtha* it is rightly said—

सर्वसंसारदुःखानां तृणैकादोर्वदुःखदा ।

अन्तःपुरस्यामपि या योजयत्यपि सङ्घटे ॥

"Of all the causes of our miseries the greatest is desire, which, like a traitor in your own house, betrays its inmates to danger and difficulty." The *Geeta* likewise teaches—

आपूर्यमाणमचलप्रतिष्ठं समुद्रमापः प्रविशन्ति यद्वत् ।

तद्वत्कामा यं प्रविशन्ति सर्वे स शान्तिमाप्नोति न कामकामो ॥२।७०॥

"To ever filling ocean grand
As various waters glide and stand
Full unperceived ; so joys may burst
On master minds which know no thirst
By hundreds, but they do not swell
Nor change, nor feel disturbed. These well
Can peace secure ; not such as care
And run for pleasures here and there."

(J. S. Chakravarti's Translation.)

To be really happy, one should act quite in a disinterested way, discharging the duties of life as they come : "A man of pleasure is a man of pains." (Young.) To seek happiness is thus to beget misery. This is described by Professor

(3) Egoistic Hedonism is a suicidal doctrine : one misses pleasure when he hankers after it.

Paradox of
Hedonism.

Sidgwick as "the *Fundamental Paradox of Hedonism*, that the impulse towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own aim." (*Methods*, p. 49.)

"Emotion turned inward," says Dewey, "eats up itself; and the result is either the assumption of cynicism and the *nil admirari* spirit, or the restless searching for some new thing, the latest sensation, which may stimulate the jaded and worn out emotional nature. If any one violates the law of his being by living upon his feelings, rather than upon the objects to which those feelings normally belong, his power of feeling becomes gradually exhausted, and he defeats his own end. He commits emotional suicide." (*Psychology*, p. 299.)

Hedonism
tends to
become
pessimistic.

Thus "the practice of Hedonistic observation and calculation has an inevitable tendency to decrease our pleasures generally" (*Methods*, p. 131); and the egoist, in making happiness the aim of his life, rather misses it. Nor do we find that the hedonist is altogether unconscious of this fact. Deeper reflection led the Cyrenaics and Epicureans to believe that positive pleasure is unattainable by man. Their theories were thus pessimistic, aiming at the avoidance of misery: "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain from the body and of trouble from the soul." Mill also writes, "In this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable. For nothing except that consciousness can raise a person above the chances of life, by making

him feel that, let fate and fortune do their worst, they have not power to subdue him : which, once felt, frees him from excess of anxiety concerning the evils of life, and enables him, like many a Stoic in the worst times of the Roman Empire, to cultivate in tranquility the sources of satisfaction accessible to him, without concerning himself about the uncertainty of their duration, any more than about their inevitable end." (*Utilitarianism*, pp. 23-24.)

"Our aim is happiness, 'tis yours, 'tis mine,
He said, 'twas the pursuit of all that live ;
Yet few attain it, if 'twas e'er attained.
But they the widest wander from the mark,
Who through the flowery path of sauntering
joy
Seek this coy goddess ; that from stage to stage
Invites us still, but shifts as we pursue."

(*Armstrong.*)

(4) Egoism is not countenanced by the facts of consciousness. The reduction of all tendencies to self-love is an extravagant theory revolting to our nature. As mentioned in § 13 of the last chapter, it is rather true to maintain that we live more for the sake of others than for our own. Social feelings are too deep-rooted in our nature to be exploded by the artifice of a few egoistic writers. As Comte remarks, "The spontaneous sociability of human nature, independent of all personal calculation, and often in opposition to the strongest individual interests, is admitted, as of course, by those who have paid no great attention to the true biological theory

(4) Egoism is not supported by consciousness : we live more for others than for ourselves.

of our intellectual and moral nature." (*Positive Philosophy*, Miss Martineau's Translation, Vol. II, p. 128.)

(5) Hedonistic calculus is extremely difficult owing to—

(a) the absence of an objective measure, and

(5) Hedonistic calculus is by no means an easy task. Pleasure and pain are psychical phenomena which can have a subjective estimate alone. But subjective estimate is necessarily (a) inaccurate and (b) variable. (a) Psychical effects cannot be quantitatively measured. Psycho-physics, no doubt, aims at measuring mental phenomena; but its investigations are mainly limited to the sphere of elementary psychoses, such as sensations; and even here its results are not always precise, but generally approximate—arrived at by reference to quantitative differences among stimuli. We cannot weigh pleasure and pain, like beef and mutton, and say that the one is 3 lbs, and another 4 lbs, and a third 5 lbs. Nay, in many cases, we experience the difficulty of determining even approximately whether the one is greater or smaller than the other. Is, for example, the pain of tooth-ache lighter than grief at the sight of misery, or the latter less than compunction at wrong-doing? Is the pleasure of a good table inferior to that of benevolence, and the latter less than that of justice? When we remember that most of our experiences are of a mixed character, varying indefinitely in degree, duration, and quality, the difficulty of calculation is infinitely increased. (b) If to this difficulty we add the difficulty arising from variation in mood, temperament, and circumstances, the hedonistic calculus becomes impractic-

(b) variation in mood and temperament.

M. J. S.

able. Not only do we find individuals varying from one another, but one and the same individual forming very unlike estimates at different times as to what is likely to promote his happiness or misery. Thus the superior advantage of the 'scientific' method, when applied to the calculation of consequences, turns out to be inferior to the comparatively simple determination of relative moral worth among competing impulses. Hedonistic calculus, therefore, cannot properly supply a truly objective standard in morals.

✓ (6) Sensualistic Egoism is properly speaking no moral system at all. It removes all restraint from the higher side of our nature and shamelessly parades the gratification of the appetites and passions. "Where self-love is made," remarks Wundt, "the exclusive motive and sole end of human action, as with the Sophists in antiquity and Mandeville in modern English ethics, the intention is to call in question the very existence of moral laws. Even the Epicurean ethics recognised the necessity of the civil order, and thus of a regard for others; it was utilitarianism with a strong tinge of egoism." (*Ethics*, vol II, p. 168.) The fact is that in degenerate times, when men generally are not actuated by higher motives, such theories merely express the spirit of the time. Thus a French lady declared that Helvetius merely expressed what was generally felt at the time; and when Mandeville was prosecuted for his publication, it was urged in defence that it was but one of a number of tracts of a like character. Butler in his *Sermons* and

(6) Sensualistic Egoism is no moral theory at all. It means license, while morality implies rational restraint.

Berkeley in his *Alciphron* similarly deplore the degenerate signs of the time. Sensualistic Egoism is thus the negation, and not the exposition, of the moral side of our nature. Were sensualism true, we would be glad to exchange a life of intelligence and conscience for one of mere sense and feeling. "Were your doctrine right," writes Carlyle, "for what should we struggle with our whole might, for what pray to Heaven, if not that the 'malady of thought' might be utterly stifled within us, and a power of digestion and secretion, to which that of the tiger were trifling, be imparted instead thereof?" (*Essay on Schiller*, Miscellaneous Essays, II, p 201.) But the unsophisticated consciousness of mankind regards such a change as tantamount to a fall. Sybaritism is a suicidal doctrine condemned by prudence and conscience alike.

(7) Life consists in activity for certain ends and not merely in the pursuit of pleasure.

✓ (7) The refined form of Egoism, represented in Epicureanism, discovers, no doubt, the defects of its sensualistic half-brother and points out also the folly of its procedure. It thus aims at 'serene pleasure' and 'true wisdom' accruing from reflection and solitude.

"O sacred solitude! divine retreat!

Choice of the prudent; envy of the great
By thy pure stream, or in thy waving shade,
We court fair Wisdom, that celestial maid."

(*Young.*)

But life is to be judged, not by the pursuit of pleasure, but by the discharge of duties: life is to be measured not simply by feeling—length, breadth,

or depth—but by activity. Feeling is not the end, but an index or mark of true life: it is, as it were, a subjective barometer determining the character of the spiritual weather. Carlyle truly observes, "We cannot but remark, as a curious symptom of this time, that the pursuit of merely sensuous good, of personal Pleasure, in one shape or other, should be the universally admitted formula of man's whole duty. Once, Epicurus had his Zeno; and if the herd of mankind have at all times been the slaves of Desire, drudging anxiously for their mess of pottage, or filling themselves with swine's husks,—earnest natures were not wanting who, at least in theory, asserted for their kind a higher vocation than this; declaring, as they could, that man's soul was no dead Balance for 'motives' to sway hither and thither, but a living, divine Soul, indefeasibly free, whose birth-right it was to be the servant of Virtue, Goodness, God, and in such service to be blessed without fee or reward." (*Essay on Schiller*, Miscellaneous Essays, Vol II, p. 202.)

—(8) Even if we ignore conscience and reason, we find that life is governed by instinct and not by pleasure. Food is sweet only to the hungry, and exercise, agreeable to the strong. There must first, therefore, be hunger and animal spontaneity in order that pleasure may be derived from food and exercise. An instinct first, and then the pleasure connected with its gratification. As Martineau remarks—"The Experience-philosophers forget that, without instinctive forces, there would be no experience to

(8) Even if we overlook the regulative function of reason or conscience, we find that life is governed by instinct instead of pleasure.

be had, in a world where the food does not drop into the mouth and the stream does not leap up at the lips, and no spontaneous blankets fall on and off the shoulders with winter winds and summer heat." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, II, p. 136.) In fact, to hold that the different faculties or propensities (*e. g.*, perception, imagination, thought, hunger, love, and veracity) have all the same end (*viz.*, pleasure) is really to obliterate their distinction. The truth is that, as already mentioned, pleasure is not an end of action; it is but an incidental experience connected with the gratification of an impulse or instinct directed to an end of life. The pleasure of the palate, for example, is not the end of eating; originally the pleasure is but an accompaniment of the gratification of hunger which aims at the support of life. (*Vide* Chap. XIX, § 3.)

(9) Moral quality belongs to activity; but pleasure or pain indicates passivity.

✓ (9) Pleasure or pain is a passive experience; but moral quality belongs to activity. The pleasure of warmth or the pain of tooth-ache, even when regulated by us, cannot be characterized as either right or wrong.

(10) Hedonism leaves no room for moral distinctions.

✓ (10) Pain is never desired for its own sake; and, thus, on the hedonistic assumption, wrong action becomes impossible, and hence its correlative right also disappears. And, if men be held accountable for results not intended by them, then morality would include even non-voluntary acts which, as we have seen (*vide* Chapter IV, § 2), are outside the moral pale.

(11) That pleasure and pain are not the

✓ (11) Pain may be endured as a means to pleasure. An individual, for example, undergoes a

surgical operation for the sake of health. But moral evil can never be employed as a means to the attainment of moral good. Thus pain and moral evil or pleasure and moral good are not the same.

✓(12) The pursuit of pleasure explains Prudence but not Virtue. Pleasure often serves as a temptation which runs counter to Duty. Duty and temptation, far from being identical, are in perpetual strife, supplying the conditions of a life of probation.

Mill commits the fallacy of figure of speech when he writes, "That to think of an object as desirable (unless for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 58.) Evidently 'to desire anything' on the ground of its being 'pleasant' is not to prove that it is 'desirable' or eligible. Mill mentions, "The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it." (*Utilitarianism*, pp. 52—53.) Now, 'visible' or 'audible' implies *capable* of being seen or heard; but 'desirable' does not mean *capable* of being desired. In fact, there is scarcely anything which cannot be desired. 'Desirable' implies what may legitimately be desired or what ought to be

same as right and wrong evident from the fact that pain may be sought as a means to pleasure, but wrong can never be used as a means to right.

(12) Hedonism overlooks the difference between Prudence and Virtue.

The agreeable is not necessarily the eligible: pleasure is not the same as duty.

'Desirable' properly implies 'eligible.'

desired. A thief, for example, desires another's property; but this cannot be called 'desirable'. The 'sole evidence', therefore, adduced by Mill, is altogether inconclusive. The agreeable, as mentioned above, is not necessarily the desirable; the pleasant is not necessarily the ought. Pleasure may attract; but it cannot command. Hedonism as based on feeling, which is purely subjective and highly variable, can never account for duty which rests on objective authority, applicable to all alike.

(13) Pleasure as momentary enjoyment is not equivalent to happiness or abiding satisfaction.

(13) Hedonism confounds pleasure with happiness. Pleasure is ordinarily a momentary enjoyment arising from the satisfaction of a passing desire or wish; and at most it may embrace the gratification of several desires. It is really restricted to sensibility and may be described as sentient welfare. ~~Happiness~~, on the other hand, is an abiding agreeable disposition arising from the systematization of desires. Happiness does not consist in either *a* pleasure or in the *mere sum* of pleasures; it is a lively mood resulting from harmony among desires. Happiness is thus essentially a rational satisfaction—a peaceful condition accruing from the due regulation of desires. In the pursuit of pleasure, "Reason," as Hume says, "is, and ought only to be, the slave of passions," the function of reason being only to devise means and supply rules for the unbounded gratification of desires; while, in the case of happiness, the desires are under the regulation of reason which supplies the principles for their adjustment and prescribes the limits to their satisfaction. The pleasure-theory

looks only to the partial satisfaction of the self; while the happiness-theory aims at the complete satisfaction of the self: the one makes sensibility the guide; the other takes reason as the central principle of our life. In the one, every possible opportunity for enjoyment should be seized; while, in the other, the pleasures of lower desires have often to be sacrificed for those of the higher and for the concord of the whole. The one, in brief, makes the mechanical sum of pleasures the end of life; the other, the spiritual harmony, the goal. Thus, Aristotle truly distinguished between *Hedonism*, which makes mere pleasure the end of life, and *Eudæmonism*, which makes peace or true well-being of the active rational self such end. (*Vide* § 2 and Chap. XII, § 1 and § 5.) It is unfortunate that hedonists often use 'happiness' for 'pleasure'; and the plausibility of their theory rests to a great extent on such confusion. "If Happiness mean Welfare", writes Carlyle, "there is no doubt but all men should and must pursue their Welfare, that is to say, pursue what is worthy of their pursuit. But if, on the other hand, Happiness mean, as for most men it does, 'agreeable sensations,' Enjoyment refined or not, then must we observe that there is a doubt; or rather that there is a certainty the other way. Strictly considered, this truth, that man has in him something higher than a Love of Pleasure, take Pleasure in what sense you will, has been the text of all true Teachers and Preachers, since the beginning of the world." (*Essay on Schiller*, Miscellaneous Essays, II, pp. 201-202.) If we take merely the

Distinction
between
Hedonism
and Eudæ-
monism.

A surfeit of pleasures produces disgust.

sum of even what Bentham calls 'pure' pleasures, it would not bring us satisfaction ; a surfeit of pleasures produces ennui and disgust :

"A surfeit of the sweetest things

The deepest loathing to the stomach brings."

(*Shakespeare.*)

Pleasure palls when attained.

The essence of pleasure lies in change or relativity, so that what seems to be attractive from distance dwindles into insignificance when experienced. Pleasure, like mirage, thus recedes as we approach : what seemed to be agreeable in anticipation turns out to be vapid in realization. Hence, the Hedonistic Paradox that the perpetual pursuit of pleasure is a constant and fruitful source of misery.

"All pleasures are like poppies spread,

You seize the flower, its bloom is shed ;

Or like the snow falls on the river,

A moment white—then melts for ever."

(*Burns.*)

2) Utilitarianism or Altruistic Hedonism makes 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' the moral standard.

§ 8. (2) Utilitarianism. Altruistic Hedonism goes by the name of Utilitarianism. Mill claims to have given currency to the term which he found incidentally used by Galt in his novel, *Annals of the Parish* (See *Utilitarianism*, p. 9, note); but Bentham seems to have been the author of it. (See Bowring's note in the *Deontology*. Vol. I, p. 287) "By Utilitarianism," writes Sidgwick, "is meant the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole ; that is, taking into account all whose happiness is

affected by the conduct." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 409.) It thus adopts "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" as the moral standard. The classification of Utilitarianism given in § 3 is to be taken as provisional, subject to the modification introduced in § 11. Let us, for the present, consider the forms mentioned in § 3.

(a) Sensualistic Utilitarianism. We take Benthamism as a type of this theory. According to Bentham (1748-1832), happiness is the standard of morality ; but it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number. "Nature," he writes, "has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think : every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire : but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. *The principle of utility* recognises this subjection. and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.*...

(a) Sensualistic Utilitarianism.

Bentham.

The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the moral standard.

Pleasure and pain are the sole motives of human activity.

* Compare in this connection the view of Helvetius who thinks that "God originally implanted only one principle in all He created...He seems to have said to man, "I endow thee with sensation, the blind instrument of my will, that, being incapable of penetrating into the depth of my views, thou mayst accomplish all my designs. I place thee under the guardianship of pleasure and pain : both shall watch over thy thoughts and thy actions : they shall produce thy passions, excite thy friendship, thy

By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question.....If that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community : if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual." (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, pp. 1-2.) Bentham is of opinion that "the word happiness is not always appropriate," because "it represents pleasure in too elevated a shape"

tenderness, thine aversion, thy rage : they shall kindle thy desires, thy fears, thy hopes : they shall take off the veil of truth : they shall plunge thee into error, and, after having made thee conceive a thousand absurd and different systems of morality and government, shall some day discover to thee the simple principles on the unfolding of which depends the order and happiness of the moral world." And, according to Helvetius, "Man being by nature sensible of no other pleasures than those of the senses, these pleasures are consequently the only object of his desires and passions, viz., avarice, ambition, pride, and friendship." (*De l'Esprit*, *English transl.* pp. 248, 251.) Sidgwick thus rightly observes—"It was from Helvetius that Bentham learnt that, men being universally and solely governed by self-love, the so-called moral judgments are really the common judgments of any society as to its own common interests ; that it is therefore futile on the one hand to propose any standard of virtue, except that of conduciveness to general happiness, and on the other hand useless merely to lecture men on duty and scold them for vice ; that the moralist's proper function is rather to exhibit the coincidence of virtue with private happiness ; that, accordingly, though nature has bound men's interests together in many ways, and education by developing sympathy and the habit of mutual help may much extend the connection, still the most effective moralist is the legislator, who, by acting on self-love through legal sanctions, may mould human conduct as he chooses. These few simple doctrines give the ground plan of Bentham's indefatigable and life-long labours." (*Outlines of the History of Ethics*, pp. 258-259). Bentham himself mentions in his common-place book that Helvetius "established a standard of rectitude for actions," the standard being that "a sort of action is a right one, when the tendency of it is to augment the mass of happiness in the community." (See Bentham's Works, Bowring's Edition, vol. X, p. 70.)

(*Deontology*, I, p. 78); and he mentions, "take away pleasure and pain, not only happiness, but justice, and duty, and obligation, and virtue, all of which have been so elaborately held up to view as independent of them, are so many empty sounds." (*Springs of Action*, I, § 15.)

According to Bentham, there are several "*elements or dimensions of value in a pleasure or a pain*," which ought to be taken into account in deciding a question of right or wrong.* These elements are thus indicated by him in the following mnemonic lines :

Dimensions of value in pleasure and pain.

*"Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure—
Such marks in pleasures and in pains endure.
Such pleasures seek, if private be thy end :
If it be public, wide let them extend.
Such pains avoid, whichever be thy view :
If pains must come, let them extend to few."*†

(*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 29.)

According to Bentham, whenever we are called upon to act, we should take these 'dimensions of value' into account in summing up the pleasures and pains; and the difference will show the good or evil tendency of the act: "weigh pains, weigh pleasures, and as the balance stands will stand the question of right and wrong." (*Deontology*, I, p. 137.) In the case of an individual, the calculation is to be made with regard to

These dimensions taken together indicate the lines of action to be pursued or avoided.

* Bentham took the hint of hedonistic calculus from the Italian jurist and economist Beccaria (1735-93), whose *Treatise on Crimes and Punishments*, advocating a sympathetic treatment of offenders, exercised a great influence on the world then.

† We may remember in this connection the four canons of Epicurus:—"The pleasure which produces no pain is to be embraced. The pain which produces no pleasure is to be avoided. The pleasure is to be avoided which prevents a greater pleasure, or produces a greater pain. The pain is to be endured which averts a greater pain, or secures a greater pleasure." (Lecky's *History of European Morals*, I, p. 14.)

him; while in the case of a community, it is to be repeated with respect to each member. According to Bentham, the calculation of the interests of the *number* of persons affected is of paramount importance in morals: "The *standard of right and wrong*, by which alone the propriety of human conduct, in every situation, can with propriety be tried," must, according to him, have reference to "the consideration of the *number*, of the interests affected." (*Principles*, p. 1, note.) He writes, "The interests of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of morals... The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it." (*Ibid.* p. 3.) He mentions also, "In the moral field the end is happiness.... To obtain the greatest portion of happiness for himself is the object of every rational being. Every man is nearer to himself than he can be to any other man; and no other man can weigh for him his pains and pleasures. Himself must necessarily be his own first concern. His interest must, to himself, be the primary interest." (*Deontology*, I, pp. 17, 18.) Bentham, accordingly, warns us against expecting disinterested acts from others: "Dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you, unless their advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so, and never will, while human nature is made of its present materials. But they will desire to serve you, when by so doing they can serve themselves; and the occasions on which they can serve themselves by serving you are multitudinous." (*Deontology*, II, p. 133.)

(We have taken Bentham's system as a type of Gross or Sensualistic Utilitarianism because he does not recognise any difference of *quality* among pleasures, by reason

The interest of the community is the supreme end in morals.

Every one seeks his own happiness.

Bentham does not admit qualitative differences.

of which some may be regarded as superior and others as inferior. He objects, as we have seen, to the term "happiness" on the ground that "it represents pleasure in too elevated a shape"; and he mentions that the "quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry." By 'purity' of pleasure he does not mean superior quality. A pleasure or pain is said to be 'pure,' when it is unalloyed or unmixed with its opposite: it is, as he says, "the chance it has of *not* being followed by sensations of the *opposite* kind; that is, pains, if it be a pleasure, pleasures, if it be a pain." (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 30.) In his *Principles of Morals and Legislation* he gives an elaborate account of simple and complex pains and pleasures which, he mentions, "may be called by one general word, interesting perceptions," and he enumerates also the "circumstances influencing sensibility." (See Chapters V and VI.) Any apparent difference of quality is viewed by him as "bias" due to variation in susceptibility: it is but an aspect of quantity. He writes, "In the same mind such and such causes of pain or pleasure will produce more pain or pleasure than such or such other causes of pain or pleasure: and this proportion will in different minds be different. The disposition which any one has to have the proportion in which he is affected by two such causes, different from that in which another man is affected by the same two causes, may be termed the quality or *bias* of his sensibility. One man, for instance, may be most affected by the pleasures of the taste; another by those of the ear. So also, if there be a difference in the nature or proportion of two pains or pleasures which they respectively experience from the same cause; a case not so frequent as the former. From

ences among pleasures.

Apparent differences of quality are due to 'bias' and so resolvable into differences of intensity.

the same injury, for instance, one man may feel the same quantity of grief and resentment together as another man: but one of them shall feel a greater share of grief than of resentment: the other, a greater share of resentment than of grief." (*Ibid.*, pp. 43 44.) Thus, to Bentham, the end of life is to secure the maximum of enjoyment irrespective of any preference for this or that *kind* of pleasure.)

(b) Refined
Utilitarian-
ism.
Mill.

§ 9. (b) **Refined Utilitarianism.** We take J. S. Mill, (1806-1873) as a supporter of this view. He adopts utilitarianism in the form of universal benevolence, with the qualification, however, that happiness, which is the sole end of life, should be rich both in quantity and quality. "The creed," he writes, "which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 9.) According to this theory, "Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends"; and Mill holds that "Some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others." (*Ibid.*, pp. 10, 11.) The standard of morality is furnished by the end of human action; and "The ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyment, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt

Happiness as
the balance
of pleasure is
the moral
standard;

but in esti-
mating happi-
ness we
should take
into con-
sideration
differences of
quality and
quantity.

by those, who, in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison." And Mill maintains, "From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal...If they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final." (*Ibid*, pp. 15, 17.) Mill explicitly states that the "Standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether"; and he says, "No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good : that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons." (*Ibid*, p. 53.)

The standard is not the agent's own happiness but that of the community.

§ 10. Criticism of Utilitarianism. The remarks made above in section 7 with regard to Hedonism apply also to Utilitarianism which is hedonistic in basis. The following additional observations may be made with regard to Utilitarianism :—

The criticism of Hedonism applies to Utilitarianism.

Additional remarks :

(1) Admitting that happiness is the end of life and that it constitutes rectitude, it must be the agent's own happiness. Hedonism consistently carried out cannot account for self-sacrifice otherwise than by proving it to be an illusion. There is no earthly reason from the hedonistic standpoint why an individual should forego his own pleasures for the

(1) Hedonism consistently carried out should be individualistic and not universalistic.

sake of others. And if a hedonist be ever led by the law of transference or by momentary enthusiasm to act in such a way, we *should* rather condemn his conduct as wrong, being contrary to the spirit and standard of Hedonism.) Martineau rightly observes—“ If self-love can become identical with self-sacrifice, it is only by subjecting the nature in which this happens to a fatal illusion, and dressing up a moment's enthusiasm as worth more to it than the collective possibilities of remaining life. Under the law which bears him off on the line least repugnant to him at the time, he flings himself away, and secures, let us suppose, for others the happiness which he renounces for himself. And who is it that does this? By hypothesis, it is the egoistic hedonist, whose reason tells him that his own pleasure is for him the sole good, and except as tributary to this, that of others has no significance. He is betrayed, therefore, by his disinterested passion into direct contradiction of his own reason, and inversion of its fundamental rule. By substituting others for himself, his rational preferences are turned upside down; and nature, like a cruel nurse, replacing him by a changeling ere he knows himself, exposes him to a fate that is not his own. He thinks, you will say, that the happiness he wins for others is the greatest for himself, though it be the last; so that there is no clashing interest. Yes: he thinks so: but is it true? Can it be shown that his twin brother, who in the same crisis was snatched by no fervours from his far-sighted prudence, but made the

compliances needful for escape, and lived in opulence and office through another generation, miscalculated his lot, and enjoyed less of 'the only good' than the dead hero? What metrical standard can demonstrate that the felicity of one supreme moment of self-immolation transcends in amount thirty years of unbroken health, of social favour, and satisfied affections? How will you go to work, in order to convince this comfortable citizen of his mistake in declining to share his brother's martyrdom? You remind him of the lies he told: he thinks them venial, and a cheap ransom from the pangs of death. You appeal to the higher truth of which the martyr's death became a missionary to the world: he perceives no higher and lower in matters where he is sure of no truth at all. You point to the almost Divine honours which the invigorated conscience of mankind pays to their self-sacrificing leaders and reformers: he prefers the daily experience of their homage to his rank, his equipages, and his power. Not only is it true that nothing which you, or which the enthusiast brother himself, could say will convince the self-seeker that he has chosen amiss: but it is no less true that the most impartial estimator of happiness cannot convict him of imprudence." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, II, pp. 336-337.)

Thus, the claim of Utilitarianism as a theory of benevolence cannot be established. Mill, no doubt, says, "The happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned.

Hedonism is inconsistent with benevolence. Utilitarianism as an altruistic theory is

thus
inconsistent

As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 24.) Bain, likewise, observes, "Utility is opposed to the selfish principle, for, as propounded, it always implies the good of society generally and the subordination of individual interests to the general good." (*Emotions and Will*, p. 303.) A consistent hedonist, however, may be led to promote the well-being of others either when he believes that it is but a means to his own or when he labours under a delusion. In either case, his act cannot be called benevolent. It is thus not intelligible how "A direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 25.) It must be remembered that—

" True charity, a plant divinely nurs'd,
Fed by the love from which it rose at first,
Thrives against hope, and, in the rudest scene,
Storms but enliven its unfading green ;
Exuberant in the shadow it supplies,
Its fruit on earth, its growth above the skies."
(*Cowper*.)

Mill in
defending
altruism
commits the
fallacy of
composition.

The so-called 'reason' adduced by Mill for proving the desirability of 'general happiness' is no reason at all. When Mill says that the ground for promoting the happiness of 'all' lies in the fact that 'every' person seeks his own happiness, Mill evidently commits the

fallacy of composition. As well might we argue that because every individual wishes to have a quantity of food for himself, he wishes also to supply the food of others. Carlyle well observes, "It is contended by many that our mere love of personal Pleasure, or Happiness as it is called, acting on every individual, with such clearness as he may easily have, will of itself lead him to respect the rights of others, and wisely employ his own; to fulfil, on a mere principle of economy, all the duties of a good patriot: so that, in what respects the State, or the mere social existence of mankind, Belief, beyond the testimony of the senses, and Virtue, beyond the very common Virtue of loving what is pleasant and hating what is painful, are to be considered as supererogatory qualifications, as ornamental, not essential. Many there are, on the other hand, who pause over this doctrine; cannot discover in such a universe of conflicting atoms, any principle by which the whole shall cohere; for if every man's selfishness, infinitely-expansive, is to be hemmed-in only by the infinitely-expansive selfishness of every other man, it seems as if we should have a world of mutually-repulsive bodies with no centripetal force to bind them together; in which case, it is well known, they would, by and by, diffuse themselves over space, and constitute a remarkable Chaos, but no habitable Solar or Stellar System." (*Essay on Voltaire*, Miscellaneous Essays, II, pp. 50-51.)

(2) If, as we have seen in § 7 (4), the difficulty of applying the hedonistic calculus to the case of an

(2) The Utilitarian calculus is impossible.

individual is great, this difficulty is enormously increased if we are to find out "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Bentham admits that "Every man is nearer to himself than he can be to any other man; and no other man can weigh for him his pains and pleasures. Himself must necessarily be his own first concern. His interest must, to himself, be the primary interest." (*Deontology*, I, p. 18.) If this be so, how can there be an impartial estimate of the well-being of the community? The "moral arithmetic" would yield highly variable results, because (a) the data would vary from individual to individual, and (b) the calculation itself would not be impartial. Under such circumstances, we can scarcely have an objective code of morals. Utilitarianism requires us to conceive of happiness "As a kind of emotional currency, capable of being calculated and distributed in 'lots,' which have a certain definite value independently of any special taste of the individual." (Leslie Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, p. 360.) Pleasures and pains, according to this view, can, as it were, "be handed about like pieces of money, and we have simply to calculate how to gain a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain." (*Ibid.*) But this is evidently impossible.

Were it possible, it would be of no practical value.

Moreover, the standard is an impracticable one. Were a just calculation of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" possible, it would take such a long time that the opportunity would be over before any decision is arrived at. To refer to the Moral

Nautical Almanac (*Vide* Chapter VI, § 5) is to avoid the difficulty ; for tradition and current maxims often fail to meet the complex circumstances which seem to be ever new. And the difficulty of the hedonistic calculation has been heightened by Mill's introduction of differences of quality among pleasures. How are we to set a *plus* of quality or quantity against a *minus* of quantity or quality ? What metrical standard is there to determine, for example, the relative values of the excellence of benevolence and the intensity of self-gratification ? Human intelligence cannot discover a common unit in such cases.

Mill has increased the difficulty.

(3) By introducing differences of quality among pleasures Mill has, no doubt, made the utilitarian standard consistent with the facts of moral consciousness ; but this psychological consistency has been gained at the cost of the consistency of the hedonistic position. Qualitative difference postulates a *differentiam* which cannot be the same as the generic agreeable experience ; and this *differentiam*, which is an *extra-hedonistic* quality, is admitted to be a ground of preference. In fact, this quality is no other than the moral quality in disguise. This admission, therefore, amounts to an abandonment of the hedonistic position. Mill, for example, writes, "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied ; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides." (*Utilitarianism*, p.

(3) Mill's modification has compromised the Utilitarian position.

14.) What Mill says is, indeed, true ; but the pleasures connected with a higher nature cannot be had without the prior existence of such a nature. Mill's view practically means that only those desires are to be gratified which are approved by conscience, and those, rejected which are condemned by it. Thus, the distinction between higher and lower as well as "the intrinsic superiority of the higher" is assumed to account for the preference for one kind of pleasure to another.* Moral nature is thus assumed, and not evolved out of sentiency : the 'noble' nature first and then its pleasures.) It is true, as Mill says, that "It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower ; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 15.) Mill has, accordingly, been justly accused by some later advocates of Hedonism as weakening the defences of the doctrine.

(4) Arbitrary verdict of men can never be accepted as the moral standard.

(4) When Mill refers to the verdict of the competent judges as "final," he forgets that arbitrary dictum carries no weight in morals. The verdict, to be effective, must be convincing ; and, to be convincing, it must successfully appeal to an inward judgment. Thus, the outer verdict is but an echo of the

* Aristotle thus accounts for different *kinds* of pleasure : "Acts which are specifically different cannot but be accompanied by pleasures which differ in kind. Thus the acts of thought differ from the acts of the senses, and the latter also differ from each other : hence pleasures should also differ.....For each different act, there is a corresponding suitable pleasure : the pleasure which belongs to a virtuous action is an honourable pleasure ; that which belongs to an evil action is a guilty pleasure."

inner voice of conscience. Morality, accordingly, is not the creation of society,—the social verdict being but the expression of an innate moral constitution. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 15.)

(5) Utilitarianism, no doubt, has a place in politics; but when it is made to work out a moral system, it cuts a very poor figure. However eminent the services of Bentham and Mill may be to Law and Politics, their contributions to Morals must be deemed as imperfect and inadequate. Utilitarianism is closely allied to Economics) which is spreading fast its empire in this mechanical and calculating age. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 8.) (It takes into account only the 'tangible' and 'material' comforts, and leaves the spiritual element entirely in the shade.) (Even, as a prudential doctrine, it indicates an inferior sort of prudence: it cannot, consistently with its hedonistic basis, take any notice of the pleasures of the higher side of our nature.) Emerson rightly observes, "The world is filled with the proverbs and acts and winkings of a base prudence, which is a devotion to matter, as if we possessed no other faculties than the palate, the nose, the touch, the eye and ear; a prudence which adores the Rule of Three, which never subscribes, which never gives, which seldom lends, and asks but one question of any project,—will it bake bread? This is a disease like a thickening of the skin until the vital organs are destroyed." (*Essay on Prudence*, Works, p. 50.) But even if Utilitarianism take into account all sorts of pleasures, still a pleasure-seeking theory can

(5) Utilitarianism may be of some aid to politics and economics; but it can never construct a satisfactory theory of morals.

never, as indicated above, lay the foundation of genuine acts of self-sacrifice and noble nature.) As Carlyle says, "Man's highest attainment was accomplished Dynamically, not Mechanically. Nay, we will venture to say, that no high attainment, not even any far-extending movement among men, was ever accomplished otherwise. Strange as it may seem, if we read History with any degree of thoughtfulness, we shall find, that the checks and balances of Profit and Loss have never been the grand agents with men; that they have never been roused into deep, thorough, all-pervading efforts by any computable prospect of Profit and Loss, for any visible, finite object; but always for some invisible and infinite one." (*Essay on the Signs of the Times*. Miscellaneous Essays, II, p. 109.) One who constantly looks at himself cannot freely throw himself away.

Men are moved not merely by considerations of profit and loss.

(6) Utilitarianism, though it professes to lay the foundation of morals on Sensibility, really appeals to Reason and Conscience to establish its claims as a moral system. It, thus, not infrequently confounds elements which are distinct and unwarrantably assumes what it professes to explain.)

(a) The altruism, which it tries to establish, must presuppose disinterested affections.

((a) It is said, for example, that pleasure is the motive of every action. Experience proves, however, that many acts are performed without any pre-conception of, or desire for, pleasure; in fact, self-sacrifice and self-improvement are often attempted with a distinct representation of pain attending such a process.) As Bulwer Lytton says—

"Love sacrifices all things
To bless the thing it loves."

(*Lady of Lyons.*)

Neither do we seek, nor do we feel that we ought to seek, pleasure at any cost. The hedonist would, no doubt, say that the attainment of the end—whatever its character may be—is attended with pleasure. But it should be remembered that this consequent or *resultant* pleasure was not the motive of action; nay, as we have shown above [*Vide* § 7 (3)], in order that such a pleasure may be felt, the action must be performed in a disinterested way. Thus the hedonist, instead of proving his position, begs the point at issue and tries to prove it by confounding the resultant with the motive pleasure.

(b) We have seen in § 7 (4) that the subjective estimate of pleasure and pain must necessarily be highly variable and capricious. If so, the 'moral arithmetic' of Bentham, as explained above, cannot yield a uniform result. Even if we introduce differences of quality, as taught by Mill, we cannot get an objective code, without presupposing a moral nature. Man may, in such a case, admit a qualitative difference among pleasures, without agreeing as to their relative excellence; qualitative difference then would merely mean what Bentham describes as "bias of sensibility." Plato well illustrates this in his *Republic*: "We may begin," he writes, "by assuming that there are three classes of men—lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain; and there are three kinds of pleasures, which are their several

(b) It assumes a moral nature which it tries to evolve.

objects. Now, if you examine the three classes, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver. And the lover of honour will think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar; while the pleasure of learning, which has no need of honour, he regards as all smoke and nonsense. But may we not suppose that the philosopher estimates other pleasures as nothing in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that abiding, ever learning, in the pursuit of truth, not far indeed from the heaven of pleasure?" (Book IX, Jowett's Edition, Vol. III, p. 475.) Thus, in spite of the moral arithmetic and the qualitative difference, utilitarianism is brought to the old sophistic position—"Man is the measure of all things.") If, however, an objective standard is established, it is by a covert appeal to the moral consciousness of mankind, such as is implied in the 'competent judges' of Mill. The 'competent judges' of Mill, like the 'judicious man' of Aristotle, are but the objectified conscience of mankind, without which no agreement can be had in morals. When Mill mentions that, in case of difference of opinion among such judges, the decision of the majority must be taken as final, he forgets that morality is not a question of votes. Had it been so, then the higher truth of the great teachers and preachers would have been lost in the opinion of the

Objective standard implies a common nature apprehending it.

rabble. Thus, when Mill assumes "the intrinsic superiority of the higher," and doubts "whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower" (*Utilitarianism*, p. 15), Mill evidently derives this knowledge from his moral nature and then sets to the credit of Sensibility what he borrows from Conscience. He assumes, therefore, what he undertakes to explain.

(c) Again, in applying the hedonistic calculus, we have to measure future pleasures and pains—the agreeable or disagreeable effects of acts to be performed—in order to ascertain the moral worth of the motives or present dispositions; but how can we possibly judge future sentient effects by reference to present tendencies? As our tastes and inclinations are highly variable, an effect which we expect to be agreeable or otherwise from our present stand-point may really turn out to be different owing to a change in such tastes and inclinations. And even this present estimate would vary with the character of an individual. What is judged as agreeable by a benevolent person may be regarded as painful by a malevolent one. And, in order that the estimate in any case may be right and proper, the present mental condition must also be so; a wrong disposition must inevitably lead to a wrong estimate. Thus, the estimate of pleasure or pain depends in every way on the character of the present disposition; and not *vice versa*. When, therefore, utilitarianism pretends to estimate the worth of a

(c) In professing to judge impulses by consequences, it really does the reverse.

disposition by reference to its sentient effects, it really does the reverse and assumes what it professes to explain. Utilitarianism is thus a convenient compendium of confusion and fallacy which lend it the plausibility it wears.

'Utilitarianism' as a designation of Universalistic Hedonism is a misnomer.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the designation 'Utilitarianism' as a badge of Universalistic Hedonism is misleading. The term implies merely the doctrine which advocates the desirability of seeking what is useful. 'Useful,' however, is a word of uncertain connotation, since its sense always depends on the character of the end aimed at. Utilitarianism by itself, therefore, does not pledge itself to Hedonism; but it is associated with Hedonism because it holds pleasure to be the sole end of life. This assumption, however, is quite arbitrary, as there are other—and nobler—ends of life than pleasure. Moral acts should be performed out of moral considerations; if they are done for the sake of pleasure, they lose their moral excellence and degenerate into base prudence. The question of morality is not a question of utility or economy. Ruskin truly observes, "All our hearts have been betrayed by the plausible impiety of the modern economist, telling us that, 'To do the best for ourselves, is finally to do the best for others.' Friends, our great Master said not so; and most absolutely we shall find this world is not made so. Indeed, to do the best for others, is finally to do the best for ourselves; but it will not do to have our eyes fixed on that issue." (*The Crown of Wild Olive*, p. 110.)

§ 11. **Forms of Utilitarianism.** In the above classification we have taken Bentham and Mill as representing altruistic hedonism. Both of them refer to sympathetic pleasures and both of them make 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' the standard in morals. Bentham, for example, writes, "The sense of sympathy is universal. Perhaps there never existed a human being who had reached full age without the experience of pleasure at another's pleasure, of uneasiness at another's pain." (*Deontology*. Vol I, p. 169.) Mill likewise observes, "The idea of the pain of another is naturally painful; the idea of the pleasure of another is naturally pleasurable. From this fact in our natural constitution, all our affections both of love and aversion towards human beings, in so far as they are different from those we entertain towards mere inanimate objects which are pleasant or disagreeable to us, are held by the best teachers of the theory of utility, to originate. In this, the unselfish part of our nature, lies a foundation, even independently of inculcation from without, for the generation of moral feelings." (*Dissertations*, I, p. 137.) But Bentham tells us at the same time that men can only be disposed to serve others "when by so doing they can serve themselves" [See §8 (a)]; and, in fact, as Lecky observes, "The selfishness of the school of Hobbes, though in some degree mitigated, may be traced in every page of the writings of Bentham." (*History of European Morals*, I, pp. 20-21.) According to him, "The constantly proper end of

The systems of Bentham and Mill are really egoistic in basis : they teach spurious benevolence.

Bentham.

action on the part of any individual at the moment of action is his real greatest happiness from that moment to the end of his life." (*Memoirs*, X, p. 560, Bowring's Edition.) Similarly Mill, though admitting the existence of "the social feeling," mentions that "this feeling in most individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, and is often wanting altogether." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 50.) "Human nature," he writes, "is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness" (*Ibid.*, p. 58); and he adds, as we have seen, "That to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility." (*Ibid.*) All these indicate an egoistic basis of morality. This see-saw procedure on the part of Bentham and Mill is intelligible by reference to their attempt to reconcile their hedonism with an impartial estimate of moral worth. This is apparent from the use made by them of the Laws of Association to account for virtuous acts involving self-sacrifice. Such acts, it is alleged, have become disinterested through habit, and may, therefore, "be satisfactorily solved upon the principle of association." (Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 124, footnote.) Acts, which are at first performed out of interested motives, come afterwards to be performed through habit in a disinterested way, because the means gradually acquires the interest of the end (the Law of Transference). Thus, as Mill observes, "It is by associating the doing right with pleasure, or the doing

Mill.

The Law of Transference is supposed to develop a disinterested love of virtue out of egoism.

wrong with pain, or by eliciting and impressing and bringing home to the person's experience the pleasure naturally involved in the one or the pain in the other, that it is possible to call forth that will to be virtuous, which, when confirmed, acts without any thought of either pleasure or pain." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 60.) Though, therefore, Bentham and Mill profess that their systems are altruistic in character, yet really they are egoistic in basis; and it is by reference to their professions that we have characterized their systems as altruistic or universalistic. We may, accordingly, describe these systems as inculcating *fictitious or spurious altruism*.

"Since we apply the term utilitarianism in general," writes Wundt, "to all systems which regard the *common welfare* as the end, the altruistic principle has the primary advantage of aiming directly at this end. While egoistic utilitarianism is obliged to make an artificial derivation of the social from the egoistic instincts, with the aid of forced reflections and associations whose existence is highly questionable; altruistic utilitarianism, on the other hand, argues from the existence of benevolent actions to the existence of benevolent instincts, which it regards as ultimate, for the reason that no state of human life can be proved to be wholly devoid of them." (*Ethics*, II, p. 171.) The different forms of utilitarianism may, accordingly, be indicated in a tabular form thus:—

Utilitarianism is thus either essentially egoistic or altruistic, according as it ignores or admits genuine benevolence :
Altruistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism is, therefore, either
(A) Fictitious or
(B) Genuine.

Modified Classification of Utilitarian Theories :

Utilitarianism or Altruistic Hedon- ism	{	I. Secular ...	{	(a) Fictitious.
				(b) Genuine.
				II. Theological.

Each of these forms may be either sensualistic or refined, according as Pleasure is estimated in a gross or in an elevated form. (*Vide* §3 and §8.)

(1) *Secular Utilitarianism* makes terrestrial pleasure the standard of rectitude, while, (II) *Theological Utilitarianism* takes into account also celestial bliss. As we have already considered (A) the Fictitious Form of Secular Utilitarianism, let us briefly notice the other forms.

§ 12. (B) **Genuine Secular Utilitarianism** —

This form of Utilitarianism admits the existence of genuine benevolence or instinctive sympathy and tries to derive a moral code from it. The systems of Schopenhauer, Comte, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson may be taken as illustrating the different forms of this theory. Let us consider these systems one by one.

(1) **Extreme Form of Genuine Secular Utilitarianism.** The system of Schopenhauer (1788-1860) may be taken as a type of this theory. According to him, sympathy is the sole legitimate motive for moral action. The motive of an action, he says, must be weal or woe, either of the agent or of others. And moral excellence depends entirely upon "Whether the act is committed or omitted for the good of another. Whenever this is not the case, the weal or woe impelling or hindering the performance of each act can only be that of the agent himself; ~~then~~ the act is invariably egoistic, and hence without moral worth." And it

(I) *Secular Utilitarianism*, which makes terrestrial happiness the standard;

(II) *Theological Utilitarianism* which calculates also celestial bliss.

I. Secular Utilitarianism is either (A) Fictitious or (B) Genuine.

(A) The Fictitious Form has already been discussed.

(B) The Genuine Form is of (1) Extreme, (2) Moderate or (3) Qualified Type.

(1) *The Extreme Type.*

Schopenhauer Sympathy is the only spring of virtuous action.

becomes bad, if the welfare of self is sought at the cost of that of others. *Schopenhauer denies that there can be any duty to self*, since inclination here takes the place of moral requirement. "Compulsory duties towards self," he writes, "are impossible on account of the self-evident law *volenti non fit injuria* [no injustice is done to the consenting person, i. e., by a proceeding to which he consents]: as for self-directed duties of inclination, ethics finds her work in this field ready performed; she comes too late." (Works, IV, p. 126.)

There can be no duty to self.

We should remember in this connection that the essence of the universe, according to Schopenhauer, is Will which is primarily a blind tendency, an unconscious impulse towards existence manifesting itself in different forms of energy—physical, chemical, vital, and psychical. Imbued with pantheistic and pessimistic ideas, he regards this primal Will as the one and all—the universal striving for existence and continuance, which is the source of all misery. "If the purposiveness of the phenomena of nature points to the unity of the primal will, the unspeakable misery of life, which Schopenhauer sets forth with no less of eloquence, proves the blindness and irrationality of the world-ground. To live is to suffer; the world contains incomparably more pain than pleasure; it is the worst possible world." (Falckenberg's *History of Modern Philosophy*, Eng. Translation, p. 543.) The world is this Will objectified: what we call body is but the visible, and what we call mind, the invisible Will; and the close connection between mind and body merely reveals this identity. There is no difference between self and others, for all are the expression of the same Will. This Will, however,

Will as a blind impulse is the ultimate reality, which manifests itself as a general tendency to live—the root of all misery.

Pessimism and Pantheism.

The Universal Will rises to consciousness in man.

Intelligence, which merely serves Will, cannot reveal the external reality.

The World is *Maya*.

The world being essentially bad and

Schopenhauer refrains from calling God : it is characterized not by choice and deliberation, but by impulse and striving—what is common to man, beast, and nature. We have an immediate knowledge of this Will in us, in whom it first rises into consciousness.* Intelligence, which thus comes into being with the better organization of the human brain, is now employed in the service of the Will for the attainment of its end. Intelligence is incapable of giving us a true knowledge of the external reality, since it is apprehended through the triple veil of space, time, and causality. Thus, excepting the immediate consciousness of the Will in self, we have no other knowledge of reality. The world as known to us is purely phenomenal ; its objectivity is due to illusion or *Ma'ya'*. The will is always determined by motive which, in the case of man, is a desire for the remission of pain. "The act of willing, and effort, which is its essence, are like an insatiable thirst." It is a perennial source of suffering and woe. "For one wish that is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied. Further, the desire lasts long, the demands are infinite, but the satisfaction is scanty and short. And even the final satisfaction is only apparent ; every satisfied wish only makes room for a new one, and both are illusions. No attained object of desire can give lasting satisfaction ; it is like the alms thrown to a beggar, which helps to keep him alive to-day that his misery may be prolonged till to-morrow." As, however, owing to the inherent badness of the world, such a desire or striving is always

* Schopenhauer may be regarded as a precursor of the Evolutionary Theory subsequently formulated by Darwin. The Will of Schopenhauer is an universal principle or impulse, characterized by strife and struggle and finally attaining to consciousness in man.

fruitless, our efforts should be directed to alleviate the sufferings of others and finally to extinguish all desires in us. When man realizes that all striving is in vain and that all individuals are really one, being but different expressions of the same Will, then egoism dies out and sympathy springs as the redeemer of the world. Sympathy really unites individuals and constitutes the basis of all love and justice ; it is the root of all virtue. This, however, is but a stage towards a higher blessedness attainable only by the complete negation of the will to live :

“ To die : to sleep ;

No more ; and by a sleep to say we end

The heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to, 'tis a consummation

Devoutly to be wish'd.” (*Shakespeare.*)

It grows out of the conviction that individual differences are illusory and that the universal alone is real, and prepares the way for that higher form of self-mortification which ignores even the happiness of a future life and aims at perfect quiescence, emancipation, or Nirva'na as the true end of life.

§ 13. (2) **Moderate Form of Genuine Secular Utilitarianism.** We take Positivism as a type of this theory. Comte (1798-1857) restricts the sphere of philosophy to the study of the positive facts or phenomena revealed in experience and regards Ethics and Politics as branches of 'Sociology'—a word coined by him to denote the science of society. The unit of society is not an individual but a family, which is a union and not merely an association of individuals. According to Comte feeling precedes knowledge ; and, being influenced by Hume and Adam Smith, he accepts the presence of

sufferings being universal, virtue consists in genuine benevolence, which is supported by the conviction of universal brotherhood and unity.

The highest virtue is the absence of all desire to live and thus to secure *Nirvana*.

(2) *The Moderate Type.*

Comte.

Philosophy is restricted to the study of facts or phenomena. Ethics and Politics are branches of Sociology.

The unit of society is the family, the members of which are held together by natural sympathy.

The altruistic feelings are specially strong in women.

At the outset the social affections are generally weaker than the personal ;

but the former become definite and well-regulated when guided by the latter.

instinctive sympathy which, he believes, is countenanced by the phrenological doctrine of Gall. Thus, in every individual, there are self-regarding and other-regarding impulses which lead him to promote his own interest as well as the interest of the community. The other-regarding—or, as Comte puts it, '*altruistic*'—tendencies first manifest themselves in animals in the form of care for offspring ; and, in man, these tendencies gradually come to include the welfare of the whole human race. The altruistic feelings are specially strong in women and are weaker than the egoistic tendencies in the earlier stages of human progress. "Besides the preponderance of the affective over the intellectual life," he observes, "the lowest and most personal propensities have, in regard to social relations, an unquestionable preponderance over the nobler. According to the sound biological theory of man, our social affections are inferior in strength and steadiness to the personal, though the common welfare must depend especially on the regular satisfaction of the former, which first originate the social state for us, and then maintain it against the divergencies of individual instincts. To understand the sociological value of this biological datum, we must observe that the condition is necessary, and that it is only its degree that we have to deplore. Personal instincts must give an aim and direction to our social action. All notions of public good must be based upon those of private advantage, because the former can be nothing else than that which is common to all cases of the latter : and, under no ideal refinement of our nature, could we ever habitually desire for others anything else but what we wish for ourselves,—unless in those infinitely rare and very secondary cases in which an excessive refine-

ment of moral delicacy, fostered by intellectual meditation, may enable a man to appreciate for another means of happiness which are of little or no value to himself. Our moral nature would then be destroyed, and not improved, if it were possible to repress our personal instincts, since our social affections, deprived of necessary direction, would degenerate into a vague and useless charity, destitute of all practical efficacy." (*Positive Philosophy*, Miss Martineau's Translation, II, pp. 130-131.)

An individual, according to Comte, apart from society is but an abstraction. The faculties and constitution of an individual are intelligible only by reference to the influence of the Society in which he lives. Society, to be adequately understood, should be studied by reference to its constant conditions as well as the conditions of its development. Sociology thus includes 'Social Statics,' investigating the conditions of order, and 'Social Dynamics,' inquiring into the laws of progress; and, as order and progress condition each other, Statics and Dynamics are closely related. The egoistic tendencies being at first strong and steady lead an individual to self-exertion and self-satisfaction; but these are gradually controlled and regulated by the development of intelligence and sympathy. The egoistic instinct, however, is not by itself bad, since self-love prepares the way for universal love. "The personal instinct," says Comte, "is the guide and measure of the social; and in no other way could the principle be presented; for in what respect and how could any one love another who did not love himself?" (*Positive Philosophy*, p. 131.) The moral progress follows the law of intellectual progress. Intellectual progress has passed through three stages

Individual constitution is essentially social.

Sociology includes 'Social Statics' and 'Social Dynamics.'

The egoistic instinct is not by itself bad.

The moral progress is parallel to the intellectual.

Three stages
of progress :
1. The
Theological.

2. The
Metaphysical.

3. The
Positive.

The law of
intellectual
development
is illustrated
also in social,
moral, and
religious
progress.

viz., the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The first is the primitive stage in which phenomena are explained by the agencies of gods and goddesses ; the second is the transitional stage in which facts are accounted for by reference to metaphysical abstractions or notions devoid of reality, such as occult causes, scholastic entities, or natural forces ; the third is the final stage when the human mind is satisfied with facts as they are presented in experience and tries only to discover the laws of their co-existence and succession.

The Law of these three stages of Intellectual Development determines also the order of social and moral progress. (1) The primitive *polytheistic* age, being characterized by bias and prejudice, illustrates the preponderance of the egoistic and military spirit and the consequent division of society into castes, with the ascendancy of the sacerdotal and military orders and the subordination of helots or industrial class. This stage is hostile to the development of the sciences and arts, and is defective in respect of the social feelings. The transition from polytheism to *monotheism* supplies, no doubt, a unifying principle in Nature and Man and thus favours the development of the sciences and social ties ; but still it exerts a hostile influence on the social instinct by fostering an egoistic expectation of future blessedness. The Christian Church, for example, though separating the spiritual from the temporal power and thus establishing the comparative independence of morals, still exerts a baneful influence on the benevolent dispositions by "corrupting the heart by an immense and incessant cupidity, and degrading the character by a servile terror : " "Every believer always pursues a purely individual end, the unrivalled preponderance of which

tends to repress every affection unrelated to it." (*Discourse*, pp. 213, 392.) In this respect Comte considers Buddhism as harmless and even favourable to the growth of the sympathetic tendencies. (2) Corresponding to the second or metaphysical stage, which is a period of transition, we have the *juristic period* in society substituting law for coercion, a defensive military organization (*e. g.*, feudal system) for the earlier, which was offensive, and serfdom for slavery. The middle classes now claim political rights and social equality; and the period, being characterized by comparative peace and unity, prepares the way for the development of the sciences and arts as well as of the social feelings. (3) The third or positive stage illustrates the *industrial period*, indicating the complete development of the sciences and the advancement of industry, with its division of labour and active co-operation, which it is the aim of government to encourage.

Order and progress which, according to Comte, constitute the essence of every society, are to be measured not merely by the welfare of some individuals or of the greatest number but by the tendency of the entire fabric, regulated by a government, to promote the highest ends of humanity. Society, which with Comte becomes identical with the State, should thus aim not merely at material comforts but also at the due regulation of intelligence within the sphere of phenomena and, above all, at the development of love and sympathy which underlie all order and progress. Thus the positivist aims at refining human nature by fostering the growth of 'universal love' and weakening the initial strength of the egoistic propensities. Altruism, which develops out of instinctive sympathy, is supported

Morality aims at the development of the sympathetic dispositions.

Altruism.

by reason and strengthened by considerations of unity, order, and harmony ; it is conducive to both common and individual well-being. As Comte uses 'Personality' for the egoistic propensities, morality to him implies the subjection of 'personality' to 'sociability.' An individual may thus be said to be moral when he is actuated by love and sympathy.

"Love is that passion which refines the soul :

First made men heroes, and those heroes gods,
Its genial fires inform the sluggish mass ;

The rugged soften, and the tim'rous warm ;
Gives wit to fools and manners to the clown."

(*Higsons.*)

Positivism
encourages
practical
morality by
dissociating
from
religious
considera-
tions.

Positivism thus takes "social morality for the basis of its whole system." According to Comte, "Morality must become more practical than it ever could be under religious influences, because personal morality will be seen in its true relations,—withdrawn from all influences of personal prudence, and recognized as the basis of all morality whatever, and therefore as a matter of general concern and public rule. The ancients had some sense of this, which they could not carry out ; and Catholicism lost it by introducing a selfish and imaginary aim. We should fix our attention on the advantages that must arise from the concentration of human efforts on an actual life, individual and collective, which Man is impelled to ameliorate as much as possible in its whole economy, according to the whole of the means within his power,—among which, moral rules certainly hold the very first place, because they especially admit of the universal concurrence in which our chief power resides. If we are thus brought back from an

immoderate regard to the future by a sense of the value of the present, this will equalize life by discouraging excessive economical preparation; while a sound appreciation of our nature, in which vicious or unregulated propensities originally abound, will render common and unanimous the obligation to discipline, and regulate our various inclinations." (*Positive Philosophy*, Miss Martineau's Translation, II, pp. 553-554.) The essence of duty, accordingly, lies in the feeling of social solidarity; and *positivism places duties higher than rights*, enjoining on all the obligation of general culture and improvement. "It is indisputable," according to Comte, "that women are, in general, as superior to men in a spontaneous expansion of sympathy and sociality, as they are inferior to men in understanding and reason. Their function in the economy of the family, and consequently of society, must therefore be to modify by the excitement of the social instinct the general direction necessarily originated by the cold and rough reason which is distinctive of Man." (*Ibid.*, II, p. 136.) Positive religion, accordingly, which directs the worship of Humanity as the *Grand Etre* or the Supreme Being, specially refers to the worship of Woman as the type of self-devotion and tenderness.

- "When pain and anguish wring the brow,
A ministering angel thou!" (*Scott.*)

Immortality is but recollection in the minds of posterity; and Humanity, as the object of worship, gradually comes to include the noblest specimens of mankind who are incorporated in it as the saints of positive religion. Love thus "becomes the essential contents of a religion of humanity, whose god is humanity, and whose cult consists in actions which are a

Duty consists in the feeling of social solidarity.

Positive religion consists in the worship of Humanity, specially as is represented in women who are types of self-devotion and tenderness.

Bentham and Comte compared:

1. *Points of similarity:*

According to both (a) personal happiness depends on social and political conditions, and (b) such happiness can be only imperfectly realized.

2. *Points of difference:*

(a) Bentham's conception of society is mechanical; Comte's, organic or vital.

(b) Morals and legislation, in the one case, have reference to an abstract conception of human nature; while, in the other, they are adapted to concrete situations.

(c) The basis of society is egoistic in the one case, and altruistic in the other.

symbolic manifestation of universal love for man." (Wundt's *Ethics*, II, English Translation, p. 150.)

"As regards their fundamental tendency," remarks Wundt, "Bentham's Utilitarianism and Auguste Comte's Positivism are in complete agreement. Comte too bases the happiness of the individual on the state of civil society; and maintains that the complicated conditions which secure social equilibrium allow only of a relative, never of an absolute maximum of happiness." (*Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.) But, in spite of these points of agreement, there are important points of difference. (a) Bentham conceived society mechanically as a mere aggregate of individuals, while Comte's account of the historical development of society shows that an individual, can be adequately understood only in relation to his social environment. (b) Although Bentham mentions that a legislator should notice the peculiarities connected with race, religion, climate, or government, yet he and his followers generally ignore such differences and undertake to construct a code of morals and legislation by computing the imaginary effects of action on persons conceived as specimens of a uniform type. Comte, on the other hand, emphasizes the necessity of a careful study of 'Social Dynamics' and adapting moral and legislative reforms to the requirements of altered circumstances. Connected with this difference we find (c) the essentially egoistic basis of society according to Bentham and his followers, as distinguished from the genuinely altruistic basis recognised by Comte, who admits "The spontaneous sociability of human nature, independent of all personal calculation, and often in opposition to the strongest individual interests." (*Positive Philosophy*, Miss Martineaus Translation, II, p. 128.)

§ 14. (3) **Qualified Form of Genuine Secular Utilitarianism.** The systems of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, though properly coming under Moral Sense (*Vide* Chapter IX, § 3), may also be taken to illustrate, in a qualified form, the moderate view explained above. Wundt speaks of "the more moderate altruism maintained by Hutcheson, which tolerates duties towards self as means to the development of the virtue of benevolence," as distinguished from the "extreme altruistic utilitarianism" of Schopenhauer. Let us consider, therefore, the systems of (a) Shaftesbury and (b) Hutcheson here to illustrate to what extent they advocate the moderate form of Genuine Secular Utilitarianism.

(3) *The Qualified Type:*

Altruism qualified by Moral Sense

(a) *Shaftesbury's System.*—The ethical optimism of Shaftesbury (1671—1713) stands in marked contrast with the moral pessimism of Schopenhauer. In opposition to Hobbes, Shaftesbury holds that human nature is inherently social and so disposed to promote the common well-being, with which individual welfare is indissolubly blended. The 'moral objects,' according to him, are not the outward acts, but the **inward dispositions** which he distributes in three classes, viz., (1) Natural Affections (e.g., love, sympathy, good-will, &c.), (2) Self-Affections (e.g., love of life and convenience, resentment, emulation, appetite, &c.), and (3) Unnatural Affections (e.g., malevolence, depraved appetites, superstitions, and barbarous propensities). Of these, the "unnatural affections" can have no place in a virtuous mind, since they do not contribute to the good either of the community or of the individual: though the satisfaction of such a disposition

(a) *Shaftesbury.*

Man is essentially social and so disposed to promote general well-being. The objects of moral judgment are the inner dispositions which are either (1) benevolent, (2) self-regarding, or (3) unnatural. Unnatural dispositions are always bad.

Virtue consists in the due adjustment of benevolence and self-regard so as to promote general well-being.

Optimism.

Virtue consists in the choice of the right impulse, which is generally in the direction of benevolence.

The natural affections are the chief source of human happiness.

The final verdict rests with Moral Sense.

Shaftesbury's system properly comes under Moral Sense.

may bring temporary pleasure to an individual, yet it is uniformly preceded by intense pain. The other two classes have, no doubt, their due place in the human constitution; but their goodness depends on their mutual adjustment and harmony: the right proportion of an impulse is always to be determined by reference to social welfare. And as, according to Shaftesbury, the different parts of the universe are interconnected, the welfare or happiness of mankind is not at all inconsistent with the good of the entire system. We thus see that the world, properly understood, is as good as it could possibly be—the good of the whole including the good of the parts, and a defect in one place being compensated by an excellence in another.

As virtue involves choice, our duty lies in selecting the proper impulse in every case of conflict; and this impulse is generally to be found in benevolence. In fact, Self-Affections are good only so long as they do not conflict with the interests of the community. Shaftesbury tries to show that the harmony of the 'natural' and 'self' affections tends to promote the happiness of the agent as well as of society. The superior importance of the natural affections is also evident from the fact that they constitute the chief source of happiness to man: "To have these natural and good affections in full strength is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoyment; to want them is certain misery and ill." Though the general good and benevolence are thus taken as indicating our duty in any case, yet the final verdict, according to Shaftesbury, rests with what he calls 'Moral Sense', which strengthens the claim of benevolence and constitutes an additional source of pleasure to the virtuous mind. Shaftesbury's system, therefore, properly comes

under Moral Sense, which apprehends the beauty of proportion or symmetry in the self-regarding and social emotions when they harmoniously blend. (*Vide* Chapter IX, § 3.)

(b) *Hutcheson's System*.—Hutcheson (1694—1747) carries the claim of Benevolence a little farther; and he practically regards it as the beginning and the end of all virtue. He classifies the **springs of action**, into **self-love and benevolence**, each of which assumes a 'turbulent' or a 'calm' form, as its elements—the desires or affections—run an uninterrupted and exclusive course or are modified by considerations of mutual harmony and general good. He also adopts the doctrine of **Moral Sense** which pronounces unreservedly in favour of **benevolence**. Calm self-love, when not in conflict with benevolence, is morally neutral: the "Actions which flow solely from self-love, and yet evidence no want of benevolence, having no hurtful effects upon others, seem perfectly indifferent in a moral sense." Though mentioning that virtuous acts must be voluntary, Hutcheson is inclined to hold the necessarian position; and he estimates the moral worth now by reference to motive, now by reference to consequences. He, accordingly, distinguishes between '**formal**' and '**material**' goodness, according as a good motive is present or the consequences alone are good. (*Vide* Chapter IV, § 3.)

(b) *Hutcheson*.

Virtue consists in benevolence. The springs of action are either self-regarding or other-regarding, each of which assumes a 'turbulent' or a 'calm' form.

Calm self-love, when consistent with benevolence, is morally indifferent.

Formal and material goodness.

"In comparing the moral qualities of actions," writes Hutcheson, "in order to regulate our election among various actions proposed, or to find which of them has the greatest moral excellency, we are led by our moral sense of virtue to judge thus: that in equal degrees of happi-

Virtue lies in the promotion of general well-being.

ness, expected to proceed from the action, the virtue is in proportion to the number of persons to whom the happiness shall extend; (and here the *dignity* or *moral importance* of persons may compensate numbers) and, in equal numbers, the virtue is as the quantity of the happiness, or natural good; or that the virtue is in a compound ratio of the quantity of good and number of enjoyers. In the same manner, the moral evil, or vice, is as the degree of misery, and number of sufferers; so that, that action is best which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers; and that worst which, in like manner, occasions misery. “(*Enquiry*, p. 177.) He was thus the first English writer who used the utilitarian formula; and he anticipated to a great extent the ‘hedonistic calculus’ of Bentham and Mill. “Upon comparing,” says Hutcheson, “the several kinds of pleasure and pains, both as to *intention* [intensity] and *duration*, we see that the whole sum of interest lies upon the side of *virtue*, *public spirit*, and *honour*. To forfeit these pleasures, in whole or in part, for any other *enjoyment*, is the most foolish bargain; and, on the contrary, to secure them with the *sacrifice* of all others, is the truest gain.” (*Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, Sect. VI, p. 167.) He likewise anticipates Mill when he remarks with Aristotle that “The good (and complete) man is the judge and standard of all things.” (*System*, I, IV, p. 121.) Like Shaftesbury he proves the harmony of public and private good and refers to the additional pleasures and pains of Moral Sense. Though Benevolence is thus practically made the test of rectitude, yet the admission of Moral Sense indicates that Hutcheson’s system, like that of Shaftesbury, should properly come under Moral Sense. (*Vide* Chapter IX,

The best action promotes ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number.’

Pleasures differ in kind, intensity, and duration.

The pleasures and pains of Moral Sense.

§ 3.) Albee, accordingly, in his *History of English Utilitarianism*, justly remarks that though the systems of these writers "do stand in a relation to Utilitarianism sufficiently close to require careful examination," yet they are "not properly utilitarian." (pp. 54, 62.)

§ 15. (II) Theological Form of Utilitarianism.

Let us now turn our attention to the theological form of utilitarianism and take Paley's system as a type of it. Paley (1743-1805) tries to unite hedonism with orthodox Christianity by holding that "The good of mankind is the subject, the will of God the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive and end of all virtue." (*Moral Philosophy*, Bk. I, Chap. VII.) Denying the existence of moral sense, which would make moral judgments arbitrary, he holds that the moral quality of an act is to be determined by its tendency to promote the happiness of mankind. Morality, no doubt, is ultimately based on the Will of God; but, as He is benevolent, He desires the welfare of men who are believed by Paley to be the central object of His creation. This deduction of utility as the moral criterion from divine goodness is supported by the beneficent contrivances in which nature abounds; thus 'the light of nature' supports also the doctrine of utility. "Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which constitutes the obligation of it." (*Ibid.*, Book II, Chap. VI, p. 53.) To know the will of God, therefore, we may consult the Scriptures; but, when they are silent we should consult the general tendency of an act to promote or diminish the common happiness. By happiness we are to understand merely a "sum of pleasures." He does not recognise qualitative differences among pleasures: "Pleasures," he says, "differ in

Hutcheson's system properly comes under Moral Sense.

II. Theological Utilitarianism.

Paley.

Paley combines Hedonism with Christianity.

The moral quality is determined by utility, which is consistent with divine benevolence. Man is the central object of creation, for whose welfare every thing has been contrived.

The Will of God is known through the Scriptures supplemented by utility. Happiness consists in the sum of pleasures, differing only

in intensity
and duration.

nothing but in continuance and intensity." (*Ibid.*, Bk. I, Chap. VI, p. 17.)

Personal
happiness is
the sole
motive for
virtue.

Though admitting that we find our most lasting satisfaction in the exercise of the "social affections," he yet contends that the motive for virtuous action is essentially egoistic. He defines "obligation" as the being "urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another;" and he mentions "we can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be a "violent motive" to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws or the magistrate unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other, depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God." (*Ibid.*, Bk. II, Ch. 2.) Thus he tries to reconcile altruism with egoism by maintaining that the motive for promoting the common welfare is the expectation of 'everlasting happiness' in the next world; and similarly we refrain from injuring others out of the fear of 'eternal punishment.' The Scriptures are thus meant not so much to teach morality as to enforce it by adequate sanctions—the promise of future rewards and punishments. Without such sanctions, the mere 'authority of conscience' is not adequate to constitute obligation: "Given, the faculty and all the sentiments it carries," he writes, "why should not I do as I like, in spite of it?" He, accordingly, defines virtue as "the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." (*Ibid.*, Bk. I, Chap. VII, p. 32.) Virtue is thus actuated by the 'religious motive,' which differs

We do good
to others for
the sake of
'everlasting
happiness,'
without
which
morality loses
its sanction.

Virtue is the
promotion of
human well-
being,
according to
Divine

from prudence in extending its calculations beyond this life with a view to gain heaven or avoid hell. Paley writes, "Now in what, you will ask, does the difference consist, inasmuch as, according to our account of the matter, both in the one case and the other, in acts of duty as well as acts of prudence, we consider solely what we ourselves shall gain or lose by the act? The difference, and the only difference, is this: that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come." (*Ibid.*, Bk. II, Chap. 3.)

Theological Utilitarianism also may wear, as remarked above (*Vide* § 11), a gross or a refined form, according to the conception of celestial bliss. We may associate it with Indra's palace and the pleasures connected with his court, as described in the *Puranas*; we may take it as connected with the *Tuba*, the *Jannat*, and the *Hur al ayyuns*, as described in the *Koran* (Cf. Sale's *Koran*, Chap. II, 25 and Chap. LXXVIII, 31-34); or we may apprehend it by reference to celestial ascendancy and agreeable experiences, as described in the *Bible* (Cf. *St. Matthew*, XIX, 28, 29; *St. Luke*, XXII, 29, 30; *Revelation*, XXI, 10-27 and XXII, 1-3). The idea of future happiness or misery would vary with the tastes, inclinations, and culture of individuals; so that even in the case of revealed promises their interpretation would depend upon such tendencies.* We, accordingly, find scriptural

behest, with a view to secure eternal happiness.

While Prudence consults only terrestrial well-being, Virtue consults celestial happiness as well.

Theological Utilitarianism may be gross or refined according to its conception of celestial happiness.

* "The various chapters of the *Koran* which contain the ornate descriptions of paradise, whether figurative or literal, were delivered wholly or in part at Mecca. Probably in the infancy of his religious consciousness, Mohammed himself believed in some or other of the traditions which floated around him. But with a wider

texts taken literally by some and figuratively by others ; and even in the latter case not uniformly by all followers. And, in the case of varying texts, emphasis is laid by some on the one and by others on another text. Thus the motive for virtuous action may in some cases be sensuous pleasures, while in others it may be "good-will from God" (Sale's *Koran*, Chap. IX, 73), the "sight of His face" (*St. Matthew*, V, 8 ; *Revelation*, XXII, 5) or union with the Diety (*Geeta*, VIII, 15).^{*} Thus Theological Utilitarianism, like the other forms, may assume either a gross or sensualistic type, or a refined or elevated form.

§ 16. **Criticism of Altruistic Utilitarianism, Secular and Theological.** The remarks made above in sections 7 and 10 may also be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the forms of utilitarianism we are discussing here. The following additional observations may be made with regard to these :—

(1) We may admit benevolence to be an original endowment of our nature without arriving at morality. Simply because we are moved to promote the well-being of others, it does not follow that such a course is obligatory upon us. Love is not identical with Duty. If, therefore, it is alleged that virtue consists in doing good to others, it must be by reason of the

awakening of the soul, a deeper communion with the Creator of the Universe, thoughts, which bore a material aspect at first, became spiritualised. The mind of the Teacher progressed not only with the march of time and the development of his religious consciousness, but also with the progress of his disciples in apprehending spiritual conceptions." (Ameer Ali's *Spirit of Islam*, p. 239.)

* The end of spiritual progress among the Hindus is taken to be *Salokya* (residence in the same heaven with God), *Samipya* (proximity to Him), *Sarupya* (attainment of perfect nature like His), or *Sajujya* (union with Him).

Previous remarks on Utilitarianism apply also to its Altruistic Form.

Additional Remarks :

(1) Benevolence by itself cannot explain Duty.

The obligatoriness of benevolence is known through

testimony of our moral consciousness. Such an estimate is evidently not an analytical judgment, but a synthetical one based on our moral experience ; we have a knowledge of benevolence and also of the verdict of conscience that it is higher than self-regard ; and hence we hold that benevolence is obligatory. The moral standard is thus assumed, and not evolved out of benevolence.

(2) If now an independent verdict of Conscience is assumed as the moral standard, there is no more any necessity for holding that benevolence by itself is obligatory. The Law of Parsimony requires that we should not unnecessarily multiply the principles for explaining a fact. If, therefore, Conscience alone can adequately supply the moral standard, what is the good of appealing to Benevolence in deciding questions of right and wrong ? Thus, *Shaftesbury* and *Hutcheson* are guilty of redundancy when, in addition to Moral Sense, they set up Benevolence as a standard of rectitude. The systems of *Schopenhauer* and *Comte* are no less incongruous. If, to *Schopenhauer*, the entire universe is but one universal Will, then there is no meaning in obligation ; and his determinism renders it equally unintelligible how one can go beyond his circumstances and entertain a motive for the well-being of others. *Comte* also is equally inconsistent in holding that sympathy, which is primarily weak, is to be the predominant impulse in a virtuous life. If, as he maintains, the self is a mere aggregate of tendencies, of which self-love is originally stronger than affection, then by

moral consciousness.

(2) The admission of moral consciousness renders an appeal to benevolence superfluous.

Inconsistency among the supporters of this view.

what agency and by what means can their relative intensities be altered? Comte, no doubt, speaks of the "moral power" of public opinion. But why should such opinion, emanating from "essentially egoistic" individuals, require the suppression of egoism and the development of sympathy, which is comparatively of "feeble energy"? If it be contended that reason, recognising sociology as the highest science, encourages the development of the social feelings, then the final award rests with reason and not with benevolence. Comte himself, however, describes the ultimate preponderance of sympathy as equivalent to the subordination of 'the theoretic impulse' or reason to 'sentiment.' If this be the case, then the final award rests with feeling and not with reason; and the position turns out to be suicidal, in as much as it implies that at a certain stage of mental development it becomes rational no longer to submit to the dictates of reason.

(3) Benevolence as a standard excludes self-love and thus precludes a harmonious development of the moral constitution.

(3) If Benevolence be made the moral standard, then self-regarding duties are ignored; and thus a harmonious development of our moral nature is precluded. Selfishness, no doubt, is condemned by conscience; but rational self-love is no less obligatory upon us than benevolence. Butler, in regarding Self-love as a standard co-ordinate with Conscience, evidently falls into the opposite mistake; but his theory contains an important element of truth, *viz.*, that the promotion of our own true well-being is no less obligatory upon us than the promotion of the well-being of others. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 11.) If a

harmonious development of our moral nature is the true end of life, then benevolence any more than self-love can never be taken as the moral standard. The true standard is furnished by Conscience which has unquestioned sway over our whole life.

(4) Benevolence as a moral standard is no less impracticable than Self-love. If every body is required to look to the interests of others, but not to his own, then the world is to be transformed into a magnificent comedy in which every one should be busy with every one else's affairs, which must necessarily be imperfectly known, instead of his own, of which he himself is ordinarily the best judge. Egoism may consistently construct a system having some plausibility ; but altruism alone, consistently carried out, would give rise to a grotesque and strange theory. Paulsen writes, "Indeed, the standpoint of absolute egoism is logically tenable ; we can imagine a society in which every one acts according to the maxim of pure egoism, whereas a society in which every one uniformly acts according to the maxim of pure altruism is not even conceivable. In so far as the economic world is based upon contract and commerce, it approximately realizes the principle of egoism ; we have here a plurality of individuals, each of whom has in view only his own interests, and yet a certain harmony of the interests of all. If, on the other hand, we make pure altruism the leading principle, every man caring only for the interests of others and never for his own, we evidently bring about such an absurd exchange of interests

(4) Benevolence as a standard is even more impracticable than Self-love.

as to make collective life inconceivable." (*System of Ethics*, pp. 380-381.)

(5) The untenable-ness of the position is proved by the inevitable appeal to moral consciousness by its supporters.

(5) That Benevolence is not really the moral standard is further evidenced by the fact that the supporters of this theory have never been able to consistently maintain their position. They have often been obliged, consciously or unconsciously, to desert their central position and to appeal to some other factor to account for the facts of our moral life. We have seen that *Shaftesbury* and *Hutcheson* appeal to moral sense; and they, not infrequently, defend virtue and benevolence on utilitarian or hedonistic grounds. When a system makes "happiness in benevolence" the ground of virtue or sympathy, it becomes distinctly hedonistic in character and forfeits its title to a satisfactory explanation either of morals or of disinterested acts. *Schopenhauer's* position is no less inconsistent. If the world is full of strife and misery, and the alleged human virtues are mere refined egoism, then it is not intelligible how one comes to entertain sympathy towards others. *Schopenhauer* is thus constrained to admit, contrary to his own doctrine of knowledge, that sympathy is an inexplicable fact of our mental constitution. If, again, the universal Will is essentially bad and prone to suffering, how can it work against itself and try to become good and take a step towards the removal of suffering? Pessimism is really a suicidal doctrine, for the very complaint implies that life is desirable: as *Huxley* remarks, "There can be no doubt in the mind of any reason-

able person that mankind could, would, and in fact do, get on fairly well with vastly less happiness and far more misery than find their way into the lives of nine people out of ten." (*Evolution and Ethics and other Essays*, p. 201.) Again, how can the universal Will, whose essence is "the will to live," divide itself and act contrary to its own nature in seeking *Nirvana*? Conflict, discord, and deliverance are alike unintelligible when there is one universal principle embracing all existence. Schopenhauer's system is a curious admixture of idealism and materialism, egoism and altruism, intellectualism and æstheticism. Thus Zeller rightly observes that Schopenhauer "carries into his system all the contradictions and whims of his capricious nature." *Comte* also, while contending that virtue consists in benevolence, maintains no less inconsistently that the moral principles are self-evident and universal, admitting of no proof. Equally grotesque is his religion of Humanity, which has aptly been described by an opponent as Catholicism *minus* Christianity. The retort that it is Catholicism *plus* Science overlooks the fact that the naturalization of religion amounts to its negation.

(6) Theological Utilitarianism is not free from the defects of the Secular form. It labours, moreover, under three special disadvantages:—(a) If, as we have seen [*Vide* § 7 (4) and § 10 (2)], the calculation of terrestrial happiness is difficult enough to render a moral estimate almost impracticable, it becomes impossible when the happiness and misery

(6) The defects of the Secular form are present in the Theological also, which is subject to additional difficulties. These are :

(a) The calculation of celestial happiness is not possible.

(b) When such happiness is not the motive, there can be, according to this view, no

of future life are taken into account. It is doubtful whether Paley himself, senior wrangler as he was, would have been able to arrive at a satisfactory solution of moral problems under such a supposition.

(b) When people are not moved by any expectation of future reward or fear of future punishment, there can be, according to this view, no room for virtuous conduct.* But men may be content simply with

* Locke writes—"If a Christian, who has the view of happiness and misery in another life, be asked why a man must keep his word, he will give this as a reason: 'Because God, who has the power of eternal life and death, requires it of us'. But if an Hobbist be asked why, he will answer, 'Because the public requires it, and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not'. And if one of the old heathen philosophers had been asked, he would have answered, 'Because it was dishonest, below the dignity of a man, and opposite to virtue, the highest perfection of human nature, to do otherwise'." (*Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. I, Chap. III, sect. 5.) It may be mentioned, however, that even among Christians, there is not always calculation of future reward or punishment as a motive to virtuous action. The doctrine of predestination, for example, leaves no room for the expectation of future reward. Since the fall of Adam, as St. Augustine mentions, human nature has become essentially bad; and so it is no longer left to man to be virtuous by personal efforts: all acts are equally offensive to God. "The natural man is the *slave* of evil, and divine grace alone can make him free. Now, divine grace cannot be brought about by man; it is entirely dependent on God's freedom." (*Weber's History of Philosophy*, p. 197.) The belief in a future life or the expectation of future rewards may not operate equally in all minds. Sale, for example, mentions in his *Koran*: "It may not be improper to observe the falsehood of a vulgar imputation on the Muhammadans, who are by several writers reported to hold that women have no souls, or, if they have, that they will perish, like those of brute beasts, and will not be rewarded in the next life. But, whatever may be the opinion of some ignorant people among them, it is certain that Muhammad had too great a respect for the fair sex to teach such a doctrine; and there are several passages in the *Koran* which affirm that women, in the next life, will not only be punished for their evil actions, but will also receive the rewards of their good deeds, as well as the men, and that in this case God will make no distinction of sexes.....One circumstance relating to these beatified females, conformable to what he had asserted of the men, he acquainted his followers with in the answer he

the discharge of the duties of life as they arise, without any thought of the everlasting happiness or punishment. And would such acts be excluded from the sphere of virtue? (c) If these be excluded, then the only motive for virtuous acts would be prudence or self-regard. True, the acts are directed towards "the good of others;" but the "motive" for the performance of these acts is merely "private happiness." There is, in such cases, objective sympathy, no doubt, disposed to promote the well-being of others, but no subjective sympathy or benevolence proper. Morality thus loses its independent ground and becomes, more or less, egoistic and hedonistic in character. Though, according to this view, human nature is not conceived as naturally bad, as was done by St. Augustine and his followers, yet it is conceived as essentially egoistic. "Without the expectation of a future existence," says Paley, "all reasoning upon moral questions is vain." It may be mentioned, however, that the estimate of virtue would be highly precarious, if it be made to depend on our fears and expectations.

room for
virtue.

(c) Virtue
merges in
prudence,

and the
theory
becomes
essentially
egoistic.

Virtue rest-
ing on fears
and expecta-
tions is highly
precarious.

" Joy comes and goes, hope ebbs and flows
Like the wave ;
Change doth unknit the tranquil strength of
men,

returned to an old woman, who, desiring him to intercede with God that she might be admitted into paradise, he told her that no old woman would enter that place ; which setting the poor woman a crying, he explained himself by saying that God would then make her young again."—*Preliminary Discourse*, pp. 162-163.

Love lends life a little grace,
A few sad smiles ; and then,
Both are laid in one cold place,
In the grave.

" Dreams dawn and fly, friends smile and die
Like spring flowers ;

Our vaunted life is one long funeral.

Men dig graves with bitter tears
For their dead hopes ; and all,

Mazed with doubts and sick with fears,

Count the hours." (*Matthew Arnold.*)

Thus Hedonism, egoistic or altruistic, gross or refined, secular or theological, is quite incompetent to render a satisfactory explanation of our moral life.

Hedonism in all its forms is thus inadequate to explain satisfactorily the facts of our moral life.

CHAPTER XI.

THE MORAL STANDARD

(II) THE STANDARD AS END (*CONTINUED*).

PERFECTIONISM.

§ 1. (II) Perfection as the Moral Standard.—

Having examined the different forms of Hedonism, let us now turn our attention to the consideration of the other forms of Teleological Theories mentioned in §2 of the last chapter. Perfectionism, as indicated above, makes Perfection or Excellence the standard of rectitude. But the conception of Perfection varies with the estimate of the true character and end of human life. Perfection (Lat. *perficio*, from *perficere*, to carry to the end; *per*, through, and *facere*, to do) implies completed culture and indicates growth or development. "By perfection is meant the full and harmonious development of all our faculties, corporeal and mental, intellectual and moral." *Metaph.*, I, p. 20.) The conception of Perfection as the moral standard varies, therefore, according as it is taken to consist in the development of our physical, intellectual, or æsthetic life, or it is regarded as distinctively moral. But whatever may be the form which Perfectionism wears, we find two peculiarities connected with it:—(1) The standard here is objective and not subjective. While Hedonism makes subjective feeling the criterion of moral worth, Perfectionism regards an objective end—health, efficiency, truth, beauty, or

Perfectionism makes excellence or completed culture the standard, to be attained by gradual development.

The standard varies according as physical, intellectual, æsthetic, or moral development is taken to be the supreme end of life.

Peculiarities of Perfectionism :

(1) The standard is objective, to be attained by culture.
 (2) The essence of moral life lies in development.
 Classification of different forms of Perfectionism.

holiness—as the standard of rectitude and aims at the attainment of the end by self-improvement or culture. (2) Perfectionism thus indicates the necessity of improving the character and conduct, and so implies that moral life is essentially a process of growth or development.

Teleological Theories may, accordingly, be classified by reference to the conception of perfection thus:—

II. Perfectionism	1. Biological	{ (a) Individual. (b) Social.
	2. Intellectual	{ (a) Based on absolute truths. (b) Based on eternal relations.
	3. Esthetic	{ (a) Individualistic. (b) Universalistic.
	4. Moral	{ (a) Transcendental. (b) Immanent.

(1) *Biological Perfectionism* aims at the due adjustment of the psycho-physical constitution to its surroundings, natural and social.

(2) *Intellectual Perfectionism* aims at the proper cultivation of knowledge.

The advocates of (1) the Biological Form of Perfectionism hold that the true end of life is the perfect adjustment of the organism to its environment or, as Spencer calls it, "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." (*Principles of Biology*, Chap. V.) As mental and moral functions are intimately connected with those of the brain, the complete adjustment of the entire life to its natural and social surroundings constitutes, according to this view, the standard of virtue and existence alike. (2) The supporters of Intellectual Perfectionism maintain that true knowledge is the sole condition of all virtue, so that to be virtuous

we have only to cultivate knowledge. (3) The champions of the third view contend that the essence of moral quality is to be found in the intrinsic beauty or deformity of certain acts, apprehended by Moral Sense. The due development of the *Æsthetic Faculty* is thus the prime condition of a virtuous life. (4) The advocates of the fourth view urge that, as moral quality is *sui generis*, moral excellence or holiness is really the standard of virtuous conduct. We have already discussed in the last chapter the first form of Teleological Ethics, viz., Hedonism, which is the prevailing doctrine of the day. And, reserving the treatment of Eudæmonism for the next chapter, we shall discuss here the different forms of Perfectionism with as much brevity as possible. Let us, therefore, consider first the doctrine of *Biological Perfection*, of which the principal supporters are Darwin (1809-1882), Spencer (1820-1905), Stephen (1832-1905), and Professor Alexander. Wallace (1823—), though advocating the doctrine of biological evolution, denies that it controls the evolution of the intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature of man. He contends that the higher faculties develop under a higher law and that evolution, rightly understood, "lends a decided support to a belief in the spiritual nature of man."

(3) *Æsthetic Perfectionism* requires the refinement of the sense of beauty.

(4) *Moral Perfectionism* enjoins the improvement of the moral nature for the attainment of holiness.

§ 2. (1) **The Theory of Biological Evolution.**—The distinguishing feature of this theory is that it does not, like Hedonism, merely generalize moral rules from experience, or, like Intuitionism, accept them as final on the testimony of consciousness, but tries to deduce

1. *Biological Evolution.*
(Spencer,

Stephen, and Alexander)
It deduces moral principles from biological and sociological laws.

Spencer.

The health of society and of individuals is the moral standard.

Organic perfection, which brings both health and happiness, is secured by evolution, involving the due adjustment of the internal to the external world.

Evolution furthers life both in

them from the biological and sociological laws regulating human life. Recognizing the "dependence of ethical laws upon the laws of life," Evolution Ethics deduces from these the laws of our moral life: "I conceive it to be the business of Moral Science," observes Spencer, "to deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery." (*Letter to Mill.*)

"The real difference between the utilitarian and the evolutionist criterion," remarks Leslie Stephen, "is that the one lays down as a criterion the happiness, the other the health of the society." (*Science of Ethics*, Chap. IX, §12, p. 352.) The chief aim of life is thus to promote the health of society and so of the individuals contained in it; and this, therefore, becomes the standard of virtue. The physical and mental powers are to be exercised for this end which secures advancement and happiness alike. The Theory of Biological Evolution takes organic, and not spiritual, perfection as the goal of our moral life. Intellectual, emotional, and volitional culture are looked upon as subsidiary processes calculated to further the primary end of life—organic development. What we call life is but an aggregate of activities or tendencies which are put forth for self-preservation and continuance; and evolution of life consists in duly adapting these tendencies to the requirements of circumstances, natural and social. Life is for life's sake. The goal of evolution is thus the increase of life both in length or duration and breadth or volume. "Estimating life by multiplying its length into its

breadth," observes Spencer, "we must say that the augmentation of it which accompanies evolution of conduct, results from increase of both factors. The more multiplied and varied adjustments of acts to ends, by which the more developed creature from hour to hour fulfils more numerous requirements, severally add to the activities that are carried on abreast, and severally help to make greater the period through which such simultaneous activities endure. Each further evolution of conduct widens the aggregate of actions while conducing to elongation of it." (*Data of Ethics*, pp. 14-15.) And this increase in complexity is quite in keeping with the character of Evolution in general.*

length and breadth.

Spencer.

Evolutionary Ethics is essentially historic in character. It traces the present mental and moral constitution of man to the history of his ancestors and ultimately to that interaction between organism and environment which underlies the evolution of every form of life. The doctrine of Natural Selection and Survival

Evolutionary Ethics is historical in character, tracing the present human constitution to ancestral experience.

*Evolution is defined by Spencer as "An integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." (*First Principles*, Part II, Ch. XVII., p. 396.) Evolution as a natural process of development was long ago anticipated in India by *Kapila* who regarded the universe and its products as the gradual evolution of *Prakriti* (Nature). *Prakriti* is the rootless root of all things (सुल्लं मूलमावाहं लं मूलं— *Sankhya Aphorisms*, Bk. I. 67); and evolution is a slow process, like milk turning into curds, gradually developing the different elements, organs, and organisms. Even in the West, Schopenhauer who was deeply influenced in his speculations by the philosophy of the East, may be regarded as a precursor of Darwin in introducing the concept of evolution. The 'Will' of Schopenhauer is an universal principle or impulse characterized by strife and struggle, and finally attaining to consciousness in man. (Vide Chap. X, § 12.)

Moral Evolution is but a form of the general course of Evolution, conditioned by Natural Selection and Survival of the Fittest. 'Good' implies due adjustment; 'evil,' mal-adjustment.

The instinct of self-preservation leads to the rectification of mal-adjustment. 'Evil' has thus always a tendency to disappear.

Man is still in process of adaptation. Perfect adaptation means perfection.

of the Fittest is as much illustrated in the evolution of the moral as in the evolution of the vegetable or the animal life. Good arises from the proper adaptation of constitution to environment; and evil is the outcome of non-adjustment or mal-adjustment. This is true of every form of life. A plant, for example, withers when removed to an uncongenial soil or unable to get sufficient light or moisture from its environment; and an animal likewise pines away when taken to a foreign climate or incapable of adapting itself to the altered conditions of its life. Thus evil appears whenever the harmony between an organization and its circumstances is disturbed; but evil has always the tendency to disappear. As the essential principle of life is self-preservation, there is ever present the tendency to rectify non-adaptation or mal-adjustment. This is illustrated in the acclimatization of plants, the altered habits of animals, and the varying manners of men with varying circumstances. What was suitable to man in his early predatory life cannot suit him in his later social life; and as he is not yet perfectly adapted to the social state, there is continuance of evil. As, however, civilization tends to bring about a perfect harmony between human nature and its social and industrial environment, so evil also shows a tendency to disappear. Man is now imperfectly adapted; and he is in process of adaptation. When there is perfect adaptation, moral rules will be illustrated in their ideal perfection. "The adaptation of man's nature to the conditions of his existence," writes Spencer, "cannot cease until the internal forces which we know as feelings are in equilibrium with the external forces they encounter. And the establishment of this equilibrium, is the arrival

at a state of human nature and social organization, such that the individual has no desires but those which may be satisfied without exceeding his proper sphere of action, while society maintains no restraints but those which the individual voluntarily respects." (*First Principles*, 2nd edition, p. 512.) Thus the evolution of morals is but a part of general evolution illustrated everywhere, and Ethics becomes but a section of Biology or, rather, of Cosmology.

Ethics is a section of Biology and Cosmology.

"Just as," writes Spencer, "fully to understand the part of conduct which Ethics deals with, we must study human conduct as a whole; so, fully to understand human conduct as a whole, we must study it as a part of that larger whole constituted by the conduct of animate beings in general." (*Data of Ethics*, p. 7.) Now conduct in the widest sense is "the adjustment of acts to ends;" and, consistently with the general law of evolution, this adjustment becomes more complex and elaborate as animals rise in the scale of existence:

Moral conduct is but a form of conduct in general.

Conduct in the widest sense is "the adjustment of acts to ends," which becomes more complex and elaborate as animals rise in the scale of existence.

"Nature in her productions, slow, aspires
By just degrees to reach perfection's height."

(Somerville.)

"Evolution," remarks Spencer, "tending ever towards self-preservation, reaches its limit when individual life is the greatest, both in length and breadth; and we regard as good the conduct furthering self-preservation, and as bad the conduct tending to self-destruction. . . . Evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, in offspring, and in fellow men." (*Data of Ethics*, pp. 25-26.) Owing, however, to the "interaction of feelings and functions," the

The limit of evolution is the maximum longevity and complexity of life.

Good conduct promotes self-preservation, while bad conduct retards it.

The "psychological aspects" of acts are closely connected with their "physiological aspects;" injurious actions are painful, while beneficial actions are agreeable.

Animal Evolution implies, therefore, that "pleasure giving acts are life-sustaining."

Thus, conduciveness to happiness becomes the final test of human perfection.

"psychological aspects" of acts constituting conduct are closely connected with their "physiological aspects." To interpret conduct adequately, therefore, we must refer to the psychological aspects as well. "It is an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of Evolution," says Spencer, "that pains are the correlatives of actions injurious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare," since "races of sentient creatures could have come into existence under no other conditions": "those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been, other things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment." (*Principles of Psychology*, § 124.) Thus, "Sentient existence can evolve only on condition that pleasure-giving acts are life-sustaining acts." (*Data of Ethics*, p. 83.) "The perfection of man considered as an agent, means the being constituted for effecting complete adjustment of acts to ends of every kind. And since the complete adjustment of acts to ends is that which both secures and constitutes the life that is most evolved, alike in breadth and length; while the justification for whatever increases life is the reception from life of more happiness than misery; it follows that conduciveness to happiness is the ultimate test of perfection in a man's nature." (*Ibid.*, p. 34.) Hence "it becomes undeniable that, taking into account

immediate and remote effects on all persons, the good is universally the pleasurable." *Ibid.*, p. 30.) Stephen likewise observes, "The organism has solved the problem for us approximately. It has come to be so constituted that what is pleasant is approximately wholesome. We start with that assumption, and correct the errors by the inverse conclusion that what is wholesome is in the long run also productive of most pleasure." (*Science of Ethics*, Chap. ix, § 11, p. 352.)

The agreeable is, accordingly, the eligible.

Thus Evolutionary Ethics becomes also hedonistic in character. The evolutionist and utilitarian criteria are, as Stephen observes, "not really divergent; on the contrary, they necessarily tend to coincide." (*Science of Ethics*, Chap. ix, § 12, p. 352) But while moral laws are mere empirical generalizations from the utilitarian standpoint, they are regarded by evolutionists as derivative laws following from biological and sociological conditions. The fundamental moral principles, though ultimately based on "utility" and deducible also from "the laws of life and the conditions of existence," appear, nevertheless, intuitive in us owing to the hereditary influence registered in our brains: "Though these moral intuitions," observes Spencer, "are the results of accumulated experiences of Utility, gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience . . . Experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility." (*Letter to Mill.*)

Evolutionary Ethics is thus hedonistic in character.

The fundamental moral principles, though ultimately resting on experience and utility, have in the later generations become intuitive owing to the influence of heredity.

An adequate explanation of moral facts involves, therefore, a reference to ancestral experience.

Moral progress means the peaceful extension of moral ideals.

Alexander.

To adequately explain, therefore, the facts of our moral life, we should not be satisfied with the mere examination of the facts of our present consciousness, but should try to trace these to ancestral experience through heredity. Evolutionary Ethics is thus not so much connected with Psychology as with Physiology, Biology, and Cosmology. "Ethics," writes Spencer, "has for its subject-matter, that form which universal conduct assumes during the last stages of its evolution..... These last stages in the evolution of conduct are those displayed by the highest type of being, when he is forced, by increase of numbers, to live more and more in presence of his fellows. And there has followed the corollary that conduct gains ethical sanction in proportion as the activities, becoming less and less militant and more and more industrial, are such as do not necessitate mutual injury or hindrance, but consist with, and are furthered by, co-operation and mutual aid." (*Data of Ethics*, p. 20.) Progress in the moral sphere thus implies a peaceful extension of moral ideals. "The war of natural selection," observes Alexander, "is carried on in human affairs not against weaker or incompatible individuals, but against their ideals or modes of life. It does not suffer any mode of life to prevail or persist but one which is compatible with social welfare." And moral progress, as he remarks, is essentially connected with "minds." Here "we have something of the following kind. A person arises (or a few persons) whose feelings, modified by more or less deliberate reflection, incline him to a new course of conduct. He dislikes cruelty or discourtesy, or he objects to seeing women with inferior freedom, or to the unlimited opportunity of intoxication. He may stand alone and with only a few friends to

support him. His proposal may excite ridicule or scorn or hatred; and if he is a great reformer, he may endure hardship and obloquy, or even death at the hands of the great body of persons whom he offends. By degrees his ideas spread more and more; people discover that they have similar leanings; they are persuaded by him; their previous antagonism to him is replaced by attachment to the new mode of conduct, the new political institution. The new ideas gather every day fresh strength, until at last they occupy the minds of a majority of persons, or even of nearly all." In fact, "persuasion and education, without destruction, replace here the process of propagation of its own species and destruction of the rival ones, by which in the natural world species become numerically strong and persistent."

Though, in explaining Evolution Ethics, we have indifferently referred to the views of its leading supporters—Spencer, Stephen, and Alexander—yet there are important points of difference among them. Without entering into details, we may mention here that Spencer's position is marked by three prominent features, not noticeable in others.

Peculiarities
of the
Spencerian
view:

(1) Spencer draws a distinction between Absolute and Relative Ethics, and mentions that the former, laying down ideal precepts, should be the guide of the latter, which is concerned only with what is relatively good under definite circumstances. His ethical procedure is thus not strictly historical; it is rather, as he himself admits, 'teleological.' (*Data of Ethics*, p. 305.) "Granted," he writes, "that we are chiefly interested in ascertaining what is *relatively right*; it still follows that we must first consider what is *absolutely right*; since the one conception presupposes the other. That is to say,

(1) Spencer's ethical procedure is rather teleological than historical: according to him Relative Ethics, which is concerned with the actual, should be regulated or improved by Absolute Ethics, which aims at the ideal.

though we must ever aim to do what is best for the present times, yet we must ever bear in mind what is abstractedly best; so that the changes we make may be *towards* it, and not *away* from it." (*Essay on Prison-Ethics*.) Thus, the ideal shapes the actual; and not the actual, the ideal.

(2) Spencer's Ethics is markedly hedonistic.

(2) Spencer's ethics is markedly hedonistic. "If we call good the conduct conducive to life, we can do so only with the implication that it is conducive to a surplus of pleasures over pains." (*Data of Ethics*, p. 45.) The ultimate moral aim, according to him, is always a desirable state of feeling; "pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception." (*Ibid.*, p. 46.) Stephen, however, though admitting that "What is pleasant is approximately wholesome," maintains, "The common rule is that each organism is better as it obeys the conditions of health, but we cannot found any common rule upon the happiness, the standard of which changes as the organism itself changes." (*Science of Ethics*, Chap. IX, § 14, p. 355.) Prof. Alexander likewise observes, "An act or person is measured by a certain standard or criterion of conduct, which has been called the moral ideal. This moral ideal is an adjusted order of conduct, which is based upon contending inclinations and establishes an equilibrium between them. Goodness is nothing but this adjustment in the equilibrated whole." (*Moral Order and Progress*, p. 399.)

Spencer's position is more individualistic.

(3) Spencer's theory is more individualistic. We have seen that, though deducing the essential features of our moral life from biological and sociological laws, Spencer yet maintains that "Evolution, tending ever towards self-preservation, reaches its limit when individ-

ual life is the greatest, both in length and breadth." (*Data of Ethics*, p. 25.) Stephen and Alexander, on the other hand, emphasize the essentially social feature of morality. "The moral law," says Stephen, "defines a property of the social tissue." (*Science of Ethics*, Chap. IV, §29, p. 160.) It is "a statement of an essential condition of social welfare." (*Ibid.*, Chap. XI, § 9, p. 425.) Similarly, the essence of the moral ideal, according to Alexander, is "That the society can be in equilibrium with itself."

§ 3. Criticism of Biological Evolution. (1) Evolutionism, as based on the 'historical' method, tries to trace our present moral constitution to the early experiences of our ancestors. But, however successful such an historical investigation may be in indicating the growth of our moral life, it does not explain the character of the moral ideal. "Cosmic evolution," remarks Huxley, "may teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before." (*Evolution and Ethics*, p. 80.) Moral life is governed by the ideal, and not by the actual. Any attempt, therefore, to explain our moral life merely by reference to the actual must prove futile. Ethics, as we have seen, is a normative science: its primary business is to determine the moral standard or ideal and not merely to discover the stages of development actually traversed by man. "A normative discipline, an art of volition and action," writes Kulpe, "can gain

Criticism of Biological Evolution:

(1) The historical method is altogether unavailing in explaining the character of the moral ideal.

Huxley's testimony.

Kulpe's testimony.

nothing either for the validity or for the systematisation of its norms and precepts from the proof of their gradual development under a variety of conditions and influences. We can no more hope that ethics will be assisted in any direct way by an account of the course of moral ideas through the centuries than that logic would be helped to solve its problems by a psychological history of the development of its concepts and judgments and methods." (*Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 214.)

(2) The Evolution Theory really involves the application of the teleological method.

(2) The Evolution Theory, however, is only apparently based on the 'historical method:' the past history determines the present, and the present determines the future, indicating continued advance or progress. The course of moral progress, therefore, is throughout under the direction of a regulating ideal, which is being realized in history. Careful examination thus reveals that the evolution theory is really based on the 'ideal' instead of on the 'actual.' Evolution is movement *towards* an *ideal* perfection and *away from* an *actual* defect. The 'historical' method must, accordingly, be replaced by the 'teleological' to explain the character of evolution as a steady advance or progress towards an ideal.

Watson.

"Was it some random throw
Of heedless Nature's die,
That from estate so low
Uplifted man so high ?
Through untold æons vast
She left him lurk and cower :

"T would seem he climbed at last
In mere fortuitous hour,
Child of a thousand chances 'neath the in-
different sky.

* * * *

"If, then, our rise from gloom
Hath this capricious air,
What ground is mine to assume
An upward process *there*,
In yonder worlds that shine
From alien tracts of sky?"

(Watson, *On Evolution*.)

(3) When, however, by the employment of the teleological method, it is shown that the ultimate end of conduct is quantity of life measured in length as well as in breadth, the result is doubly questionable:

(3) Mere complexity or prolongation of life can never be proved to be the moral end:

(a) In the first place, though length of life may be shown to be the biological end of all conduct,* it is doubtful whether breadth or "greater elaboration of life produced by the pursuit of more numerous ends"

(a) Complexity of constitution involves greater risk of disturbance and suffering;

(*Data of Ethics*, p. 14) can similarly be shown to be the chief end of conduct. 'Breadth' by itself may not be desirable. Complexity of structure or constitution implies a greater risk of disturbance and suffering. So increase of 'breadth' may not be quite consistent with increase of 'length.' (b) In the second place, even if it be shown that both con-

(b) Prolongation of life can never be

* The contrast is interesting between the evolutionary conception of the moral ideal as striving for life and the conception as advocated by Schopenhauer that the moral ideal consists in the negation of the will, the abandonment of all effort—even the effort to live.

said to be desirable by itself apart from its character or quality.

Sidgwick's testimony.

tinuance and volume of life constitute the supreme biological end, it does not follow that these constitute the supreme moral end. "I cannot," writes Sidgwick, "accept a view of the well-being or welfare of human beings—as of other living things—which is suggested by current zoological conceptions and apparently maintained with more or less definiteness by influential writers; according to which, when we attribute goodness or badness to the manner of existence of any living organism, we should be understood to attribute to it a tendency either (1) to self-preservation, or (2) to the preservation of the community or race to which it belongs—so that what "Wellbeing" adds to mere "Being" is just promise of future being. It appears to me that this doctrine needs only to be distinctly contemplated in order to be rejected. If all life were as little desirable as some portions of it have been, in my own experience and in that (I believe) of all or most men, I should judge all tendency to the preservation of it to be unmitigatedly bad." And he adds, "The mere existence of human organisms, even if prolonged to eternity, is not in any way desirable; it is only assumed to be so because it is supposed to be accompanied by Consciousness on the whole desirable; it is therefore this Desirable Consciousness which we must regard as ultimate Good." (*Methods of Ethics*, Bk. III, Ch. XIV, § 3, pp. 397-398.)

(4) Biological and moral evolution can not be the

(4) Biological and Moral Evolution do not mean the same thing: 'survival of the fittest' in the one case means the victory of the 'strongest' under

definite circumstances, while in the other it implies the ascendancy of the 'morally best,' which includes the protection of the weakest. "The practice of that which is ethically best—what we call goodness or virtue," observes Huxley, "involves a course of conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence. In place of ruthless self-assertion it demands self-restraint; in place of thrusting aside, or treading down, all competitors, it requires that the individual shall not merely respect, but shall help his fellows; its influence is directed, not so much to the survival of the fittest, as to the fitting of as many as possible to survive. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence. It demands that each man who enters into the enjoyment of the advantages of a polity shall be mindful of his debt to those who have laboriously constructed it; and shall take heed that no act of his weakens the fabric in which he has been permitted to live. Laws and moral precepts are directed to the end of curbing the cosmic process and reminding the individual of his duty to the community, to the protection and influence of which he owes, if not existence itself, at least the life of something better than a brutal savage." (*Evolution and Ethics*, pp. 81-82.)

(5) Evolutionary Hedonism as advocated by Spencer has all the defects of Utilitarianism. It moreover unwarrantably assumes that conduciveness to 'totality of life' brings also a 'surplus of agreeable feelings.' The *Law of Self-conservation* is not so

same, for they are governed by different tendencies and principles.

Huxley's testimony.

(5) The defects of Utilitarianism are present also in Evolutionary Hedonism. It unwarrantably assumes

that life-promoting activities are necessarily pleasure-producing.

axiomatic as it is supposed by Bain and Spencer to be : we find, for example, several useful and needful acts unaccompanied by pleasure (e. g., digestion, respiration) or even accompanied by pain (e. g., labour pain, consciousness of shortcoming). Thus the concomitance of Life and Happiness and their final identity are not supported by facts. The assumption of Spencer, therefore, that virtue implies such concomitance and ultimately their identity is purely gratuitous. If conflict, pain, and imperfection have hitherto characterized moral progress, there is no room for expecting that a time will come when, owing to the perfect adjustment of the inner to the outer conditions of our existence, these features will be altogether eliminated—giving place to perfect equilibrium, complete happiness, and finished virtue. The true source of moral progress is to be found in the consciousness of shortcoming and the consequent impulse to improvement. An absolute quiet, therefore, in which even the consciousness of obligation must have died away, would mean stagnation and absence of moral inspiration. The Absolute Ethics of Spencer, with its moral ideal, like the optimistic anticipation of Krause that, through education and culture, evil has a tendency to disappear, is merely a myth or Utopia ; and hence we find it repudiated by Alexander and Stephen. Stephen, for example, writes, "The attempt to establish an absolute coincidence between virtue and happiness is in ethics what the attempting to square the circle or to discover perpetual motion is in geometry or mechanics." (*Science*

The Absolute Ethics of Spencer is a dream.

of *Ethics*, p. 430.) It should not, however, be inferred from this that there is no room for moral ideal in the moral progress of individuals and nations. The impulse to such progress is rather found, as we shall see (*Vide* Chap. XXI, § 4), in the consciousness of short-coming arising from the recognition of a difference between the actual and the ideal. But to represent the ideal as ceasing to be an ideal at any stage of human culture, is to extinguish the consciousness of short-coming then and thus to destroy the very essence of moral life by repudiating further moral advance.

(6) *Biological* evolution does not explain *mental and moral* evolution. Even if *physical* evolution be admitted, *mental or moral* evolution as a consequent process is not proved. The organs or physiological conditions, for example, of conscience and the sense of beauty are not definitely known. How, then, are we to trace the evolution of these faculties to remote ancestors? Evolution may explain the development of an element already existing; but it cannot create anything wholly new. Evolution, accordingly, cannot show that conscience has emerged out of sentiency, any more than it can show that sentiency has emerged out of mere vegetative functions.

(7) If, however, we concede all that the evolutionist requires and thus admit that moral evolution is merely a physical necessity, then we need not at all be careful about our conduct. If moral perfection, relative or absolute, comes to us in the course

(6) Biological evolution does not prove moral evolution.

Evolution is not creation, but the gradual manifestation of what was latent before.

(7) If moral evolution is a physical necessity, there can be no room for moral effort.

of nature, then we may be quite reckless in our conduct, knowing that whatever happens happens in its proper place. But such a supposition even is repugnant to our moral consciousness. "Nothing," observe Janet and Seailles, "could be more convenient to each individual than this theory, since it allows him to yield to all his passions, knowing that progress will go on just the same, and that the supremacy of good will be in any case effected by natural forces." (*History of the Problems of Philosophy*, II, p. 89.)

(8) The assumption of the evolution theory that human nature has been moulded merely by circumstances is entirely gratuitous.

(8) Evolution theory assumes that the human constitution has been made what it is wholly by circumstances. The environment acting on the human mind has moulded it in its present form. But are we to attribute all the stir and activity to the outer world and none at all to the inner? Does food really give rise to appetite, light to vision, and social need to moral nature? Do objects create faculties or do faculties seek after their appropriate objects? Are instincts produced by occasions or are occasions but opportunities for the gratification of instincts? To advocate the doctrine of spontaneous generation or the evolution of tastes, inclinations, and rational principles out of mere accidental circumstances is to overstep the limits of rational gymnastics. Alexander admits in the case of morals that "the war of natural selection" is here essentially connected with "ideals," which "by degrees spread more and more" as "people discover that they have similar leanings." If such be the course

of moral progress, then it indicates the victory of the "ideal" and not the "actual," the supremacy of "mind" and not of "nature." The very fact that "people discover that they have similar leanings" implies similarity of moral constitution and the presence of innate tendencies which finally break through hostile forces and establish their ascendancy. Heredity cannot create anything wholly new, though it may strengthen or weaken a tendency already existing. Evolution or Heredity, therefore, cannot bring into existence a moral nature where there was a blank before, any more than it can enable the eyes to hear or the ears to see. The explanation of the *a priori* factors from the evolutionary standpoint is altogether unsatisfactory: (a) If cumulative experience extending over several generations can generate intuitive ideas, then in course of time their number should increase; but the number is the same now as it was in antiquity. To say that the period of time is not yet adequate to generate new ideas, is to take refuge in darkness and to admit the weakness of the position. (b) Moreover, the innate ideas are quite unlike the materials (sensations) out of which they are alleged to have developed. Space, for example, is not homogeneous with sensations which are phenomena in time alone. Time-order or Number is not Space. "It matters not," writes Martineau, "how many ages and organisms are expended in grinding down and refining and re-compounding these materials: they will never turn out either plenum or vacuum enough for a hat to

Heredity cannot create any thing wholly new, though it may modify tendencies already existing.

Thus the *a priori* ideas can never be the outcome of evolution.

put your head in." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, II, p. 387.) Naturalistic Ethics is an extravagant theory not supported by facts.

(2) *Knowledge as the Moral Standard.*

Virtue is reduced to knowledge.

Socrates.

Proper training would incline one to virtue as therein lies his true interest.

Wollaston.

Virtue is resolved into truth. Evil is the practical denial of a true proposition.

§ 4. (2) **Knowledge as the Moral Standard.** If Biological Evolution takes the furtherance of life as the moral ideal, the doctrine of intellectual perfection takes the ideal as progress in knowledge. With the development of knowledge an individual is aware of the true conditions of duty; and when one is thus convinced of his duty, he is led to act in that direction. Virtue is thus reduced to knowledge. "The disease of all diseases," says Budha, "than which none is worse, is ignorance." (*Dhammapada*, Sec. 26. Trubner's Edition, p. 125.) Socrates (470-399 B. C.), who is regarded as the father of Moral Philosophy, may be named as an advocate of this view. Dissatisfied with the pretensions and corruption of his time, he tried to convince people that they really did not know what they professed to know. If people could only be properly taught, he thought, they would naturally be inclined to virtue. The path to virtue is, therefore, knowledge. As duty and interest were blended together in the Socratic notion of good, Socrates justified virtue on utilitarian grounds; and he could not conceive that a man could be so irrational as to knowingly commit a sin and thus to go against his own interest. In modern times we find also analogous theories. Wollaston (1659-1724), for example, resolves virtue into truth and holds that what we call moral evil is merely the practical denial of a true proposition. Stealing, for instance, is wrong, because it implies the contradiction in practice of the true proposition that the property belongs to another.

Wollaston does not, however, include in his notion of good both moral and prudential considerations. On the contrary he draws an explicit distinction between 'moral good' and 'natural good' or 'happiness', which are regarded by him as distinct objects of rational pursuit and inquiry. Wollaston's theory was but a development out of Clarke's. Let us, therefore, notice here the views of (a) Cudworth (1617-1688) and (b) Clarke (1675-1729), who are regarded as the prominent modern supporters of this doctrine, as illustrating the same fundamental position, though in different ways.

(a) *Cudworth's System*.—The Understanding, according to Cudworth, is "an active cognoscitive power" which intuitively reveals the "Intelligible Ideas" or notions, constituting the foundation of all knowledge and existence. Rejecting absolutism altogether, whether human (as advocated by Hobbes) or divine (as advocated by Descartes), Cudworth maintains that the true and the good are ultimately based on Divine Nature. These are really due to the eternal and necessary modes of His Mind, determining creation and cognition alike. Divine modes of thought are thus the ultimate essences of all things as well as the *a priori* conditions of human knowledge. The categories of the human understanding are, therefore, not merely subjective forms, but also objective conditions representing facts. As "Intelligible Ideas" they cannot be pictured or presented to the imagination; but nevertheless they are objects of knowledge, giving us an insight into the real constitution of things. The process of cognition is thus essentially deductive, involving the application of a ready-made category to an object presented in experience: "knowledge," as he says, "doth not begin in

Cudworth.

The Understanding intuitively discovers the Eternal Truths or 'Intelligible Ideas' which ultimately rest on Divine Nature.

The 'Intelligible Ideas' or Categories are not merely subjective forms but also objective conditions.

Cognition is essentially deductive, involving the application of a category to a fact.

individuals, but ends in them." (*Eternal and Immutable Morality*, Book IV, [III, 13, p. 461.] When, therefore, a thing is known, it does not seem to be altogether strange and new, but somewhat familiar, owing to the prior existence and operation of the corresponding category in us.* The "intelligible ideas" are thus described by Cudworth as "anticipations" of experience. When we judge, for example, a figure as a triangle or an act as just, we merely apply the "anticipation" or "intelligible idea" of 'triangle' or 'justice' to a particular case. Judgment is thus but a form of logical subsumption: it consists in the application of a given pre-conception to a particular case. If we have but a clear and adequate knowledge of these "ideas", which are the defining marks of acts and objects, we must be able to judge them aright and thus to pursue the right course. Our chief aim, therefore, should be the due development of Intelligence.

An adequate knowledge of the categories is essential to correct judgment.

Our aim, therefore, should be the cultivation of Intelligence.

Clarke.

Eternal and immutable relations constitute the foundation of all truth and virtue.

(b) *Clarke's System*.—Clarke also resolves virtue into knowledge. According to him there are eternal and immutable relations of things and persons, constituting the basis of all truth and virtue. There are in "Morals, as in Geometry, certain unalterable relations, aspects, and proportions of things, with their consequent

* This is but an echo of the Platonic Doctrine of Reminiscence, according to which knowledge is but a revival or recollection of the eternal ideas or truths known to us in our ante-natal existence. Cf.—

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar;
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home." (Wordsworth.)

agreements and disagreements." God Himself, through His infinite goodness and wisdom, adapts His will to these eternal and immutable relations, so that truth and virtue do not ultimately depend on His arbitrary will. As in mathematics, "so in moral matters there are certain necessary and unalterable respects or relations of things which have not their origin from arbitrary and positive institutions, but are of eternal necessity in their own nature." (Clarke's *Works*, ii, p. 626.) As mathematical relations are immutable giving rise to self-evident mathematical truths, so human relations are equally fixed and eternal, giving rise to duties or moral truths spontaneously apprehended by Reason or Intelligence. Morality thus ultimately depends on the fitness or unfitness of the relations in which we stand to each other and to the rest of the universe. The duties of a child towards his parents are not the same as those of the latter to the former; and with every variation in relation there is a variation in our duties. "The same necessary and eternal *different relations* that different things bear to one another; and the same consequent *fitness or unfitness* of the application of different things or different relations one to another; with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily *does* determine itself, to choose to act only what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe; *ought* likewise constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings to govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public in their respective stations. That is, these eternal and necessary differences of things make it *fit and reasonable* for creatures so to act; they cause it to

Even Divine Will is adapted to these relations.

Human Reason spontaneously apprehends them;

and virtue consists in acting according to them.

be their *duty* or lay an *obligation* upon them so to do, even separate from the consideration of these rules being the *positive will* or *command of God*; and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension of any *particular private and personal advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment*, either present or future, annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive appointment, to the practising or neglecting of those rules." (*Boyle Lectures*, 1705, p. 176, 9th edition.) If men, therefore, act wrongly, they act "contrary to that understanding, reason and judgment, which God has implanted in their nature, on purpose to enable them to discern the difference between good and evil. 'Tis attempting to destroy that order by which the universe subsists." To be virtuous we should have an insight into the true relations of things. We have, no doubt, an intuitive knowledge of such relations; but this knowledge may be perfected by culture and habit or obscured by "the extremest stupidity of mind, corruption of manners, and perverseness of spirit."

To be virtuous, one should aim, therefore, at a correct knowledge of these relations.

(1) Knowledge and Morality are not the same: the one has to do with the actual, the other, with the ideal; the one involves mere conviction, while the other, obligation as well.

§ 5. Criticism of Dianœtic Ethics. (1) To resolve morality into mere knowledge is to miss the distinctive character of moral quality. Knowledge is concerned with *what is*, while morality with *what ought to be*. In the one, we contemplate the actual; while in the other, we strive after the ideal. The authoritative claim of morality is not to be found in mere knowledge. To deny that two and two are four or that material bodies fall to the ground amounts to folly or obtuseness but not to sin. Truth carries conviction, but not authority, such as is implied in Duty. Truth, though categorical, is not

imperative; if we act contrary to it, we may be pronounced stupid but not corrupt.

(2) The conditions of knowledge are not identical with those of virtue. Truth is quite consistent with a necessary constitution of things; but virtue implies freedom and choice. Necessity explains knowledge, but contingency is essential to virtue. Though moral truths are eternal and immutable, yet action according to them must be contingent in order that there may be merit or demerit in an agent. Truth necessitates assent; but virtue rests on the election of an obedient will. To know is not to do: however much we may be convinced of a truth, there is still left room for choice to act or not according to it.

(3) Mathematical and physical relations underlying truths or knowledge do not necessarily postulate a mind. Attempts have been made to explain the universe and its relations mechanically, instead of teleologically; and such an explanation, however fallacious on other grounds, may be quite consistent with fixed laws or truths. But the supposition of morals without minds is an absurdity. Objective conditions alone may satisfy the requirements of Science; but subjective conditions are needed to suppose even the possibility of morals. Thus the province of knowledge is not co-extensive with that of virtue. The latter, though resting on objective conditions, presupposes a subject capable of acting according to them.

(4) The relations which underlie truths or knowledge cannot be described as fit or congruous

(2) Knowledge implies a necessary constitution of things, while virtue implies free choice.

(3) Mere objective conditions, on which knowledge is based, may be possible; but such a supposition is absurd in morals which necessarily involve reference to a mind.

(4) Fitness of relations is derived from

morality, and
not morality,
from it.

from the moral stand-point without presupposing moral conditions. If a certain relation is judged as morally fit, it must be by reference to the moral end served by it. Apart from it, the relation is ethically neutral. Thus the relations of fitness or unfitness, described by Clarke as the prior conditions of morality, are really posterior to it: it is morality which explains fitness, and not fitness morality. Morality implies, no doubt, relations; but the peculiar character of a relation is determined by it. Relation as a physical or intellectual fact does not explain duty; it is the implied authoritativeness which accounts for it.

(5) Knowledge
is not attend-
ed with the
moral senti-
ments which
are peculiar
to our moral
life.

(5) The difference between Knowledge and Virtue, Truth and Duty, is brought out clearly by their concomitant experiences. Truth necessitates assent; Duty requires obedience. Truth and knowledge may give rise to satisfaction, and error and ignorance may occasion perplexity and pain; but we never experience approbation or compunction in such a sphere. We may regard a man as intelligent and wise for his knowledge and experience, or as dull and foolish for his ignorance; but we never attribute any merit or demerit to him for his intellectual excellence or defect. Moral experiences have some special traits not to be found in mere exercise of Intelligence.

3. *Beauty as
the Moral
Standard.*

§ 6. (3) **Beauty as the Moral Standard.** Some are disposed to hold that the Right is but an aspect of the Beautiful.

“How near to good is what is fair !

Which we no sooner see,

But with the lines and outward air

Our senses taken be." (Ben Jonson.)

The doctrine that the moral standard lies in Beauty or the *Æsthetic* aspect of an act is allied to the theory of Moral Sense. As we have already considered this theory above (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 3 and Chap. X, § 14), we may dismiss the topic with only a brief reference to the views of its prominent supporters. The general Greek tendency was to take an artistic view of the Good; and this tendency is well illustrated even in the system of *Plato*. (*Vide* Section 8.) In modern times, the systems of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Herbart illustrate the position more or less fully. "What is beautiful," remarks *Shaftesbury*, "is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and proportionable is true; and what is at once both beautiful and true is of consequence agreeable and good." (*Misc.* III, Ch. ii.) "Beauty and good" are to him "one and the same." (*Moralists*, Part III, Sec. 2.) *Hutcheson* likewise speaks of "the moral beauty or deformity of actions" (*Enquiry*, p. 176): "We have," he says, "a sense of goodness and moral beauty in actions, distinct from advantage." (*Ibid.*, p. 190.) (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 3.) *Herbart* (1776—1841), resolving all knowledge and experience into relations, tries to make out that the essence of moral experience lies in the harmonious or inharmonious relations among our ideas which give rise to feelings, impulses, and volitions. According to *Herbart* the feeling arising from relations is essentially of an *æsthetic* character; and so the moral feeling is also of the same type. The rising and sinking of ideas are determined by their reciprocal relations; when there is harmony or equilibrium among them, there is a feeling of approval; and when there is discord, a

This theory is allied to the doctrine of Moral Sense.

Herbart.

Reducing all knowledge to relations, he attributes moral experience to the apprehension of harmonious or inharmonious relations among ideas.

The moral sentiment characterizing such apprehension is essentially æsthetic in character.

Jonathan Edwards.

Virtue is the beauty of moral excellence.

Ruskin.

Taste is morality.

Moralæstheticism is either (a) individualistic, or (b) universalistic.

(1) The æsthetic and moral sentiments, though similar to a certain extent, are not exactly alike.

The moral sentiments are relative to activity

feeling of disapproval. Jonathan Edwards (1703—1758), too, holds an analogous view. "Virtue," he writes, "is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a *moral* nature, i.e., such as are attended with desert or worthiness of *praise* or *blame*"; and "true virtue," according to him, "most essentially consists in benevolence to being in general." (*A Dissertation concerning the Nature of True Virtue*, Chap. I.) Ruskin (1819—1900) similarly observes: "Taste is not only a part and an index of morality; it is the *only* morality...Tell me what you like, and I will tell you what you are." (*Crown of Wild Olive*, § 54.) It should, however, be noticed in this connection that æstheticism assumes either (a) an *individualistic* type, as in Herbart and Ruskin, or (b) an *universalistic* form, as in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Edwards. In the one case the moral estimate is essentially connected with the personal experience of an individual, while in the other it is connected with universal benevolence or general well-being. But from either stand-point, we must cultivate our taste if we wish to be virtuous.

§ 7. Criticism of Æsthetic Ethics. (1) Though agreeable feeling accompanies the apprehension of Beauty and Right, yet their characteristics are not the same. Both, no doubt, are objects of common apprehension; both are devoid of any personal consideration and so are characterized by disinterestedness; and both alike give rise to agreeable feelings. But, in spite of these points of agreement, there are important points of difference. Beauty has no necessary reference to personal activity, while morality is restricted to the sphere of voluntary acts.

Beauty may fascinate, but cannot command. The essence of morality, however, lies in its authoritativeness—its unqualified demand for action in the direction of Right. Again, though pure pleasure always attends the contemplation of Beauty, mixed experiences often characterize the performance of what is right. To do our duty, we have often to throw out of the way a hostile desire and thus to experience an element of pain, which may be greater or less than moral complacency according as our nature is comparatively low or elevated. Hence we find Kant mentioning that duty involves constraint.

and are authoritative in character.

(2) The estimate of Beauty is not so uniform as that of Duty. The æsthetic sentiment is comparatively variable; and hence we find that the supporters of moral æsthetics often seek extraneous help to account for the invariable character of the moral standard. Shaftesbury, for example, refers to the uniform agreeable experience connected with the right, and Hutcheson regards "happiness in benevolence" as the essence of virtue. It was not without justice, therefore, that Price charged the æsthetic moralists with degrading the estimate of virtue by reducing it to a mere 'relish.' By the steady pursuit of what is good and noble, one may come to possess a virtuous character and thus acquire a 'taste' for virtue. But such liking is not essentially æsthetic; it is merely the outcome of uniform obedience. It is a factor derived from habit and superadded to the primitive conviction of Right.

(2) The æsthetic standard, as resting on feeling, is highly variable; while the moral standard, as resting on conviction, is comparatively constant.

(3) Harmony and passive experience may satisfy the conditions of Beauty; but authority and free-choice are essential to Morality.

(4) The Beautiful is not necessarily the Right.

(5) The peculiarities of moral experience are not to be found in æsthetic experience.

(3) The conditions of Beauty are not the same as those of Morality. Beauty may be found in outward objects, but morality is illustrated only in personal acts. To be moved by beauty is not to be virtuous. Harmony and proportion may excite the æsthetic feeling; but these are not adequate to generate the moral sentiments. There may be no less harmony among the confederates of a gang of robbers or among the acts of a profligate than among the elements of a musical or a pictorial production; but we never recognise moral beauty in the former, though we may be moved by the æsthetic feeling in surveying the latter.

(4) The province of Beauty is not co-extensive with that of Morality. There may be beauty in musical or dramatic performance, not consistent with the ends of morality. We, accordingly, find Plato excluding Poetry from his ideal commonwealth, as fiction is not quite consistent with truth and virtue.

(5) The concomitant experiences in the case of Beauty and Morality are markedly distinct. We never attribute merit or demerit to a person for apprehending or missing beauty in objects; nor do we feel approbation or disapprobation for such experiences. In the moral sphere, however, we always have a consciousness of complacency or compunction, merit or demerit in connection with our obedience or transgression. Beauty is thus not the same as Duty or Right.

§ 8. (4) **Holiness as the Moral Standard.** It is again contended by many that moral perfection is a

*Holiness
is the Moral
Standard.*

unique quality not resolvable into anything else. The moral ideal supplies an end which should determine our conduct and which represents the limits of holiness attainable by man. The conception of such an ideal has dominated the thoughts of great men in all ages : it is no less patent in Plato than in Hegel ; it is inculcated with no less force in the Geeta than in the Bible or the Koran. The estimate of the moral ideal has not, however, been the same with all men : (1) Some take the ideal to be the transcendent perfection illustrated in Divine Nature ; (2) others take it to be the perfection as conceived by man and revealed in his conscience. This immanental standard again is conceived (a) by some as settled and definite, though admitting of variation owing to different grades and forms of development, and (b) by others as essentially progressive, as manifested in the moral progress of mankind.

(1) *The Transcendental Standard*.—Among ancient writers we may take Plato (427-347 B. C.) as a supporter of this view. According to him the Good is the highest Idea in the transcendental world which should mould our character. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 5.) It is the greatest reality discovered by philosophic reflection and is the parent of all virtue : a knowledge of it establishes the supremacy of Reason and brings about a “harmony” among the different parts of the soul, which is the essence of all virtue. Plato finally regards the True, the Good, and the Beautiful as but different aspects of the Divine. (*Vide* § 6.) This is analogous to the Hindu conception of the Deity as *Sachchidanandam* (सच्चिदानन्दम्). We find a trace of this transcendental view in early Christian Ethics. St. Augustine (354-430 A. D.), who was deeply influenced

The moral quality being unique, the end of moral activity is moral perfection or holiness.

The moral ideal is conceived by some as (1) transcendent, and by others as (2) immanental.

The immanental standard again is viewed by some as (a) fixed and by others as (b) essentially progressive.

(1) *The Transcendental Standard*.
Plato.

The Good is the supreme Idea which should mould our character.

St. Augustine.

Since the fall of Adam, human nature has become essentially bad. Thus all human acts are offensive to the Deity, as they fall short of His infinite perfection, which is really the standard in morals.

(2) *The Immanent Standard.*

The standard is revealed in us either (a) as a *fixed* or (b) as a *progressive* ideal.

(a) *The Fixed Standard.*

Though the ideal is potentially

by Plato, contends that the highest good consists, not in happiness, but in virtue, and that its ultimate source is to be found in the perfect nature of the Deity. Since the fall of the first parents of mankind, human nature, however, has become essentially bad ; so that all human acts are equally offensive to God. Salvation can never be due to personal merit ; it can be due only to divine grace. According to this view no human acts can properly be regarded as virtuous, since they fall short of the infinite holiness of the Divine Nature by which alone men are to be measured.

(2) *The Immanent Standard.*—From this standpoint, the standard of judgment is furnished by the ideal as revealed in us. (a) Such an ideal, however, may be conceived as definite and settled so far as the limit of human perfection is concerned, though within this limit the ideal may vary owing to the influence of education and circumstances. The standard is essentially the same always and everywhere; though it may be differently conceived owing to the limitations of personal experience. We may describe this form of the immanent standard as *Settled*. (b) The other form of the immanent theory is that the moral standard is progressive in its very nature : It gradually improves with the march of time or, as maintained by the Hegelians, with the evolution of the Universal Spirit. We shall call this standard *Progressive*. Let us notice these two views separately.

(a) *The Fixed Standard.*—This does not mean that the standard as it actually operates is exactly the same in all men. The germ, and so the limit, of moral development is pre-determined, no doubt ; but below

the limit there is room for variation owing to the influence of education and experience. Though, for example, it is universally admitted that honesty is right, benevolence is right or justice is right, yet the notions of honesty, benevolence, and justice are not quite the same in all. As these notions are not equally developed in all, so the moral estimates based on them are expected to vary. (*Vide Chap. VIII, § 5.*) It is contended by the supporters of this view that the standard by which we are to be judged is not the Infinite Holiness of the Deity, but its finite image as communicated to us through conscience: we are to be judged by the human ectype and not by the divine prototype. "It is not His personal and absolute ideal," writes Martineau, "by which we are to be tried; but His communicated and relative ideal, implanted in our humanity, so far as He has permitted it to dawn on each of us. Beyond this, we are at present out of relation to Him, and not less foreigners to His moral rule than we are to His intellectual life in matters transcending even the guess of our reason. But this relative standard is high enough, alas! to justify the deepest humiliation that, like the Christian, is not abject." (*Types*, II, p. 120.)

(b) *The Progressive Standard*.—According to this view, the moral ideal, which guides the conduct of man, is always relative to circumstances, so that with enlightenment and culture the moral ideal improves. "It is not unusual for philosophers," observes Mansel (1820-1871), "to reason as if they were possessed of an absolute, and not merely of a relative standard of morals;—as if they had attained to the conception of eternal morality, as it exists in the nature of God, instead of to that temporal

the same in all, yet it may actually vary owing to the limitations of experience and education.

The moral standard is the ideal as implanted in us and not the infinite holiness of the Deity.

Martineau.

(b) *The Progressive Standard*.

The Moral ideal is relative to age and circumstances.

Mansel.

manifestation of it which is adapted to a particular state of the constitution, and stage of the progress, of man."* (*Metaphysics*, p. 390.) The conception of such a progressive ideal is prominent among Neo-Hegelian writers who hold that it is always the reflexion of the spirit of the age. T. H. Green (1838-1882,) for example, speaks of "the idea of the good" as "an idea which gradually creates its own filling." "Moral development," he writes, "will not be merely progress in the discovery and practice of means to an end which throughout remains the same for the subject of the development. It will imply a progressive determination of the idea of the end itself, as the subject of it, through reflection on that which, under influence of the idea but without adequate reflection upon it, he has done and has become, comes to be more fully aware of what he has it in him to do and to become." (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 259.)

Green.

Holiness is, no doubt, the end of human life; but, as it is felt to be obligatory, the final standard seems to be the moral law, involving the command of a Supreme and Holy Mind.

§ 9. Criticism of Holiness as the Standard.—There is no doubt, an element of truth in the doctrine that holiness is the moral standard. Our moral nature implies that we should strive after perfection or holiness which, as shown above, is a special form of excellence, not like truth, beauty, or pleasure. This moral excellence, however, which we regard as the goal of our life, is not optional, but obligatory: it is not left to us either to seek moral excellence or to

*Referring to the Divine arbitrary will as the moral standard, Lecky observes—"Closely connected with this doctrine is the notion that the morality of God is generically different from the morality of men, which having been held with more or less distinctness by many theologians (Archbishop King being perhaps the most prominent), has found in our own day an able defender in Dr. Mansel." (*History of European Morals*, I, p. 18.)

neglect it; it is not a question of option, but of obligation. We have in us the consciousness that we *should* so regulate our life as to attain moral perfection. Moral perfection is thus *binding* upon us—binding in the sense of authoritative requirement; it thus carries with it all the weight of sanction involved in the preference of the Supreme Mind. Even in the highest stage of moral development, a sense of duty or obligation is present with the knowledge of right, though a sense of constraint may be absent owing to the subsidence of conflict between inclination and duty. (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 3.) We cannot avoid, therefore, the notion of law as the standard, backed by the authority of a Holy Nature. Such a law, no doubt, as indicated above (*Vide* Chap. X. § 1), implies an end; and the end, so far as we can comprehend it, is holiness; but this holiness in its turn may be but a qualification for a higher destiny in store for us. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 9.)

It may be mentioned in this connection that the *transcendental standard* is untenable in morals. If the standard be the infinite holiness of the Supreme Mind, not at all analogous to what we feel and realize, then our moral life turns out to be a hopeless reverie and the conditions of probation are annulled. The *progressive standard*, likewise, is not countenanced by facts. The fundamental moral principles are essentially the same to-day as they were in the days of Abraham or Solon, Mahammad or Luther. The same moral spirit breathes in the Vedic hymns as we find in the latest utterances of a Pope or a martyr.

The Transcendental Standard is untenable, as it practically denies the possibility of a virtuous life.

The Progressive Standard is neither tenable, as the fundamental moral principles are the same always and every-

where, however much their contents may vary.

The limit of moral perfection is supplied in the ideal inherent in our constitution, though, within such a limit, there is room for progress owing to the widening of our mental horizon and the expansion of our notions of virtues. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 5.) The ideal potentially has in it the limit assigned by the Creator, though actually it is of this or that form owing to the peculiarities and restrictions of personal experience. The actual standard is thus ordinarily, more or less, an approximation to the ideal.

Perfectionism, by itself, is thus inconclusive.

The positive verdict of consciousness in favour of an authoritative requirement should not be set aside for the conception of a mere ideal or fascinating end of human pursuit.

§ 10. **Perfectionism Inconclusive.** The preceding remarks must have made it clear that Perfectionism, though pretending to furnish the supreme end of our moral life, does not yield a final and uniform result. The several ends discussed above—biological, intellectual, æsthetic, or spiritual—may be but means to a higher state as the reward of a life of probation. The conjectural interpretation of the summum bonum should not be regarded as more valid than the positive testimony of consciousness in favour of 'a categorical imperative.' Men, no doubt, are led to inquire into the ultimate significance of our moral life as of everything else.

"But men may construe things after
their fashion,
Clean from the purpose of things themselves."
(*Shakespeare.*)

Thus we cannot set aside the solid psychological fact of an authoritative requirement in the moral sphere in favour of a hypothetical conception of an end believed to be the real significance of our moral life.

The moral end is conceived by some as essentially progressive, never realized in practice, but always impelling us towards higher and higher ideals. Thus Wundt's '*law of the heterogony of ends*' implies that ever new ideals are shaped by the lessons of previous moral experience. "Those elements of the result that lie outside of the original motive," says Wundt, "are eminently fitted to become new motives or elements in new motives, from which new ends or variations of the original end arise." (*Ethics*. I, p. 330.) Thus individualistic ends of self-contentment and self-culture prepare the way for the social ends of public well-being and general progress; and these in their turn lead to the wider humanistic ends of improvement of mankind and universal welfare. But even such a tendency towards continuous moral progress implies an indelible sense of obligation with its consciousness of authoritative requirement or moral law. While, therefore, the standard as law is clearly revealed in the facts of consciousness, the standard as end rests on mere hypothesis, more or less arbitrary. As Emerson observes—

"To insight profounder
Man's spirit must dive;
His aye-rolling orbit
At no goal will arrive;
The heavens that now draw him
With sweetness ⁱⁿ told,
Once found,—for new heavens
He spurneth the old."

(*The Sphinx*)

Wundt's '*law of the heterogony of ends*' indicating continuous moral progress,

reveals but the operation of the consciousness of obligation, which ever urges us forward in our moral path.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MORAL STANDARD.

(II) THE STANDARD AS END (*CONTINUED*).

EUDÆMONISM.

§ 1. (III.) Eudæmonism as the Moral Standard.

Let us now turn our attention to the consideration of the remaining form of the Moral Standard, viz., Eudæmonism.* If Hedonism makes pleasure the standard of rectitude and Perfectionism makes excellence such a standard, Eudæmonism tries to reconcile these two extreme views by making both perfection and pleasure the moral standard. [*Vide* Chap. X, § 2 and § 7 (13).] Though, as rational beings, it is urged, we aim at perfection, yet as sentient beings we seek happiness; and true happiness, it is contended, is to be found in a synthesis of reason and sensibility. The pleasures of sense being

Eudæmonism makes both perfection and agreeable feeling the moral standard.

* The supreme or final end of human life is called by Aristotle "eudaimonia" or well-being, "for we choose it for itself and never for the sake of something else." Sidgwick observes, "The belief, to which even writers of reputation in modern times have given countenance, that the notion of *eudaimonia* as the end of human action was introduced by Aristotle—in opposition to Plato, who maintained virtue to be the or chief good—has, so far as I know, no foundation whatever." The error involved in it, however, would be less important if *eudaimonia* were not currently rendered happiness, and thus more or less definitely conceived as a whole of which the elements are pleasurable feelings: whereas both Plato and Aristotle—no less than Socrates—conceive "well-doing" to be the primary constituent of "well-being." (*Outlines of the History of Ethics*, p. 48, foot-note.)

essentially limited, mixed, and evanescent, can never yield pure enjoyment. The essence of true happiness lies in the ascendancy of reason and the consequent systematization of our desires. Then there is no more any conflict between egoism and altruism, momentary and abiding enjoyments. As all the inclinations and passions are brought under the regulation of reason, harmony reigns in the mind, and enduring and general satisfaction is the result.

"Peace rules the day when reason rules the mind."

(Collins.)

"Happiness," writes Seth, "is not the sum or aggregate of pleasures, it is their harmony or system. The distinction between happiness and pleasure, even within the sphere of feeling, could hardly be better stated than by Professor Dewey: "Pleasure is transitory and relative, enduring only while some special activity endures, and having reference only to that activity. Happiness is permanent and universal. It results only when the act is such a one as will satisfy all the interests of the self concerned, or will lead to no conflict, either present or remote. Happiness is the feeling of the whole self, as opposed to the feeling of some one aspect of self." As misery or unhappiness is not pure pain, or even a balance of pain over pleasure, but lies in the discord of pleasures, so happiness lies in the harmony of pleasures, or in the reference of each to the total self. Happiness is, in a word, the synthesis of pleasures." (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 216-217.)

Thus, from the eudæmonistic standpoint, true

True happiness accrues from the union of reason and sensibility.

The ascendancy of reason brings about a harmony among desires, thus yielding peace and felicity.

Pleasure is a partial and momentary gratification, while happiness is an abiding satisfaction of the entire self arising out of concord.

Feeling is thus an integral part of the moral standard which is happiness :

without the attendant joy a nature can never be said to be truly virtuous.

happiness, involving both reason and feeling, is the standard of rectitude. The virtuous man, in doing what is right, feels also the joy connected with its performance. Nay, it is contended by the advocates of this view that without the attendant joy an act, even if it be reasonable, can scarcely be called virtuous. An individual reluctantly following reason and thus doing what he believes to be right on any occasion cannot properly be said to be virtuous. The very fact that he does not find pleasure in well-doing shows that he is not really virtuous. Thus the connection between moral excellence and satisfaction is taken by the supporters of this view to be analytical and not synthetical as maintained by other writers*. Pleasure is not merely a concomitant but a factor of what we call virtue or moral excellence. "We are not," writes Seth, "to think of reason as having exclusive interests of its own, apart from those of sensibility; its interest is rather the total interest of sensibility itself. By its peculiar insight and impartiality, reason secures the well-being of the life of sensibility, and, through the integration of its several conflicting tendencies in the conception of ends and of a supreme ideal, effects that perfect and harmonious sentient satisfaction which we call happiness." (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 210-211.)

Two forms of Eudæmonism:

Eudæmonism appears in either of two principal

* Locke and Kant, for example, contend that there is a synthetic relation. Locke, for example, defines "moral good and evil" as "only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good and evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the law-maker." (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Chap. XXVIII, Sec. 5.) For Kant's view *vide* Chap. IX, § 20.

forms, viz., (1) Intellectual, or (2) Moral. (1) The first form is illustrated in the systems of the Stoics and Spinoza, who contend that the essence of virtue is to be found in the peace and happiness connected with true knowledge. (2) The second form is illustrated in the systems of Aristotle and Hegel who take the happiness of our moral life to be the test of true virtue. Let us briefly consider these views one by one.

§ 2. (1) **The Intellectual Form of Eudæmonism.** (a) **Stoicism.** The founder of the School was Zeno (342-270 B. C.). The difference between Stoicism and Epicureanism is rather with regard to the means than with regard to the end. Both aim at the attainment of felicity or bliss, though the means suggested is different: while the Epicureans maintain that pure enjoyment is the means to happiness (*Vide* Chap. X, § 6), the Stoics contend that **we must forego enjoyment in order to be truly happy.** The materialistic pantheism of the Stoics has led them to connect human destiny and aspiration with their theory of the universe: "No ethical subject," says Chrysippus, "could be rightly approached except from the pre-consideration of entire Nature and the ordering of the whole." God or Zeus is conceived by the Stoics as the primeval fire from which the soul of man has emanated in the form of warm ether. The physical world is likewise believed by them to have developed out of Zeus, and it is expected to be finally consumed into His eternal substance. The world is under the moral administration of Zeus aided by some subordinate deities. As the divine spirit permeates the world through and through, it bears upon it the mark of goodness and wisdom which characterize Him.

1. Intellectual.

2. Moral.

1. *The Intellectual Form*

(a) *Stoicism.*

The Stoics and the Epicureans agree as to the end which is regarded as happiness; but they differ with regard to the means.

The Stoics contend that we can be happy only by renouncing pleasures.

Their materialistic pantheism

and optimism

The natural as well as the moral constitution is characterized by Reason, which is essentially Divine.

Virtue consists in the due exercise of Reason :

'Life according to Nature.'

Resignation and contentment.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.

Cosmopolitanism.

The reason, which we find in man, is but a ray of divine reason which is manifested no less in the constitution of the Natural than in that of the Moral world. The world, being thus essentially divine, must be conceived as perfect ; and any apparent defect noticed anywhere must be deemed as evanescent before the Supreme Mind, who "knows how to even the odd and to order the disorderly, and to whom the unlovely is dear." Believing in the essential unity of the rational self, the Stoics take the passions and inclinations as but its perversions due to incorrect estimates of what is eligible or objectionable. **Virtue thus consists in the proper exercise of Reason**, which is the divine in the human and which unites the individual not only with the rest of mankind, but with the universe itself. We are, therefore, as the Stoics say, "**to live according to Nature**," which is essentially rational. It secures universal interest, peace, and contentment alike, and induces resignation by strengthening our faith in the propriety of all events. "Everything," exclaims the Stoic emperor, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, is harmonious to me which is harmonious to thee, O Universe ; nothing is too early or too late for me that is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature : from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return. The Athenian says, 'Beloved City of Cecrops' : and shall I not say, 'Beloved City of God' ?" Thus the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics is but a corollary to their theory of the universe which leads them to recognise universal brotherhood.

In our attempt "to live according to nature," we discover that the "primary ends of nature" are self-preservation and health which are implied in the very

exercise of our instincts or natural impulses. These, therefore, and their accessories—such as strength, wealth, security, honours—are regarded by the Stoics as objects of rational choice : and wisdom consists in the right preference of such “goods.” Such “goods” or useful things, however, may be turned to good or bad use : a virtuous man would make proper use of them, while a vicious individual would put them to a wrong use. Thus, in themselves, they are neither good nor bad : they may fitly be described as *indifferent things* (*adiaphora*), lying between good and evil. The real good or virtue lies, not in such indifferent things, but in the wisdom of the choice. (Cf. Kant’s System, Chap. IX, § 20.) They merely afford an opportunity for the right exercise of judgment, just as a bull’s eye enables an archer to become a good marksman. The Stoic sage, therefore, though influenced by the passions and inclinations, knows that their objects are not really good ; and so he practises *indifference* to them. He is unaffected by hope or fear, love or resentment, pleasure or pain.

The essence of virtue and wisdom lies in right choice.

The Stoic indifference and determinism led to apathy and equanimity.

“Stone walls do not a prison make,
Nor iron bars a cage ;
Minds innocent and quiet, take
That for an hermitage.” (Lovelace).

This indifference harmonized well with the Stoic determinism which, amounting almost to fatalism, required that men should be satisfied with what came to them in the course of nature. It explains the extreme **apathy and equanimity**, not disturbed even by the death of a friend. Why should we mourn at all knowing, as we do, that everything comes about in due course ? But, as “children of one Father,” we should always try

to promote the general well-being, so far as it is consistent with rational life.

Though the Stoics were the first to form a definite conception of Duty or Moral Obligation, yet duty with them assumed rather the negative form of abstinence than any positive form of active life. True happiness, according to them, is to be found in seclusion which enables one to preserve the repose of the soul by avoiding the vanities of life. They, accordingly, extol the joy of contemplative life, undisturbed by passions, and even advocate suicide, if required by physical infirmity, to preserve the calm of mind. We should not even be offended at the conduct of others: "Recollect," says Epictetus, "that in what a man says or does, he follows his own sense of propriety, not yours. He must do what appears to him right, not what appears to you; if he judges wrongly, it is he that is hurt, for he is the person deceived. Always repeat to yourself, in such a case: The man has acted on his own opinion." Denying that there are degrees or gradations of sin, the Stoics insist on the absolute necessity of attaining to true wisdom which is unshaken by the vicissitudes of life and which enables one to be just, charitable, and magnanimous. True wisdom, then, constitutes virtue and happiness at the same time. The felicitic aspect of virtue, though implied in the case of the earlier Stoics in the form of tranquillity and honest pride, becomes more prominent in the case of the later supporters of the school since Cicero as the "joy and gladness" of a virtuous life.

Duty with them assumes the negative form of abstinence.

True happiness is found in seclusion, contemplation, and equanimity.

Epictetus.

We should try to attain true wisdom which secures virtue and happiness alike.

(b) *Spinozism.*

§ 3. (b) **Spinozism.** The metaphysical pantheism of Spinoza (1632-1677)—for such it is, as his All is a

characterless Being—makes the intellectual love of God the ultimate standard of virtue. Let us briefly refer to the main points of his system to render this position clear. Spinozism is the logical outcome of Cartesianism. The geometrical method of Descartes is more rigorously applied by Spinoza to show that Substance, in the sense of a Self-dependent Being, is really one and that morality is but the result of our conscious relation to it. Geometrical and moral truths, according to Spinoza, are not arbitrary, as maintained by Descartes, but necessary, being determined by the eternal laws of the Divine Mind. As the geometrical properties of a figure are mutually implicated in one another and necessarily follow from the character of the enclosed space, so the moral qualities and relations inevitably follow from the constitution of things as determined by the eternal necessity of Nature. Hence Spinoza's attempt to "demonstrate ethics in a geometrical way." "The affections of hatred, anger, envy, &c., in themselves considered, follow from the same necessity and power of nature as all other particular things; and refer themselves therefore to definite causes, and possess definite properties, which are just as worth knowing as the properties of anything else which we find it interesting simply to contemplate. So I shall treat of the nature and energy of the affections and the mind's influence on them, as of God and the mind in the preceding books; and shall deal with human actions and appetencies just as if it were a question of lines, planes, and solids." (*Ethics*, III. Inter. Vol. I, p. 125.)

Spinoza's *Ethics* is really the crown and completion of his metaphysics. When beginning, for example, the Second Book of his 'Ethics,' he writes, "I will now

Intellectual Love of God is the moral standard.

The pantheism of Spinoza is a development out of Cartesianism.

There is one universal substance.

Like mathematical properties, moral qualities and relations inevitably follow from the necessary constitution of things.

Geometrical method in Ethics.

The metaphysical grounds of the theory

Spinoza's ethics is a development out of his metaphysics.

Spinoza's method is deductive.

He starts with certain definitions.

Definition of 'Substance.'

There is one infinite and self-dependent substance,

which is revealed to us through the 'attributes' of Extension and Thought.

explain the results which must necessarily follow from the nature of God, or of the Being eternal and infinite; not, indeed, all these results, ... but only those which can lead us to the knowledge of the human mind and of its highest blessedness." We shall, accordingly, briefly mention here the chief points of his metaphysics which determine his 'Ethics.' Philosophy as the universal science must show a comprehensive principle from which everything can be deduced: "In order that our mind may correspond to the exemplar of nature, it must develop all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and sum of nature, so that that idea may appear as the source of all other ideas." (*De Emend*, VII, 42). Spinoza, accordingly, proceeds quite in a deductive way starting from a few abstract definitions; and his philosophy ultimately hinges on his notions of Substance, Attribute, and Mode.

By "*Substance*" Spinoza understands "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself." As *causa sui*, its "essence involves existence." Not depending on anything else, it is the ultimate explanation of all things—"the source of all other ideas." The origin and source of Nature is thus "a Being, single and infinite, which is the totality of being, and beyond which there is no being." (*De Emend*, ix.) God, Nature, and Substance are thus to Spinoza one and the same thing. Though ordinarily we take 'Nature' to be the actual or realized aggregate of things as distinguished from what is possible or ideal, yet the actual and the ideal blend in the Divine Mind, to whom all are equally possible and real. This universal Substance appears to us under the *Attributes* of Thought and Extension: whatever we know, we know in the form of either

Spirit or Matter. "By attribute," says Spinoza, "I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence." (*Ethics*, i, def. 4.) The attributes, therefore, are not essential to the very nature of substance; they are necessary only for our apprehension of it. In one of his letters, after defining substance, he mentions— "By attribute I understand the same thing, only that it is called attribute with reference to the understanding *attributing* a certain nature to substance." (Ep. 27.) The *Modes* are but finite or individual forms in which the universal substance manifests itself through this or that attribute. "By mode," he observes, "I understand the affections of substance, or whatever is inherent in something else, through which it is conceived." (*Ethics*, I, def. 5.) As waves are to the ocean, so are the modes to the infinite substance: forms which perpetually arise but which absolutely have no existence. "From the necessity of the divine nature an infinite number of things follows in infinite ways, as will be evident if we reflect that from the definition of a thing the understanding infers many properties which necessarily follow from it—that is from the very essence of the thing defined." (*Ethics*, i, 16, dem.) Thus Spinoza identifies logical cogency with dynamical efficiency. "The modes of the divine nature follow therefore necessarily and not contingently, and that, whether we consider the divine nature absolutely, or as determined to act in a certain manner. Further, God is the cause of these modes not only in so far as they simply exist, but in so far as they are considered as determined to any action." (*Ethics*, i, 29 dem.) It is evident then that

Definition of
'Attribute.'

The attributes, though essential to our knowledge of the substance, are really indifferent to it.

The universal substance manifests itself in finite forms or 'modes.'

Definition of
'Mode.'

Logical necessity is identified with causal efficiency.

The modes are the necessary expression of the Divine Substance.

All is God.

The eternal substance and the finite forms are but different aspects of one reality which may be called God or Nature.

Natura Naturans.
Natura Naturata.

Time and number are mere forms of imagination under which we represent phenomena.

Things are conceived 'under the form of eternity' when they are viewed as implicated in, and necessarily following from, the Divine Essence.

As everything is determined by Divine Substance, there is properly no room for freedom or morality.

"Whatever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be or be conceived." (*Ethics*, i, 15.)

The distinction, then, between the Eternal Reality and the finite things is rather apparent than real. Both are 'Nature' in different aspects. God is Nature: as the universal world-essence, as the active principle, He is the *Natura Naturans*; as the sum-total of finite things, as the realized product, He is the *Natura Naturata*: the former denoting "Substance with such attributes as express an eternal and infinite essence; the latter, all that follows from the necessity of the Divine nature or of one of its attributes, i. e., all modifications of attributes considered as existing in God, and incapable without God of either existing or being conceived." (*Ethics*, I, 29 schol.) Time and number, therefore, are mere fictitious entities, forms of the imagination under which we conceive phenomenal things. These seemingly arise and pass away, while their inner essence—the eternal and infinite substance abides. "Things are conceived as actual in two ways—either in so far as they exist in relation to a certain time and place, or in so far as we conceive them as contained in God and following from the necessity of the Divine nature. When in this second way we conceive things as true and real, we conceive them under the form of eternity, and the ideas of them involve the eternal and infinite essence of God." (*Ethics*, V. 29, schol.) As rejecting the Cartesian nominalism and indeterminism, Spinoza maintains the essential reality of the universal substance alone, by which everything is determined to its own place and circumstances, there is scarcely any room for moral distinctions in his system. Whatever is, is in its proper place, as determined by the eternal

necessity of Divine nature ; and the question of morality is altogether irrelevant with regard to the Absolute Ground of the universe. 'Good' and 'evil' are only relative terms like heat and cold, up and down, pleasure and pain, which have a meaning only in relation to finite modes or *natura naturata*. As there is no room for freedom of will in Spinoza's theory, there cannot be any meaning in 'ought' or what should be, as distinguished from what is. 'Good' and 'bad' merely indicate our emotions as determined by adequate or inadequate ideas. "By good," says he, "I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us, by evil that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good" (*Ethics*, IV., def. 1, 2) ; and "the mind's highest utility or good is the knowledge of God" (*Ethics*, IV, 28, dem.) which brings peace and happiness to the mind.

'Good' and 'evil' are on relative terms intelligible by reference to finite modes

Good is what is useful ;

and the highest good is to know and love God, yielding supreme felicity.

"If the red slayer think he slays,
Or if the slain think he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again.

"Far or forgot to me is near ;
Shadow and sunlight are the same ;
The vanished gods to me appear ;
And one to me are shame and fame.

"They reckon ill who leave me out ;
When me they fly, I am the wings ;
I am the doubter and the doubt,
And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.

"The strong gods pine for my abode,
And pine in vain the sacred Seven ;
But thou, meek lover of the good !
Find me, and turn thy back on heaven."

(Emerson.)

The psychological grounds of the theory.

In every finite being there is a self-maintaining impulse which is the source of all activity.

This impulse, though attended with feeling, desire, and will, is essentially cognitive.

Love, desire, and volition are but 'modes of thought.'

Will is essentially intelligent,

Psychological explanation of the above metaphysical doctrine of virtue and happiness may be found in the following account of the finite constitution and tendency. The spring of all moral activity is found by Spinoza in a certain self-maintaining or **self-realizing impulse inherent in each finite being**—"the effort by which it endeavours to persevere in its own being". (*Ethics*, III, 6, 7.) Feeling or emotion is merely the expression of this "effort" which, when satisfied or furthered, gives rise to pleasure, and, when frustrated or obstructed, gives rise to pain. As "the essence of the mind consists of adequate and inadequate ideas" (*Ethics*, III, 9 dem.), the self-maintaining impulse is essentially cognitive in its nature. "Love, desire, or the affections of the mind, by whatever name they are designated" are merely "modes of thought" (*Ethics*, II, ax. 3), for without thought there can never be any one of these "affections of the mind": "The idea is prior in nature, and when the idea exists the other modes must exist in the same individual." (*Ethics*, II, 11 dem.) Similarly, "There is in the mind no volition save that which an idea as idea involves." So, "Will and understanding are one and the same.....A particular volition and a particular idea are one and the same". (*Ethics*, II, 4, 9, cor. and dem.) Will is thus in its very nature intelligent: "Will is the endeavour to persist in one's being when that endeavour is referred solely to the mind." (*Ethics*, III, 9, schol.)

Without intelligence, will ceases to be will and becomes only passion or blind impulse. "We act when anything takes place in us of which we (or that intelligence which is our essence) are the adequate cause—i. e., when anything follows in us from our nature which that nature taken by itself makes clearly and distinctly intelligible. We are passive when anything takes place in us or follows from our nature, of which we are not the cause, save partially." (*Ethics*, III, def. 2.)

As intelligence is thus the essence of the mind moral progress means really intellectual progress. Inadequate and confused ideas beget passions, while adequate and clear ideas emancipate the mind from their thralldom. "The power of the mind is defined solely by knowledge, its weakness or passivity by the privation of knowledge." (*Ethics*, V, 20, schol.) Hence "The effort to understand is the first and sole basis of virtue" (*Ethics*, IV, 26, dem.); and 'good' and 'evil' are merely equivalent to "that which helps or hinders our power to think or understand." (*Ethics*, IV, 27.) There are three stages of intellectual progress.

(1) The lowest stage of intellectual exercise is *the life of Imagination* which construes the impressions of sense as indicating distinct and independent realities. As we are thus engrossed in the individual things and relations instead of in their eternal ground, we are led by passions and emotions which check the due development of reason, the "better part" of the mind, and bring about a condition of "bondage" or thralldom to them. "The powerlessness of man," observes Spinoza, "to govern and restrain his emotions, I call servitude. For a man who is controlled by his emotions is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, under whose power he is often com-

while
passion is
blind.

Intelligence
being the
essence of the
mind, moral
progress
means
intellectual
progress.

As clear ideas
beget freedom
while obscure
ideas induce
bondage, the
strength of
the mind is
determined
by know-
ledge.

The primary
virtue is thus
'the effort to
understand.'

'Good',
accordingly,
is what
helps, and
'bad', what
hinders, our
effort to
understand.
Three stages
of intellectual
progress :
(1) *Imagina-
tion*. It
represents
individual
objects as
independent
realities and
so begets in
us emotions
and passions
which lead us
astray and
enslave us to
objects.

pelled, though he sees the better, to follow the worse." (*Ethics*, IV, Pref.) At this stage, it is the individual or finite self that seeks its realization, forgetful of its true nature and end.

(2) *Discursive Reason.* It traces individual objects and incidents to their general conditions and principles, thereby proving the eternal necessity of finite modes and thus freeing the mind from their influence.

Passions are controlled when they are intellectualized.

This inferential stage of knowledge cannot, however, be regarded as perfect, for still a difference is observed between individuals and their general grounds from which they are deduced.

Imagination deals with the concrete,

(2) The fundamental rational impulse of self-maintenance, which is repressed in the first stage by passions, gradually asserts itself, however, to secure freedom and bliss. "Man is free," says he, "in so far as he is led by reason, for then only is he determined to act by causes which can be adequately understood by his own nature alone." (*Tract. Pol.*, cap. II, 11.) As bondage consists in modality or finitude, freedom manifests itself as we rise from its charm. And the first step which we take in this direction is to explain the individual by the universal. Individuals no longer excite our love or hatred when we account for their doings by reference to the inevitable laws of nature. The spell of imagination, and so of passion, is broken when we look at things through "a form of eternity": "The mind has greater power over the passions, and is less subject to them, in so far as it understands all things as necessary." (*Ethics*, V, 6.) Thus by intellectualizing a passion we stifle it, and we get the better of the variable emotions when we discover their general grounds. It makes us independent of passion, for, "To all actions to which we are determined by passion, where the mind is passive, we can be determined by reason without passion." (*Ethics*, IV, 59.) This is the stage of Reason (*Ratio*) or ratiocinative explanation which is regarded by Spinoza as a higher stage of intellectual and moral progress. Here we deduce the phenomena of sense from their universal ground and thus recognise a system or order of nature from which they inevitably follow. This

consequently cannot be taken as the highest stage of intellectual or moral perfection, as we still, to a certain extent, observe the distinction between the accidental modes and their essential principles from which they are believed to follow. Reason as a faculty of principles is not yet altogether free from the influence of Imagination which covers, according to Spinoza, perception, memory, and ideal construction, dealing with the concrete.

(3) The third or highest stage of intellectual and moral progress is, accordingly, described by him as *Intuition* (*Intuitus*), which enables us to contemplate the universal and the accidental, the one and the many, at once, as mutually implicated in each other. When this intuitive glance apprehends the diversity of sense through the unity of true knowledge and regards the former as but expressions of the latter, the limitations of time and place and, with these, the influence of imagination and passions are transcended. We now contemplate things "under the form of eternity" (*sub specie eternitatis*) as parts of an "Eternal Necessity." Ratiocinative knowledge (*Ratio*), as tracing individuals to their general laws, views things "under a certain form of eternity" (*sub quadam specie eternitatis*), no doubt; but it is intuition which gives us at a glance the knowledge of the whole and of the parts as mutually implicated in each other and enables us to apprehend things in their necessary relations "under the form of eternity" (*sub specie eternitatis*), as "following from the eternal necessity of the nature of God." (*Ethics*, II, 45, schol.)

while Reason, with the general.

(3) *Intuitive Reason*. It spontaneously apprehends the universal and the accidental as involved in each other, and so conceives things 'under the form of eternity.'

The spell of imagination as well as of passion is thus broken.

If Imagination construes things as independent realities, perfected Reason (Intuition) interprets them in the light of the idea of God, i.e., under the form of eternity. "Here," says Spinoza, "by existence I do not

Thus perfected Reason or Intuition interprets every form of existence as

essentially connected with the Universal Substance (God).

This highest exercise of Intelligence involves 'the intellectual love of God' or genuine regard for the universal order of things from which every thing inevitably follows.

It brings peace and happiness to the individual and the community alike.

Thus, true wisdom emancipates a man from the bondage of passion, and makes him charitable, generous, and magnanimous.

understand duration—i.e., existence abstractly conceived and as a certain form of quantity. I speak of the very nature of existence which is ascribed to individual things because of this, that from the eternal necessity of the nature of God an infinitude of things follow in infinite ways." (*Ethics*, II. 45, schol.) This supreme attitude of intelligence is our "intellectual love of God," which is the end of all moral life. "The mind's intellectual love towards God", observes Spinoza, "is the very love of God with which He loves Himself;—loves, not in so far as He is infinite, but in so far as He is expressed by the essence of the human mind considered under the form of eternity: i.e., the mind's intellectual love towards God is part of the infinite love with which God loves Himself." (*Ethics*, V, 36.) A life under the guidance of exalted reason is really a life under the guidance of God with whom we feel our identity and to whose eternal and beneficent laws we resign ourselves with alacrity. Such a life is consistent no less with universal interest than with one's own. "The impulse of self-preservation, which in its higher forms is self-perfection and self-realization," says Spinoza, "is the spring of all virtue; and it is when one seeks most his own good that he contributes most to the good of others in turn."

A perfectly wise man would be quite passionless and hence free. He would be guided solely by rational motives, without being influenced by any feeling: he "would hate no man, envy no man, be angry with no man" (*Ethics*, IV, 73, dem., and schol.) "He who would return hatred for injury", writes Spinoza, "lives a miserable life indeed. But one who sets himself to lay siege to hatred with love you cannot deny to be a

safe and happy warrior. With equal ease he faces a single foe or a host, and asks no aid from fortune." (*Ethics* IV, 46 and schol.) Such an individual is habitually generous; but, though guided by rational and patient good-will, he is not even moved by love or pity. The conditions of such a life are better fulfilled, according to Spinoza, in a commonwealth, where the common and concurrent elements of life are fully brought out, than in solitude, where an individual is his own master. This highest rational stage of human activity is marked by complete emancipation from the bondage of passion. When we are led by passion, our acts "no longer follow from the laws of our own nature, but are determined by what is alien to it." (*Ethics*, IV, 20.) Freedom consists in the self assertion of Reason, which is our true being; and the degree of freedom is determined by the degree of self-assertion ranging from the imperfect ratiocinative stage to the stage of perfect intuition or instantaneous apprehension. "Man is free in so far as he is led by reason, for then only is he determined to act by causes which can be adequately understood by his own nature alone." (*Tract. Pol.*, Cap. II, 11.) Such a mind, undisturbed by feeling or passion, experiences the perfect joy of acquiescence in the eternal and inevitable order of the universe which is apprehended "under the form of eternity." Thus "the absolute virtue of the mind is to understand; its highest virtue, therefore, is to understand or know God." (*Ethics*, IV, 28, dem.) The only security which we can find against the inroads of passions is in our "intellectual love of God," which, by convincing us of the eternal necessity of all things, inspires in us peace, resignation, and good-will. "Blessedness is the contentment

Man is free only when he acts from reason.

He is then both virtuous and happy.

of spirit which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God." According to Spinoza, "Beatitude is not the reward of virtue : it is virtue itself." (*Ethics*, I, V, prop. 42.)

§ 4 **Spinozism and Vedantism.** Spinozism resembles Vedantism in many important points. Vedantism, as a philosophical and religious doctrine of the Hindus, has undergone modifications in the course of its development. The germs of Vedantism are clearly traced by *Sankaracharyya* to the ancient *Upanishads*; but, even as a formulated doctrine, it is not exactly the same as it is taught by its founder *Veda-Vyasa*, explained by its commentator *Sankaracharyya* (who, it may be mentioned, was influenced to a certain extent by the Budhistic doctrine of *Maya*), and further developed by other followers. The teachings of *Sankar-vashya*, the *Panchadashi*, the *Vedantasara*, the *Vedanta-siddhanta-muktavali*, and the *Paribhasha*, though analogous to those of the *Vedanta-sutras*, are not quite the same. Without entering, however, into the variations of the doctrine, we may simply refer here to its main features as it is generally accepted with a view to indicate some important points of similarity between this doctrine and Spinozism.

(1) The ultimate Substance or Reality, according to both, is *Brahman* or the Divine Being. The finite world which we observe is but a world of modes or manifestations of the Deity.

(2) The character of this Substance is unknowable and indefinable. All the qualities or attributes known to us are but ways in which we conceive this Eternal Substance, which in its true character is above those qualifications. The *Upanishads*, for example, say of the real Brahman—"Truly, O friend, this Imperishable is

Points of resemblance :

(1) The ultimate reality is the Divine Substance ; and the finite world is but its manifestation.

(2) The Divine Substance in its ultimate character is devoid of

neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, neither red (like fire) nor fluid (like water); it is without shadow without darkness, without air, without ether, without attachment, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without a mouth, without measure, having no within and no without." (*Brih. Ar.*, III, 8, 8, Deussen, System, p. 146.) The Absolute Deity (*Nirguna Brahma*) of the Vedantist resembles the colourless Substance of Spinoza; and Extension and Thought are regarded by both as 'Attributes' of this Substance as apprehended by us.

qualifications though it is conceived by us as having the attributes of thought and extension.

(3) The only way in which we can possibly convey some idea of the inconceivable Brahman must necessarily be by negative predicates. The Vedantist contention that "We can say only 'No, No' of God" corresponds to the negative qualifications of Spinoza, following from his *omnis determinatio est negatio*.

(3) The Deity can only be negatively conceived.

(4) Corresponding to the Spinozistic distinction of *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata*, there is the Vedantist distinction of *Iswara* as the Lord or Creator and *Sansara* as the world of modes subject to *upadhis* or conditions. The Vedantist further draws a distinction between the qualified (सगुणः) and the unqualified (निगुणः) Brahman: the former is relatively conceived as *Iswara* or Creator and so qualified by *upadhis*, though of a much purer character (विशुद्ध) than what are illustrated in the case of the phenomenal world; while the latter is conceived as the Absolute Deity, devoid of all qualifications. This Absolute God, the true Brahman, or the Highest Self is altogether unaffected by what we may think of Him: He is as little tainted by our ignorance as the sun is by the clouds that pass over it. Spinoza's *Natura Naturans* as characterized by

(4) Distinction between the Absolute Deity and the Relative Creator.

attributes really corresponds to the *Iswara* of the Vedantist; and the colourless Substance of Spinoza corresponds to the unqualified Brahman (निर्गुणब्रह्म) of the Vedantist.

(5) Mind is essentially cognitive; the different tendencies being but modifications of intelligence.

(5) The *Mens* of Spinoza is virtually the same as the *Manas* of the Vedantist. Mind is conceived as essentially cognitive, so that the emotional and volitional tendencies are regarded as but modifications (विकारः) of intelligence. The several mental functions or tendencies (वृत्तिः) — such as perception (बुद्धिः), conception (विज्ञानं), desire (कामं), faith or infidelity (श्रद्धा or अश्रद्धा), resolution or irresolution (धृतिः or अधृतिः) — are, accordingly, regarded as perversions (विवर्तः) of intelligence or knowledge.

(6) The illusory belief in the multiplicity of things is the source of all our miseries.

The Vedantist objectifies ignorance in the form of Nescience.

(6) The life of 'bondage' as described by Spinoza corresponds to the life fettered by ignorance or *Maya* in Vedantism. According to both the views, the root-cause of all strife, sorrow, or mischief is to be found in our illusory belief in the multiplicity of things which are really one in their essence. The Vedantist here goes a little farther, since he attributes the illusion not merely to subjective ignorance but to an objective Nescience (अविद्या) which pervades the universe. It is a general cosmic force which, like gloom, veils the real and paints it as phenomenal. It is analogous to the negative or perverting influence of Platonic 'Matter.'

(7) Freedom or perfection can be attained only by the ascendancy of Reason and the consequent subjugation of sense and imagination.

(7) According to both the systems, Freedom from bondage can only be purchased by exchanging the life of sense and imagination for the life of reason. When true Science (विद्या) dissolves the charms of Nescience (अविद्या) and thus enables us to realize the unity of all things, then alone are we free from the baneful influence of hope or fear, anger or love, joy or sorrow. "A man whose mind has entered into the Eternal, into Brahman,

obtains liberty." (*Maitrayana Upanishad*, VI, 34.)

(8) The stages of intellectual progress are also analogous in both the systems. The *Paribhasha*, for example, describes three grades of knowledge which lead us to conceive things as real in different senses altogether. (See page 18 of the *Paribhasha*.) Existence is thus distinguished as *apparent* or *illusory* (प्रतिभासिकः), *conventional*, *practical* or *phenomenal* (व्यवहारिकः), and *truly real* (परमार्थिकः). The first is illustrated in erroneous imputation or illusory attribution, as when a rope is imagined to be a snake; the second, in supposing a Creator (*Isvara*), heaven and hell, and men governed by Him; and the third, in the conviction that only Brahman or the eternal One is real. These three forms roughly correspond to the three stages of intellectual progress described by Spinoza as Imagination, Reason, and Intuition. The final stage of intuition enables one to realize that he is the Deity. As the Vedantist says, 'तत्त्वमसि,' 'thou art He'; 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि,' 'I am Brahman.' It is described by Max-Muller "as an *Anatheosis*, a return of man into the divine nature." (*Vedantism*, p. 107.) "A human soul," says Sankaracharya, "which has found the knowledge of the Highest Brahman, cannot die, cannot be moving towards Brahman." Similarly in the *Brihat Aranyak Upanishad* it is said, "Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by everything." (II, 4, 6.)

(9) The Vedantist, like Spinoza, is satisfied with everything. The highest knowledge makes him free, virtuous, and happy at the same time. There is bliss in the very consciousness that "this is Thy Self which is within all." When what we call self is thus divested of its temporal limitations and all things are conceived

(8) Three stages of intellectual progress.

(9) The highest knowledge is the knowledge of the Deity, which makes an individual virtuous and happy.

"under the form of eternity," the mind is freed from all evil and all anxiety. "With this," says the Vedantist, "the fetters of the heart are broken, all doubts are rent asunder; all works are destroyed, for the Eternal (Brahman), the highest and the lowest, has been seen."

(10) The significance of morality is due to imperfect knowledge.

(10) Morality, according to both the views, is restricted only to the sphere of imperfect knowledge. The Vedantist, for example, tells us that the moral law guides only those who have not attained perfect wisdom and who are thus led to regulate their conduct by the *Karmakanda* (*Veda*). But when it is realized that the Self is the eternal Brahman, then an individual is above all moral restraint. "The Self, smaller than small, greater than great, is hidden in the heart of the creature. A man who is free from desires and free from grief, sees the majesty of the Self by the grace of the Creator."

Though there are thus many points of similarity between Spinozism and Vedantism, yet we find that the agreement of Vedantism with Hegelianism is no less great. And we should not be surprised at this, if, as Martineau observes, "The spirit of Spinoza survives in the school of Hegel" (*Types*, I, p. 20.) We shall advert to this topic again in section 8.

§ 5 (2) The Truly Ethical Form of Eudæmonism.

Having considered the form of Eudæmonism in which virtue and happiness are found in the supreme exercise of Intelligence, let us now turn our attention to the form in which they consist in the due regulation of the several tendencies, which is the essence of our moral life. Aristotle is usually regarded as a prominent supporter of this view in ancient times, and Hegel may be taken as a modern representative of the same doctrine. Let us consider these views separately.

2. The Ethical Form.

The truly ethical form of eudæmonism teaches that virtue and happiness consist in the due regulation of impulses.

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(a) **Nicomachean Ethics.** To understand adequately its teachings we must remember what is taught by Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) in his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Wonder, observes Aristotle, as the parent of all knowledge, is also the quickener of philosophic reflection, which in its crude form finds expression in mythology and in its developed form gives rise to philosophical systems. All inquiry finally turns on the determination of the true character of Substance or Reality. Plato had already tried to solve the problem by reference to his transcendent world of Ideas, believed by him to be the ultimate real world. But such an ideal world, being altogether cut off from the sensible, cannot render a satisfactory explanation of the latter. Substance, to be a substance, must be *in* the objects, of which it is the essence, and not outside them. The real is not something beyond but inside the things which derive their reality from it. Without it a thing has no meaning and no being. Thus, according to Aristotle, the Idea or the Universal is not before or beyond the concrete and the individual (*universalia ante rem*); it is implicated in the very nature of the things of sense which acquire a meaning by reference to it (*universalia in res*). The Idea is, so to speak, the formative principle of things. Aristotle's substance is thus a universal individualized—an idea realized in the concrete. The concrete is what it is by reason of the moulding influence of the Idea or Form. Matter without Form is purely negative and contingent; it is but a tendency which gets a meaning only when realized through Form. The Form is thus the actual, while the Matter is potential: the former, operating in nature as a universal principle, moulds according to its requirements the latter and

(a) Aristotle

All philosophical problems ultimately hinge on the question of Substance.

Plato's Ideas as transcendent realities are cut off from the sensible world which they seek to explain.

Aristotle, accordingly, regards the ideal realities as implicated in the concrete things themselves. The Idea is the formative principle of things. Matter is but a blind tendency which assumes a definite shape owing to the moulding influence of

the Idea or Form.
Matter is thus potential, while Form is actual.
The concrete is the merging of matter in form.
Nature illustrates the progressive development of matter into form.

The soul is the end, and so the moving principle, of the body.

gives it the reality which it can possibly attain. A concrete substance is thus the merging of matter in form, of potentiality in actuality. Aristotle thus resolves his four metaphysical principles or causes—the formal, the efficient, the material, and the final—ultimately into two, Matter and Form, of which the latter alone is the goal, the actual, the moulding principle.

As Matter and Form are inseparably connected together, Nature illustrates a continuous course of development from the possible to the actual. The seed, for example, has a meaning only in relation to the tree, which is its form; and the tree again is matter in relation to the log of wood, which in its turn may be regarded as matter in relation to the finished furniture in which raw wood attains its end. Nature thus exhibits a constant progressive movement from inorganic to organic, from organic to sentient, and from sentient to rational existence. The human soul is a microcosm, reflecting in its constitution the faculties of the inferior grades of existence and having in addition the divine and immortal faculty of reason. The soul is really the 'form' of which body is but the 'matter', since the latent capacities of the latter are brought out and made actual by the former. The soul, accordingly, is defined by Aristotle as "the first entelecheia"

**Entelecheia* is the technical term used by Aristotle to represent the actualizing power of the soul. The *first entelecheia* is "the lowest stage of actuality, the minimum of influence required to transform potentiality into actuality". "It is not indispensable that all the functions of the living subject should be at all times in complete exercise: it is enough if the functional aptitude exist as a dormant property, ready to rise into activity when the proper occasions present themselves." (Grote's *Aristotle*, II, 186.) The soul is thus a realization in its first or rudimentary stage, ready to manifest itself when an opportunity arises. As the soul is implied whether we are awake or asleep, it must necessarily

of a natural body"—as the perfect *expression or realization of what an organism is capable of attaining*. Thus the soul and the body are very closely connected together,—the soul being, as Aristotle says, "the *truth* of the body," in which the bodily conditions find their real meaning. The soul manifests itself in the form of activities or faculties which range from the lowest stage of nutrition, revealed in plants, to the highest stage of reason, distinctive of man. The soul generally then is "The vital principle of all organized bodies, manifesting itself in an ascending scale of functions, nutritive, sentient, locomotive, appetitive, imaginative, rational, throughout the range of animated existence, from plant up to man. Each higher function involves the lower, so that all the functions are found conjoined with rationality in man, while the nutritive function exists separately in vegetables." (Mayor's *Ancient Philosophy*, p. 99.)

Reason, which is the distinctive feature of man, is regarded by Aristotle as the divine element appearing in the human constitution. It is the faculty of principles which renders intelligible the sensible world by means of the categories or most general notions and enables us to attain true happiness by duly regulating the lower propensities. Reason is thus the source of all true knowledge, virtue, and happiness in us. But human constitution, as mentioned above, is partly rational and partly irrational, the latter including the vegetative and animal tendencies. The vegetative or nutritive function is beyond the regulation of reason, while the appetitive

The soul manifests itself in the form of faculties ranging from the lowest vegetative stage to the highest rational stage, found in man.

The human soul illustrates all the functions.

Reason is the divine element in man. It furnishes a knowledge of the general principles by means of which we construe the objects of sense and regulate the lower propensities.

Thus both knowledge

be entelechy of the first or implicit kind. The first entelechy stands to the second as knowledge possessed stands to knowledge applied.

and virtue imply the regulative function of reason.

Human excellence consists in the rational regulation of the different tendencies.

Virtue brings happiness.

Two forms of virtue :

1. *Intellectual*, aiming at the development of knowledge.
2. *Moral*, aiming at the due regulation of propensities.

The peculiarity of Aristotelian Ethics is that

and impulsive tendencies are amenable to its influence. Human excellence does not consist in the mere natural play of the several tendencies operating in the mind ; it lies in the due regulation of these by the supreme faculty of reason which is the especial endowment of man : "The good of man," says Aristotle, "is a putting forth of the faculties of the soul in accordance with his highest excellence." Thus virtue lies in the proper exercise of the supreme faculty of reason, which brings also true happiness. Happiness is, therefore, inseparably connected with virtue ; and the highest happiness—the final and supreme satisfaction (*the summum bonum*)—is found in wisdom, due to the exercise of reason, the highest faculty in us.

If virtue is essentially rational activity, then, corresponding to the different directions of this activity, there are different forms of virtue in us. As reason may be exercised either within its own sphere in developing true knowledge or within the sphere of the appetites and impulses in properly regulating them, virtue may assume either an intellectual or a moral aspect. Thus virtue or excellence (*Arete*) with Aristotle has a double significance : it is either (1) *dianoetic* or (2) *ethical* ; the one is purely rational, the other, semi-rational. And it is here that we find the distinguishing feature of Aristotle's Ethics. *Moral virtue*, according to him, is not, as with Socrates and to a certain extent also with Plato, simply knowledge ; its essence lies in volition, i.e., the right regulation of the propensities by reason. Morality thus involves not simply reason, idea, or 'form', but the passions, propensities, or 'matter' as well. It is, like every other reality, something *concrete* : its essence lies

in the regulation of the latter by the former. We must remember in this connection that '*Will*', according to Aristotle, is but reason stimulated into action by desire; it implies comparison and purpose (end) and should thus be distinguished from '*wish*,' which has reference to means alone. Voluntary action indicates that its *arche* or originating cause lies in the agent—that it is "a grasping after something within our own power after previous deliberation." The freedom of the will is postulated in all moral acts—whether good or bad; and only acts under constraint or due to ignorance can be regarded as really involuntary. We start with capacities which may be turned to good or bad use by the character of our choice; and it is by practice or a series of acts that such capacities are converted into settled habits, definite tendencies, or what we call '*formed virtues*.' Moral virtue, then, though distinguished from other natural phenomena by the presence of an ability to mould its materials, is really a development out of those very materials which, as natural impulses, operate in the brute simply as '*natural virtues*' (physical *arete*). The natural tendencies must, therefore, be duly regulated and strengthened by practice before an individual can be regarded as truly virtuous; and the stimulus to such practice is found in the fact that virtue always brings with it serene pleasure or happiness. Nay, as Aristotle says, "A man is not good at all unless he takes pleasure in noble deeds. No one would call a man just who did not take pleasure in doing justice, nor generous, who took no pleasure in acts of generosity, and so on." (*Nicomachean Ethics*, I, VIII, 12.)

Thus virtue, according to Aristotle, is not merely an activity but "a fixed habit of mind, resulting from effort

it regards moral virtue as connected with the concrete life of an individual.

Morality is not abstract knowledge, but the concrete regulation of the passions and inclinations by reason. Will is essentially rational. It involves free choice. Virtue is voluntary.

Moral virtue is not a natural endowment, but an acquired aptitude, resulting from the habitual subordination of the lower impulses to the dictates of reason.

Virtue is attended with serene pleasure.

Virtue is determined by mean, avoiding either excess or defect.

It is based on right judgment and aims at the harmonious development of our nature according to the dictates of reason.

Definition of Virtue.
List of Virtues.

and principle, which, with reference to our own particular nature, is equidistant from excess or defect. Being based on right judgment, it aims at the harmonious exercise of the different faculties or tendencies and avoids the one-sidedness of either self-gratification or self-mortification. It secures the due development of all the faculties by their proper regulation instead of the indulgence of a particular tendency by the suppression of the rest: it aims at concrete perfection and not at an abstract refinement. It is "An acquirement, tending by deliberate purpose towards a mean relative to us"; and it is added that the mean must be "determined by reason and as the judicious man would determine." To illustrate his theory, Aristotle discusses the several virtues in detail which may be indicated in a tabular form thus:—

<i>Province.</i>	<i>Defect.</i>	<i>Mean.</i> (<i>Virtue.</i>)	<i>Excess.</i>
Danger.	Cowardice.	<i>Valour (Courage).</i>	Rashness.
Enjoyment.	Insensibility.	<i>Temperance.</i>	Intemperance.
Property.	Avarice (<i>Illiberality.</i>)	<i>Liberality.</i>	Extravagance (<i>Prodigality.</i>)
Wealth.	Meanness.	<i>Magnificence.</i>	Luxuriousness.
Greatness.	Humble-minded- ness.	<i>Magnanimity.</i>	Vainglorious- ness.
Honour.	Want of Ambition.	<i>Right Ambition.</i>	Over-ambition.
Provoca- tion.	Spiritlessness.	<i>Gentleness</i> (<i>Good Temper.</i>)	Irascibility.
Companion- ship.	Rudeness.	<i>Sociableness.</i>	Obsequiousness.
Conversa- tion.	Self-disparage- ment.	<i>Sincerity.</i>	Boastfulness.

<i>Province.</i>	<i>Defect.</i>	<i>Mean.</i> (<i>Virtue.</i>)	<i>Excess.</i>
Recreation.	Sullenness (Boorishness).	<i>Wittiness.</i>	Buffoonery.
Intercourse.	Impudence.	<i>Modesty.</i>	Bashfulness.
Rank (Condition).	Callousness.	<i>Indignation.</i>	Envy.

As Aristotle's doctrine of mean may make virtue uncertain and variable, he tries to fix an absolute standard by reference to the judgment of the (ideal) wise man of society at any time. 'Magnanimity' or 'high-mindedness,' as exalted self-respect, is regarded by Aristotle as the crown and accompaniment of all other virtues, being fed by them and itself sustaining their purity. 'Indignation' with regard to the fortunes of others is regarded as a virtue because the indignant man, grieved only at undeserved prosperity, illustrates the mean, as distinguished from excess, illustrated in the case of the envious, who are grieved at all prosperity. Above all these special virtues Aristotle places *justice* which he regards as the proper mean between the commission of wrong and the sufferance of wrong.

Justice is the highest moral virtue.

As pleasure is taken by Aristotle to be the natural concomitant of the healthy exercise of every organ or faculty, he regards the harmonious exercise of the several tendencies or faculties in us as eminently calculated to make life happy. Aristotle admits that sense-pleasures and external goods are to a certain extent necessary for perfect happiness ; for, without health there can be no courage ; without wealth, no liberality ; and without honour, no emulation. But these must be regarded as of subordinate value, since they are only helpful to the attainment of the several virtues by affording opportu-

Happiness can be attained only by the harmonious exercise of the different tendencies or faculties.

Pleasures vary in purity and kind.

As man is naturally social, his perfection and happiness are attainable only in society.

Politics is the crown of Ethics.

nities for the proper exercise of the different faculties. True pleasure, therefore, is found in the free and rational exercise of a faculty. Aristotle admits that pleasures vary in purity as well as in kind with the character of the activities to which they are attached. And as man is by nature a social being and so "a political animal," his perfection and happiness are adequately attainable only in society. Justice, for example, as the most perfect virtue, is possible only in the State; for justice can never be attained without the security and sanction of equal laws. Hence Aristotle regards *Politics* as but the completion and verification of *Ethics*.

We must remember, however, that the ideal of morality is furnished by true moral insight which is the essence of all virtue: insight determines virtue, and virtue in its turn improves insight. But for the due regulation of the irrational part of our nature by the rational, there would be no virtue. Man would be degraded into beast, if he failed to cultivate the highest endowment of his nature which brings also perfect happiness. Thus true self-interest dictates that we should further our higher or rational self, as distinguished from the lower or animal self. This proves the superiority of the intellectual virtues and specially of true wisdom which inclines one to philosophy or sober reflection. The life of calm contemplation is free from care, is independent of circumstances and is attended with the highest satisfaction. The generous man requires wealth; the sociable man, friends; and the brave man, health; but the truly wise man is above all such external wants. It is only by virtue of the divine element in us that we can lead such a life. By the continued and undisturbed exercise of rea-

True moral insight is the essence of all virtue.

The highest virtue is intellectual culture and true wisdom which incline one to philosophy and calm contemplation, yielding serene pleasure.

son we ennoble ourselves and thus secure our true well-being (*eudaimonia**). As involving the proper development of the highest faculty in us and, with it, a harmonious development of the other faculties or tendencies in due measure, it yields the tranquillity and serene pleasure of true wisdom and thus enables us to have a taste of the eternal blessedness of the Gods. The good of man is thus proved to be "a putting forth of the faculties of the soul in accordance with his highest excellence." True happiness is found in the perfect realization of the true or rational self.

True happiness is found in the perfect development of the rational self.

§ 6. (b) **Hegelianism.** German intellectualism, illustrated more or less prominently in the systems of all German thinkers since the time of Leibniz, culminates in Hegel (1770–1831). It is he who earnestly tries to get over the dualism of Self and Not-Self, Mind and Matter, inherent in Modern Philosophy. The singularism of Spinoza or the pluralism of Leibniz, the materialism of Hobbes or the idealism of Berkeley are but imperfect attempts at unification without any inner principle of evolution or coherence. The attempt of Kant to reconcile the claims of both subject and object, Spirit and Nature, in his doctrine of the synthetic unity of apperception also proved a failure. There was still the chasm between the intellectual world of necessity and the moral world of freedom, between phenomenon

(b) *Hegel.*

Hegel tries to remove the dualism inherent in modern philosophy by propounding his theory of Absolute Identity, which regards the universe as but the evolution of the Infinite Spirit.

*Sidgwick writes—"This cardinal term is commonly translated "happiness"; and it must be allowed that this is the most natural term for what we (in English) agree to call "our being's end and aim." But the English word "happiness" so definitely signifies a state of feeling that it will not admit the interpretation that Aristotle (as well as Plato and the Stoics) expressly gives to *eudaimonia*; hence, to avoid serious confusion, it seems to me necessary to render *eudaimonia* by the more unfamiliar "well-being" or "welfare." (*History of Ethics*, p. 56, foot-note.)

and noumenon, between the subjective principle of synthesis and the objective ground affording opportunity for the exercise of such a principle. Kant himself, in the first edition of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, mentioned by way of conjecture that the external thing-in-itself might be of the same character as the internal; and Fichte, accordingly, professing himself to be a disciple of Kant, construed the external world as but a dressed up reality—a reflection of the Ego. But this 'subjective idealism' was still one-sided in character in as much as, instead of reconciling, it sacrificed one side to the other, Nature to Spirit. Schelling's 'objective idealism' tried to avoid the defect by undertaking to show that Nature was but the heterization or otherness of the Spirit; but the identity of the two (Nature and Spirit) was not proved by any inner principle of evolution. The Absolute of Schelling was, as it were, "shot from a pistol." Moreover, "the intellectual intuition," which Schelling regards as the true source of our knowledge of the Absolute, can hardly be accepted as the organ of philosophical knowledge. Philosophy, as the highest science, must essentially be a general inquiry and general exposition. It cannot, therefore, be based on 'intuition', which is concerned with the concrete and individual; it must be a science from concepts. Hegel, accordingly, bases his philosophy on reflection or reason and tries to develop his 'absolute idealism' out of a system of concepts. These concepts, however, are not to be regarded as abstract, divorced from objects, but as concrete, implicated in the very nature of things. They are not to be understood as merely subjective forms determining knowledge, but as objective processes regulating the genesis of things.

Philosophy as a general inquiry should be based on concepts.

Hegel develops his 'absolute idealism' out of a system of concepts, which are not mere abstract subjective forms but concrete objective processes underlying the evolution of the universe.

In Hegel's system the form is implicated in matter, the idea in things, logic in metaphysics. Nay, his doctrine of Identity implies that the form is the matter in course of evolution, the idea is the things in the process of development, logic is metaphysics as unfolding the real order of things. As Hegelian metaphysics may be regarded as the final outcome of Kantian principles and surmises, so Hegelian logic may be viewed as the ultimate result of Kantian method. The 'antinomies' of Kant are more thorough-going than they are usually supposed. The antithesis and reconciliation implied in the 'antinomies' pervade the entire system of Kant, visible no less in his division of the *Critiques* than in the distribution of their parts and contents. This antinomial method of Kant, after passing through the intermediate stage of antithetical method as employed by Fichte and Schelling, finally appears as the *dialectic of Hegel*. The Hegelian dialectic undertakes to prove that the entire universe is but the evolution of the Universal Spirit or Idea. The process of evolution is indicated in the dialectics—the 'schema of trinities,' as it has been called, of Position, Negation, and Sublation or Reconciliation. To illustrate the process, Hegel commences with an inquiry into the character of our thought, which indicates also the character of things. The entire universe is beaming with intelligence, if we have but eyes to see it. Where there is law, there is measure; and where there is measure there is intelligence. If law and system constitute the essence of the universe, it must be taken to be essentially rational. In fact, the atoms or molecules, which are viewed as governed by laws and so constituting a system, are themselves the creatures of thought.]

Identity of
Thought and
Being, Logic
and
Metaphysics.

The entire
universe is
but the evolution of the
Absolute
Spirit.

It is proved
by the immanence of
thought in all
things.

In the composition of minerals, the structure of crystals, the growth of plants, and the instincts of animals there is as much intelligence as in any human product. As Wordsworth says—

“I have felt

A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts ; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man :
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.”

The identity of thought and being reveals that one process underlies both, governed by the same law.

Thus one logic rules the universe.

The dialectic movement of thought, constituting the subject-matter of logic, proceeds from thesis to antithesis to synthesis.

If, then, matter is spirit, thought is reality, then the rhythm or movement of thought indicates also the pulses or processes of things. Thus one law—the law of Spirit or Idea—governs the entire universe, one rhythm throbs in every constitution, one logic regulates every process. Logic, therefore, becomes metaphysics ; and the laws of logic represent the moments or movements of Being. If we observe with care the working of our own mind we find that it invariably moves from position to negation and to a higher position still, from indifference to difference and to a higher unity always. When, for example, I perceive the table before me, my knowledge of it as a table implies its difference from other articles, such as chairs, benches, and *punkhas*. But this distinction involves an agreement—a higher unity—under which all these things are brought, viz., furniture. As soon, however, as we reach this position, it is negated again by its contrast : furniture, for example, is intelligible only as distinguished from, say, the room or building, its walls,

floors, and ceilings. But this distinction in its turn implies an agreement, that all of them are solids. Solidity again carries us to its opposite liquidity; and these again to their generic essence 'matter.' Matter, likewise, we can understand only by its distinction from Mind; and so both of them are sublated again in Being. Thus the rhythm of thought proceeds from *thesis* to *anti-thesis* to *synthesis*. The Law of Contradiction, regarded by Aristotle as the highest law of thought, is not, therefore, to be understood absolutely, for absolute difference there is none. It is to be taken only relatively, as always involving Identity. Identity in difference and difference in identity are interwoven in the very texture of our being. This is all that is implied in the Hegelian denial of "the validity of the laws of identity and contradiction." Evolution is the law of our being, the law of the universe—the progress from undifferentiated simplicity to differentiated complexity.* Hegelian philosophy has, accordingly, been described as **Dialectical Evolution** as distinguished from Biological Evolution, discussed above. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2 and 3.)

The dialectical movement of Reason, illustrated above in the acquisition of knowledge, is illustrated also in the genesis of things. As "Logic coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and held in thoughts" (*Logic of Hegel*, tr. by Wallace, p. 45), the categories of logic indicate also the processes of things. "They are," as Hegel says, "the heart and centre of things." (*Ibid.*, p. 50.) These categories, however, are not to be conceived as a mechanical sum—an aggregate of conditions—presenting things under different heads;

Contradiction is always relative, involving Identity.

Dialectical evolution is the law of the universe.

The dialectical movement of Reason explains the evolution of things.

The categories of logic, constituting an organic whole, explain the processes of thought as well as of things.

* Cf. The Law of Biological Evolution. See Spencer's definition of the Law (foot-note to § 2, Chap. XI).

The supreme category is that of Self-conscious Existence or Being.

Being, Idea, Reason, or God is thus the ground or basis of all evolution.

they constitute a vital unity—an organic whole—a “spiritual hierarchy”—explaining the system of knowledge and universe alike. The highest category from which all other categories follow—the highest reality on which all other realities rest—is thus the category of self-conscious existence or being, for it explains everything else but does not require anything else to explain its character. Mind, as an active principle, thinks according to the categories which betray but processes of its evolution. And the very intelligibility of the world proves that it is not something unlike the mind, but an ideal unity governed by the same categories or laws. The essential unity of all things—the unity of intelligence with the intelligible world—implies that *Being, Idea, Reason, or God* is the ultimate principle from which everything, mental or material, noumenal or phenomenal, essential or accidental, has been evolved. Logic discovers this supreme category by the dialectical method which reveals also the process of its evolution. Philosophy, as “the science of the Absolute,” traces the evolution of Being or Idea to the final form it assumes in the self-conscious life of man. “Pure *Being*,” writes Hegel, “makes the beginning : because it is on one hand pure thought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate ; and the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined.” (*Logic*, tr. by Wallace, p. 158.) We thus take the Absolute as Being. This ‘Being,’ as wholly indeterminate, is “not a featurelessness reached by abstraction, not the elimination of all character, but the original featurelessness which precedes all definite character and is the very first of all.” (*Ibid.*, p. 159.) ‘Being,’ though logically posterior, is ontologically prior :

though, to show that it is the ultimate principle of all existence, we have dialectically reached it by elimination or abstraction, yet, as the supreme actuality, it is the very beginning of all things, which are but stages of its evolution according to the dialectic procedure. The final result of abstraction is to be viewed as above all differentiation. "Philosophy," as Hegel observes, "has constantly been based on the consciousness of an absolute unity where the understanding sees and accepts only separation." (*Ibid.*, p. 354.) Now, pure Being, as beyond all differentiation or qualification, as devoid of definite content, is equivalent to *Not-Being* or *Nothing*. Being and Not-Being are thus identical. "Being, as Being, is nothing fixed or ultimate: it yields to dialectic and sinks into its opposite, which, also taken immediately, is Nothing." (*Ibid.*, p. 161.) Being thus merges in Not-Being and Not-Being, in Being; and this transition gives rise to the richer concept of *Becoming*. In fact, Being and Not-Being are not in themselves absolute; their relative significance is brought out by their union in *Becoming*, which indicates their *identity in difference*. A child, for example, in becoming a boy is, and at the same time is not, a boy. The ultimate significance—or, as Hegel says, "the truth"—of Being and of Nothing is, accordingly,

The principle of Being, though conceived through abstraction, is not the product of analysis, but is the original unity out of which everything has been evolved.

Pure, indeterminate Being is equivalent to Not-Being or Nothing.

One concept merges in the other and thus yields the richer concept of *Becoming*, indicating the process of transition.

* Broadly speaking we may say that the 'truth' of Hegel corresponds to the 'form' of Aristotle. Truth is the end or ultimate meaning of anything: it is, so to speak, the realization or fulfilment of its destiny. Being and Not-Being, for example, acquire a definite meaning only by reference to their end or realization in *Becoming*. Similarly science may be said to be the 'truth' or fulfilment of common sense; philosophy, the 'truth' of science; and the Idea, the 'truth' of philosophy. Truth can be attained only through error: the attainment of truth means the exclusion of error. "Error or other-being, when superseded," says Hegel, "is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result."

The essence of Being is Becoming, which is its truth or proper end. Becoming, then, is the first determinate or concrete notion which explains the genesis of things.

found in "the unity of the two," in Becoming. "Becoming is the first concrete thought, and therefore the first notion : whereas Being and Nought are empty abstractions. The notion of Being, therefore, of which we sometimes speak, must mean Becoming ; not the mere point of Being, which is empty Nothing, any more than Nothing, which is empty Being. In Being then we have Nothing, and in Nothing Being : but this Being which does not lose itself in Nothing is Becoming. Nor must we omit the distinction, while we emphasise the unity of Becoming : without that distinction we should once more return to abstract Being. Becoming is only the explicit statement of what Being is in its truth." (*Logic*, tr. by Wallace, p. 167.) Becoming or change, then, is the essence of the universe : it explains origination (transition from Nothing to Being) and decay (transition from Being to Nothing), birth and death, appearance and disappearance : it means explication, unfolding, development, realization. It is the "passage to Being Determinate" or definite form of existence. "Life is a Becoming," and its highest expression is Mind.

Hegelianism is pan-logical.

Hegel's philosophy has, accordingly, been described by Haym as logical idealism, as a "Logisierung" of the universe. In the words of the elder Erdmann (a pupil of Hegel) it is "Panlogismus," since it regards the dialectical movement of thought as the law of existence and the concrete forms of existence as but illustrations of the categories or abstract forms of thought. Nevertheless, his philosophy is essentially, as Rosenkranz

(*Logic*, tr. by Wallace, p. 352.) The father of New Logic resembles to a certain extent the father of Old Logic in the conception of evolution as a continuous progress, up to the stage of human self-consciousness.

(another pupil of Hegel) observes, a "philosophy of Spirit." The dialectical method is but the form which explains the way in which the Universal Spirit manifests itself in Nature and Mind. The entire universe is a thought-process, a "synthetic unity," to use a Kantian expression: "What is rational is real; and what is real is rational."* (Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, Hyde's translation, p. xxvii.) Thus the supreme reality is not to be viewed as an undifferentenced unity beyond the antithesis of Nature and Spirit; it is essentially Spirit: "the Absolute is not Substance but Subject." "It is," says Hegel, "no inert, abstract Universal, but the absolute womb, the eternal impetus and source from which everything proceeds, to which everything returns, and in which everything is eternally preserved." (*Philosophy of Religion*, translated by Speirs and Sanderson, Vol. I, p. 95.) Philosophy, as "the science of the Absolute," thus falls into three main divisions: (1) *Logic*,

The dialectical method explains the way in which the universal spirit unfolds itself in Nature and Mind.

The supreme Reality or Being, according to Hegel, is Spirit; and so his philosophy is idealistic. Divisions of Philosophy, as the science of the Absolute: (1) Logic;

* Wallace in his Introduction to Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* writes—"An idea is not an additional and intervening object of our knowledge or supposed knowledge. That a thing is our object of thought is another word for its being our idea, and that means we know it. The distinction between truth and falsehood, between reality and appearance, is not arrived at by comparing what we have before us in our mind with some inaccessible reality beyond. It is a distinction that grows up with the growth and organisation of our presentations—with their gradual systematisation and unification in one consciousness. But this consciousness which thinks, *i. e.*, judges and reasons, is something superior to the contrast of physical and psychical: superior, *i. e.*, in so far as it includes and surveys the antithesis, without superseding it. It is the 'transcendental unity of consciousness' of Kant—his synthetic unity of apperception. It means that all ideas ultimately derive their reality from their coherence with each other in an all-embracing or infinite idea...The certainty and necessity of truth and knowledge do not come from a constraint from the external thing which forces the inner idea into submission; they come from the inner necessity of conformity and coherence in the organism of experience." (Pp. cv-cvi.)

(2) the
Philosophy
of Nature ;

and (3) the
Philosophy
of Spirit.

Divisions of
the Philo-
sophy of
Spirit :
(a) doctrine
of the Subjec-
tive Spirit ;
(b) doctrine
of the Objec-
tive Spirit ;

(c) doctrine
of the Abso-
lute Spirit.

The Absolute
Spirit rises to
self-con-
sciousness in
man after
passing
through the
stage of
Nature.

which exhibits the Idea or Divine Being as it is in itself before its self-differentiation or explication in the world ; (2) the *Philosophy of Nature*, which exhibits the Idea in its otherness, when it has passed out of itself, has set itself over against itself ; and (3) the *Philosophy of Spirit*, which exhibits the Idea in its self-consciousness, when it has returned to itself by taking up into itself the world which it has set over against itself. The comprehensive Hegelian system attempts an explanation of this rich variety of the universe by reference to its principle—the Idea, Spirit, or God ; but, as our main interest here is in Hegelian ethics, we shall not enter into these details.

The Philosophy of Spirit, like the Philosophy of Nature (comprehending Mechanics, Physics, and Organics), is divided into three parts, viz., (a) the doctrine of the *Subjective Spirit*, as it manifests itself in the individual mind ; (b) the doctrine of the *Objective Spirit* as it appears in the community and reveals itself in its ordinances, institutions, and progressive evolution in history (comprehending Ethics, Politics, and History) ; and (c) the doctrine of the *Absolute Spirit* as it returns unto itself by transcending the difference of subject and object and thus discloses that the Infinite is the essence of the finite (comprehending Art, Religion, and Philosophy). In all these cases we find that the Idea gradually unfolds itself from its first implicit condition to its final self-conscious form through the intermediate stage of self-alienation. Spirit first manifests itself as Nature in order that it may subsequently appear as Mind. As the nature of Spirit is self-determination, it can be revealed only in relation to external influence, i.e., as contradistinguished from what appears as necessity. We are aware of a self only

through a not-self: the not-self is thus a necessary stage in the development of self-consciousness. The Absolute was thus first 'in itself' as an Idea or Reason before it came to exist 'for itself' as Mind; and it is only 'through itself' as Nature that the Universal Spirit can rise to self-consciousness.

Things at first sight appear to us as disjoined, discrete, and merely externally determined; but, as Hegel says, "The truth of necessity is freedom." There is no meaning in necessity or external determination if the thing viewed as so determined has no individuality or life of its own apart from such determination. Thus self-determination is involved in every form of determination. The determination of things by one another is but an aspect of self-determination, of their mutual implication or fusion in an ideal unity of which they are the expression. The entire universe is but one organism whose life-blood courses in every part. The essence of the universe being self-determination, it is illustrated everywhere: the necessary relations of things are but 'moments' or elements in the world-process which is realizing itself through them. The opposition, therefore, of not-self to self, of sense to reason, of passion to conscience is essential to the very manifestation of the Idea, which realizes itself only through them. But the not-self, sense, or passion is no less rational than the self, or reason, or conscience: Reason in the one case is implicit, moving below the floor of consciousness, while in the other it is explicit, consciously organizing the materials supplied to it. Thus the motive force of all reality or development is opposition or contradiction which is 'sublated,' *i. e.*, at once negated and conserved: the antitheses are but necessary 'moments'

The apparently external determination of objects really involves self-determination.

The seeming opposition of self and nature, of reason and sense, of conscience and passion is but a means to self-realization.

The Universal Spirit evolves itself, through conflict or contradiction.

in the evolution of the Universal Spirit. *Intellectually*, the world which at first seemed foreign to the ego is discovered to be its counterpart: the objective relations are found to be but crystallizations of thought-forms or categories which operate subjectively in every mind. *Morally*, the passions and inclinations which at first seemed to be hostile to our moral nature are found to be essentially related to it, being necessary to its evolution. Conflict, therefore, is a means to development; necessity is a revelation of freedom; and self-limitation is a step towards self-assertion or self-realization.

Self-realization is the supreme virtue.

The 'true self' or personality, as explicit reason, requires the subjection of the 'false self' or individuality, moved by passions and inclinations, in which reason is only implicit.

Die to live.

Self-realization is thus the law of the universe; and so it is the supreme virtue of man. As "Nature is the extreme self-alienation of Spirit, in which it yet remains one with itself," so the passions and inclinations inherent in our sensuous nature, though not without rationality, are away from the 'true self' constituting the essence of humanity. Virtue consists then in subordinating the 'false self' or 'individuality' to the 'true self' or 'personality.' The Hegelian maxim 'Die to live' implies that we must annul the natural and immediate life of the self which is opposed to the not-self, involving a reference to the community; and only as this individual or lower self dies can we attain to the universal or higher self which is at one with the not-self. "The true interpretation of the maxim," says Caird, "is that the individual must die to an isolated life, *i. e.*, a life for and in himself, a life in which the immediate satisfaction of desire as his desire is an end in itself,—in order that he may live the spiritual life, the universal life which really belongs to him as a spiritual or self-conscious being." (*Hegel*, Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, p. 213.) Self-

abnegation is thus a means to self-realization;* self-renunciation, a means to self-satisfaction. Thus *eudæmonism* unites in it the principles of asceticism and epicureanism, rationalism and sensualism, perfectionism and hedonism. We can promote our true being only by curbing the false; we can further our true happiness only by renouncing false pleasures. A true positive must always be mediated by a negative. It is only by transcending the limitations of space and time and identifying ourselves with others that we can further our true being and secure beatitude. Thus the good

Self-realization by its rationalizing

* "I am morally realised," says Bradley, "not until my personal self has utterly ceased to be my exclusive self, is no more a will which is outside others' wills, but finds in the world of others nothing but self. 'Realise yourself as an infinite whole,' means 'Realise yourself as the self-conscious member of an infinite whole, by realising that whole in yourself.'" (*Ethical Studies*, p. 73.) Seth writes—"It is this self-consciousness, this power of turning back upon the chameleon-like, impulsive, instinctive, sentient or individual self, and gathering up all the scattered threads of its life in the single skein of a rational whole, that constitutes the true self-hood of man. This higher and peculiarly human self-hood we shall call personality, as distinguished from the lower or animal self-hood of mere individuality; and, in view of such a definition of the self, we may say that self-realisation means that the several changing desires, instead of being allowed to pursue their several ways, and to seek each its own good or satisfaction, are so correlated and organized that each becomes instrumental to the fuller and truer life of the rational human self. This power of rising above the impulse of the moment, and of viewing it in the light of his rational self-hood; this power of transcending the entire impulsive, instinctive, and sentient life, and of regarding the self which is but the bundle of impulses as the servant of the higher rational self, is what makes man (ethically) man. It is this endowment that constitutes will. We do not attribute will to the animal, because, so far as we know, it cannot, as we can, arrest the stream of impulsive tendency, but is carried off on the back of present impulse. That is a life according to nature for it; in such a life it realises the only self it has to realise. But man can take the larger view of reason, and can act in the light of that better insight. It is given to him to criticise the impulsive "stream," to arrest and change its course, to subdue the lower, animal, natural self to the higher, human, rational self." (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 206-207.)

process
harmonizes
all interests
and so yields
supreme
satisfaction.

which is sought is not the good of one individual or propensity as distinguished from that of others. The entire system is rationalized yielding the pure joy of perfect harmony or concord with the whole. There is no more any conflict of impulses or interests; they are unified by the supreme direction of the rational or true self. There is thus harmony, peace, and bliss. (*Vide* §10.)

"If solid happiness we prize,

Within our breast this jewel lies,

And they are fools who roam ;

The world has nothing to bestow,—

From our own selves our joys must flow."

(*Cotton.*)

God is absolutely good.

Evil is negative.

Morality is not merely subjective, but also objective, illustrated in the world-process.

The Ethos.

"God," says Hegel, "is good and good alone; the distinction between evil and good is not present in this One; it is with the element of distinction, or differentiation, that it first enters at all." (*Philosophy of Religion*, translated by Speirs and Sanderson, vol. I, p. 99.) Evil is thus purely negative, and the world-process is essentially good. The great merit of Hegelianism is that it regards morality as not merely subjective, illustrated in the lives of individuals, but also as objective realizing itself in history in the progress of nations and events. The Ethos is the world-will, the expression of the Absolute Reason, the revelation of divinity in human affairs and relations for the realization of its own end. The Absolute Reason is thus not only the highest Truth but also the supreme Good which is realizing its end through individuals, communities, and institutions: the moral order is an objective process in course of realization or development. Morality is realized in a number of institutions all of which tend to unite the individual will with the universal world-process. And

the fundamental moral institution on which even Society and the State depend is the Family. Hegel, accordingly, regards marriage as a sacred tie intended to promote the end of society and the state; and marriage not based on a conviction of duty amounts simply to concubinage. The State is regarded by Hegel as the goal of the *Objective Spirit*, to which the family and civil society are but means. The State aims only at the general good or the good of the whole and does not hesitate to sacrifice individual or private interests for such an end. The perfect form of the State, according to Hegel, is constitutional monarchy; and the monarch is, as it were, the embodiment of Ethos realizing its end in history. We find, accordingly, Hegel, unmoved by national disaster, watching Napoleon with speculative interest as "this world-mind on horse-back" on the very day of the battle of Jena. The highest realization of the Idea, however, is not attained until we come to the *Absolute Spirit* as it is manifested in Art, Religion, and Philosophy. As freedom is the essence of the mind, its adequate realization must be the goal of all spiritual activity. Freedom, however, cannot be fully realized in the State which is more or less an armed power bent on co-ercion; it is illustrated completely in the spontaneous exercise of Absolute Reason, specially as it manifests itself in Philosophy. Art, Religion, and Philosophy, according to Hegel, are not merely processes of the human mind but life-processes of the Universal Spirit itself. Philosophy as absolute knowledge is perfect self-consciousness and so the highest realization of the Idea: it is, so to speak, the self-thinking Idea. Philosophy is the process of the Absolute Idea as it becomes conscious of itself in progressively higher forms

Moral Institutions :
Family,
Civil Society,
and the State.

Perfect freedom, which is the end of all spiritual activity, is attained in Philosophy, and to a great extent in Art and Religion. These indicate not merely subjective processes, but also the objective manifestation of the Absolute Spirit.

in the higher intellects. The principles of the earlier philosophical systems are superseded and absorbed in a richer synthesis of the later systems. Each system reflects the culture of its time and manifests itself when such culture draws to a close affording occasion for self-reflection or thought-construction: "The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering."

Hegelianism is (1) Universalistic and (2) Optimistic.

(1) Universalism implies the paramount claims of society and humanity, to which those of the individual are subordinate.

(2) Optimism implies that the apparent defects and imperfections are but stages towards the realization of the supreme end.

It is apparent from the preceding account that Hegelianism is essentially (1) universalistic and (2) optimistic. (1) The universalism of Hegel is manifest in his conception of the Universal Spirit as the only reality revealing itself in the processes of the universe. Subjective morality and individualistic conception of society thus sink in the background. The Ethos is revealing itself in the course of events and progress of institutions; and individuals as agencies are only auxiliary to such realization. The State, society, and history thus become ends in themselves and not merely means ministering to the wants of individuals. Hence the claim of humanity, and so of society and the State, becomes more sacred than the claim of an individual. They are governed by an independent Ethos which realizes itself through individual agencies. This explains the supreme importance attached to the civic and social aspects of moral life by Hegelians generally. (2) The optimism of Hegel is no less a necessary consequence of his Absolute Idealism. If morality is but the expression of the world-reason in operation, in which individuals as well as societies and institutions partake, then the seeming shadows of the world turn out to be but partial light: the apparent defects and imperfections are mere stages towards the realization of the supreme

end. Sin and suffering are thus only relative experiences which, when properly construed, are seen to be 'moments' in the consummation of the world-process. The moral principle 'Die to live' is, therefore, illustrated not only subjectively in the lives of individuals but also objectively in history, since the evils and sorrows incidental to the development of the spiritual life of the universe are essential to its adequate realization. The law of self-realization through self-abnegation is, accordingly, no less true of God than of man; indeed, it may be said to be the law of man because it is the law of God—the law of the universe. If the universe is a spiritual unity, then everything—even what appears to us as evil or sorrow—has its proper place and function: the conflicts and contradictions disappear before the higher conception of a rational unity. And individuals, while apparently striving to promote their own ends, moral or prudential, are really playing into the hands of the world-organizing Ethos. In the words of Goethe—

Evil and sorrow are entirely relative, disappearing before the higher conception of an absolute rational unity.

"In the floods of life, in the storm of deeds,
Up and down I fly,
Hither, thither weave,
From birth to grave,
An endless weft,
A changing sea
Of glowing life.

Thus in the whistling loom of Time I ply,
Weaving the living robe of Deity."

§ 7. **Spinozism and Hegelianism.** As a monistic theory Hegelianism resembles Spinozism to a great extent: according to both the systems the universe is but the expression of one universal Being which is illus-

Spinozism and Hegelianism, though both pantheistic, have

important
points of dif-
ference be-
tween them,
which are—

(1) The su-
preme princi-
ple in the one
is a colourless
Substance,
while in the
other it is a
self-conscious
Spirit.

trated in all its particular forms and tendencies. But in spite of this cardinal similarity, there are important points of difference :—

(1) The supreme principle from which everything is deduced is viewed by Spinoza as Substance and by Hegel as Subject or Spirit. The 'Substance' of Spinoza, as transcending the distinction of thought and extension, spirit and matter, is an incomprehensible something—a zero. It is not without justice, therefore, that Martineau refuses to regard it as God and to characterize Spinozism as a genuine form of pantheism. (See *Study of Religion*, vol. II, p. 164.) The 'Substance' of Spinoza, like the 'Absolute' of Schelling, is an undifferenced unity blank of all predicates and so beyond all comprehension. As pure 'indifference' it is alleged to be apprehensible by 'intuition'; but intuition, as mentioned above, can never be the organ of philosophy. Hegel's 'Idea' or 'Reason,' on the other hand, is a principle of self-consciousness realized in personal experience. As a synthetic principle it is known to unify all experience; and it is, accordingly, regarded as a universal principle of synthesis organizing all things and processes. As an object is an object in relation to a subject, it may be viewed as but its other side, conditioned by the same laws and features : if objects exist only *for* intelligence, they may be regarded as essentially a manifestation of intelligence.

(2) Spinoza's principle is static, while Hegel's, dynamic. Spinoza does not explain *how* the universe is evolved out of his infinite Substance.

(2) Spinoza's philosophy is, so to speak, inert, in as much as it has not in it a principle of evolution explaining the genesis of things out of the universal Substance. It is rather a negative gulf swallowing up all than a positive principle realizing itself in all things. It is with truth, then, that his Substance has been likened to the den of a lion where there are many steps to but none

from. Hegel's philosophy, however, is essentially a philosophy of evolution : the law of evolution (the dialectical method) is immanent in the very nature of the Idea or Reason. If the 'Substance' of Spinoza is essentially static, the 'Absolute Reason' of Hegel is essentially dynamic : the unalterable substance of the one becomes the world-process of the other.

(3) The ethics of Spinoza, in accordance with the prevailing tendency of his time, is essentially subjective and individualistic, while the ethics of Hegel, as influenced by the spirit of his age, is essentially objective and universalistic. The perfection and the happiness of the individual constitute, according to Spinoza, the end of all moral effort, while the perfection and the well-being of the community constitute, according to Hegel, the end of all moral activity. *Subjective* morality, according to Hegel, is but a lower stage making room for *objective* : individual perfection and happiness are viewed as instrumental to the perfection and well-being of the community, secured by the operation of the Ethos in the form of social and political ordinances.

In spite of these important differences, however, we find that Spinozism and Hegelianism are essentially the same in their methods, tendencies, and results. The 'dialectic' ethics of Hegel is characterized by no less logical rigour than the 'geometric' ethics of Spinoza. In both the systems 'evil' objectively is an illusion, though subjectively it may have a value. Individual liberty in both the systems merges in universal necessity—what Hegel characterizes as the 'self-determination' of Absolute Reason. Moral progress in both the systems coincides with the progress of reason or

(3) The ethics of Spinoza is subjective and individualistic, while that of Hegel is objective and universalistic.

In spite of these differences, they are essentially the same.

Points of Similarity :

(1) Logical rigour.

(2) Evil is illusory.

(3) Universal necessity.

(4) Moral progress coincides with intellectual progress.

(5) The spring of moral effort is ultimately the Divine Being.

(6) Catholic, humanitarian, and optimistic in tendency.

Hegelianism and Vedantism resemble each other in their wide influence and division into schools.

intelligence which is our true being. And the true source of morality is not the individual effort but the Universal Being which reveals or realizes itself in nature and history. As such revelation or realization is believed to be the necessary expression of supreme excellence, the systems of both the writers are catholic and humanitarian in tendency and optimistic in result. The Impersonal Power actualized in individual wills aims primarily at the general good and only secondarily at the good of individuals as members of an all-embracing existence or evolution.

§ 8. **Hegelianism and Vedantism.** As already mentioned (*Vide* § 4), Hegelianism resembles Vedantism in many important points. There is similarity even in the wide influence and divergence of interpretations of the two systems. Hegelianism has moulded, more or less palpably, modern European thought and religion no less powerfully than Vedantism has moulded Hindu thought and religion. As Vedantism is divided into two main schools—monistic or pantheistic (*advaitavad*) and dualistic or theistic (*dvaitavad*), so Hegelianism is divided into two main branches—the right and the left, the one denying while the other affirming a pantheistic interpretation of the system. “The Hegelian School,” observes Windelband, “had rich experience in its own life of the blessing of dialectic; it split even in the Thirties upon religious antitheses.....The “right wing” of the Hegelian school, which resisted a pantheistic interpretation of the master, and emphasised the metaphysical importance of personality, attracted those thinkers who stood in a near relation to Hegel, and maintained Fichtean and Leibnizian motifs. Such were I. H. Fichte,

Christ. Weisse, H. Ulrici.....To the "Left" among the Hegelians belong Arnold Ruge, Ludwig Feuerbach." (*History of Philosophy*, translated by Tufts, pp. 629—630.) And the controversy still continues in our own day in the systems of Caird, Green, Bradley, McTaggart, Howison, and Rashdall, one way or the other. The important points of similarity between Hegelianism and Vedantism are:—

Points of similarity.

(1) The Supreme Reality according to both the systems is the Deity or Universal Spirit which manifests itself in the rich variety of this world. With regard to the character of this ultimate reality there is more agreement between Hegelianism and Vedantism than between Spinozism and Vedantism. The Absolute Deity (*Nirguna Brahman*) of Vedantism, though devoid of all predicates or qualifications, is still conceived as Spirit or Thought (*Chaitanya*). It is, in fact, the Universal Reason realizing itself in Nature and History. "This universe," says the author of Chandogya Upanishad, "was in the beginning Not-being; this (Not-being) was Being." (3, 19, 1.) Thus Brahman is conceived both as "Being and Not-Being (*sat and asat*), as Reality and Not-Reality (*satyam and asatyam*)." Deussen observes on this point, "As early as Rigveda X. 129. 1, with a degree of philosophical insight remarkable when the date is considered, it is said of the primeval condition of things, the primeval substance, therefore of Brahman in the later sense, that at that time there was *na asat, na u sat*, "neither not-being nor yet being." Not the former, for a not-being neither is nor has been; not the latter, because empirical reality, and with it the abstract idea of "being" derived from it, must be denied of the primeval substance. Since, however, metaphysics

(1) The supreme reality is the Universal Spirit, the undifferentenced unity of Being and Not-Being.

has to borrow all its ideas and expressions from the reality of experience, to which the circle of our conceptions is limited, and to remodel them solely in conformity with its needs, it is natural that in process of time we should find the first principle of things defined now as the (not-empirical) being, now as the (empirical) not-being." (*Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 128.)

(2) The supreme reality is conceived as a spiritual energy which evolves itself in this rich variety of the world through Not-Being or *Avidya*.

(2) The Supreme Reality is not merely a negative Substance, like that of Spinoza, to which all things may be traced, but a positive energy evolving the entire universe out of itself. Both Hegelianism and Vedantism, accordingly, undertake an explanation of the world and try to show how it has been evolved out of the Universal Spirit. Creation, according to both the systems, is merely a metaphor for self-explication. And there is similarity between the systems also in the mode of genesis. As, according to Hegel, the first 'concrete' concept of 'Becoming'—the creative principle, so to speak—is reached only through Not-Being, so according to Sankaracharyya, creation is intelligible only through Nescience or *Avidya*. As the Absolute Spirit first heterises itself—becomes its other in Nature—in order to rise to self-consciousness in man, so Brahman is reflected in *Avidya* before it appears as multiplicity of living beings. "The conception of *avidya*," writes Deussen, "was developed from the negative idea of mere ignorance to the positive idea of false knowledge. The experimental knowledge which reveals to us a world of plurality, where in reality only Brahman exists, and a body, where in reality there is only the soul, must be a mistaken knowledge, a delusion, a *máyá*." (*Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 74.) As Hegel observes, "The

reality is the universal, which goes out of itself, particularises itself, opposes itself to itself, that it may reach the deepest and most comprehensive unity with itself."

(3) According to both the systems, all things are endowed with thought, being but the expression of Universal Reason. The contingency of space and time is but a veil which conceals the ideal meanings of things. "Nature," says Hegel, "is but the extreme self-alienation of spirit, in which it yet remains one with itself"; and the soul, says the Vedantist, is but the divine self in us: "Indeed I am thou, O holy Deity, and thou art I, O Deity." "Objectivity," as Hegel observes, "is, as it were, only a covering under which the notion lies concealed." (*Logic of Hegel*, translated by Wallace, p. 351.) Reason is the essence not only of the natural but also of the moral world. "The philosopher's stone," says Hegel, "must be concealed somewhere *in Nature itself*, we say; Nature is in itself rational, and knowledge has to apprehend the reason actually present in it. But the ethical world, or the State which is, in fact, reason potently and permanently actualised in self-consciousness, is not permitted to enjoy the happiness of being reason at all. On the contrary, the spiritual universe is looked upon as abandoned by God, and given over as a prey to accident and chance."

(3) Entire Nature is instinct with reason which operates consciously in man.

(4) The substantial reality of the universe is admitted in both the systems. As cause and effect are substantially the same, the universe is as much real as the Universal Spirit itself. In the language of Spinoza, the one is but *Natura Naturata*, while the other is *Natura Naturans*. It is our individualistic and arbitrary interpretation which is false and illusory; the world-process

(4) Though the world is essentially real and rational, yet the limitations of space and time constitute a veil, conceal-

ing the ideal
meaning of
things.

itself is essentially real and rational. Though the universe is thus essentially real, yet its limitations of space and time are regarded by both the systems as illusory. The Universal Spirit reveals itself in the world-process which, viewed in its concrete multiplicity and evanescent phenomena, must be held as *maya* or a false show ; nevertheless, such a process is necessary to the very conception of the Universal Subject, whose will is realized in the universe. As Hegel observes, "Within the range of the finite we can never see or experience that the End has been really secured. The consummation of the infinite End, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world : and the result is that it needs not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality, accomplished. This is the illusion under which we live. It alone supplies at the same time the actualising force on which the interest in the world reposes. In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it ; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise." (*Hegel's Logic*, tr. by Wallace, pp. 351—352.) The Vedantist likewise maintains, "What applies to Brahman, as the Great Cause of all things, applies also to the Great Effect, namely, the Universe. Its substantial reality is not denied, for that rests on Brahman, but all that we see and hear by our limited senses, all that we perceive and conceive and name, is purely phenomenal, as we say, is the result of Avidya, as the Vedantists say. The universal simile that the world is a dream turns up frequently in the Vedanta."

(Max Muller's *Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy*, p. 85.)

(5) Knowledge, according to both the systems, though manifested in human consciousness, is not merely subjective, but objective; and its essential character is brought out, and not destroyed, by contradiction. The contradictions immanent in the phenomenal universe give it a determinate being which, as the sphere of knowledge, is intelligible only in relation to the indeterminate Brahman. As Hegel observes, "Error or other-being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result." (*Logic of Hegel*, translated by Wallace, p. 352.) The essence of knowledge, as the Vedantist says, is its *svayam-prakāśatva*, i. e., its eternity and consequent self-manifestation. Brahman is the eternal and infinite reality, knowledge, and beauty (*satyam, jñanam, sundaram, anantam*).

(5) Knowledge is not merely subjective, but objective, developing through contradiction.

(6) Corresponding to the three stages of knowledge usually advocated by Vedantists (*Vide* § 4), there are three stages in Hegelianism. (a) The first stage is indicated in the common view that individual objects as existing in space and time are the only realities of which we are aware. In this stage we employ such categories as Being, Quality, and Quantity, which, though implicitly involving thought-relations, do not explicitly suggest their presence. (b) The second stage is indicated in science which tries to explain the individual by reference to the general, the seemingly independent concrete entities by reference to their abstract conditions or relations. In this stage we employ such categories as Essence and Existence, Force and Expression, Substance and Accident, Cause and Effect, to interpret reality, i. e., to explain things by

(6) Three stages of knowledge:
(a) Sensuous or illusory.

(b) Scientific or phenomenal.

their relations or ideal connections. But even here there is a vestige of independence and external influence, illustrated in the first form of knowledge, 'essence' explaining 'existence,' 'substance' explaining 'accident,' 'cause' explaining effect: laws are believed to explain facts which follow from them. But, properly construed, these are mutually implicated in one another, the separation of laws from facts or of substantiality from relativity being quite arbitrary. (c) Hence the highest stage of knowledge is the philosophic (*Begriff*) which sees unity in multiplicity, substantiality in relativity. We thus discover that the substantial involves in its nature relations; and hence the subject or self alone is substantial, since it persists in the midst of changes, it remains self-identical in the midst of its fluctuating moods or manifestations. "Science, therefore," says Hegel, "must work into the hands of philosophy, that philosophy in turn may translate the universality of reflection which science has produced into the higher universality of the reason, showing how the intelligible object evolves itself out of the intelligence as an organic whole, whose necessity is in itself." In this highest stage of knowledge we employ such categories as Final Cause and Organic Unity, implying the presence and operation of Reason or Intelligence. The development of knowledge is thus characterized by the same dialectic method which underlies all being and all thought: the first stage is of that implicit and absolute character, which is illustrated in pure Being—in which a thing is taken as intelligible by itself without any reference to anything else; the second stage is illustrated in negation, differentiation, antithesis, detection of relations as essential

(c) Philosophic or real.

Dialectical development of knowledge.

to reality ; and the third or highest stage is illustrated in the synthesis of these ideal relations in a principle of self-consciousness, conceived as Subject or Spirit. While science, therefore, conceives all things as mechanically related, philosophy construes them as organically connected, being but movements of the Universal Spirit. "The nature of the universe," says Hegel, "hidden and shut up in itself as it is at first, has no power which can permanently resist the courageous efforts of the intelligence : it must at last open itself up ; it must reveal all its depth and riches to the spirit, and surrender them to be enjoyed by it." Thus philosophy, according to both Hegelianism and Vedantism, enables us to see a spiritual unity in the apparent multiplicity of things. "The result of philosophy," writes Hegel, "is that God is the absolutely True, the Universal in and for itself, the All-comprehending, All-containing, that from which everything derives subsistence." (*Philosophy of Religion*, translated by Speirs and Sanderson, Vol I, p. 90.)

(7) Both the systems admit the distinction between the higher and the lower, the true and the false, or the universal and the individual self. With regard to the Vedantic conception of soul or true self Max Muller writes, "When we speak of the Self, in Sanskrit *Atman*, we should always remember that it is not what is commonly meant by the Ego, but that it lies far beyond it. What we commonly call our Ego is determined by space and time, by birth and death, by the environment in which we live, by our body, our senses, our memory, by our language, nationality, character, prejudices, and many other things. All these make up our Ego, or our character, but they have nothing to do with our Self. Therefore to

(7) Distinction between the true and the false self.

Virtue consists in subordinating the false to the true self

(8) Operation of moral force in history : objective moral order.

translate *atman* by soul, as many scholars do, is rather misleading, for soul means so many things, whether the animal or living soul, the perceptive soul, and the thinking soul, all of which, according to the Vedanta, are perishable, non-eternal, and not the Self. What Brahman is to the world, its eternal and omnipresent cause, that the Self is to the Ego ; and hence Brahman was soon called *Parama-atman*, the Highest Self, while the Self in man was called the *Giva-atman*, for a time the living or the embodied Self." (*Vedanta Philosophy*, pp. 88-89.)
Virtue, according to both the systems, is the subordination of the false or individual to the true or universal Self : self-realization must be only through self-sacrifice or self-abnegation.

(8) Both the systems teach that the universal order is essentially moral in its tendency and that the Absolute Spirit is realizing its purpose in the progress of history. The Vedantist, accordingly, teaches that we are to aim at the purity of the soul and that we should not at all be mindful of the results or, as they are called, the 'fruits' of our actions. As Hegel observes, "Whether the individual exists or not is a matter of indifference to the objective ethical order, which alone is steadfast. It is the power by which the life of individuals is ruled. It has been represented by nations as eternal justice, or as deities who are absolute, in contrast with whom the striving of individuals is an empty game, like the tossing of the sea." (*Philosophy of Right*, translated by Dyde § 145, p. 156.)

Though both the systems thus recognise the working of the objective moral order in history, yet they differ in their estimates of the diverse tendencies at work to promote it. Vedantism in this respect is characterized by

more catholicity and toleration than Hegelianism. While every faith or tendency is considered by the Vedantist as having a place in the universal framework, to Hegel only the established order seems to be legitimate and appropriate. This conservatism of his explains his hostility to Fries of Jena (a follower of Kant) who advocated toleration of popular views and aspirations. "Epicurus," writes Hegel, "believed that the world generally should be given over to each individual's opinions and whims; and according to the view we are criticising the ethical fabric should be treated in the same way. By this old wives' decoction, which consists in founding upon the feelings what has been for many centuries the labour of reason and understanding, we no longer need the guidance of any ruling conception of thought." (Preface to *Philosophy of Right*, translated by Dyde, p. xxii.)

Vedantism is more catholic and tolerant.

(9) Both the systems are optimistic and universalistic in character. The universe, being but the expression of the Absolute Spirit, is essentially good and united by common interests. The feeling of unity or solidarity is strong in both the systems, as all men are viewed as but the expression of the same Universal Spirit or Brahman. Our love of humanity is the legitimate outcome of our consciousness of unity with our fellows; it is the practical expression of our regard for the true or Divine Self in us. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 22.)

(9) Optimism and universalism.

(10) Both the systems are characterized by eudæmonism. Virtue and happiness are essentially the same, there being an analytical connection between them. We thus find in the Upanishads—"There is one ruler, the Self within all things, who makes the one form manifold. The wise who perceive Him within their self or soul, to

(10) Eudæmonism.

them belongs eternal happiness, not to others." Likewise Sankaracharyya observes—

“स्वानन्दभावे परितुष्टिमन्तः सुशान्तसर्वेन्द्रिय वृत्तिमन्तः ।

अहनिशं ब्रह्मणि ये रमन्तः कौपीनवन्तः खलु भाग्यवन्तः ॥”

“Fortunate indeed is the man, though clad in rags, who is contented with his own happiness, is the master of his passions and is lost in his love of Brahman.”

(11) The Universal Spirit is the embodiment of all perfection—moral, æsthetic, and intellectual.

(11) The Universal Spirit is conceived in both the systems—as it is in Platonism and other transcendental systems—as essentially true, good, and beautiful at the same time. (*Vide* Chap XI, § 8.) The Absolute Idea as manifested in nature is the Beautiful, as conceived by intelligence is the Supreme Reality or True, and as realized in practice is the Good. The Brahman is likewise described by the Vedantist as *Sachchidanandam*. “The Brahman of which the human intellect is powerless to predicate anything beyond its being, its knowing, and its being perfect or blessed, was to be worshipped by those who felt a desire for worshipping, for though it was not affected itself by any attributes, no harm would happen to the worshipper or the worshipped if he called it the Lord, the creator, the father, preserver, and ruler of the world.” (Max Muller's *Lectures on Vedantism*, p.85.)

Distinction between the Absolute and the Relative Deity.

Both the systems draw a distinction between the Absolute God and the Relative Deity as conceived by us and made the object of worship. Corresponding to the *Nirguna Brahman* and the *Saguna Brahman* of Vedantism we have in Hegelianism the Abstract or Undetermined Universality and the more Concrete or Conditioned God of religion. “What we have first,” writes Hegel, “is this divine Universality—Spirit in its entirely undetermined Universality—for which there exists absolutely no

element of difference. But upon this absolute foundation (and this we state for the moment as fact) there now appears that element of distinction which, in its spiritual character, is consciousness, and it is with this distinction that religion, as such, begins. When the absolute Universality advances to the stage of judgment, that is to say, when it proceeds to posit itself as determinateness, and God exists as Spirit for Spirit, we have reached the standpoint from which God is regarded as the object of consciousness, and Thought, which at the beginning was universal, is seen to have entered into the condition of relation and differentiation." (*Philosophy of Religion*, translated by Speirs and Sanderson, Vol. I, p. 100.)

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and (3) pantheistic.

emanating from the Deity and liable to re-absorption in Him at death; and he conceives God as pure Form which, as we have seen (*Vide* § 5), is the guiding principle of things. The rationality of the universe, according to Aristotle, implies a world-reason, which appears as human reason in us. Thus belief in universal reason, which is the essence not only of the human constitution but of the entire intelligible world, is present, more or less prominently, in all the eminent supporters of this school.

10. Eudæmonism and Pantheism. With regard to the last feature, mentioned above, a difficulty is often experienced in reconciling our moral nature with Pantheism. If God be everything—if we are but He—then how can there be an evil at all? Hence the general tendency among eudæmonists is to regard evil as purely negative—as something due to our subjective or individual conception. But this does not relieve the difficulty. If there be no evil, how can there be any room for virtue—any striving after what is conceived as noble and good? If such a conception be illusory, then our moral efforts turn out to be the expression of disease or fanaticism. Pantheism, consistently carried out into action, should thus incline one rather to reckless conduct than to the prosecution of a virtuous life. But, as a matter of fact, we find that pantheists in all ages are noted for their spotless character and transcendent piety. How chaste, for example, are the lives of Parmenides, Spinoza, and the Vedantists generally! The expression ‘a Parmenidean life’ has really come to mean

How to
reconcile
Pantheism
with the
moral eleva-
tion of its
supporters?

a pure and spotless life. How, then, are we to reconcile this fact with the legitimate consequences of the theory? The explanation of the difficulty is, I believe, to be found in the moral culmination which Pantheism implies. Pantheism, viewed merely as an ontological doctrine, may present the above difficulty; but Pantheism regarded as the end of a saintly life solves the difficulty. (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 3.) The Hegelian Ethos involves no less sincere a faith in a real moral order under the guidance of Supreme Providence than the Vedantic doctrine of *Karma* with its implications of merit and demerit. And the gradual withdrawal of the Stoic or the Vedantic sage from the active life of pursuit (which has been likened by some to the retraction by the tortoise of its limbs inside its own shell) indicates but progressive moral emancipation from 'the bondage of passion' and the growing conviction of the providential regulation of events.

When, by scrupulous and faithful discharge of the duties of life, one builds up a virtuous character, he feels less and less the force of evil propensities and inclinations. Uniform obedience begets a habit for virtue which now becomes, as we say, his 'second nature.' Thus, when an occasion arises, the individual is no longer tempted to follow a base propensity, his habitual tendency being to go in the direction of what is right. At this highest stage of moral culture, the conflict between inclination and duty, between prudence and conscience, between human desire and divine behest, dies away; and the

Pantheism indicates a moral culmination in which the conflict between duty and inclination is transcended.

uniform ascendancy of right is established beyond dispute. The human constitution at such a stage beats in unison with the divine, and one feels himself to be, as it were, one with God.* This conviction is further deepened by the experience that the results of our acts are outside our control, and an estimate of their relative utility from the personal stand-point is more or less arbitrary and precarious. When the 'vanity of human wishes' is thus proved and it is discovered that

"There is a power
Unseen that rules the illimitable world,
That guides its motions, from the brightest star
To the least dust of this sin-tainted mould ;
While man, who madly deems himself the lord
Of all, is nought but weakness and dependence"
(Thomson)

* The *Geeta* says—

"युक्ताहारविहारस्य युक्तचेष्टस्य कर्मसु ।
युक्तस्वप्नावबोधस्य योगो भवति दुःखहा ॥ ६ । १७ ॥
यदा विनियतं चित्तमात्मन्येवावतिष्ठते ।
निस्पृहः सर्वकामेभ्यो युक्त इत्युच्यते तदा ॥ १८ ॥
यथा दीपा निवातस्थो नेङ्गते सोपमा स्मृता ।
योगिनो यतचित्तस्य युञ्जती योगमात्मनः ॥ १९ ॥
यतो परमं ब्रह्म विद्ध योगसेवया ।
यत्र चैवात्मनात्मानं पश्यन्नात्मनि तुष्यति ॥" २० ॥

"The Yoga that is pain-destroying is for him who is regulated in eating and amusement, regulated in performing actions, regulated in sleeping and waking.

"When his subdued thought is fixed on the *Self*, free from longing after all desirable things, then it is said "he is harmonised."

"As a lamp sheltered from the wind flickereth not ;' such the traditional simile of the Yogi of subdued thought, absorbed in the Yoga of the *Self*."

—then a saintly man naturally resigns himself to the will of the Supreme Being* ; and he is scarcely conscious of this self-surrender, for his moral nature has, so to speak, merged in the divine. The self is revealed on the occasion of the opposition of self and not-self ; and when this opposition dies out, the consciousness of self also fades away. This is true no less morally than perceptually. In the perceptual sphere, the antithesis of self and nature, of subject and object, first rouses our attention to them ; and when the antithesis is absent we have no suspicion of their presence†. So in the moral sphere the antithesis of self and God, lower and higher self, inclination and duty is essential to our consciousness of responsibility and individuality ; and when this antithesis disappears with the perfection of our nature, the consciousness of our personality also sinks into the background.‡ This accounts for the Vedantic conception

Attention being riveted to the Deity, the objective attitude preponderates over the subjective, and self-consciousness lapses into the original 'intuitive emotion,' directed to the object of thought.

"When the mind is quiet, stopped by the practice of Yoga, when he seeth the SELF by the SELF, and in the SELF is satisfied." Chapter VI, 17-20. (Translation of Miss Annie Besant.)

*It is said in the *Geeta*—

"कायेन मनसा बुद्ध्या केवलैरिन्द्रियैरपि ।

योगिनः कर्मकुर्वन्ति सङ्गं त्यक्त्वात्मसुखये ॥" ५ । ११ ॥

"By the body, by the heart (*manas*), by the mind (*budhi*), even by the senses alone, Yogins, giving up attachment, do their work for the purifying of the 'soul.' (Davies' Translation. Chap. V, 11.)

(†) Cf. Tennyson—"The baby new to earth and sky,
What time his tender palm is prest.
Against the circle of the breast,
Has never thought that "this is I.""

‡ Hegel writes—"This is the most sublime morality, that evil is non-existent, and that man is not to allow to this distinction, this nullity, any valid existence. Man may wish

The lapse of self-consciousness, however, does not imply the absorption of self in the Deity.

that "The soul or Self of the sage—whatever its original relation to Brahman may be—is in the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the universal Self." (Dr. Thibaut's Preface to *Vedānta-Sūtras*, p. cxxi.) The lapse of self-consciousness, however, does not mean the extinction or absorption of self in the Deity. As an expert dancer is scarcely conscious of the regulation of his movements when dancing to the tune of a music, so a sage forgets his personality when he naturally acts in the direction of his Conscience. "Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not : whosoever sinneth hath not seen him, neither known him." (1 *John*, iii, 6.) This, I believe, is the explanation of Pantheism as a moral theory ; and in no other way can we reconcile it with the transcendent purity of its supporters. Otherwise, no one can sincerely regard himself as identical with God. In fact, even the expression of such an opinion implies individuality ; and it is no less involved in all moral effort or striving after perfection. Pantheism is but the religious expression of an exalted moral nature. And

"Happy the man who sees a God employ'd
In all the good and ill that chequer life !
Resolving all events, with their effects
And manifold results, into the will
And arbitration wise of the Supreme." (*Cowper*.)

to persist in this difference, to carry this separation on into a settled opposition to God—the essentially existing Universal—and then man is evil. But it is also possible for him to regard his difference as non-existent, to place his true being in God alone, and direct his aim toward God—and then man is good." (*Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 99.)

It is not unjustly, therefore, that Vedantism requires rigid moral discipline in the shape of tranquility, restraint, self-denial, long-suffering, collectedness, and faith on the part of its disciples. Moral preparation is essential to the acceptance of its truth. "The Vedanta philosophy," observes Max Muller, "abstruse as its metaphysics are, has not neglected the important sphere of Ethics, but that on the contrary, we find ethics in the beginning, ethics in the middle, and ethics in the end, to say nothing of the fact that minds so engrossed with divine things as the Vedanta philosophers, are not likely to fall victims to the ordinary temptations of the world, the flesh, and other powers." (*Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy*, p. 170.)

When, however, pantheism is thus reached as the final stage of moral progress and is formulated as a system, its psychological history and moral significance may be missed and it may implicitly be adopted as a metaphysical doctrine. Nay, there is something grand and fascinating in the conception that we are but parts of One Universal Being whose all-embracing existence does not leave any room for individuality; and logically too the position seems to be specious, since unity, which is the goal of all speculation, is reached here in the strict form of monism without any duality. Either thoughtless acquiescence or metaphysical advocacy blinds one to the moral defects of the theory. Though one feels and acts—nay even thinks—as a dualist or theist, yet he may theorize or speculate as a monist or pan-

Hence Vedantism enjoins strict moral discipline on the part of its votaries.

The transition from moral to metaphysical pantheism is easy when its psychological history is missed.

theist. "Comparatively few, even in India," writes Dr. Thibaut in his Introduction to the *Vedanta-Sutras*, "are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who think it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite.'" (P. cxxvii.) To extinguish personality is to put out all light and abandon all inquiry altogether. As Dr. Thibaut points out, "The *Isvara* who allots to the individual souls their new forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal conscious being is at the same time identified with the totality of the individual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going systematisers of Vedantic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid altogether." (Introduction, p. cxxiv, foot-note.) Hence we find the theistic or dualistic construction of Hegelianism by the "Hegelian Right" represented by Ulrici and the younger Fichte as well as a similar interpretation of Vedantism by Ramanuja* and Poorna Prajna. "We have been obliged," says Dr. Thibaut, "to leave it an open question what kind of Vedanta is represented by the Vedanta-sutras, although reason was shown for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more

The theistic
or dualistic
interpreta-
tion of
Vedantism
and Hegelian-
ism.

* "अद्वैताख्यं मतं विहाय भट्टिति इति प्रवृत्तिर्भव ।" (*Tatta Muk.*)

"Renouncing monism anon embrace dualism."

closely related to the system of Ramanuga than to that of Sankara." (Preface, p. cxxvi.)

"That each, who seems a separate whole,
Should move his rounds, and fusing all
The skirts of self again, should fall
Remerging in the general Soul,
Is faith as vague as all unsweet:
Eternal form shall still divide
The eternal soul from all beside." (Tennyson.

In Memoriam, XLVII.)

§ 11. Criticism of Eudæmonism. As eudæmonism involves a complex standard, involving both perfection and happiness, the criticisms of these forms of the moral standard apply *mutatis mutandis* to this theory. The moral quality being unique, the intellectual form of the theory is specially open to the objections urged against dianoetic ethics. We, therefore, offer only the following general observations on the theory:—

(1) Eudæmonism has, no doubt, an important element of truth in it, *viz.*, that the truly virtuous life is invariably a happy life. Pleasures we may have in the gratification of the senses; but happy we can never be if we are not virtuous. (*Vide* Chap. X, sections 2 and 7.) It seems, however, that virtue and happiness are connected rather synthetically than analytically. The very conception of virtue or moral excellence does not involve the notion of pleasure or happiness. As we are sentient beings, our feelings are generally indices to the proper or improper exercise of our faculties; but such feelings

The criticisms of Hedonism and Perfectionism apply *mutatis mutandis* to Eudæmonism

Additional remarks:

(1) The virtuous life is, no doubt, a happy life; but happiness is an index and not the standard of morality.

can never be viewed as an integral part of propriety or impropriety. As Kulpe says, "The attainment of a moral end shall always bring with it an enduring satisfaction; but this will oftentimes be a mere secondary effect, welcome indeed, but not the one and only purpose of our volition." (*General Philosophy*, p. 229.) The moral standard thus does not involve in it a reference to feeling, agreeable or disagreeable, which simply indicates to us whether we are acting in the direction of our being's end or away from it. And this view is supported even by the testimony of the eudæmonists themselves. Aristotle, for example, regards pleasure as merely a concomitant of the legitimate exercise of a faculty or organ. Spinoza similarly observes, "Pleasure is a passion by which the mind passes to a greater, pain a passion by which it passes to a less, perfection." (*Ethics*, iii, 11, dem.) The following remark of Mayor with regard to Aristotle, who is generally believed to be the father of eudæmonism, may be quoted in this connection:—"As to Aristotle's general conception of Ethics, is he to be called a Eudæmonist? So it has often been said, because he makes *eudaimonia* the end to which man's life and actions should be referred. But the well-being and well-doing, which constitute the *eudaimonia* of Aristotle, are carefully distinguished from any form of pleasurable sensation. *Eudaimonia* with him is a particular kind of putting forth of the powers of the soul, which is intrinsically good by itself, quite apart from the pleasure which, as a matter of fact, attends it like its shadow.

Admissions of
eudæmonists.

Virtuous activity does not become good because it is a means to pleasure; it is good as being itself the end we should aim at. We admire it in and for itself, as we admire a beautiful statue. This view is of course very far removed from the Epicurean and also from the modern Utilitarian. It agrees with these in so far as it determines the quality of our actions by referring them immediately to an end, instead of to an absolute law, or intuitive conception of right; but the end is neither pleasure to self nor pleasure to others, but the perfect fulfilment of the *ergon* (i.e., proper work or function) of man. And to know what this perfect fulfilment is, we must fall back on reason embodied in the judgment of the wise man." (*Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 126-127.) The remark of Seth, therefore, that "We may, with Aristotle, regard pleasure as the bloom of the virtuous life, as the index and criterion of moral progress" (*Ethical Principles*, p. 217), is not wholly true. Happiness may be regarded as an 'index' or concomitant sign of virtuous life; but it can never be erected into a standard or 'criterion' of rectitude.

(2) The truth of the above remarks is borne out by the essentially rationalistic tendency of eudæmonism. Virtue, according to it, consists in the exercise of the supreme faculty of reason and the due regulation of the other faculties or tendencies by it. Such regulation involves, no doubt, a systematization among desires, which brings peace and happiness to the agent; but happiness is merely an (inseparable) accident and not the end of our moral

(2) The rationalistic basis of eudæmonism betrays the supremacy of reason in the moral sphere.

life. A virtuous life may be a happy life; but we cannot simply convert the proposition and say that a happy life is a virtuous life. The systematization of desires is due to their subordination to reason which is thus regarded as the final authority in morals. Morality involves, no doubt, a rational constitution and a system among desires; but these by themselves can never constitute duty. There must be the discrimination of right and wrong, and authority connected with the former requiring us to act in its direction. Happiness* in a sentient creature is but an index that he is moving towards the proper end of his life; it thus indicates some end achieved, some want satisfied. But the end, the want can never be conceived as optional in the moral sphere; it is imperative and obligatory. And this conception of command or authoritative requirement implies of course a moral law which we are to obey.

Mere system among desires, yielding happiness, cannot explain the authoritative aspect of morality.

(3) Eudæmonism appeals to a standard which is an incongruous mixture of subjective and objective elements.

(3) Eudæmonism involves an incongruous mixture of subjective and objective elements in the moral standard. Perfection and progress, as conceived by reason, constitute objective ends or ideals which we should strive to attain; but happiness is merely a subjective experience which, though ordinarily accompanying a virtuous life, is not at all inconsistent with a degraded life, altogether sunk in immorality. If at such a stage an individual, by self-forgetfulness or self-sophistication, can be happy, we never regard him

* "It has pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure."

(Locke.)

as virtuous. Here also there is a systematization of desires and the consequent absence of discord and misery, but the systematization in such a case is brought about from the lower level—away from virtue or the true end of our life. The subjective experience of happiness can never be introduced into the objective standard of morality without dissolving it into personal liking or caprice.

Even if we admit that men are moved to moral activity by considerations of happiness accruing from the attainment of a moral end, still it does not follow that happiness is itself a part of such end. The pursuit of moral ends may bring about happiness as "a secondary result in subjective consciousness;" and it may even operate as "a motive on the will." (Wundt.) "Thus," says Wundt, "it may be regarded as an indispensable means to the attainment of moral ends, but never as the moral end itself.... Man can seek the good only because doing so makes him happy; yet the good itself is not happiness, but an objective psychical product, which becomes a good in the ordinary sense of a pleasure-producing force solely through its reflections in the individual consciousness." (*Ethics*, Vol. III, p. 85.)

Even if it be admitted that men are moved to virtue for happiness, it does not follow that happiness is the moral standard.

(4) Without entering into the difficulty of what is described by Hegel as penetrating the 'hard husk' of spatial and temporal limitations of objects in order to read their ideal meanings, we may mention that his dialectical method is too narrow and rigid to account for the rich and elastic flow of notions or facts. To restrict the movement of thoughts and

(4) The logical rigour of the dialectical method is not adequate to account for the rich variety of the concrete world or to explain

the characteristics of moral life which rests on freedom.

things within the narrow limits of the dialectic procedure is to deprive them of their natural vitality and to subject them to a morbid and monotonous process. It is not unjustly, therefore, that Chalybaeus humorously likens the dialectic method to an articular disease affecting the entire system. Moreover, the transition or mobility of the categories is intelligible only by reference to the vitalizing power of thought which is essentially discriminative in character. This vital cognitive principle, however, is not the only principle known to us. Our moral life, for example, is not characterized by mere logical necessity but by dynamic contingency as well. If self-realization through self-sacrifice be the inevitable law of the universe, then moral life, being deprived of its characteristic freedom, is converted into a mere logical machine; and hence its hopes and fears, its complacency and compunction, its merits and demerits—in short, its essence and meaning are dissipated, leaving only an empty name.

(5) To obliterate personality is to extinguish morality. And personality is composed not merely of the true but also of what is called the false self.

(5) The objective and universalistic tendency of Hegelian Ethics, though a great merit in this subjectivistic and egoistic age, is so very paramount as to annul and absorb the personal factor in ethics altogether. The personal is not merely the universal but the individual factor as well. Personality cannot be cleft in twain—the true and the false, the universal and the individual; it is an indivisible unity involving both the factors. And our moral life is not a strife between the true and the false, but between the true and the true, self: our desires and inclinations, which

express our individuality, are as much real and personal as our judgments and decisions. Virtue does not consist in the victory of one of two rival combatants in the arena of our consciousness, but in the due exercise of personal power when it is tempted in hostile directions. To overlook this personal factor is to miss the very essence of morality. While, therefore, we may admit objective morality or the operation of Ethos in the regulation of events constituting history, we should be careful not to ignore the personal ethics of motives. To swamp subjective morality in objective is to obliterate morality altogether; for, objective morality is intelligible only by reference to subjective, *viz.*, the motives and ways of Providence such as can be gleaned from an examination of personal consciousness. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 3.)

Objective morality has a meaning only by reference to subjective.

Yet this is what we find in the system of Hegel. If self-realization through self-renunciation is the law of the Universal Spirit rising to self-consciousness in man, then subjective morality merges in objective, leaving no room for morality at all. It may be mentioned that Hegel himself, in spite of his earnest advocacy of objective ethics in the progress of history, has not been able to rise above the anthropomorphic conception when he maintains that the earth is the most perfect heavenly body fitted for the development of spiritual life. As Hoffding remarks—"In spite of all his dialectic Hegel was not able to rise above the geocentric and anthropocentric standpoint, which, indeed, we are

forced to adopt. No dialectic can teach us to jump off our own shadows." (*History of Modern Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 185.)

There are mixed moral theories which aim at explaining moral facts by reference to more than one standard.

§ 12. *Mixed Standards.* Though we have discussed in the preceding pages types of different classes of moral theories, yet we should remember that there are many systems which cannot be forced into the classifications given above. As mentioned before (Chapter IX, § 7), moralists in constructing their systems have looked not to logical possibilities but to the facts of moral consciousness which require to be explained. Thus, as we have seen, the systems of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, though properly coming under Moral Sense, resemble also altruistic hedonism to a great extent. Bishop Butler, likewise, though admitting the supremacy of conscience, includes also 'cool self-love' in the moral standard. As his system occupies a prominent place in the history of ethical thought, let us briefly notice it here.

Butler.

Psychological basis of his system.

Butler's System.—Bishop Butler (1692–1752), like his contemporaries Clarke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, is an advocate of Independent Morality. But while Clarke's system is essentially metaphysical in character, being a deduction from right reason apprehending the eternal relations of things, Butler's system is essentially psychological, being based on a careful analysis of the human moral constitution. While agreeing with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in their admission of genuine benevolence and so in their opposition to Hobbes and Mandeville, he yet differs from them in

their analysis of our moral constitution which overlooks the supremacy of Conscience.* Human constitution is conceived as "Not merely a system of impulses in which a certain balance and harmony has to be maintained in order that it may be in a good condition, but a system in which some springs of action are naturally governing and regulative, while others are naturally submissive to regulation." (Sidgwick's *History of Ethics*, p. 192.) In explaining the meaning of a 'system' or 'constitution,' Butler writes, "It is a one or a whole made up of several parts; but yet the several parts even considered as a whole do not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you include the relations and respects which those parts have to each other. Every work both of nature and of art is a system; and as every particular thing, both natural and artificial, is for some use or purpose out of and beyond itself, one may add, to what has been already brought into the idea of a system, its conduciveness to this one or more ends." Let us instance in a watch—Suppose the several parts of it taken to pieces, and placed apart from each other; let a man have ever so exact a notion of these several parts, unless he considers the respects and relations which they have to each other, he will not have anything like the idea of a watch. Suppose these several parts brought together and anyhow united; neither will he yet, be the union ever so close, have an idea which will bear any resemblance to that of a watch. But let him view those several parts put together, or consider them as to be put together

Human nature is intelligible not merely by reference to its parts, but also by reference to their mutual relations or adjustment.

Meaning of 'System' or 'Constitution'

illustrated by reference to the mechanism of a watch.

* "The not taking into consideration this authority, which is implied in the idea of reflex approbation or disapprobation, seems a material deficiency or omission in Lord Shaftesbury's *Inquiry concerning Virtue*."—Preface to *Sermons*, p. 377 (Bohn's Edition).

The essence of the human constitution lies in the regulative function of Conscience, which preserves the balance among the mental powers or tendencies.

Human nature or constitution is adapted to virtue.

in the manner of a watch ; let him form a notion of the relations which those several parts have to each other—all conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, showing the hour of the day ; and then he has the idea of a watch. Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. Appetites, passions, affections, and the principle of reflection, considered merely as the several parts of our inward nature, do not at all give us an idea of the system or constitution of this nature ; because the constitution is formed by somewhat not yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which these several parts have to each other ; the chief of which is the authority of reflection or conscience. It is from considering the relations which the several appetites and passions in the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea of the system or constitution of human nature. And from the idea itself it will as fully appear, that this our nature, *i. e.*, constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears, that its nature, *i. e.*, constitution or system, is adapted to measure time. What in fact or event commonly happens is nothing to this question. Every work of art is apt to be out of order ; but this is so far from being according to its system, that let the disorder increase, and it will totally destroy it. This is merely by way of explanation, what an economy, system, or constitution is. And thus far the cases are perfectly parallel. If we go further, there is indeed a difference, nothing to the present purpose, but too important a one ever to be omitted. A machine is inanimate and passive ; but we are agents. Our constitution is put in our own power. We are charged with it ; and

therefore are accountable for any disorder or violation of it. Thus nothing can possibly be more contrary to nature than vice ; meaning by nature not only the *several parts* of our internal frame, but also the *constitution* of it." (Preface to *Sermons*. Bohn's Edition, pp. 373-374.)

Butler analyses the moral constitution of man into three elements :—

(1) Benevolence and Self-love. Such facts as friendship, compassion, parental and filial affection, and goodwill to mankind in general conclusively prove that disinterested benevolence is as much natural to man as self-love or regard for one's own interest. "Every man," writes Butler, "hath a general desire of his own happiness ; and likewise a variety of particular affections, passions, and appetites to particular external objects. The former proceeds from or is self-love ; and seems inseparable from all sensible creatures, who can reflect upon themselves and their own interest or happiness, so as to have that interest an object to their minds : what is to be said of the latter is, that they proceed from or together make up that particular nature, according to which man is made. The object the former pursues is somewhat internal, our own happiness, enjoyment, satisfaction ; whether we have, or have not, a distinct particular perception what it is, or wherein it consists : the objects of the latter are this or that particular external thing, which the affections tend towards, and of which it hath always a particular idea or perception. The principle we call self-love never seeks anything external for the sake of the thing, but only as a means of happiness or good : particular affections rest in the external things themselves. One belongs to man as a reasonable creature reflecting upon his own interest

Analysis of
the moral
constitution :

(1) Benevo-
lence and
Self-love,
which are
both natural
and instinc-
tive in the
human con-
stitution.

Self-love as a
general re-
gard for our
own welfare
should be
distinguished
from the
particular
inclinations
directed to
appropriate
objects.

or happiness. The other, though quite distinct from reason, are as much a part of human nature..... There is, then, a distinction between the cool principle of self-love, or general desire of our own happiness, as one part of our nature and one principle of action; and the particular affections towards particular external objects, as another part of our nature, and another principle of action." (*Sermon XI.*) And the difference between cool self-love and the particular passions and inclinations is "not a difference in strength or degree," but "a difference in *nature* and in *kind*." (*Sermon II.*)

(2) The particular inclinations or tendencies. These are directed to appropriate objects, which are external things and not merely internal satisfaction.

(2) The particular appetites, passions, and affections directed to their appropriate objects and calculated to secure their own ends, which are not inconsistent with those of self-love and benevolence. "That all particular appetites and passions are towards *external things themselves*, distinct from the *pleasure arising from them*, is manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another." (*Sermon XI.*)

(3) Conscience. As a principle of reflection, it is concerned with the regulation of the different tendencies of the human mind.

(3) Conscience, the principle of reflection in man "by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper and actions." (*Sermon I.*) "The principle of reflection or conscience being compared with the various appetites, passions, and affections in men, the former is manifestly superior and chief, without regard to strength. And how often soever the latter happens to prevail, it

is mere *usurpation* : the former remains in nature and in kind its superior ; and every instance of such prevalence of the latter is an instance of breaking in upon and violation of the constitution of man." (*Sermon II.*) "Conscience," as Butler points out, "is not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some influence ; which may be said of every passion, of the lowest appetites : but likewise as being superior ; as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others ; in-so-much that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself : and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right : had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world." (*Sermon II.*)

Supremacy of
Conscience.

The several elements of the human constitution thus constitute an organic whole with the due subordination of parts, each of which has its legitimate sphere of operation within its own province. All the natural impulses, i. e., dispositions and tendencies which belong to the original plan and constitution of human nature, are designed by the Creator to serve certain ends and so are not without moral significance. Even the impulses which lead us to inflict harm have their sphere of usefulness in our constitution. Resentment, for example, whether in the form of *sudden* anger, which anticipates reason in warding off injury, or in the form of *settled* indignation directed against vice and wickedness, has evidently a purpose in our moral constitution. "The one stands in our nature for self-defence, the other for the administration of justice." In fact, we may

All the
natural im-
pulses have
their legiti-
mate spheres
of exercise.

discover the legitimate sphere of exercise in each case by determining the natural drift or aim of a faculty or tendency.

The particular inclinations, aiming either at general or at individual good, are not discordant with Benevolence and Self-love.

The particular passions and affections, though having definite ends of their own, really work in the direction of Self-love and Benevolence and so are not discordant with these. "Men," says Butler, "have various appetites, passions, and particular affections, quite distinct both from self-love and from benevolence: all of these have a tendency to promote both public and private good, and may be considered as respecting others and ourselves equally and in common: but some of them seem most immediately to respect others, or tend to public good; others of them most immediately to respect self or tend to private good: as the former are not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love; neither sort are instances of our love either to ourselves or others; but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the individual and the species, and proofs that He intended we should be instruments of good to each other, as well as that we should be so to ourselves." (*Sermon I.*) Self-love and Benevolence, too, though fundamentally distinct are not in conflict with each other: "They are so perfectly coincident," writes Butler, "that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards society." (*Ibid.*)

Self-love and Benevolence are also in accord with each other.

The supreme regulative faculty, however, is Conscience.

✓ The supreme regulative faculty, however, is Conscience which is the distinctive endowment of man: "This prerogative, this natural supremacy, of the faculty which surveys, approves or disapproves the several affection of our minds and actions of our lives, being that

by which men *are a law to themselves*, their conformity or disobedience to which law of our nature renders their actions, in the highest and most proper sense, natural or unnatural." (*Sermon*, II.) Butler, accordingly, adopts the Stoic formula of virtue—"Live according to nature". But 'nature', as Butler points out, should not be construed to imply whatever is inborn in us—any natural propensity or craving—or what may happen to be the strongest inclination for the time being. 'Nature' properly indicates the distinctive endowment of a creature; so that though mere instincts—appetites and passions—may constitute the nature of animals, they do not adequately express the 'nature' of man, whose special endowment is rational and moral. Life according to nature, is thus life according to the supreme regulative faculty in us: it is life according to Conscience. "As the idea of a civil constitution implies in it united strength, various subordinations, under one direction, that of the supreme authority; the different strength of each particular member of the society not coming into the idea: whereas, if you leave out the subordination, the union, and the one direction, you destroy and lose it: so reason, several appetites, passions, and affections, prevailing in different degrees of strength, is not *that* idea or notion of *human nature*; but *that nature* consists in these several principles considered as having a natural respect to each other in the several passions being naturally subordinate to the one superior principle of reflection or conscience. Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a natural part of our nature, but not the whole: add to these the superior faculty, whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them, and take in this its natural superiority, and

The maxim of virtue is, 'Live according to nature'.

'Nature' indicates the distinctive endowment of a creature;

and the distinctive feature of man is found in his Reason and Conscience.

Thus 'to follow nature' is 'to follow Conscience.'

The harmony of our nature is preserved by the due subordination of the propensities to Conscience;

and the harmony is disturbed by the preponderance of the propensities.

Moral judgments are passed on voluntary acts and are accompanied by moral sentiments.

Virtue consists in the due regulation of impulses ; and it is intrinsically desirable, apart from questions of utility.

To follow nature is to preserve the dignity of our constitution.

An action is natural and good when it is in harmony with reasonable Self-love

you complete the idea of human nature. And as in civil government the constitution is broken in upon, and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority ; so the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties or principles within prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme over them all." (*Sermon III.*)

In vindicating the moral constitution of man, Butler maintains that our moral estimates are directed to voluntary acts and are accompanied by moral sentiments. Prudence and Benevolence, though obligatory on us, do not in themselves constitute obligation. Virtue, according to him, is intrinsically eligible apart from questions of utility. Virtue does not consist in the mere spontaneous or natural exercise of the passions and inclinations, but in their proper regulation. "No passion God hath endued us with can be in itself evil ; and yet men frequently indulge a passion in such ways and degrees that at length it becomes quite another thing from what it was originally in our nature." (*Sermon VIII.*) Thus, '*following nature*' does not mean acting capriciously or spontaneously ; it implies acting according to the true dignity of our moral nature, i. e., according to the rule of right implanted in us : "Every man is naturally a law to himself, that every one may find within himself the rule of right, and obligations to follow it." (*Sermon II.*)

Butler thus summarizes his view : "The nature of man is adapted to some course of action or other. Upon comparing some actions with this nature, they appear suitable and correspondent to it : from comparison of other actions with the same nature, there arises to our view some unsuitableness or disproportion. The corres-

pondence of actions to the nature of the agent renders them natural : their disproportion to it, unnatural. That an action is correspondent to the nature of the agent, does not arise from its being agreeable to the principle which happens to be the strongest : for it may be so, and yet be quite disproportionate to the nature of the agent. The correspondence, therefore, or disproportion, arises from somewhat else. This can be nothing but a difference in nature and kind, altogether distinct from strength, between the inward principles. Some, then, are in nature and kind superior to others. And the correspondence arises from the action being conformable to the higher principle ; and the unsuitableness from its being contrary to it. **Reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the nature of man :** because an action may be suitable to this nature, though all other principles be violated ; but becomes unsuitable, if either of those are. Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident : for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future, and the whole ; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things. Thus they who have been so wise in their generation as to regard only their own supposed interest, at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find, that he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his own interest and happiness."

(*Sermon III.*)

and Conscience, and unnatural and bad when out of harmony with them.

Conscience and cool Self-love are coincident.

True and abiding interest lies in the direction of Duty.

The Mixed Standard is also illustrated, more or less clearly, in the systems of Cumberland, Gay, and Paley, as well as in Eudæmonism.

In connection with the Mixed Standard we may also mention the systems of Cumberland, Gay, and Paley, with whom perfection, happiness, common-well-being, and the will of God more or less clearly enter into the moral standard. Eudæmonism as a moral theory employs also a Mixed Standard more or less prominently. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 2.)

§ 13. **Criticism of the Mixed Standard.** To enter into a detailed examination of the chief forms of mixed theories would carry us beyond the scope of our work. We offer, accordingly, a few general remarks on this point. Mixed systems, no doubt, enjoy the advantage of employing a multiplicity of principles to solve the problems of our moral life: when one of the principles fails, the other is close at hand to render the help it can towards solving a difficulty. But this advantage is secured at the cost of both (1) logical and (2) psychological consistency.

(1) The law of parsimony requires that we should not assume several principles to account for a fact, if fewer principles can possibly render a satisfactory explanation of it. And logic and metaphysics alike ever aspire at unity to account for things. (2) Every elementary quality is determined by its own laws; and if, as we have seen, moral quality is unique and elementary, it must be conditioned by laws appropriate to it. Our mental life, no doubt, is a concrete unity having diverse functions or qualities; and so the laws governing these functions are, as a matter of fact, closely connected with one another. But such connection does not imply that the different laws reg-

Mixed Theories are (1) illogical and (2) unpsychological.

(1) The law of parsimony requires that we should not unnecessarily multiply our first principles.

(2) Moral quality being elementary is governed by its own laws.

ulate each elementary experience. There are, for example, the laws of attention, the laws of memory, and the laws of the feelings; and since attention, memory, and feeling are closely connected with one another, their laws also interact or converge to produce a concrete experience. But this does not mean that the laws of attention are the laws of memory or of feeling or *vice versa*.

In fact, every concrete experience is more or less complex involving several elements which are governed by their own laws; and the ultimate laws of nature are generally taken to be as numerous as our elementary experiences. If what we call a moral act is a complex phenomenon, involving physical, intellectual, emotional, and volitional factors, if it implies a relation of agent to others as well as to some superior authority as the source of obligation, if it involves a relation of motive to outward action and consequences, then an adequate explanation of such an act must involve a reference to all these features and their laws. But this does not mean that all these conditions are essential to the explanation of the *moral aspect* of the act. A material object may illustrate in its constitution, physical, chemical, dynamical, and mathematical laws; but this does not imply that all these laws are essential to explain the peculiarity of any one feature of the object. Thus the explanation of the moral quality of an act, requiring a direct reference to moral laws, may also involve an indirect reference to other laws calculated to throw light on concomitant features. If consequences are

A complex fact, involving several elements, is governed by different laws; but all of these cannot be said to regulate each element.

Thus, a moral act, as a complex phenomenon, illustrates different laws, all of which do not constitute the moral standard.

generally indices to motives, if virtue is usually connected with self-sacrifice and the promotion of general well being, if obligation implies higher authority, then all these may be taken into account in determining the moral quality of an act; but all these factors are not equally essential to such determination. Some of them are essential, constituting the standard, while others are accidental, being but indices or concomitant signs. Thus, while we regard moral law or higher authority as the moral standard, we take a reference to consequences or future happiness as but incidental tests or concomitant signs creating a presumption in favour of this or that moral quality. The one is fundamental and the other, accidental. In including, therefore, all these marks or features in the moral standard, the supporters of mixed theories confound what is essential with what is accidental in the moral sphere; they confound signs with the standard. The vice of a mixed theory is that it tries to co-ordinate principles which are really subordinate. Paley, as we have seen, has included no less than three factors in his moral standard. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 15.) His standard has, accordingly, been humourously described as combining "The maximum of error in the minimum of space."

The supporters of mixed theories include in the standard concomitant signs.

The advocates of such theories not infrequently contradict themselves by setting up one of the co-ordinated elements as supreme.

The truth of the above remarks is borne out by the general tendency in all mixed theories to regard as paramount one of the principles which are ostensibly co-ordinated in the moral standard. And it is also a noteworthy fact that the principle which is usually regarded as supreme is Conscience or the Moral Fac-

ulty. We have seen that though Shaftesbury and Hutcheson refer now to Benevolence and now to the Æsthetic Faculty in determining the moral quality of an act, yet they always refer to the Moral Sense as discovering such quality. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 14.) Butler, likewise, though apparently co-ordinating Self-love and Conscience, really regards Conscience as the final authority in morals. He observes, for example, "It is our duty to walk in that path, and follow this guide, without looking about to see whether we may not possibly forsake them with impunity." (*Sermon* III.) He mentions also in his Preface to the Sermons—"Whereas in reality the very constitution of our nature requires that we bring our whole conduct before this superior faculty; wait its determination; enforce upon ourselves its authority, and make it the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole business of a moral agent, to conform ourselves to it. This is the true meaning of that ancient precept, *Reverence thyself*." Occasionally Butler seems to assign to Self-love a superior place*; but Self-love is construed by him liberally so as to include the elements of happiness coming from Benevolence and Virtue. Reasonable Self-love, as implying "a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness," is thus viewed by him as "not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but as a part

And ordinarily Conscience is regarded as the supreme faculty laying down the moral standard.
Admissions of

Shaftesbury,
Hutcheson,
and Butler.

The 'Self-love' of Butler includes Conscience.

* "Though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such; yet, when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." (*Sermon* XI.)

Eudæmonism, likewise, admits the ascendancy of Conscience.

of the idea itself."* (*Analogy*, Part I, Chap. V.) Self-love or Prudence, liberally construed, thus includes Conscience. (See Chap. XVI, § 6.) Similarly, eudæmonistic theories, while including happiness in the moral standard, make it dependent on the regulative influence of Reason or Conscience. Thus even the supporters of mixed standards are driven to admit that the moral quality can be finally determined only by the moral test in the form of the declarations of Conscience.

§. 14. **Concluding Remarks.** Let us now conclude this brief review of the different forms of the moral standard with a few remarks as to what seems to be its true character. One naturally feels diffident to pronounce an opinion on a point which has engaged the attention of the best intellects, apparently without any unanimity. But, as we shall try to show, there is an element of truth in almost every system, though the general defect is either to make everything of a partial principle or to include diverse elements in the moral standard. The remark of Leibniz that "Systems are true by what they affirm, but false by what they deny" is generally true, for affirmation is usually due to insight, while denial, to oversight. The determination of the moral standard requires a careful and impartial examina-

All theories have elements of truth in them. Their defect lies in universalizing a partial principle.

* "In the common course of life, there is seldom any inconsistency between our duty and what is called interest: it is much seldomer that there is any inconsistency between duty and what is really our present interest; meaning by interest, happiness and satisfaction. Self-love, then, though confined to the interest of the present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue; and leads us to one and the same course of life." (*Sermon III.*)

tion of the facts of moral life, which, being often very complex, are liable to misconstruction owing to imperfect analysis and personal bias. "When the inward frame of man", says Butler, "is considered as any guide in morals, the utmost caution must be used that none make peculiarities in their own temper, or anything which is the effect of particular customs, though observable in several, the standard of what is common to the species; and above all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward movements and affections: which principle will of course have some influence, but which, being in nature supreme, ought to preside over and govern all the rest." (*Sermon II.*) In trying to ascertain the true character of the standard we should keep before our mind the central problem and divorce it from all extraneous associations and should thus be careful not to confound what is accidental or collateral with what is essential or fundamental.

The authoritative aspect of morality is explained easily by Jural Theories. If moral distinctions involve the consciousness of obligation to act in the right direction, such consciousness, whether original or acquired, clearly implies a reference to higher authority, divine or human, requiring the performance of such acts. Even when this authority is conceived as human, there is an element of truth in the view, in as much as human authority is generally exercised in the direction of what is good and eligible. The extreme view of Hobbes that the

Only unprejudiced and impartial examination can reveal the true standard.

We should not confound the accidental with the essential.

The Jural Theories satisfactorily explain the element of authority implied in obligation.

Human authority is generally exercised in the direction of Conscience.

The standard of Hobbes is intelligible by reference to the condition of his time.

When a sovereign uses his authority for social welfare, he is evidently guided by reason.

Thus, according to Bain, rational human authority is the standard.

And his position is intelligible by reference to his phenomenalistic

arbitrary will of the sovereign is the final standard in morals may, on examination, reveal some element of truth in it. When we remember the time when Hobbes propounded his theory, we can easily understand how a peace-loving philosopher would try to secure peace at any cost. That even the arbitrary will of a sovereign, securing obedience, peace, and happiness, is preferable to anarchy, confusion, and misery, such as prevailed after the deposition of Charles I, can scarcely be gainsaid. The 'state of nature' was naturally suggested to Hobbes when he contemplated the strife and confusion produced by the selfish clamour for power by men, no longer under the wholesome restraint of sovereign authority. That reason requires 'constraint' in the form of 'natural laws' with a view to secure peace and happiness is admitted by Hobbes. So that when a sovereign is regarded as exercising his authority for social good, he is really under the restraint of reason. When Hobbes mentions that the sovereign authority should be obeyed only so long as it affords protection, he practically admits that even an arbitrary exercise of power for mere selfish ends must, to be effectual, be under the regulation of prudence and reason. Bain, likewise, contends that the social enforcement of useful acts is the ultimate explanation of moral distinctions. Here, too, reasonable authority is considered as the final explanation of morality, though such authority is conceived as human. If, as we shall see more fully in Chap. XVI, § 6, utility coincides to a great extent with morality,

and if, imbued with the scientific and positivistic spirit, we abandon any search after 'invisible issues' and move only within the sober limits of 'reality,' then the admission of rational human authority as the final standard in morals becomes intelligible to us. And such authority, as stated above, is generally exercised in accordance with the requirements of our moral nature in the direction of what is good and eligible.

and hedonistic tendencies.

But if even the highest human authority does not feel justified in acting in any direction it likes, if a sinner trembles even in solitude 'like a guilty thing surprised,' if there is difference between 'liberty' and 'license,' not merely, as Burke points out, in the political, but also in the moral sphere, then the authority implied in morals must be acknowledged as other than human, since it is superior to humanity, irrespective of differences of time and clime, rank and attainments. Thus the authority is taken by the supporters of the theological form of the Jural Standard, as no other than that of guiding Providence or Deity. It is the 'dæmon' or 'master self' in one's breast that demands an unconditional surrender to its requirements. Conscience is thus viewed as the oracle of God, revealing His 'guiding love' and natural preference of what is intrinsically holy to His creatures, 'made after His own image,' so that by willing obedience they may prove themselves worthy of the charge committed to their care. If, as Butler mentions, "There are as real and the same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-crea-

But the fact, that even the highest human authority cannot help submitting to the voice of his Conscience, has led the supporters of the Theological Branch of the Jural Theory to maintain that the standard is superior to human personality, i.e., divine.

Conscience is thus viewed as the oracle of God.

And, to account for the varying degrees of merit and demerit in an agent, moralists like Hutcheson and Martineau have been led to admit a scale of moral worth among the inner springs of human action, which is regarded as the moral standard.

As, however, such a scale is the expression of general moral laws, these are taken as the standard by Calderwood.

Again, as the greatest danger to our moral life comes from sensibility, Kant demands its unqualified suppression by making pure regard for the highest moral principle as the standard.

tures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good" (Butler, Ser. I, p. 387); if, accordingly, the several propensities and tendencies are given in us for the furtherance of these ends, then it is but natural to expect that the merit or demerit of a rational agent should be determined by the proper or improper regulation of these propensities and tendencies. Hence we find the admission by moralists like Hutcheson and Martineau of a scale of moral worth in the case of the springs of human activity and the contention of writers like Kant and Calderwood that such a scale is really determined by moral principles or 'categorical imperatives'.

As, again, the greatest danger to the integrity of our moral nature comes from egoistic tendencies—and even affections may be regarded as having an egoistic reference—Kant makes an attempt to do away altogether with desires and inclinations and to set up reverence for the pure form of the abstract moral principle as the sole condition of virtuous life. Kant, we have seen, treats the theological implication of moral law as merely a postulate of practical reason instead of as a demonstrated fact; and this even has an important element of truth in it. The existence of God as moral governor, if proved beyond dispute, would render a life of moral probation impossible by introducing extraneous considerations like those of hope and fear, reward and punishment into the moral sphere. How can there possibly be a fair trial and faithful service when there is the likelihood of one's being bribed

into obedience by considerations of self-interest? As Kant observes, "All remains disinterested and founded merely on duty; neither fear nor hope being made the fundamental springs, which if taken as principles would destroy the whole moral worth of actions." (*Practical Reason*. Abbott's Translation, pp. 226-227.)

That religion is an aid to morality can never be denied; but when such aid is rendered in the form of introducing egoistic considerations into the moral life then the essence of such a life is vitiated. Hence is it that individuals, wanting in moral inspiration, are rather led astray by outward forms and conventional observances (such as penances, ablutions, and ceremonies), when moved by blind religious enthusiasm. To avoid these injurious effects, Buddhism and Positivism withdraw themselves from abstruse metaphysical discussions and idle religious controversies and merely devote themselves to further the ends of practical morality by inculcating universal benevolence and good-will. We should remember, however, that when genuine religion supplements morality—when one is led to religious faith by righteous work and scrupulous obedience—then the moral nature, instead of being perverted, becomes further improved and sanctified. "When the Theistical belief," writes Shaftesbury, "is intire and perfect there must be steady opinion of the superintendency of a Supreme Being, a witness and spectator of human life, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the universe: so that in the perfectest recess, or deepest solitude, there must be One still presum'd

And, to preserve the purity of our moral life, he treats the existence of God as merely an object of moral faith.

To render our moral life fruitful and conducive to general well-being, Buddhism and Positivism preach universal benevolence and goodwill as the ideal of morality.

Genuine faith in Providence and true religion are, however, important aids to morality.

Shaftesbury.

remaining with us; whose presence singly must be of more moment than that of the most august assembly on earth. In such a presence, 'tis evident, that as the shame of guilty actions must be the greatest of any; so must the honour be of well-doing, even under the unjust censure of a world. And in this case, 'tis very apparent how conducing a perfect Theism must be to virtue, and how great deficiency there is in Atheism." (*Inquiry*, p. 57.)

Psychological Hedonism is right in holding that ordinarily we are moved to action by the prospect of pleasure; and Ethical Hedonism is right in supposing that pleasure is often an index to the legitimate exercise of our powers.

'The greatest happiness of the greatest number,' is, no doubt, generally a test of rectitude; but such happiness should be rich both in quality and quantity, as mentioned by Mill.

If we examine the Teleological Theories of Ethics, we also find that there are elements of truth in them. Psychological Hedonism is to a certain extent right in supposing that we are generally moved to action by a prospect of pleasure, whether egoistic or altruistic; and Ethical Hedonism, in erecting pleasure as the standard of rectitude, is so far right as to suppose that pleasure is generally the accompaniment of natural and legitimate exercise of powers. Though we may thus hold with Bentham that we are generally right when we aim at 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' yet it is no less true, as indicated by Mill, that there are qualitative hedonistic differences which should regulate our moral choice. As men, however, are often moved to a virtuous course not merely by the expectation of terrestrial happiness but also by the prospect of celestial bliss, Paley and other supporters of the theological standard are not altogether wrong when they include such prospective bliss in the moral estimate of mankind. But the hedonistic paradox is true no less in the case of celestial than in the case

of terrestrial pleasures; and the search after an agreeable end of activity brings only anxiety, uneasiness, and misery.

The Perfectionists, as distinguished from the Hedonists, are so far right as to suppose that moral activity is governed by the ideal instead of by the actual.

"The fiend that man harries
Is love of the Best;
Yawns the pit of the Dragon,
Lit by rays from the Blest.
The Lethe of nature
Can't trance him again,
Whose soul sees the perfect,
Which his eyes seek in vain."

(Emerson, *The Sphinx*.)

The different forms of Perfectionism have also elements of truth in them. The pursuit of the ideal involved in all moral effort implies, no doubt, that we strive to attain an end which is not realised in practice; but the peculiarity of the moral ideal, as mentioned above, is that it carries authority or command. Behind perfection there is requirement, authoritative prescription, a law or 'categorical imperative' demanding unconditional submission. The several ends of life—physical, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral—are not detached but closely connected, being but parts of an entire psycho-physical constitution. The prosecution of a virtuous life is thus generally conducive to health and closely connected with true intellectual and æsthetic culture.

Paley's standard brings out the common tendency that men are moved to virtue by prospects of celestial bliss. Nevertheless, the truth of the Hedonistic Paradox is proved by the fact that the hankering after pleasure breeds only misery. Perfectionism indicates that our moral life is governed by the ideal;

and the different forms of Perfectionism reveal that the several ideals are inter-connected, contributing to the elevation of character.

The peculiarity of the moral ideal is that it carries authority, involving 'categorical imperative.'

Virtuous life alone can lead to the harmonious development of our complex constitution on all its sides.

Evolution or Self-realization as the supreme law of our being imposes upon us the obligation of duly cultivating the different sides of our nature.

Moral evolution depends on the due regulation of the several tendencies, primary and secondary.

Our constitution is only then best adapted to its environment, physical and social, when we follow the dictates of Conscience (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 6); and true knowledge and appreciation of beauty involve no less a reference to the claims of our moral nature. It is not without truth, therefore, that Plato and other great thinkers regard God—the ultimate source of our moral constitution—as the embodiment of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness.

The harmonious development of our whole nature is thus the supreme duty of our life. Evolution or Self-realization may thus be regarded as the law of our being. But such a law implies not merely a physical or logical necessity, such as is maintained by Spencer, Spinoza, or Hegel, but also a moral requirement, an imperative duty. It is true, no doubt, that there is a natural tendency to the normal development of our organs and faculties if left to themselves; but apart from this regulation of nature, there is also the regulation of will under the guidance of Conscience. With the increase of experience and the taste of the consequences of our acts we acquire new tendencies which are modifications, if not perversions, of the old. Thus, in the language of Martineau, 'secondary' springs of action arise by the side of the 'primary,' bringing forth new conflicts and occasions which require the active control of Conscience. Artificial wants and requirements, arising from the ever-increasing complexities of domestic, social, and political relations of human life, further complicate matters and so afford ample room

for the vigilant supervision of this supreme faculty. Thus what might have been easily achieved by man in his simply 'natural' condition, as advocated by Rousseau and Nietzsche, can be achieved only with difficulty under the altered conditions of a more or less civilized community. This of course does not mean that civilization has brought us only defects and disadvantages as suggested by Rousseau and his followers. The egoistic and militant propensities, so much needed in the earlier stages of individual and social development to secure self-preservation and well-being, require to be curbed and modified to a great extent when protection and comfort are ensured by social and political organizations with the advance of civilization. Thus the 'social contract' of Hobbes is not without moral significance. It has, no doubt, been argued by Rousseau that the refined manners of civilized society are only hollow pretence, without any genuine inspiration or sincerity. But, even if we admit the truth of this remark to a certain extent, we must remember that habits which are at first induced by conventional morality may in course of time beget honesty of purpose. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 4.)

Moreover, conventional morality itself is but the expression of the Universal Ethos, the common moral nature of mankind, which, however repressed or modified by idiosyncrasies and circumstances, gives rise to the 'laws of nations' (Grotius*) and their

The state of nature and civilization have both their advantages and disadvantages as determining moral progress.

The 'laws of nations' are essentially moral in character, influencing moral development

* Grotius (1583—1645) defines '*Jus Naturale*' as the "dictate of Right Reason, indicating that an act, from its agreement or dis-

Self-realization involves the regulative influence of Conscience or Reason.

Reason as a charioteer duly controls the passions and inclinations.

equitable relations. Thus the development of individual or social constitution is left not merely to the blind play of natural forces but also to the regulation of Conscience, as it is reflected either in personal consciousness or in the impersonal 'laws of nations.' And, as the essence of our moral life lies in the right regulation of the several tendencies and propensities, the character of what we call moral development is determined not by the spontaneous growth of these tendencies and inclinations but by their legitimate exercise or proper control. Self-realization, as a moral rule, requires, therefore, the due cultivation of the several faculties constituting the self under the guidance of Conscience. "Every ethical theory," observes Seth, "might claim the term self-realisation, as each might claim the term happiness. The question is, What is the self? or Which self is to be realised? Hedonism answers, the sentient self; Rigorism, the rational self; Eudæmonism, the total self, rational and sentient." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 204.) As, however, rationality and sentiency are not of co-ordinate rank in our moral life, the latter is but the servitor and the former the lord, the one supplying materials to be rightly adjusted by the other. The conception of Reason as charioteer guiding the passions and inclinations as horses is as old as the Upanishads or the Platonic Dialogues.*

agreement with man's rational and social nature, is morally disgraceful or morally necessary."

* In the third section (*Valli*) of the *Katha Upanishad* there is the celebrated simile of the chariot (*Ratharupaka*). The soul

Such regulation, however, implies an order among the impulses and their adaptation to circumstances and relations. The laws of Conscience are embodied, as mentioned above (*Vide* Chap. IX § 23), in the moral scale, such as is put forward by Hutcheson or Martineau. The impulses, however, are always relative to circumstances; and their propriety in any case is determined by their fitness with regard to the connected relations and opportunities. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 24.) There is thus truth in the view of Clarke that the essence of morality is to be found in the "eternal and immutable relations" which, by conditioning our opportunities and impulses, determine the moral character of our acts. As our choice is always relative to circumstances, the character of these, as ordained by the Creator, affects the character of our choice. One set of circumstances,

Such regulation implies an order among the impulses and their adaptation to circumstances and relations.

As the propriety of conduct is determined by relations and opportunities, these are viewed by Clarke as constituting the moral standard.

is compared to a person seated in a chariot which is the body, the reason being the charioteer; the will, the reins; the passions or senses, the horses; and the things of sense, the roads. "If," it is said, "the charioteer, the reason, is unskilful, and the reins are always slack, his senses are ever unruly, like horses that will not obey the charioteer; but if the charioteer is skilful, and at all times firmly holds the reins, his senses are always manageable, like horses that obey the charioteer." (3, 4, &c.). Similarly Manu observes: "In the restraint of the organs running wild among objects of sense, which hurry him away hither and thither, a wise man should make diligent effort, like a charioteer restraining restive steeds." (II. 88.) Plato, likewise, in the *Phaedrus* compares the reason to a charioteer driving a pair of winged horses of different breed, one of which, the rational impulse, is obedient to the rein, while the other representing the appetites and passions is unruly and ever disposed to draw the chariot to vile and ignoble things. "The chariots of gods," observes Plato, "in even poise, obeying the rein glide rapidly; but the others labour, for the steed who has evil in him, sinking heavily to the earth, keeps them down, when he has not been rightly trained by the charioteer." (Jowett's Translation, Vol. II, p. 124.)

Again, when the eternal relations and circumstances are regarded as the expression of the eternal thoughts or intelligible ideas of the deity, these are looked upon as the standard in morals.

(Cudworth.)

The eternal relations and intelligible ideas are, however, revealed through general moral principles, intuited by Conscience, constituting the moral standard.

Virtue, then, consists in the right regulation of the different tendencies, making up our moral constitution, according to the dictates of Conscience.
(Butler.)

involving certain relations and impulses, justifies certain acts which can never be justified when the relations and circumstances are reversed or altered. Thus parental regulation is not of the same moral value as filial disobedience, though both of them imply an exercise of power by one individual towards another. Though the persons are the same, yet their relations are different and hence their duties and rights are not exactly the same. If, again, these relations and circumstances are eternally the same, the 'eternal and immutable morality' of Cudworth, implying intelligible ideas, or the archetypal thoughts of the Deity as embodied in creation and implanted in our constitution, is no longer obscure to us. The relations are reflected in our impulses whose relative moral worth is reported by Conscience in the form of general moral principles. Conformity to the principles is at the same time conformity to right relations; and transgression of the principles means impiety towards the divine order and system as objectified in nature and revealed in personal consciousness.

Our moral constitution is thus, as indicated by Butler, an organic whole; and virtue consists in the proper regulation of the several tendencies. The gratification of each tendency brings, no doubt, its own satisfaction, but such a satisfaction may not, as shown above (*Vide* Chap. X, § 2 & 7, & § 1 of this Chapter), be accordant with true happiness, yielding peace and contentment. Happiness, in the true sense of the word, is the crown of a virtuous life.

The different forms of enjoyment experienced by creatures are well indicated in the Geeta.

True happiness is the crown of a virtuous life. (Eudæmonism.)

“सुखं त्रिदानीं विविधं शृणु मे भरतर्षभ ।
अभ्यासाद्रमते यव दुःखान्तश्च निगच्छति ॥ १८।१६ ॥
यत्तदयेविषमिव परिणामेऽमृतोपमम् ।
तत्सुखं सात्त्विकं प्रोक्तमात्मबुद्धिप्रसादजम् ॥ १७ ॥
विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगाद् यत्तदयेऽमृतोपमम् ।
परिणामेविषमिव तत्सुखं राजसंस्कृतं ॥ १८ ॥
यदयंचानुबन्धे च सुखं मोहनमात्मनः ।
निद्रालस्यप्रमादीत्यं तत्तामसमुदाहृतं ॥ १९ ॥
नतदस्ति पृथिव्यां वा दिवि देवेषु वा पुनः ।
सत्त्वं प्रकृतिर्जैर्मुक्तं यदेभिः स्थाविर्भुङ्क्तेः” ॥ ४० ॥

“Hear now from me, O chief of Bharatas! the threefold kinds of pleasure. That which causes gladness by usage and brings an end to pain;

Which is as poison in the beginning, but is like nectar in the end; that is declared to be “good” pleasure, born from the serenity of one’s own mind.

That which is like nectar in the beginning from the connection of sense-objects with the senses, but is as poison in the end, is held to be of “passion.”

That pleasure which in the beginning and in the results is the bewilderment of the soul and springs from sleep, idleness, and stupidity, is called “dark.”

There is nothing here in earth, nor yet among the gods in heaven, which is free from the three modes which are born of Nature (*Prakriti*).” (Chap. XVIII, 36-40. Davies Translation.)

Happiness, however, is merely a mark and not the standard of virtue.

Whatever may be our conception of the moral end we regard it as obligatory—sanctioned by the authority of a Perfect Mind.

Thus, the testimony of consciousness seems to be in favour of the view that the moral standard lies in obligation or Law revealed to Conscience.

Eudæmonism is thus justified in regarding *Sattwik* enjoyment, or what is described here as “good” pleasure born from the serenity of one’s own mind,” as the test of virtuous life. But happiness, as we have seen, is ordinarily an index to virtue and not its standard. Whatever may be our conception of the moral end—whether pleasure, health, knowledge, beauty, perfection, or happiness—we regard it as obligatory or binding: it is backed by authority which requires unconditional acceptance of what is right. The authority implied in the moral standard is, as explained above, not of an arbitrary character, but such as carries its own evidence with it. Its intrinsic ascendancy is patent to us as it is based on reason which reports the righteous preference of the Supreme Being, communicated to us for our guidance. Thus the positive declarations of consciousness warrant faith in the view that the essence of the moral standard is to be found in Law or Obligation, an authoritative requirement to act in the direction of what is right and proper. And an individual, who unconditionally surrenders himself to the dictates of his Conscience, is raised above the freaks of Fortune, not at all moved by her smiles or frowns.

“True dignity is his whose tranquil mind
Virtue has raised above the things below ;
Who, every hope and fear to Heaven resign’d,
Shrinks not, though fortune aims her deadliest blow.” (*Beattie.*)

CHAPTER XIII.

THE SUPREMACY OF THE MORAL STANDARD.

§ 1. Complexity of the Human Constitution.

What we call a concrete object is more or less complex, governed by different laws. In the case of a living being, the more numerous the functions, the greater the complexity of its constitution. As what we call the human constitution has diverse functions—physiological, mental, and moral—it is really very complex in character, governed by various laws. The different parts of our constitution, though having distinct ends, are harmoniously blended together so as to subserve the chief end of life. Each minor end is governed by several laws and so the supreme end, though having laws of its own, is indirectly conditioned by numerous laws. There are, for example, physical, intellectual, and moral ends of our life; and each of these ends is secured by observing a plurality of laws. Thus the physical end is promoted by laws of health involving biological, chemical, physical, and dynamical laws; the intellectual end is furthered by logical and psychological laws, each of which involves diverse elements or conditions; and the moral end is achieved by obedience to the laws of our moral life. And, as our constitution is a harmonious unity or an organic whole, these different laws interact or mutually condition each other. The physiological laws, for example, have their bearing on psychology,

The human constitution is a complex whole having diverse functions, harmoniously blended together.

The different functions are governed by different laws, such as physical, intellectual, and moral.

As our constitution is an organic unity, the different laws interact

and tend to
operate
harmoniously.

and psychological laws also have their bearing on physiology; and both physiological and psychological laws are closely connected with the moral: our mental life is coloured by organic conditions which in their turn are affected by psychical factors; and, as we shall see in the next chapter (*Vide* 5), what we call our duty is conditioned by organic and psychical factors as well. The duty, for example, of maturing a scheme of safety does not arise in the case of a lunatic; nor is it obligatory on an invalid, who can not help himself, to succour a man in distress; an insolvent can never be expected to ransom a prisoner.

The end of
every being
is the due
development
of its powers.

The end of every form of existence seems to be its perfection or the proper development of its structure or constitution. The end of rock seems to be the adequate solidification of its strata; the end of a plant, its due growth and fructification; and the end of animal life, the complete development of its organs and functions. The end of man, accordingly, is the harmonious development of his capabilities, physical and mental, intellectual and moral, temporal and spiritual. Certain ends, however, are secured spontaneously and naturally (as in the case of digestion and respiration), while others are attained by voluntary regulation and persistence (as in the case of physical or moral culture). But besides this difference in the mode of the attainment of ends there are important differences with regard to their scope or complexity. Certain ends are comparatively simple and so are pursued with relative indifference

The end of
man, there-
fore, is the
harmonious
development
of his
faculties.

to the rest ; while there are others which are more complex, involving the co-operation of several factors.

We may, for example, seek health or knowledge with less reference to the other ends of life than we can possibly do in the case of moral culture. Though moral quality is unique and elementary, yet it is illustrated, as mentioned above (*Vide* Chap. IV), only in the case of a conflict of impulses. Such a conflict implies that we are tempted in different directions and betrays the necessity of the due regulation of the several tendencies. The essence of morality, then, lies, as pointed out by Aristotle, in the proper control of the several propensities ; and the authority of Conscience consists in the superintendency which it exercises over them. The moral end, therefore, is necessarily complex involving our physical, mental, and moral well-being. It is in the right exercise of the several tendencies that morality consists ; it aims at the perfection of our whole nature. From this we are not to conclude that perfection is the moral standard. For perfection, as mentioned above, has behind it an authority which requires its realization in personal life : perfection, from the moral stand-point, is obligatory and not optional ; it is to be acquired by voluntary effort as something eligible and not attained by the spontaneous growth of what is inevitable.

The pursuit of the moral end implies the due regulation of the several tendencies constituting the mind.

§ 2. **Complexity of Constitution Involves Conflict.** As a complex constitution is moved by several ends, these may either converge or diverge. The constitution, however, being an organic whole,

Life involves a conflict of dispositions or tendencies.

the convergence of the different ends can alone secure perfection and peace, while their divergence brings decay and misery. When, however, a constitution is left to itself it has a tendency to move along the line of least resistance and thus to foster the development of certain propensities to the exclusion or neglect of others. But as the lines of least resistance themselves vary from time to time with a variation of the numerous factors constituting our temperament and environment, there gradually appears a conflict among the several tendencies making up our mental and moral constitution. Our appetites and passions, desires and affections, tastes and inclinations, thus often come into collision with each other, threatening the integrity of our nature and detracting from peace and perfection. To preserve the balance of our constitution and thus to secure peace and perfection the principal end is of our moral life. But for the conflict, there would be no trial and no room for moral life. When, therefore, we carefully survey our constitution we find that there are different forms of conflict which we may describe as conflict of ends or standards. Thus, there may be (1) a conflict of natural and artificial ends or standards, (2) a conflict of physical, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral standards, or (3) a conflict among the different forms of the moral standard itself. As the last (3) we have already discussed in Chap. VIII, in connection with 'conflict of duties,' we shall confine our attention here to the other two forms alone.

Such conflict is relative to a conflict of ends or standards regulating human life. Three forms of conflict : (1) conflict of natural and artificial ends ; (2) that of physical, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral ends ; and (3) that of the different forms of the moral end. The third case has already been discussed in Chap. VIII, §2.

(1) Conflict of natural and artificial standards is not infrequently illustrated in connection with our dress and food, our deportment and dealings, our condemnation and approval. (2) Conflict of the second kind is often illustrated in the lives of athletes, scholars, painters, and poets. In bestowing attention exclusively on the development of one aspect of our nature, we are often disposed to leave the other aspects entirely in the shade. Thus an athlete, bent on developing his physique, is likely to neglect the due development of his intelligence; and a scholar or a painter, bent on the cultivation of his intellectual or æsthetic faculty, is disposed to overlook physical culture. But such conflict, as we have already mentioned, is not conducive to our being's true end; and hence we find provision already made in our moral nature to duly regulate the several tendencies and thus to establish harmony in the place of conflict, peace and perfection in the place of discord and decay.

(1) The first is illustrated in the conflict of convention and natural disposition.

(2) The second is illustrated in the lives of individuals pursuing exclusive ends.

Our moral nature is a provision for the harmonious development of the different tendencies.

§ 3. **The Supremacy of the Moral Standard.** Such supremacy is proved both (1) subjectively and (2) objectively.

Subjective and objective evidence of moral supremacy.

(1) *Subjective Evidence.* Consciousness testifies to the fact that, however much we may be disposed to follow the one standard to the neglect of the rest, we do not feel ourselves justified in pursuing such a course. Whenever the attention of a scholar is drawn to the fact that by undue intellectual exercise he is undermining his health, or an athlete is led to think that, by exclusive regard to

(1) Subjective evidence: whenever we deviate from the harmonious development of our powers, we experience compunction.

his physique, he is weakening his mind, he at once experiences compunction for having neglected his duty. The harmonious development of our powers is so clearly enjoined on us by Conscience, that we can never deviate from the rule without an instantaneous conviction of wrong-doing. Even if, through habit or inclination, one persists in the wrong course, he is not altogether unconscious of its character. When an individual sets aside a natural standard, approved by Conscience, in favour of an artificial one, condemned by it, he is struck with compunction, unless his moral nature has already been hardened by habitual transgression. In fact, a penitent mind, moving still within the narrow limits of convention, may even be led to exclaim—

“Enjoin me any penance ; I'll build churches,
A whole city of hospitals.” (*Fletcher and Shirley.*)

(2) Objective
evidence:

(2) *Objective Evidence.* The constitution of (a) Society and (b) Nature, likewise, bears out the supremacy of the moral standard.

(a) Deviation
from the
moral
standard
entails social
condemna-
tion.

(a) Whenever one acts contrary to the moral standard, he incurs the displeasure and condemnation of society. To secure the good opinion of others, men are even led to feign virtue when really they have it not : hypocrisy has aptly been described as the homage which vice pays to virtue. Artificial standard, to be effective, must be in the line of the natural and the moral. A social or legal standard, which runs counter to the moral sense of mankind, cannot stand. Thus the surest way to win sympathy and support of others is to shape one's life according

to the moral standard. "Do you desire," said Socrates, "the reputation of a good musician? The only sure way of obtaining it, is to become a good musician. Would you desire in the same manner to be thought capable of serving your country either as a general or as a statesman? The best way in this case too is really to acquire the art and experience of war and government, and to become really fit to be a general or a statesman. And in the same manner if you would be reckoned sober, temperate, just, and equitable, the best way of acquiring this reputation is to become sober, temperate, just, and equitable. If you can really render yourself amiable, respectable, and the proper object of esteem, there is no fear of your not soon acquiring the love, the respect, and esteem of those you live with."

Testimony
of Socrates.

(b) The constitution of Nature no less evidently supports the supremacy of the moral standard. Generally speaking, we may say that a life according to such standard secures health, peace, and prosperity, while a life away from the standard is almost the surest way to disease, discord, and ruin.

(b) Nature supports the supremacy of Conscience by punishing every transgression.

As Manu says:—

“दुराचारो हि पुरुषो लोके भवति निन्दितः ।

दुःखभागौ च सततं व्याधितोऽप्यायुरेव च ॥”

(*Manava Dharma Sastra*, IV, 157.)

“Indeed the evil-doer is despised in society; he is always unhappy, diseased, and short-lived as well.”
The connection of virtue with health and happiness

is regarded as a fundamental fact of our life even by empirical and evolutionary writers. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2.) We shall dwell on this topic more fully in Chap. XVI; but let us briefly notice it here in a separate section.

§ 4. The External and the Internal Standard.

The external standard is the attitude of Society and Nature towards moral conduct.

The internal standard is Conscience.

Views of Mill and Bain.

The external standard includes the agreeable and disagreeable consequences of our moral acts.

View of Austin.

We may, then, distinguish between an external and an internal standard in morals. The verdict of Society and the behaviour of the Natural World towards us with regard to a moral act constitute what may be called the external standard, while the verdict of Conscience, revealed in personal consciousness, constitutes the internal. There is such a correspondence between the two, that even utilitarian writers are at times disposed to regard them as convergent tests of rectitude. Mill, for example, refers to the "External and Internal Sanctions of Morality" (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 4); and conduciveness to happiness is generally regarded as a test of rectitude. "The general welfare," says Bain, "is at all times considered a strong and adequate justification of moral rules." (*Moral Science*, p. 442.) The external standard thus includes the felicific or injurious consequences of our virtuous or sinful acts. The world is so constituted that the acts which we call right bring happiness and those that are wrong bring misery to mankind generally. "According to the theory of utility," writes Austin, "the measure or test of human conduct is the law set by God to his human creatures. Now some of his commands are revealed, whilst others are unrevealed. Or (changing the

phrase) some of his commands are express, whilst others are tacit. The commands which God has revealed, we must gather from the terms wherein they are promulged. The commands which he has not revealed, we must construe by the principle of utility: by the probable effects of our conduct on that general happiness or good which is the final cause or purpose of the good and wise lawgiver in all his laws and commandments. Strictly speaking, therefore, utility is not the *measure* to which our conduct should conform, nor is utility the *test* by which our conduct should be tried." (*Jurisprudence*, Lecture IV. Vol I, p. 160.)

Thus, the external standard is but the echo of the internal: the latter is really the standard, while the former, as Austin suggests, is but an index or concomitant sign. Some thorough-going utilitarian writers may, no doubt, object to this double test as implying the weakness of the Intuitional position. An appeal to consequences, it may be said, implies the practical abandonment of intuitions and the adoption of utility as a standard in morals. But it may be replied that considerations of utility are not a monopoly of utilitarians. The unity of the universe justifies a belief in the correspondence of its different laws; and utility, though not the standard, may be a test in morals: "An utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree." (Mill,

The external standard is but a reflection of the internal.

Utility is thus a test in morals.

Views of Mill

and
Sidgwick.

Utilitarianism, p. 32.) Thus utilitarianism, properly construed, is not at variance with intuitionism: the external standard supplements the internal. "It seems to me undeniable," observes Sidgwick, "that the practical affinity between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism, is really much greater than that between the two forms of Hedonism [Egoistic and Universalistic].....Many moralists who have maintained as practically valid the judgments of right and wrong which the Common Sense of mankind seems intuitively to enunciate, have yet regarded General Happiness as an end to which the rules of morality are the best means, and have held that these rules were implanted by Nature or revealed by God for the attainment of this end. Such a belief implies that, though I am bound to take, as *my* ultimate standard in acting, conformity to a rule which is for me absolute, still the Divine and (we may say) *intrinsic* reason for the rule laid down is Utilitarian." (*Methods of Ethics*, pp. 84-85.) We may only add that though a moral law or rule is generally conducive to happiness, yet it would be going beyond evidence to maintain that utility constitutes the "intrinsic reason for the rule."

As the different forms of perfection are closely connected, neglect or undue cultivation of one involves injury to the rest.

§ 5. **Conflict of Standards Transcended in a Virtuous Life.** Our moral constitution implies, as mentioned above, a system among the several propensities constituting our mental life and the due regulation of these according to the verdict of Conscience. The different forms of perfection—physical, intellectual, æsthetic, and moral—are not in conflict

with each other, but are parts of a sacred unity which constitutes the ideal of life.

"That Beauty, Good, and Knowledge are three sisters That dote upon each other."

The neglect of one involves more or less injury to the rest. Physical degeneracy, for example, begets cowardice and, by rendering sustained labour difficult, dwarfs intellectual growth and prevents adequate æsthetic and moral culture. Undue intellectual or æsthetic culture, likewise, may give rise to a mood of reflective analysis or a condition of morbid sentimentality, which is not quite consistent with the requirements of an active moral life. There can, however, never be an undue development of our moral nature, as its essence lies in regulation and the consequent legitimate development of the different sides of our nature. Our moral constitution being a harmonious whole, discord disappears as the ascendancy of Conscience is firmly established. Every moral victory implies the strengthening of the higher impulses and the weakening of the lower ones; and persistence in such a course of conduct ends in the unquestioned ascendancy of the rule of right and the due subordination of parts. Such a condition, as indicated in the preceding section, yields peace and happiness and secures the good-will and support of others. Cases, no doubt, occur when with the best of intentions and the greatest of efforts men fail to achieve what they honestly desire. In such cases the agents themselves deplore the issue and may be sorry for their conduct,

There can, however, be no undue development of our moral nature which by the proper regulation of the different tendencies, secures peace and happiness.

and the persons affected by it may also resent. Thus apparently virtuous conduct does not always produce happy consequences, nor does it invariably secure peace and sympathy. But these apparent exceptions, properly understood, turn out to be illusory and really confirm, instead of disproving, the account given above. (1) We know that the moral quality of an act is determined by the motive and is not at all affected by the result. So far as the result is concerned, it is generally beyond our control, being entirely at the disposal of Providence or Natural Laws. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 8.) Indeed one may be led at times to think that—

The consequences of our acts are, to a great extent, beyond our control.

"Our wills and fates do so contrary run
That our devices still are overthrown ;
Our thoughts are ours, their ends none of our own."

(Shakespeare. *Hamlet*, III, ii, 221-223.)

But even such a thought does not stagger the truly virtuous man. Knowing fully well that the external world is under the regulation of Providence, who aims through His laws at more comprehensive and beneficent results than finite individuals can possibly entertain or divine, a man of pure heart is satisfied with what he accomplishes. Being above temptation and conflict, he resigns himself to the ways of Providence, thinking that—

This conviction induces resignation in a holy mind.

"There's a divinity that shapes our ends

Rough hew them how we will." (*Hamlet*.)

The objective morality of Hegel does not exclude the subjective ; and the latter never comes in conflict with the former. The obedience and resignation of

a faithful heart enable it to adapt its conduct to the requirements of both subjective and objective morality and thus to enjoy peace and bliss. (2) Nor does such an individual ever lose the sympathy and support of others. Whenever his intention is understood by others, they readily approve of his conduct and offer him all the sympathy and support they can. To what extent wilful negligence or imprudence is responsible or excusable is a topic which we shall take up in its proper place (*Vide* Chaps. XIV and XVI); it need not detain us here.

A virtuous person finally secures the sympathy and support of others.

Thus, a life uniformly regulated by the moral standard is at peace with itself and with the rest of the world. It discharges its duties as they arise, unfettered by desire and unmoved by consequences. As Budha says, "Concealing the six appetites as the tortoise conceals his limbs, guarding the thoughts as a city is surrounded by the ditch, then the wise man in his struggle with Mara or the Tempter shall certainly conquer, and free himself from all future misery." (*Dhammapada*, Section XI.) Such a life approaches the pantheistic conception of the unification of the self with the Deity, there being no more any discord between personal wish and divine behest. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 10.) There is no more any tendency to follow ceremonial practices or refrain from prevailing prohibitions. A person leading such a life is above conventional morality and above expectation or fame. His only guide is his honest heart or Conscience. In such a condition one may exclaim—

Thus, uniform obedience to the moral standard secures perfection, peace, and happiness.

“जानामि धर्मं न च मे प्रवृत्तः
 जानाम्यधर्मं न च मे निवृत्तिः ।
 त्वया हृषिकेश हृदिस्थितेन
 यथा नियुक्तोऽस्मि तथा करोमि ॥”

“I know what is enjoined as right and also what is prohibited as wrong ; but I have not any inclination to pursue the one or to avoid the other. I do only what Thou, O Providence, residing in my breast, directest me to do.”

CHAPTER XIV.

DUTIES AND RIGHTS.

§ 1. Duty, the Supreme Fact of Moral Life.

The essence of our moral life lies in the consciousness of Duty or Obligation, without which morality has no meaning. No doubt, among the early Greek thinkers and some other people, the idea of Duty was often superseded by the notion of the Good; the idea of authoritative requirement was replaced by the notion of the attractiveness or agreeableness of the Good. This, of course, was due to the character of their national life and pursuit, which developed the notion of a common desirable end, promoting general well-being. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 8.) Their theories were shaped by the bent of their minds as determined by national education and culture. But even among these people the consciousness of unwritten laws was always present more or less prominently, however much it might have been repressed by personal bias or national traits. Heraclitus, for example, insists on the duty of obeying "The divine law from which all human laws draw their substance." The Greek poet Menander likewise says, "In our own breast we have a God—our Conscience." And he mentions, "It is not to live, to live for self alone. Whenever you do what is holy, be of good cheer, knowing that God Himself takes part with rightful things. The rich heart is the great thing that man

Duty is the cardinal fact of moral life

The consciousness of unwritten moral laws, imposing obligations, is universal.

Heraclitus.

Menander.

The notion of Duty was first brought into prominence by the Stoics.

The Jewish influence.

The Christian influence.

The notion has been emphasized in modern times since the time of Kant.

Ethics, as a normative science, is based on the notion of 'ought'.

Sidgwick.

wants." The Stoics were the first to bring the notion of Duty into prominence. It is said of Zeno that "He was the first who ever employed the word duty, and who wrote a treatise on the subject." (Diog. Laert. *Lib.*, VII.) The notion of Duty has gradually developed under the Jewish and Christian influence, involving an explicit reference to Divine commands. The outward and mechanical conception of Duty entertained by the Jews has by and by been replaced by the inward and spiritual conception advocated by the Christians, though their doctrine of faith has sometimes led them to the opposite doctrine of Antinomianism, denying any necessity of obligation for them. To Kant in modern times is due the emphasis now ordinarily laid on Duty as the cardinal fact of our moral life.

Since the time of Kant the whole of morality has been based, more or less explicitly, on the notion of Duty or Obligation. The peculiarity of Ethics, as the science of morality, is that it investigates 'what ought to be' as distinguished from 'what merely is', which constitutes the subject-matter of the positive sciences. "The fundamental notion represented by the word "ought" or "right,"" involved in all moral judgments, is, as Sidgwick observes, "essentially different from all notions representing facts of physical or psychical experience." (*Methods of Ethics*, p. 27.) It is, as he says, "ultimate and unanalysable." (*Ibid.*, p. 34.) As morality is co-extensive with life, the consciousness of Duty is really the compass of life, which leads

it to perfection, peace, and glory, but which, if unheeded, brings peccancy, misery, and disgrace. "There is one principle of the soul," writes Channing, "which makes all men essentially equal, which places all on a level as to means of happiness, which may place in the first rank of human beings those who are the most depressed in wordly condition, and which therefore gives the most depressed a title to interest and respect. I refer to the Sense of Duty, to the power of discerning and doing right, to the moral and religious principle, to the inward monitor which speaks in the name of God, to the capacity of virtue or excellence.....The Sense of Duty is the greatest gift of God. The Idea of Right is the primary and the highest revelation of God to the human mind, and all outward revelations are founded on and addressed to it. All mysteries of science and theology fade away before the grandeur of the simple perception of duty, which dawns on the mind of the little child. That perception brings him into the moral kingdom of God. That, lays on him an everlasting bond. He, in whom the conviction of duty is unfolded, becomes subject from that moment to a law, which no power in the universe can abrogate. He forms a new and indissoluble connexion with God, that of an accountable being. He begins to stand before an inward tribunal, on the decisions of which his whole happiness rests; he hears a voice, which, if faithfully followed, will guide him to perfection, and in neglecting which he brings upon himself inevitable misery." (*Works*, Vol. II, pp. 3-4.)

The Sense of Duty is the highest gift of God.

Channing.

Duty involves conflict between Reason and Sense.

§ 2. **Character of Duty.** Duty, as mentioned above, is an elementary fact of our moral life. It implies a conflict between the higher and the lower self, the rational and the irrational part of our nature. Our moral constitution consists, as we have seen, in the due regulation of the propensities and inclinations by Conscience or Moral Reason. Morality involves probation or trial; and trial implies conflict—temptation to be overcome, perfection to be attained. With the growing years and increasing experience, we become enamoured of the world and enthralled by its charms; and though the conditions of trial are thus made more and more stringent, yet all the while the primitive light of Conscience shines (unless quenched by habitual disobedience) to show us the way.

“Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing Boy,
But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,
He sees it in his joy.”

(Wordsworth.)

Duty is thus born of conflict, actual or potential. Conflict leads to choice; and choice in the moral sphere must be according to the terms of duty. In the simply natural life of infancy, when for want of conflict, volition is left in abeyance, there is no room for duty. (*Vide* Chap. V, § 4.) To the consciousness of duty, however, a potential conflict may suffice, though this does not satisfy the conditions of the presence of duty in any case. An individual,

Conflict leads to choice; and choice, to morality.

The knowledge of duty is not identical with its operation.

when disposed to act in a particular direction, becomes aware of duty when an alternative course of action is suggested to his mind, though he does not feel the force of an inclination to act in this direction. Thus, an onlooker or a moralist may discuss questions of duty by reference to alternative courses of action, conceived in thought, though not realized in practice. The knowledge of duty, therefore, is not co-extensive with its actual operation. A boy can understand duties when cases are presented to him implying conflict; but duties are not binding on him so long as conflict is not realized in his personal experience. Similarly, a saint, who has transcended the conflict of impulses, is not deprived on that account of his knowledge of duty, though there may not be a sphere for duty in his case owing to the subsidence of all conflict. Spectators may, no doubt, speak of his duties by reference to his relations and circumstances; but he does not feel the force of such duties, as he is altogether unmoved by allurements and temptations. Being still a man, however, he is always susceptible to conflict; and so by reference to potential conflict we may speak of his duties. Though we may thus objectively speak of his duties, yet subjectively he is unaffected by them. "A perfectly good will," says Kant, "would be equally subject to objective (moral) law, but could not be conceived as obliged thereby to act lawfully.....Ought is here out of place, because volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law." A child and a saint may

Children and saints are morally, though not psychologically, above duties.

therefore be said to be morally above duties, though not so psychically or psychologically. Hence, in ordinary life, when a man in the midst of conflict does an act willingly and spontaneously, we seldom call it a duty: in proportion as the aspect of conflict tends to disappear and acts are done in accordance with wishes, we are disposed to regard the acts as natural rather than as obligatory. And with the force of conflict the aspect of obligation comes into full view. Hence Duty is generally represented as stern or severe. Wordsworth writes—

“Stern daughter of the Voice of God !
 O Duty ! if that name thou love
 Who art a light to guide, a rod
 To check the erring, and reprove ;
 Thou who art victory and law
 When empty terrors overawe ;
 From vain temptations dost set free,
 And calm'st the weary strife of frail human-
 ity !”

The stage of a saint, as described above, is rather an ideal than an actual one. As a matter of fact, since the development of our moral nature, we are always open to temptation, more or less. The condition where there is simply the all-absorbing thought of the Deity and reverence for Him is rarely attained by man, who is ordinarily moved by ‘chance desires.’ So long as our minds move in worldly things and their allurements, so long as we are influenced in the slightest degree by them, we cannot imagine ourselves as above conflict or obligation.

The stage of a saint is an ideal condition rarely reached by man.

Even in the case of a virtuous man, the moral problem is presented in the form of conflict, though its intensity is weakened by the strengthening of the virtuous dispositions. If our mental constitution is such that cognitive, affective, and conative factors always go together, though with varying degrees of intensity and combination, then whenever an alternative course is suggested to the mind it becomes charged with feeling, and becomes an incipient impulse, however faint, to action. Thus conflict is present, more or less prominently, throughout, involving not merely the consciousness but also the operation of Duty. The lower impulse may be weaker and the higher impulse, stronger; but still there is a weight to lift, however slight, in order to conform one's conduct to the calls of Duty. "A right act," says Martineau, "does not cease to be my duty because I do it willingly; nor am I unconscious of doing what I ought because I also am doing what I would; my conscience does not perish the moment my wishes are in harmony with it. The mind which is thus at peace with itself is still the seat of the same springs of action, with full consciousness of their respective worths; and is still called, in every case of choice, to give effect to that consciousness and go with the better impulse. Unless, therefore, you are prepared to say that the conditions of choice themselves will cease, and leave only 'a spiritual automaton,' so that perfected mind is tantamount to no mind at all, you must admit that the relative apprehensions of right, i.e., 'the sense of duty,' can

The sphere of Duty is thus practically co-extensive with human life, moved, more or less, by conflict of impulses.

Martineau's testimony.

never be bereft of exercise. What is really attained to by the finished nature is, an entire parallelism between the relations of the prudential and those of the moral scale. But there is in this nothing to destroy the felt gradations of either; we continue to *like* this, that, and the other, with various intensities; we continue to *revere* this, that, and the other, with various depth of homage: that the two orders of feeling meet upon the same objects does not identify them; and should I come to wish always and only what is right, then, more than ever, shall I know that it is not because I wish it that it is right. The moral differences will stand out for me as enduring realities; the proportionate intervals of desire will remain the precarious adjustment to them of a mutable personality." (*Types*, II, pp. 97-98.)

Hedonists and Utilitarians, assigning to sensibility the supreme place in the human constitution, fail to give a satisfactory account of Duty.

The position of Evolutionists is also analogous.

Utilitarian Writers find it a little hard to give a satisfactory account of obligation. As, with them, the claims of sensibility are paramount and Reason merely panders to the requirements of Sense, the conflict implied in duty, between the rational and the irrational part of our nature, has scarcely any place in their system. They advocate, no doubt, that the representative emotions and ends are to be preferred to the presentative ones; but the ground of preference does not lie in any intrinsic worth or superiority of the rational or representative factor but in its instrumentality as a procurer of sense. *Evolutionists* apparently occupy a slightly different position, since they defend the intrinsic evolutionary superiority of the later evolved, complex, and representative

impulses to the earlier, simple, and presentative dispositions. But this so-called intrinsic evolutionary superiority lies ultimately in the demands of sense, for ministering to which reason gets the credit usually attributed to it : this authority of the rational factor, though appearing in the later generations of mankind as innate owing to the influence of heredity, is really acquired by faithful service to sensibility in a series of generations. If sense be thus the final arbiter of our lives, there can scarcely be any meaning in saying that we ought to follow it. The pleasures of sense, as mentioned above, can attract but can never command. Moreover, as mentioned above (*Vide* Chap. X, § 7), psychological hedonism precludes the ethical form ; if, as a matter of fact, we always *do* seek pleasure, there is no meaning in saying that we *ought* to do so. *Bentham*, accordingly, takes the easiest course by simply denying Duty. "It is, in fact, very idle," he observes, "to talk about duties ; the word itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive...The talisman of arrogance, indolence, and ignorance is to be found in a single word, an authoritative imposture...It is the word "ought," "ought or ought not," as circumstances may be.....If the use of the word be admissible at all, it "ought" to be banished from the vocabulary of morals." (*Deontology*, pp. 10, 31, 32.) The fact may be "disagreeable" and repulsive" to a moralist who has left no room for it in his system ; but to pronounce a sentence of ejection against it, is to presuppose the operation of law, which it is the aim of these moralists to deny in the moral sphere.

Pleasure may attract, but cannot command.

Bentham denies the presence of duties altogether :

but to ignore
is not to ex-
plain.

The views of
Mill and Bain
also are not
tenable.

According to
Spencer, the
sense of duty
is transitory,
being due to
the feeling of
coercion and
so disappear-
ing with its
subsidence.

Nay, the idea of obligation is so ingrained in our nature, that Bentham himself cannot help writing with regard to his moral theory—"Every pleasure is *prima facie* good, and ought to be pursued. Every pain is *prima facie* evil, and ought to be avoided." (*Deontology*, p. 59.) A fact is not annihilated by simple denial; it persists, whether heeded or not. As well might we deny the existence of light by simply shutting our eyes. *Bain*, accordingly, tries to account for it by reference to external enforcement; and *Mill*, by reference to the conscientious feelings of mankind; but these attempts are alike futile and fallacious as we shall see in the next section.

Spencer also regards the sense of duty as gradually developing out of external sanctions or penalties, until it emancipates itself altogether from them and thus brings about its own ruin. He writes, "Emerging as the moral motive does but slowly from amidst the political, religious, and social motives, it long participates in that consciousness of subordination to some external agency which is joined with them; and only as it becomes distinct and predominant does it lose this associated consciousness—only then does the feeling of obligation fade.

"This remark implies the tacit conclusion, which will be to most very startling, that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases. Startling though it is, this conclusion may be satisfactorily defended. Even now progress towards the implied ultimate state is traceable. The observation is not infrequent

that persistence in performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure ; and this amounts to the admission that while at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform it. The contrast between the youth on whom diligence is enjoined, and the man of business so absorbed in affairs that he cannot be induced to relax, shows us how the doing of work, originally under the consciousness that it *ought* to be done, may eventually cease to have any such accompanying consciousness. Sometimes, indeed, the relation comes to be reversed ; and the man of business persists in work from pure love of it when told that he ought not. Nor is it thus with self-regarding feelings only. That the maintaining and protecting of wife by husband often result solely from feelings directly gratified by these actions, without any thought of *must* ; and that the fostering of children by parents is in many cases made an absorbing occupation without any coercive feeling of *ought* ; are obvious truths which show us that even now, with some of the fundamental other-regarding duties, the sense of obligation has retreated into the background of the mind. And it is in some degree so with other-regarding duties of a higher kind. Conscientiousness has in many out-grown that stage in which the sense of a compelling power is joined with rectitude of action. The truly honest man, here and there to be found, is not only without thought of legal, religious, of social compulsion, when he discharges an

equitable claim on him ; but he is without thought of self-compulsion. He does the right thing with a simple feeling of satisfaction in doing it ; and is, indeed, impatient if anything prevents him from having the satisfaction of doing it.

Perfect adaptation, it is said, extinguishes obligation.

"Evidently, then, with complete adaptation to the social state, that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation, will disappear. The higher actions required for the harmonious carrying on of life, will be as much matters of course as are those lower actions which the simple desires prompt. In their proper times and places and proportions, the moral sentiments will guide men just as spontaneously and adequately as now do the sensations. And though, joined with their regulating influence when this is called for, will exist latent ideas of the evils which non-conformity would bring ; these will occupy the mind no more than do ideas of the evils of starvation at the time when a healthy appetite is being satisfied by a meal." (*Data of Ethics*, pp. 127-129.)

Whether external coercion can develop the notion of duty or not we shall discuss in the next section. Here we may only mention that the elimination of the sense of duty with the increase of 'moralization' is not borne out by facts. No doubt, persistence in virtuous conduct renders the performance of virtuous acts easy and agreeable ; but simply because one feels pleasure in doing his duty he does not cease to know it : as Martineau says, "My conscience does not perish the moment my wishes are in harmony

with it." (*Types*, II, p. 97.) Nay, we may go a little farther and maintain that with the increase of 'moralization' in the proper sense of the term, conscientiousness is rather deepened and intensified. The more one adapts his conduct to the requirements of Conscience, the more he becomes conscious of his short-comings and the greater the necessity he feels to be particular about his moral conduct. The sense of duty, like every other fact of our life, is deepened and developed by exercise and weakened and withered by neglect. If, however, with the evolutionists, we regard moral development as only a natural process, then there can properly be no room for morality at all in their system; and so no question of the continuance or disappearance of the sense of duty can arise. (*Vide*, Chap. XI, § 3.)

But does not the obligatoriness of the representative impulses, involved in the evolution of conduct, imply the ascendancy of reason and its principles? From the stand-point of sense, it is not always wise to sacrifice the present to the future, the agreeable to what is considered as noble. If, then, the rule of moral life is that the actual should always be sacrificed before the ideal, it only reveals the regulative function of reason and the subordinate place which prudence occupies in the moral constitution of man.

§ 3. **Source of Duty.** Duty, as we have seen, involves a conflict between the higher and lower sides of our nature with the consciousness of the intrinsic superiority of the former to the latter.

Moral progress intensifies, instead of weakening, the consciousness of obligation.

The course of moral progress reveals the ascendancy of reason.

Duty implies that, in the case of a conflict of impulses, we are required to act in the

direction of
the higher.

Whenever there is a conflict of impulses, we recognise that one of them has a claim upon us to be the principle of conduct at the time, while the other is to be rejected as ineligible or unworthy, however agreeable it may be to our mind. But impulses are but mental phenomena which in themselves can have no authority in their nature. They may report, however, on the occasion of conflict, the preference of a Supreme Mind who, to ennoble His creatures, requires them to act according to His command, based as it is on the very nature of things and relations. If, as we have seen, moral law is categorical and imperative in character, it expresses an authority superior to our personality requiring us to act according to its dictates. The authority evidently is no personal peculiarity, since all human beings equally admit its legitimacy, whenever they are required to shape their conduct according to its declarations. This superior authority is no other than divine, for nothing else can be regarded as higher than human personality and capable of regulating it. "How should I know," asks Selden, "I ought not to steal? I ought not to commit adultery? 'Tis not because I think I ought not to do them, nor because you think I ought not: if so, our minds might change: whence then comes the restraint? From a higher Power: nothing else can bind. I cannot bind myself; for I may untie myself again; nor an equal cannot bind me; for we may untie one another: it must be a superior power, even God Almighty". (*Table Talk*, p. 84.)

The higher
impulse,
indicating the
preference of
a Supreme
Mind, carries
His authority
with it.

Selden.

Duty, then, is the voice of God—the command of Providence—to act in a direction which is consistent with His perfect nature and the requirements of the universe. Thus, morals culminate in religion ; ethics, in theology. But, for the simply conscientious life of an individual, such a theological sequel may not be necessary. One may simply go on discharging his duties as they arise, without ever raising any question of their source or discovering the August Source whence moral authority flows. Religion, as mentioned before, is often an important aid to morality ; but it may not necessarily operate in an otherwise conscientious life. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 10 and Chap. XII, § 14.)

Duty is the voice of God in us.

Paley is of opinion that the true source of moral obligation is to be found in our expectation of reward or fear of punishment in future life. Obligation, he says, consists in being "urged by a violent motive resulting from the command of another"; such a motive is to be found only in "what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by." (*Vide* Chap. X, § 15.) Thus, according to *Paley*, the expectation of 'everlasting happiness' and the fear of 'eternal punishment' are the only adequate inducements to virtuous conduct ; and so they are to be regarded as the ultimate authority in the moral sphere. Apart from such motives, the authority of Conscience, he says, is quite unavailing. "What," he asks, "is the authority of any man's conscience to himself?" "Given, the faculty and all the

According to *Paley*, the authority of obligation lies in the expectation of reward or fear of punishment in future life.

Paley's position is untenable: (1) Obligation is equally binding on those who are moved, and those who are not, by considerations of future happiness and misery. The sense of duty is too deep-rooted in human nature to be eradicated by any subjective variation of mood.

(2) Virtue is reduced by Paley to mere prudence.

Bain explains obligation by reference to ~~social en-~~forcement.

sentiments it carries ; why should not I do as I like, in spite of it ? Be it a real angel with a flaming sword, or be it a scarecrow dressed up by the moral philosophers, it is anyhow a thing that, with adequate courage, may be faced ; and if I choose to defy it, and to think nothing of the worst it can do, what then ? Have I not slipped through your fingers, and left you with nothing more to say to me ?" This position of Paley, however, is not at all defensible. (1) If an individual be so very callous as to be altogether insensible to the pangs of Conscience, then it would be altogether idle to expect that he would ever forego the actual pleasures of this world for what to him appears as but the shadowy prospects of a world beyond. (2) Even, if we assume that such an individual may be led to obedience by a prospect of future happiness, we can scarcely characterize his conduct as virtuous. He merely weighs pleasures and pains of different sorts and finally acts in the direction of what seems to him to be the more agreeable course. This merely illustrates prudence, but not virtue. The charms of pleasure can never be identified with the authority of duty.

The account of moral authority given by other utilitarian writers is also analogous. Instead of referring to celestial happiness or misery, they refer to our terrestrial experiences to account for duty. *Bain*, for example, is of opinion that the consciousness of duty is due merely to social and political enforcement. What we find enforced without, we come to regard as obligatory within. 'Duty,' as he says, "is

the line chalked out by public authority, or law, and indicated by penalty or punishment." (*Mental Science*, p. 394.) *Spencer*, too, is disposed to support this view, of course, as modified by his doctrine of heredity. He writes, "To the effects of punishments inflicted by law and public opinion on conduct of certain kinds, Dr. Bain ascribes the feeling of moral obligation. And I agree with him to the extent of thinking that by them is generated the sense of compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes, and which the word obligation indicates." (*Data of Ethics*, p. 126.) Moral authority is thus traced by these writers to external control and its force lies in the intensity of the several sanctions of morality. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII.) And though the physical or natural sanction is regarded by Bain and Bentham as fundamental, Mill is disposed to hold that the internal or psychological sanction is the essential factor. It is based, he says, on the feeling of unity with our fellow men, which is the main-spring of all our virtuous and disinterested acts. Obligation is merely a matter of personal feeling. "The internal sanction of duty is a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on a violation of duty." The essence or source of obligation is to be found in "the feeling which constitutes the binding force." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 49.) When a person is influenced by moral obligation, "the force he is really urged by is his own subjective feeling, and is exactly measured by its strength." (P. 43.) "The sanction," he adds, "so far as it is disinterested, is always in the mind itself." (*Ibid.*)

Spencer supports the view modified by heredity.

Moral authority is traced by these writers to the sanctions of morality.

Mill resolves obligation in to personal feeling.

Obligation is thus equivalent to motivation.

But subjective feeling is not the same as objective authority involved in duty.

Social enforcement can neither explain the ground of duty, as the reasons for such enforcement ultimately rest on moral consciousness.

Nor can physical necessity be identified with the claim of morality.

Thus obligation in the hands of these writers is tantamount to motivation: the intensification of motive by personal experience is viewed as the creation of authority for us. But such intensification implies merely a modification of our feelings and impulses without affecting in the least the authority which is believed to be the ground of obligation. The "pain attendant on a violation of duty" involves the consciousness of duty. Transgression presupposes a rule transgressed, an authority slighted. The subjective feeling is not the same as the objective authority: the former may reveal, but can never constitute, the "binding force" of the latter. To mistake the feeling for the authority is to confound the consequent with the antecedent, to put, as it is said, the cart before the horse. The force of these remarks is, to a certain extent at least, weakened with regard to Bain and and Spencer who are disposed to trace moral authority to external constraint, social or natural. But social enforcement can never be accepted as the final explanation of what is obligatory, for such enforcement itself is not arbitrary but the expression of what is deemed as eligible by the unsophisticated consciousness of mankind. (*Vide*, Chap. IX, § 15.) Natural constraint, likewise, begetting a consciousness of the greater utility of representative experience, is a physical necessity closely connected with 'Natural Selection' and widely different from what we call moral authority. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 3.) Physical necessity may teach prudence but not virtue. According to Spencer, the feeling of obligation,

primarily connected with "the political, religious and social restraining motives," is transferred to "the moral restraining motive" through some common representative factors. "Accepting in the main," he writes, "the view that fears of the political and social penalties (to which, I think, the religious must be added) have generated that sense of coerciveness which goes along with the thought of postponing present to future and personal desires to the claims of others, it here chiefly concerns us to note that this sense of coerciveness becomes indirectly connected with the feelings distinguished as moral. For since the political, religious, and social restraining motives, are mainly formed of represented future results; and since the moral restraining motive is mainly formed of represented future results; it happens that the representations, having much in common, and being often aroused at the same time, the fear joined with three sets of them becomes, by association, joined with the fourth. Thinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act, excites a dread which continues present while the intrinsic effects of the act are thought of; and being thus linked with these intrinsic effects causes a vague sense of moral compulsion". (*Data of Ethics*, p. 127.) The truth of such psychological transference may readily be admitted; but its logical validity is open to serious question. If from the common animal nature of the cow and the crow we conclude that what is peculiar to the former is also distinctive of the latter, that certainly does not afford any justification for our acting accord-

Spencer explains the feeling of obligation with the help of the laws of association.

The feeling of coercion, associated with political, religious, and social enforcement, is converted into a moral restraining motive through representative factors.

Association, however, may explain subjective expectation but not objective authority.

ing to such expectation. Surely, we can never be justified in milking a crow by reason of its similarity with a cow, even if we be prompted to do so. So, if we be led to think that authority attaches to the moral motive simply because it resembles in certain features motives of other kinds, with which such authority is found to be connected, then we should treat the moral authority as fictitious and illusory. Subjective association can never create an objective bond.

Moral authority is not derived from society or external nature; it is inherent in the impulses reflecting divine requirement.

The authority is due to the intrinsic worth and not to the mere intensity or persistence, of an impulse.

Thus Darwin misses the essence of moral obligation when he explains it by reference to persistent instincts.

The authority implied in obligation can, therefore, never be regarded as anything foreign to our moral nature, as derived from our environment, natural or social. The conflict implied in duty is not a conflict between an individual on the one side and society or nature on the other; it is not a tug of war or trial of strength in which victory ultimately rests with the stronger. The conflict is really between our impulses, one of which has a divine claim upon us. Such conflict, however, is not in respect of intensity or persistence, but in respect of moral worth or value. *Darwin*, accordingly, misses the essence of duty when he resolves it into the mere operation of the prevailing dispositions. "Man," he observes, "comes to feel, through acquired and perhaps inherited habit, that it is best for him to obey his more persistent instincts." (*Descent of Man*, p. 92.) And he mentions, "The imperious word *ought* seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct, either innate or partly acquired, serving him as a guide,

though liable to be disobeyed. We hardly use the word *ought* in a metaphorical sense when we say hounds ought to hunt, pointers ought to point, and retrievers to retrieve their game. If they fail thus to act, they fail in their duty, and act wrongly." (*Ibid.*) But we should not forget that, however agreeable or beneficial it may be to an animal to follow its persistent instinct, it cannot even be supposed as always congenial to man, who is endowed with a higher moral nature. Even if such a course be otherwise beneficial or agreeable to man, it cannot be regarded as his duty. Prudence is not identical with Conscience. Darwin mentions, "The wish for another man's property is, perhaps, as persistent a desire as any that can be named." (*Ibid.*, p. 90.) Evidently no consistent system of duties can be constructed from such declarations.

It is evident, therefore, that duty always involves a conflict among impulses or dispositions; and such conflict is not, as shown above, in respect of their relative intensities, but in respect of their comparative moral rank or value. The conflict is between higher and lower impulses or, to vary the expression, between higher and lower selves. As an impulse in the abstract is a non-entity, as it is but a concrete manifestation of mind which issues in action in this or that form, the conflict of impulses is really a conflict between two different mental modes or tendencies. We thus come to the Hegelian account of obligation that it is the regulation of the false or lower self by the true or higher.

As impulses are but modifications of self, duty implies a conflict between the higher and the lower self.

The Hegelian
view.

Green.

The 'higher
self' reflects
divine
authority.

The
pantheistic
interpreta-
tion of duty
is unsatis-
factory.

Viewed strictly from the Hegelian stand-point it implies the claim of the universal self on the individual, the authority of the rational self over the non-rational. (*Vide*, Chap. XII, § 6.) "It is the very essence of moral duty," says Green, "to be imposed by a man on himself." (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 354.) Such self-imposition of a command does not imply, however, that absolutely man is his own law-giver; it implies that relatively or vicariously he is 'a law unto himself': the authority which an individual exercises in the moral sphere over himself is merely derived from the sacred authority of a Holy Governor as it is revealed in personal consciousness by Conscience. "If", says Green, "the infinite Spirit so communicates itself to the soul of man as to yield the idea of a possible perfect life, and that consequent sense of personal responsibility on the part of the individual for making the best of himself as a social being from which the recognition of particular duties arises, then it is a legitimate expression by means of metaphor—the only possible means, except action, by which the consciousness of spiritual realities can express itself—to say that our essential duties are commands of God." (*Ibid.*, p. 348—349.) The pantheistic interpretation of the Hegelian account of duty is scarcely tenable. Mere difference of magnitude or power between the universal and the individual self does not in itself constitute a ground for moral obligation. Again, if the universal self absorbs or extinguishes the individual, there can be no meaning in either

obligation or obedience. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 11.)

Duty or obligation, then, involves a conflict which is within the internal sphere of impulses and not in the external sphere of consequences. It implies an objective authority requiring us to act in the direction of the eligible course. This authority, as we have seen, is not an external authority, physical or social. An external authority, to be morally efficacious, must appeal to the internal and so presuppose it. "The moral duty," says Green, "to obey a positive law, whether a law of the State or of the Church, is imposed not by the author or enforcer of the positive law, but by that spirit of man—not less divine because the spirit of man—which sets before him the ideal of a perfect life and pronounces obedience to the positive law to be necessary to its realisation." (*Prolegomena*, p. 354.) In fact, a positive law which runs counter to our moral expectations is resented as unjust and the suffering it brings to an offender is never regarded as punishment but as cruelty. The authority implied in moral obligation is thus primarily internal and not external. This, however, does not mean that it is only subjective without any objective counterpart. The self cannot be divided against itself: it cannot, as Martineau says, "be at once the upper and the nether millstone." (*Types*, II, p. 108.) Self is unitary, and the different impulses are but different modifications of it: an impulse by itself can never play the part of a god against another. The authority, therefore, which is revealed in personal consciousness

The authority involved in obligation is thus internal and not external.

It is, however, not merely subjective, but objective, revealed by Conscience.

Mansel.

is a real objective authority superior to our personality, though revealed in it by Conscience. "The Moral Reason, or Will, or Conscience of Man, call it by what name we please, can have no authority, save as implanted in him by some higher Spiritual Being, as a *Law* emanating from a *Lawgiver*. Man can be a law unto himself, only on the supposition that he reflects in himself the Law of God;—that he shews, as the Apostle tells us, the works of that law written in his heart. If he is absolutely a law unto himself, his duty and his pleasure are undistinguishable from each other; for he is subject to no one, and accountable to no one. Duty in this case becomes only a higher kind of pleasure,—a balance between the present and the future, between the larger and the smaller gratification. We are thus compelled, by the consciousness of moral obligation, to assume the existence of a moral Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity." (Mansel. *Bampton Lectures*, pp. 80-81.)

Duty is the requirement of the subjection of personality to the claim of the moral law.

§ 4. **Duty, Obedience, and Virtue.** Duty, as we have seen, implies the authoritative claim of one course of action as distinguished from another, when there is conflict between them. It is the requirement of the subjection of personality to moral law, and so it implies possible obedience or transgression. We know that morality is concerned with motives and not with the outward acts or their results. However much the consequences of our acts and the overt acts themselves may be outside our control,

the motives which influence us seem always to be amenable to our regulation. (*Vide* Chap. XX, §6). Free-will, as Kant observes, is a postulate of morality. The consciousness of obligation involves the consciousness of an ability to act either according or contrary to it.

"So nigh is grandeur to our dust,

So near is God to man,

When Duty whispers low, *Thou must*

The youth replies, *I can.*" (*Emerson.*)

Duty thus implies a contingency or uncertainty, a possibility of acting either in the direction of moral law or in the opposite direction. When, however, the choice is exercised in the direction of duty then there is obedience. Obedience is thus the fulfilment of obligation; it is the acceptance of the claim of moral law in any particular case. If obligation implies the theoretical recognition of the claim of moral law as guide, obedience indicates the practical acceptance of such a claim and the consequent regulation of conduct according to it.

Duty involves contingency—possible obedience or disobedience.

Obedience is the fulfilment of obligation.

When one, by a series of acts of obedience, brings his character in harmony with the requirements of Conscience, he grows virtuous. Virtue is thus a form of character in harmony with moral law. It is acquired by faithful service and is really the crown of an honest life. "Virtue," says Aristotle, "is a permanent state of mind, formed with the concurrence of the Will, and based upon an ideal of what is best in actual life—an ideal fixed by reason according as the moral sense of the good man would

Virtue indicates an excellence of character acquired by habitual obedience.

determine its application." (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 5.) If obedience is piece-meal, virtue is an entire whole: the one is illustrated in concrete acts, while the other is represented in the general attitude of mind or personal character. Uniform obedience develops virtue, and virtue in its turn renders subsequent obedience easy and agreeable. Obedience does not necessarily involve virtue, though virtue involves habitual obedience.

Duty indicates the eligible course of action in concrete cases, while virtue illustrates the general tendency of the mind to act in the direction of duty.

Muirhead.

Duty has reference to definite courses of action, while virtue indicates the acquired tendency of the mind to act according to duty. The one is the guide, while the other is the habitual disposition to follow it. The one represents the standard; while the other, the character in harmony with it. "Virtue," says Muirhead, "is the quality of character that fits for the discharge of duty. In this sense it is not opposed to duty, save as good character in general is opposed to good conduct in general. The relation between virtue and duty is that of universal to particular, and may be illustrated by the relation of the State to the Individual. The character of a man's action, in reference to particular circumstances, is determined by the virtuous habit of will with reference to the particular form of desire that is called into exercise, just as the character of an individual citizen is determined by the character of the society to which he belongs. The performance of the duty has moral quality only in so far as it is the expression of a virtue; virtue, on the other hand, only lives in the performance of

duty." (*Elements of Ethics*, p. 190.) The spheres of duty and virtue are thus co-extensive: what duty indicates, virtue carries out; and what virtue carries out is in accordance with duty. Sidgwick, however, is disposed to dispute this position. "In its common use," he writes, "each term seems to include something excluded from the other. We should scarcely say that it was virtuous—under ordinary circumstances—to pay one's debts, or give one's children a decent education, or keep one's aged parents from starving; because these are duties which most men perform, and only bad men neglect. Again, there are excellent actions which we do not commonly call duties, though we praise men for doing them; as for a rich man to live very plainly and devote his income to works of public beneficence. At the same time the lines of distinction are very doubtfully drawn on either side; for we certainly call men virtuous for doing what is strictly their duty when they are under strong temptations to omit it; and we can hardly deny that it is, in some sense, a man's strict duty to do whatever action he judges most excellent, so far as it is in his power." (*Methods*, pp. 219-220.)

There is thus perfect correspondence between Duty and Virtue.

Sidgwick, however, is inclined to hold that their spheres are not co-extensive.

The above remark of Sidgwick only brings out the different senses in which the term 'virtue' has ordinarily been used. Over and above the sense in which it has been used above, it is sometimes used in the specific sense of a type of character which is disposed to execute duties under great difficulties. 'Virtue' thus at times carries with it

The term 'virtue' is ambiguous: (1) It has been used in the generic sense explained above, and (2) also in the specific sense of an exceptional

strength
of character
manifested
in overcom-
ing a strong
temptation.

Virtue in the
latter sense
is associated
with what is
heroic or
meritorious.

Our moral
life illustrates
more or less
difficulty
born of con-
flict between
reason and
sense ; but
virtue does
not necessari-
ly imply
unusual
difficulty.

the idea of 'merit' associated with the execution of what are called 'heroic' acts. And 'heroism' in morals is judged by the degree of difficulty overcome in responding to the call of duty. An act is thus said to be virtuous when it reveals unusual strength of character.* When an individual, for example, risks his own life to save that of another his action is judged as virtuous. Hence the words 'virtue' and 'vice' have come to mean character as revealed in sexual morality, it being implied that the difficulty of repressing the temptations 'flesh is heir to' is ordinarily very great. In fact, whenever an act by reason of its difficulty or indefiniteness is liable to be passed over by the common people, its execution brings credit to an individual, who thereby betrays an exceptional strength of character. Though the term 'virtue' thus denotes sometimes extra merit connected with strength of character, yet the central meaning of the term does not bear any such connotation. Ordinarily, no doubt, difficulty characterizes our moral life ; and the degree of virtue may be measured by the extent to which such difficulty is overcome. But virtue in itself does not imply any difficulty. It merely expresses a habitual condition of the mind, acquired by practice, to act uniformly in the direction

* "Virtue", says Muirhead, "is often loosely used in the sense of meritorious act, as when we speak of 'making a virtue of necessity'. Here it is distinguished from duty as the meritorious act is distinguished from the act which is simply good : the meritorious act being that which is the result of a higher than the average standard of virtue, whether in overcoming natural disadvantages, as when we speak of the diligence of a stupid scholar as meritorious, or in achieving exceptional success *ceteris paribus*." (*Ethics*, p. 190.)

of moral law. Thus the spheres of duty and virtue seem to be coincident. And this is practically admitted even by Sidgwick. "We should agree," he says, "that a truly moral man cannot say to himself, 'This is the best thing on the whole for me to do but yet it is not my duty to do it though it is in my power': this would certainly seem to common sense an immoral paradox." (*Methods*, p. 220.)

Duty, obedience, and virtue thus indicate the proper succession of events in the normal moral constitution. And this succession is secured not, as Spencer points out, by the necessity of nature but by willing obedience to the dictates of Conscience. The path of duty, of course, is not strewn with flowers but thorny. As we advance with bleeding feet and throbbing heart, we acquire strength and courage until the inner consciousness becomes a source of serene pleasure and renders us immune from suffering and apprehension. Virtue is not so cheap as can be earned by mere ablutions, sacrifices, and professions; it can be acquired only by a faithful and scrupulous discharge of the duties of life. Virtue is, in fact, the crown of an honest life. It is acquired by self-conquest, the conquest of the lower or animal self by the higher or rational self. It establishes the undisputed sway of the higher impulses and frees the mind from vain fears, pursuits, or enterprises. As the *Geeta* says—

Duty, obedience, and virtue indicate the proper succession of events in normal moral development.

Virtue is the outcome of a laborious process of faithful and persistent obedience.

“उद्धरेदात्मनात्मानं नात्मानमवसादयेत् ।

आत्मेव ह्यात्मनो बन्धुरात्मैवरिपुरात्मनः ॥ ५

बन्धुरात्मात्मनस्तस्य येनात्मेवात्मना जितः ।

अनात्मनस्तु शत्रुत्वे वर्त्तेतात्मैव शत्रुवत् ॥ ६

जितात्मनः प्रशान्तस्य परमात्मा समाहितः ।

शीतोष्ण सुखदुःखेषु तथा मानापमानयोः ॥ ७

ज्ञानविज्ञान तृप्तात्मा कूटस्थो विजितेन्द्रियः ।

युक्त इत्युच्यते योगी समलोष्टाश्मकाच्चनः ॥ ८

सुहृन्मित्रार्युदासीन मध्यस्थश्चैव बन्धुषु ।

साधुष्वपि च पापेषु समबुद्धिर्विशिष्यते ॥ ९ ॥ १० ॥

“Each one ought to raise himself by himself and not to debase himself, for he himself is the friend of himself, and also his foe. (Chap. VI, 5.)

“He is a friend to himself who by himself has conquered self, and self too may become as a foe by the hatred of that which is not self. 6.

“The sovereign spirit of him who is self-conquered and placid is self-contained in cold and heat, in pain and pleasure, and also in honour and dishonour. 7.

“The Yogin whose soul is content with divine and human knowledge, who dwells on high, whose senses are subdued, and who accounts a clod, a stone, or gold alike, is called a perfect devotee (*yukta*). 8.

“He is esteemed who is equal-minded to companions, friends, enemies, strangers, neutrals, to aliens and kindred, yea, to good and to evil men.” 9. (Davies' Translation.)

§ 5. **Conditions of duty.** Duty, as we have seen, is the demand of our moral nature to regulate our life according to the dictates of Conscience.

Questions of duty should be solved not by abstract considerations but by reference to concrete circumstances and personal ability. "The place of every man," says Burke, "determines his duty." (*Appeal from New to Old Whigs.*) To determine our duty in any case we should take into consideration the following factors:—

Duty is relative to circumstances.

(1) Moral law indicating the course of action eligible at the time. Without Conscience there would be no light to show us the way; the revelations of Conscience are the only guides we have in the moral sphere. Even external authority, as we have seen, involves an appeal to them. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 13 and § 15.)

Conditions of duty: (1) Conscience.

(2) Circumstances are essential to duty. There must be an opportunity for acting in the direction of moral law, in order that a duty may arise. Abstract examination of the relative eligibility of conflicting impulses is quite different from the concrete situation in which we are called upon to act in a certain direction. We may, for example, discuss in the class-room the propriety of justice or benevolence; but surely the duties of justice and benevolence do not arise until cases are presented requiring us to act according to them. The theoretical analysis is not the same as practical decision. Nay, even the theoretical estimate must be relative to one's opportunity or circumstances. The duties, for example, of a master are not the same as those of a servant, nor are the duties of a judge the same as those of a culprit. Without the environment and the relations

(2) Circumstances.

The moral significance of the world : it is the sphere for moral activity.

Fichte.

(3) Strength or ability.

(4) Self-determination.

in which we stand to it, our moral life would have no meaning. Whatever other significance the world may have to us, its moral significance cannot be denied. Without it there would be no room for trial and no possibility of morals. The view of Fichte, that the world is but the stuff of our duty, has thus an important element of truth in it.

(3) There must also be personal power or ability to act in the direction indicated by Conscience. Duty implies not merely the moral law and circumstances but also the capability of an agent to act in the required direction. It is rightly said in the Koran that "God will not force any soul beyond its capacity." An invalid, for example, too weak to stir out of bed, is not under an obligation to rescue a child whom he may see drowning. A decision, if not idle and spurious, must be based on the resources at command ; and the resources in the moral sphere include personal ability to carry out what is required of us by Conscience.

(4) Self-determination is also an important condition of Duty. The power of rational choice from alternative courses of action, present before the mind, is presupposed in every moral act and so is involved in the determination of a duty in any case. A lunatic or a hypnotized patient, for example, can never be said to be under an obligation to do an act, though there may be power, occasion, and the knowledge of moral law. As the will-power is paralysed in such an individual, he loses his responsibility and, with it, the prospect of glory implied in moral

victory. With the disappearance of the power of free choice, the distinctive human feature, with its hopes and fears, merits and demerits, also vanishes.

It is evident that if any one of these factors be absent, the conditions of duty are not fulfilled. We may know, for example, that it is right to help the poor and we may also have the power and determination to render the required help; but if the opportunity be wanting—if there be no man in distress—then the duty does not arise. Similarly, if there be occasion, power, and self-determination, but not the knowledge of moral law, such as is illustrated in the morally neutral field, the question of obligation does not arise at all. Thus there is no consciousness of duty in connection with purely physical or intellectual acts on any occasion.

If any one of these conditions be wanting, there can be no duty.

§ 6. **Conditions of Obedience.** We have seen that the knowledge of obligation does not necessarily mean obedience. Nay, as we shall see later on (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 6), necessity extinguishes obligation. If one be constrained to act in the direction of obligation, it ceases to be a requirement and appears as fate or necessity. The spontaneity or free movement of moral life is implied in the very notion of what we call moral or obligatory. Obligation thus leaves either obedience or disobedience possible. And obedience may be secured by the following means:—

Obligation postulates free-will, with the possibility of obedience or disobedience.

Conditions of obedience.

(1) The prime condition of obedience is sincerity of purpose in conforming one's conduct to the dictates of Conscience. As we have already dwelt on this

(1) Sincerity:

point in Chapter VI, § 7, we shall only refer to it briefly here. Self-deception, we know, is the parent of all deception ; and one who is true to one's self is true to all. There should thus be an earnest desire for doing the best, that one is capable of, under all circumstances. Sincerity, in the proper sense, would lead one to decide cases by reference to their concrete fullness and not their abstract isolation. Men, at times, make a parade of sincerity by doing something exceptional, calculated to win applause, instead of quietly doing what is really required by his Conscience under the circumstances. Sincerity is so very natural and pure, that it is spoilt altogether by the slightest admixture of art and hypocrisy. As Carlyle says, "I should say *sincerity*, a deep, great, genuine sincerity, is the first characteristic of all men in any way heroic. Not the sincerity that calls itself sincere ; ah no, that is a very poor matter indeed ;—a shallow braggart conscious sincerity ; oftenest self-conceit mainly. The Great Man's sincerity is of the kind he cannot speak of, is not conscious of : nay, I suppose, he is conscious rather of *insincerity* ; for what man can walk accurately by the law of truth for one day ? No, the Great Man does not boast himself sincere, far from that ; perhaps does not ask himself if he is so : I would say rather, his sincerity does not depend on himself ; he cannot help being sincere !" (*Hero-worship*, Lect. II.) Sincerity in such a case is so very genuine that it operates spontaneously and not by effort or ostentation.

no show or
ostentation.

Carlyle.

(2) Personal reflection is also an important condition of obedience. Genuine obedience does not mean compliance with popular opinion or conventional morality ; it is the willing acceptance of the claim of moral law as it is felt within. When, by personal reflection, one is convinced of his duty, then its performance is more certain than when its estimate varies with the breath of popular voice. It is not meant, however, that personal conviction by itself renders obedience certain ; for it is but one of the several factors which lead to obedience. But enlightened foundation of duty is generally more efficacious than blind acquiescence in the prevailing views. To keep this spirit of personal reflection alive in us, we should generally avoid merely moving in the groove of habit or routine. Routine has, no doubt, its uses ; but the mechanical uniformity induced by it reduces man to an automaton and takes away not only the judging sense, but also the proper impulse to do what is suited to an occasion. Thus Brotherhoods, Communities, Societies, while having their spheres of usefulness, should not be used as means of converting men into machines. It is good, no doubt, that an individual as a member of a noble society, should be led to do what is enjoined by it ; but it is far better to have the personal inspiration and enthusiasm for good and to adapt one's action to the requirements of a case. When mechanicalness takes the place of insight and devotion, the spiritual spring is dried up, and form and outward conformity usurp its place : a code of

(2) Personal reflection.

Routine tends to weaken the vigour of moral life.

honour in such a case not infrequently takes the place of the code of conscience. Our aim should always be to base our conduct on our conviction.

(3) Moral
courage.

(3) Strength and courage are also necessary to obedience. History shows that a life of honesty is more or less a life of difficulty and persecution. One should thus have the strength of character to rise above not merely the seductive influence of passions and inclinations but also above the threats and rewards of the world. When once a course is clearly seen as obligatory nothing should deter us from following it. "The characteristic of heroism," says Emerson, "is its persistency. All men have wandering impulses, fits, and starts of generosity. But when you have chosen your part, abide by it, and do not weakly try to reconcile yourself with the world. The heroic cannot be the common, nor the common the heroic. Yet we have the weakness to expect the sympathy of people in those actions whose excellence is that they outrun sympathy, and appeal to a tardy justice. If you would serve your brother, because it is fit for you to serve him, do not take back your words when you find that prudent people do not commend you. Adhere to your own act and congratulate yourself if you have done something strange and extravagant, and broken the monotony of a decorous age." (*Essay on Heroism*.) Apart from convention and usage, interested motives often lead men to criticise the conduct of others; and one should have firmness enough not to be blindly led by such criticism.

Emerson.

One should
not be in-
fluenced by
praise or
criticism.

There are men who construe charity as weakness, justice as cruelty, humility as flattery, and forgiveness as timorous connivance; and others who regard insolence as independence, cruelty as justice, servility as deference, and obstinacy as firmness. We should have strength of character to act according to our conviction and not to be influenced by such opinions.

(4) Duty should be done without any attachment. "Whosoever will come after me," says the Great Teacher, "let him deny himself." (*St. Mark*, VIII, 34.) Self-abnegation is the great secret of prompt and uniform obedience. Kant's principle of virtue has this element of truth in it that it requires us to do our duty quite disinterestedly. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 20 and § 22.) We should not be swayed by love or hate, fear or expectation, if we mean to do our duty under all circumstances. As the *Geeta* says—

(4) Duty should be done quite in a disinterested way.

“यस्य सर्वं समारम्भाः कामसंकल्पवर्जिताः ।

ज्ञानाग्निदग्धकर्माणि तमाहुः पण्डितं बुधाः । ४ । १८ ।

त्यक्त्वा कर्मफलासङ्गं नित्यदत्तो निराश्रयः ।

कर्मण्यभिप्रवृत्तोऽपि नैव किञ्चित् करोति सः । १९ ॥

“He whose every effort is free from the impulse of desire, whose work has been burnt up by the fire of knowledge, is called by the wise a learned man (*pandit*).

“Renouncing all attachment to the fruit of works, ever contented, self-reliant, this man, though engaged in work, yet works not at all.” (IV, 19-20. *Davies' Tr.*)

§ 7. **Distinction among Duties.** Ordinarily various distinctions have been drawn among duties ; and we may notice some of them.

(1) Duties have been distinguished into *perfect or determinate* and *imperfect or indeterminate* according as they are enforceable or not by external authority. Veracity and charity, for example, are instances of imperfect obligation, as they cannot be enforced by the State ; while payment of a debt, not barred by limitation, and respecting the property or life of another are regarded as instances of perfect obligation, for their performance can be enforced by punishment.* This distinction is evidently a juridical one and may be traced to the distinction between perfect and imperfect laws observed by Roman jurists. "The imperfect laws," writes Austin, "are laws which speak the desires of political superiors, but which their authors (by oversight or design) have not provided with sanctions. Many of the writers on *morals* and on the so called *law of nature* have annexed a different meaning to the term *imperfect*. Speaking of imperfect obligations, they commonly mean duties which are *not legal* : duties imposed by commands of God, or duties imposed by positive morality, as contradistinguished to duties

(1) *Distinction between perfect and imperfect duties* : duties enforceable by external authority are called perfect or determinate ; while those not so enforceable, imperfect or indeterminate.

It is a juridic distinction.

Austin.

* Bain draws a corresponding distinction between what he calls 'obligatory morality,' including duties 'properly so-called,' and 'optional morality,' including virtuous acts which are 'purely voluntary.' (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 14) Forbearance from specified injuries, religious orthodoxy, and chastity are given as examples of the former ; while the support of aged parents, the payment of debts that cannot be legally recovered, and 'pure virtue or beneficence' are given as illustrations of the latter. (*Moral Science*, pp. 436-437.)

imposed by positive law." (*Jurisprudence*, Lect. I, Vol. I, pp. 102.)

(2) Duties have also been distinguished into *definite and indefinite*. Definite duties are those which are precise in their scope and application, while indefinite duties are vague in these respects. Thus the payment of a debt is definite, both with regard to amount and person, while charity is indefinite as it is not restricted to a definite measure or individual. Contractual and legal relations thus give rise to definite duties, while those which rest simply on the inner verdict of Conscience are regarded as indefinite.

(2) *Distinction between definite and indefinite duties*, the one being precise, and the other, vague.

(3). Duties have also been distinguished into *natural and artificial*. The former are taken to include those which arise from our natural constitution, while the latter cover duties arising from conventional or contractual arrangements. Thus the duties of parents and children, benefactor and beneficiary are natural, being enjoined by our moral nature and moral relations; while the duties of principal and agent, vendor and vendee are taken to be artificial, as they are based on mere contract or mutual agreement.

(3) *Distinction between natural and artificial duties*, the one being due to the natural moral constitution, while the other, to contract or convention.

(4). Duties have further been distinguished into *common and special*: the one referring to duties always binding upon all, such as the duties of benevolence and veracity; while the other referring to specific duties arising from special situations or relations, such as those of master and servant, teacher and pupil. In the history of the Church,

(4) *Distinction between common and special duties*, the one being binding upon all alike, while

the other,
on some
alone.

An analogous
distinction
was drawn
in the
middle
ages between
ordinary and
monastic
duties.

All these
distinctions
are extra-
moral. From
the moral
stand-point
all duties
are equally
binding upon
all when
there are
occasions for
them.

The distinc-
tion between
perfect and
imperfect
obligation is
due to a
confusion
of the

we find an analogous distinction in the middle ages between what were regarded as ordinary duties, applicable to common life, and monastic duties, which were only 'counsels of perfection' to the few.

The above distinctions are all based on principles extraneous to the moral sphere. From the moral stand-point all duties are equally perfect, definite, natural, and special. Whether a duty is enforced or not by penalty is immaterial in the moral sphere: apart from such enforcement it is binding upon us as required by our moral nature.* Nay, the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligation is itself based on confusion. If external authority be the real ground of obligation, then acts not enforced by it can never be called obligatory at all. The expression 'imperfect obligation' is a hybrid derived partly from moral nature and partly from social enforcement. It is called 'obligatory' by reference to the demands of our moral nature; and it is called 'imperfect' by reference to social enforcement. If an act be morally obligatory, it cannot be morally

* Corresponding to the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, we have the popular distinction between 'obligation' and 'duty': the one (from Lat. *obligo*, to bind) indicates what one binds himself to do to another by definite understanding; while the other (from Lat. *debere*, to owe) implies what is due from one person to another in virtue of his condition as a human being and member of society. Duties are therefore inseparable from our moral constitution, while obligations are accidents arising from contractual relations. Thus we speak of the duties of parents and children, husbands and wives; while we talk of the obligations of a debtor or a solicitor. This distinction, however, is untenable in ethics: the so-called obligations ultimately rest on duties; and all duties from the moral stand-point are equally sacred. We have accordingly used the terms synonymously.

imperfect; and if it be legally imperfect, it can never be legally obligatory. As Austin remarks, "An imperfect obligation, in the sense of the Roman jurists, is exactly equivalent to no obligation at all. For the term *imperfect* denotes simply, that the law wants the sanction appropriate to laws of the kind. An imperfect obligation, in the other meaning of the expression, is a religious or a moral obligation." (Lect. I, Vol. I. p. 102.)

provinces of
ethics and
jurispru-
dence

Austin.

The very fact that Bain includes 'Pure Virtue or Beneficence' within optional morality, brings out that he recognises a moral sphere outside the political. "Although Morality," he writes, "inculcates benevolence, this is not a Law proper, it is not obligatory, authoritative, or binding; it is purely voluntary, and is termed merit, virtuous and noble conduct." (*Moral Science*, p. 436.) 'Pure Virtue or Benevolence,' according to him, includes "all actions for the benefit of others, without stipulation, and without reward; relief of distress, promotion of the good of individuals or of society at large." (P. 437.) And he adds, "The highest honours of society are called into exercise by the highest services." If so, then, 'the highest services' are higher than 'obligatory morality'; and the very fact, that "the highest honours of society are called into exercise" to encourage them, shows the homage which men are disposed to pay to the dictates of Conscience as distinguished from the requirements of external authority. Social enforcement is a matter of feasibility or convenience, not

affecting the character of duty. Veracity, for example, though not enforceable by society, is as much binding upon an agent from the moral stand-point as respecting the property of another. The true 'noble' or 'heroic' acts are thus done in obedience to the inner voice of Conscience, even though external authority cannot enforce them: "the act of good Samaritan, the rescue of a ship's crew from drowning," as Bain admits, "could not be exacted the law cannot require heroism." (*Vide* Chap. III, § 7.) The expressions indefinite, artificial, common, and special duties are no less misleading. From the moral stand-point all duties are definite, requiring the performance of specific acts under definite circumstances. Even the so-called 'artificial' duties ultimately rest on what are described as 'natural'; normal moral constitution requires the performance of all duties as equally obligatory. Similarly, all duties are in a certain sense 'common,' in as much as they rest on the demands of the common moral nature of man; and all duties may be said to be 'special,' in so far as they are relative to definite situations and relations. We have seen (*Vide* § 5) that duties arise only in relation to definite circumstances without which they have no meaning and no existence. Thus from the moral stand-point all duties are equally imperative, definite, special, and perfect.

§ 8. **Classification of Duties.** We have said that our moral life is a harmonious whole in which the several duties are closely connected.

The terms 'indefinite,' 'artificial,' 'common,' and 'special' duties are also misleading.

From the moral stand-point, all duties are equally definite,

natural,

common,

special,

and perfect.

with one another. Hence starting with certain duties we may deduce the rest; for all of them constitute an organic whole. Thus a perfectly virtuous man is true to himself, to others, and to God; similarly, a man who is truly just or benevolent is expected to be dutiful in every way. The Socratic view, that 'virtue consists in well-doing,' indicates also this organic unity of our moral life. One, who really does well what he is called upon to do, must be deemed an honest or conscientious man; and a conscientious man is dutiful all round. "The best man," says Socrates, "and the most beloved by the gods, is he that, as a husbandman, performs well the duties of husbandry; as a surgeon, the duties of the medical art; in political life, his duty towards the commonwealth. The man that does nothing well, neither useful nor agreeable to the gods." Thus the division or classification of duties is more or less arbitrary. But still it may serve some useful purpose in bringing the different aspects of our moral life prominently before our view and revealing their relations and responsibilities. We may thus attempt a classification; but we must carefully bear in mind that all the duties are very closely connected together in a healthy moral life. Following Clarke, we may classify our duties into those towards (I) God, (II) Others, and (III) Self, adopting our relation to the different forms of being as the principle of classification. Let us briefly consider these classes of duties with special reference to those general conditions which affect our moral life in each sphere.

Duties are interconnected constituting a harmonious whole:

the Socratic doctrine that 'virtue consists in well-doing.'

Classification of duties indicates the different aspects of moral life.

Clarke's classification: Duties to (I) God, (II) Others, and (III) Self.

(I) *Duties to God.*

Our devotion to the Deity should be genuine and spontaneous.

(I) *Duties to God.* Our duties towards the Deity include, as Clarke mentions, our sentiments and acts, such as Veneration, Love, and Worship. These, however, must be such as are acceptable to Him: egoistic feelings and acts of cruelty can never find any favour with the Supreme Judge and Governor. "God is a spirit; and they that worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth." If any feelings be acceptable to Him these must be the spontaneous outpouring of a heart melted with a sense of His beneficence and justice.

"When nature fails, and day and night

Divide Thy works no more,

My ever-grateful heart, O Lord,

Thy mercy shall adore.

Through all eternity to Thee

A joyful song I'll raise;

For, oh! eternity's too short

To utter all Thy praise." (*Addison.*)

Prayer as the expression of gratitude.

If any sacrifice can please Him, it must be the sacrifice of our egoistic propensities before the altar of Conscience. Our prayer should be the expression of our gratitude and not petitions for favour. How often conflicting prayers are sent up to Heaven by buyers and sellers, potters and cultivators, creditors and debtors, and the rivals in a law suit or an undertaking! Moreover, owing to our extremely narrow vision, we are prone to overlook the larger view of a question and are often led to pray for things which ultimately turn out to be injurious even to ourselves. Shakespeare well observes—

enables us to do our duty freely and with alacrity.

A contented person never undertakes what is beyond his capacity or power: he bears in mind the motto—'First deserve, then desire.' He can say with regard to himself

A contented
soul is dutiful

"I laugh not at another's loss ;
I grudge not at another's gain ;
No worldly wave my mind can toss ;
I brook that is another's pain.
I fear no foe : I scorn no friend :
I dread no death : I fear no end." (Dyer.)

And contentment not only keeps one within the legitimate exercise of his powers, but it yields also pure delight by restricting his wants. "Content," says Addison, "is equivalent to wealth, and luxury to poverty; or, to give the thought a more agreeable turn, *Content is natural wealth*, says Socrates; to which I shall add *Luxury is artificial poverty*." (Spectator, N. 574.) A contented man may thus exclaim—

and happy.

"My mind to me a kingdom is ;
Such perfect joy therein I find,
As far exceeds all earthly bliss
That world affords, or grows by kind :
Though much I want what most men have,
Yet doth my mind forbid me crave." (Dyer.)

Contentment thus prepares the way for self-control, though it in its turn contributes to contentment.

(3) *Self-control* has always been regarded as a prominent duty of human life. The importance of self-control is evident from our life of trial, which

(3) Self-con-
trol.

involves a conflict between the animal and the divine part of our constitution. Our animal wants and propensities, though having a legitimate sphere of their own in the preservation and continuance of life, are often liable to outrun their limits and bring us to the verge of moral bankruptcy. Hence the necessity of the regulative influence of Conscience. Self-control, however, does not mean the mortification of self; it means only the due regulation of the several tendencies. As all the propensities have been given us by the Creator, they all have their legitimate spheres of exercise in due season. Our moral efforts should therefore be directed to keep them within their bounds and not to extinguish them altogether. This, of course, does not mean that such unnatural tendencies as envy, malice, cruelty, which are but perversions or excrescences of natural inclinations, should be cherished. Our moral nature requires that our natural dispositions should be duly regulated, while the unnatural or morbid ones should be extirpated. Thus self-control is essential to the *purity* of our moral life. This self-control, however, to be effective, should be comprehensive, covering our intellectual, emotional, and volitional tendencies. We should forbid our thoughts to travel in unholy regions, prevent our feelings from being directed towards unworthy objects, and restrain our desires for evil things. Without such a concurrent attempt, an exercise of self-control can at most produce a temporary effect, which is bound in the long run to give way. Though the

Self-control implies the due regulation of the several tendencies.

Unnatural tendencies should be repressed.

Self-control should be comprehensive.

stress of self-control is illustrated with regard to the passions, which dispute the sway of Conscience the most, yet it is required, more or less prominently, in the regulation of the other impulses as well. Self-control should beget a strength of character which may make one proof against not merely the inroads of passion, but also against the subtle influences from without operating in the form of undue sympathy or antipathy, calumny or flattery.

One should be above praise or blame ;

Flattery draws its sustenance from false sympathy and panders to vanity ; it blinds one to his faults and leads him to overlook the legitimate claims of some and to show undeserved favour to others. The ways of the flatterer are often very insidious and it is very difficult to withstand them. One is flattered even when he is told that he hates flattery.

he should resist the subtle influence of flattery.

“ But when I tell him he hates flatterers,
He says he does, being then most flattered.
Let me work ;
For I can give his humour the true bent.”

(*Shakespeare.*)

(4.) *Self-preservation* is such a paramount duty of life that it is already secured to a great extent by the necessity of nature.

(4) Self-preservation As a supreme duty of life it is secured to a great extent by Nature.

“ Tell me, where lives that thing so meek and tame,
That doth not all his living faculties
Put forth in preservation of his life ?
What deed so daring, which necessity
And desperation will not sanctify.” (*Coleridge.*)

It is already so well provided for by Nature and so generally followed by living beings, that it is

Suicide is
inexcusable.

Self-preservation
often
leads to
undue regard
for self.

The unity of
moral life is
proved by
the inter-
connection of
duties and
virtues.

superfluous to dwell on this duty at length. Still, we may notice in this connection the enormity of the sin of *suicide*. The stoical advocacy of it (*Vide* Chap. XII § 2) in extreme cases is not at all justifiable, or even reconcilable with their doctrine of indifference or devotion to Nature. Certainly we should patiently bear the pain and suffering which falls *on* our lot ; and if, at times, we are called upon to bear the brunt of the battle, we should have faith and strength enough unflinchingly to play our part and should never be runaways leaving the field before we are summoned. But the risk in respect of self-preservation is rather towards excess than towards defect. Men are often led to imagine that their self-preservation is at stake when really they are disinclined to an act of self-sacrifice. Cases are not unknown of even millionaires who withhold their charities apprehending future want.

The unity of our moral life is also proved in the case of self-regarding duties and virtues. A true regard for one's own well-being involves the observance of all the duties of life—domestic, social, and religious. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 8.) One who is true to himself can never be false to any one. Prudence, properly understood, is, as indicated by Butler, on a par with Conscience : a consistent regard for one's self secures virtue and happiness alike. As Tennyson says—

“ Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
These three alone lead life to sovereign power.
Yet not for power (power of herself

Would come uncalled for), but to live by law,
Acting the law we live by without fear."

§ 9. **Conflict of Duties.** Every classification, we must remember, is more or less abstract and arbitrary; and such is also the case with the classification of duties. Our duties run into one another. They have reference to concrete cases, requiring simultaneous attention to the claims of self and others. Hence, apparently conflict arises among duties, and casuistry* attempts to solve such

The classification of duties may be taken to imply that the classes are entirely distinct which often come into collision with one another.

* Casuistry as a science aims at solving doubtful cases of duty by attempting definite interpretations of moral rules and indicating exceptions to them. It teaches us which of the conflicting moral principles we are to follow and which to neglect on a particular occasion. It resembles jurisprudence in trying to codify and explain the laws of our moral life in all their details and illustrating them by appropriate cases. While jurisprudence, however, discusses the grounds of external obedience to civil authority, casuistry examines the grounds of the inner obedience of the soul to the laws of God. Both these sciences aim at securing the desirable end not merely by a discussion of general principles but by an elaborate treatment of all the duties of life. "The casuists," says Adam Smith, "do not so much examine what it is, that might properly be exacted by force, as what it is, that the person who owes the obligation ought to think himself bound to perform from the most sacred and scrupulous regard to the general rules of justice, and from the most conscientious dread, either of wronging his neighbour, or of violating the integrity of his own character. It is the end of jurisprudence to prescribe rules for the decisions of judges and arbiters. It is the end of casuistry to prescribe rules for the conduct of a good man. By observing all the rules of jurisprudence, supposing them over so perfect, we should deserve nothing but to be free from external punishment. By observing those of casuistry, supposing them such as they ought to be, we should be entitled to considerable praise by the exact and scrupulous delicacy of our behaviour." (*Moral Sentiments*, Part VII, Sect. IV, pp. 398-399.)

Casuistry owes its existence to the attempt on the part of the Church to settle for common people what their duties are on definite occasions. Clergymen have often been the repositories of the consciences of the people and so have been approached by them for directions in cases of difficulty. This led ecclesiastical realists of the Christian Church in the 14th and 15th centuries

Hence the use of casuistry to solve moral difficulties by rules and exceptions.

difficulties. The solution of difficulties in this way, however, is altogether inconsistent with the true character of our moral life, which is an organic whole with the due subordination of parts. We have seen that really there can be no conflict of duties as they constitute a harmonious whole conducive to the perfection of our entire

to compile manuals of casuistry dealing more or less fully with cases of duty; and it was specially adapted to the requirements of auricular confession, then in vogue. Penitential books, ecclesiastical jurisprudence, and the systematic morality of the schoolmen all tended to support such a procedure. To simplify the matter, books of casuistry gradually came to be alphabetically arranged books of reference, giving answers to all important moral problems. Such external reference gradually weakened the moral susceptibilities of common people and led them rather to acts of external conformity than to genuine integrity of character. And the conflict of views and directions in the different manuals not infrequently led men to think that one course of action, supported by one authority, was perhaps as good as another, supported by a different authority.

“Who shall decide when doctors disagree,
And soundest casuists doubt, like you and me.” (*Pope.*)

Thus, a man following his inclination tried to find out an authority which sanctioned his conduct; and hence casuistry gradually came to mean escape through the moral back-door, false reasoning, or quibbling. “Books of casuistry,” observes Adam Smith, “are generally as useless as they are commonly tiresome. They could be of little use to one who should consult them upon occasion, even supposing their decisions to be just; because, notwithstanding the multitude of cases collected in them, yet upon account of the still greater variety of possible circumstances, it is a chance, if among all those cases there be found one exactly parallel to that under consideration. One, who is really anxious to do his duty, must be very weak, if he can imagine that he has much occasion for them; and with regard to one who is negligent of it, the style of those writings is not such as is likely to awaken him to more attention. None of them tend to animate us to what is generous and noble. None of them tend to soften us to what is gentle and humane. Many of them, on the contrary, tend rather to teach us to chicanery with our own consciences, and by their vain subtleties serve to authorise innumerable evasive refinements with regard to the most essential articles of our duty.” (*Moral Sentiments* p. 411.)

nature. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 2.) The very supposition of conflict among moral principles or duties implies a mechanical, and not a vital, relation among them. To resolve such conflict by reference to an external code of casuistry is still more objectionable, as it tends to extinguish the inner inspiration and set up arbitrary authority in its stead. "Casuistry," says Mackenzie, "seeks to draw out rules for breaking the rules—to show the exact circumstances in which we are entitled to violate particular commandments. This effort is chiefly associated historically with the teaching of the Jesuits. It was called "casuistry" because it dealt with "cases of conscience." It fell into disrepute, and was severely attacked by Pascal. And on the whole rightly. It is bad enough that we should require particular rules of conduct at all, but rules for the breaking of rules would be quite intolerable. They would become so complicated that it would be impossible to follow them out; and any such attempt would almost inevitably lead in practice to a system by which men might justify, to their own satisfaction, any action whatever. The way to escape from the limitations of the commandments, is not to make other commandments more minute and subtle, but rather to fall back upon the great fundamental law, of which the particular commandments are but fragmentary aspects." (*Ethics*, pp. 340-341.)

Thus the enumeration of the different classes of duties given in the preceeding section should never be taken to imply that they constitute entirely dis-

But moral life is a concrete and harmonious whole, involving no conflict of duties.

Casuistry is more or less arbitrary and dogmatic, tending to vitiate our moral life.

The different classes of duties are but different aspects of the concrete moral life.

Duty, being relative to circumstances, is always one and definite on any occasion.

Conflict of impulses is mistaken for conflict of duties.

distinct classes which at times come into collision with one another. They are but different aspects of our single moral life which cannot be so divided as to set one part against another. Every duty, as we have seen, must be determined by reference to concrete circumstances and not by an abstract consideration of the claims of self, others, and God. No one suspends himself in mid air to avoid treading on worms, nor does he starve himself to save the vegetable creation. Duty can be ascertained only by honest determination and not by captious or casuistical examination. Abstractly considered, there are classes and sub-classes of duties; but correctly understood, a duty is but one under a definite set of circumstances. Divorced from circumstances a duty has no place but in the mind of a speculator. Thus, what we call domestic, social, and religious duties arise from circumstances which require us on any occasion to act according to a certain moral principle. Concrete circumstances give rise to impulses whose conflict is the occasion for the application of a moral principle. The conflict of impulses is mistaken for conflict of duties; but certainly the conflict of the contending impulses does not indicate a conflict of duty. As explained in Chapter VIII, we may waver between two courses of action to determine our duty; or, having determined it, we may fail to carry it out. Thus confusion or perversity may subsequently lead us to imagine that the two courses were equally eligible for us, when really our duty lay in one direction alone.

Aristotle.

"Moral Weakness," according to Aristotle, "which

results in a man's doing the wrong although knowing what is right, and following appetite against reason, is not, as Socrates supposed, a myth. Moral action may be represented as a syllogism in which a general principle of morality forms the major premiss, while the particular application is the minor: but the conclusion which is arrived at is relatively is not always that which is executed practically. The question, in fact, must be studied not logically but psychologically and physiologically: and when we regard the problem in this manner, we find that appetite can lead to a minor premiss being applied to one rather than another of two major premisses existing in the mind. Animals, on the other hand, cannot be called weak or incontinent just because such a conflict of principles is with them impossible." (Wallace's *Aristotle*, pp. 105—106.)

Thus the application of different moral principles to a concrete case, through confusion or inclination, may lead to the supposition of a conflict of duties when really there is none. The view that duties are always relative has thus an element of truth in it; for the application of a moral principle to a certain case is always relative to its definite character. As the promotion of (physical) health by reference to physical conditions does not imply any conflict of physical laws, so the promotion of our moral well-being must be by reference to the moral conditions mentioned above and does not mean a conflict of moral principles. Thus, charity, parental duty, the

The moral principles, viewed with regard to a concrete situation, indicate but one duty.

claims of friendship and justice never come into collision: on any particular occasion our duty is one and definite as indicated by moral law by reference to its conditions. True charity, for example, is indicated in the *Geeta* thus—

Charity.

दातव्यमिति यद्दानं दोग्धनेऽनुपकारिणे ।

देगे कालं च पात्रे च तद्दानं सात्त्विकं श्रुतम्" । १७ । २० ॥

"The gift of alms which is made in saying, "This must be given," to one who cannot return it, in a proper place and time and to a worthy object, is called "good." " (Chap. XVII, 20. Davies' Translation.) Similarly, Martineau observes, "A mother, who is nursing her infant and therefore inseparable from him must refuse to undertake the charge of a friend prostrated by scarlet fever, however ready she would else be to serve, night and day, in the isolated sick-room. Or, suppose that the papers from Italy report a capture by brigands of an English traveller, whose life can be bought off only at some enormous price, and that I find it is my friend who has fallen into their clutches. For my love of him, I would ransom him at any cost I could command; but if I am a father, I have no right, for his sake, to beggar my children and deprive them of their education and outfit for the battle of life. Nor can we hesitate to postpone the claims of simple Friendship to the sharp appeal of urgent Pity. If, for example, I am helping my friend in some important undertaking,—a literary work, or a series of scientific experiments, and, while we are at work together, we are interrupt-

Nursing an invalid.

Ransom g a prisoner.

Succour in distress.

ed by an accident in the street at the very crisis of our problem; and an injured man will probably die, unless I, summoned as a surgeon on the spot, hasten to take direction of the case; it cannot be doubted that I must go to the sufferer and quit my friend." (*Types*, II, p. 220.)

Even justice, which is so very precise and strict that it is represented by the Pythagorians as a square and is often assigned a very high place among duties and virtues, must be relative to its conditions; otherwise, by its undue severity or leniency, it may lose its essential character and function. Thus justice should be administered not in a fit of passion but with due consideration; and it should always be tempered with mercy.

Justice.

Mercy.

"The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath: It is twice blest;
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes:
'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown;
His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
But mercy is above this sceptred sway;
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings:
It is an attribute to God himself;
And earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice." (*Shakespeare*.)

§ 10. **Moral Rights.** After what has been said of "Duties" little need be added about "Rights", as

Duties and
Rights are
correlative s.

these are but correlatives. Duty, as we have seen, implies what is due or owing, a moral debt which should be paid. Now, that which is due or owing must be due or owing to some person by another. Two parties must needs be concerned in such an affair. Duty implies right. The duties of children imply rights in parents. It is the duty of a teacher to give proper instruction to his pupils; and so the pupils may be said to have a right to due training. Obedience is the duty of subjects to rulers, and service that of workmen to their masters. The rulers accordingly, have rights to exact obedience from subjects; and masters, to exact services from workmen. In the case of self-regarding duties, there is the claim of the higher self upon the lower. As our moral constitution requires the due subordination of the sentient self to the rational, the latter evidently may be said to have a right to such subordination.

Duties and Rights ultimately rest on the same moral laws and relations.

Duties and rights ultimately rest on the same moral laws and relations. They are due to the moral necessity which we are under of properly regulating the several tendencies, physical and mental; and so they do not permit external interference or constraint. "As moral obligation," writes Calderwood, "signifies an imposed necessity of acting in accordance with moral law, it implies the right of the moral being, without restraint from others, to engage in the forms activity thus required. This is the natural and inalienable right of personality,—To act according to Conscience. God has in the

constitution of our nature provided for it; and our fellowmen can have no warrant to restrict it." And, 'he continues, "As moral obligation requires from me right actions towards others, it implies rights on their part equivalent to those belonging to myself. Here also the measure of obligation is the measure of rights. The latter cannot be more restricted than the former. The right to fair judgment, the right to generous feeling, and the right to payment of money due, have all exactly the same ethical validity." (*Moral Philosophy*, pp. 94-95.)

The same remarks, therefore, hold good with regard to the classification and distinction of rights as with regard to those of duties. From the moral stand-point, all rights are equally legitimate, whether they are enforced by external authority or not. "There is as little an imperfect right," says Dr. Brown, "in a moral sense as there is in logic an imperfect truth or falsehood." (*Philosophy of Mind*, Sect. 91.) Corresponding to the distinction of natural and artificial duties (or what is popularly known as the distinction between duties and obligations), there is, in the case of rights, the distinction between what are called natural and acquired rights. The acquired rights ultimately rest on those that are natural. If by the legitimate exercise of our powers we acquire property or enter into contracts, we have evidently a right to the enjoyment of the fruits of our labour. Moral rights and duties are altogether inalienable. No doubt artificial duties or acquired rights may be transferred by the same rightful

Like 'duties,' all 'rights' are equally valid from the moral stand-point.

Natural rights constitute the basis of those that are acquired.

Moral rights and duties are inalienable.

exercise of powers which brought them into existence. This only implies that when the circumstances are altered, our duties and rights resting on them are also correspondingly modified. Though, therefore, our rights of property and contract may be transferred or destroyed by the just exercise of our powers, yet the natural rights, on which these artificial rights finally stand, can never be alienated or annihilated. A father, for example, can never forego his right to the obedience of his children, nor can a man in distress relinquish his right to the help of others. "Moral rights," says Calderwood, "are not self-exacted, nor can they be voluntarily surrendered. They are the necessary accompaniment of obligation under reign of moral law. They are as unchangeable as the nature of moral law itself, and the obligation which it imposes." (*Ibid.*, p. 95.)

If the error of duties lies towards defect, the error of rights lies towards excess. In the one case we are disposed to be negligent and forgetful, while in the other we are generally very particular and even exacting. It is evidently due in many cases to our aversion to labour, which, as mentioned above, is not a healthy moral sign. Neglect of duties on one side means encroachment on the rights of another. So an individual should not be less mindful of his duties than of his rights. If the performance of duties be sometimes irksome and painful, we should remember that it is also so to others: what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander. The surest way, then, to respect others'

Natural rights cannot be transferred or destroyed.

We are disposed to strain our rights.

We should be more mindful of our duties than of our rights.

rights is to scrupulously observe one's own duties. If all men attend to their duties, their rights will take care of themselves. It would secure order and peace and would, in fact, be the realization of the kingdom of Heaven on earth. Moreover, we should remember that duty by performance grows into pleasure. There is nothing so elevating and cheering as the consciousness of having done one's duty. Wordsworth writes—

Duty by performance becomes a source of serene pleasure.

“Stern Law-giver ! yet thou dost wear
The Godhead's most benignant grace ;
Nor know we anything so fair
As is the smile upon thy face :
Flowers laugh before thee on their beds
And fragrance in thy footing treads ;
Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong ;
And the most ancient heavens, through
Thee, are fresh and strong.”

(*Wordsworth.*)

We may mention in this connection that men are at times disposed to strain their rights by overlooking their duties. Men thus clamour for power or position without first qualifying themselves for it. We find, accordingly, irresponsible men rushing for what the more thoughtful and dutiful shrink from. How often is the motto, “First deserve, then desire,” reversed in practice ! This tendency to strain one's rights leads one by natural transition to what are called prying and meddlesomeness. We should not interfere with the rights of others in any way by ignoring our duties. People sometimes think

‘First deserve, then desire.’

Undue curiosity or interference should be checked.

that they have a right to the secrets of others and even express their displeasure for not having been informed of them. When emanating from sympathy and good-will, such a tendency may have some justification; but even then it is liable to transcend its limits, wounding others' feelings and interfering with their work. "This passion," writes Adam Smith, "to discover the real sentiments of others is naturally so strong, that it often degenerates into a troublesome and impertinent curiosity to pry into those secrets of our neighbours which they have very justifiable reasons for concealing; and upon many occasions, it requires prudence and a strong sense of propriety to govern this, as well as all the other passions of human nature, and to reduce it to that pitch which any impartial spectator can approve of." (*Moral Sentiments*, Part VII, Sec. 4.)

§ 11. **Rule of an Honest Life.** Let us conclude this chapter with a brief reference to the way in which we should regulate our life, so that we may not neglect our duties.

(1) Idleness should be avoided and activity should be well-regulated.

(1) The first condition is that we should not be idle, for idleness, as mentioned above, is but a form of misdirected activity. Aversion to labour opens the door to many sins, with regard to self, others, and God. But as mere activity does not necessarily mean that it is well-regulated, our next effort should be to direct it to the proper channel.

(2) We should attend to duties instead

(2) Hence, the second great condition of an honest life is that it should attend rather to its

duties than to its rights. The habit of dwelling on our rights begets a false consciousness of what is due to us and thus blinds us to our duties towards others. So drones fancy that they have a right to the help of their relations or friends, and hence they wrongly draw upon the resources of others. Beggars similarly should never think of their right to the charity of others; they should rather attend to what they are called upon to do from their humble station in life. The rich and the powerful, likewise, should think, not of the homage or services due to them, but rather of what is incumbent upon them to do towards others. If Providence has given one an exalted rank, his responsibilities are great indeed! Attention to duty implies that we should be mindful more of the present than of the future. We should not put off what can be done to-day till to-morrow and should not live in idle expectation, heedless of what may be achieved at present. "It is no very good symptom either of nations or individuals," writes Carlyle, "that they deal much in vaticination. Happy men are full of the present, for its bounty suffices them; and wise men also, for its duties engage them. Our grand business undoubtedly is, not to see what lies dimly at a distance, but to do what lies clearly at hand." (*Essays*, Vol. II, 98.)

(3) The next condition of dutiful life is, as indicated above, sincerity. Casuistical spirit is to be altogether extinguished: "It is not right," says Burke, "to turn our duties into doubts." (*Appeal from New to Old Whigs*.) Our aim should be the

of to rights.

Drones.

Beggars.

Responsibilities of exalted position.

We should be mindful of the present.

(3) Honest determination to do what is right and thus to lay the foundation

of good
character.

purity of heart and not external conformity or ostentation of virtue. Piso's justice or Quixotic sympathy, for example, is suicidal; acts like these frustrate their own ends. "It is a common remark," says Dewey, "that moral codes change from 'Do not' to 'Do,' and from this to 'Be.' A Mosaic code may attempt to regulate the specific acts of life. Christianity says, 'Be ye perfect.' The effort to exhaust the various special right acts is futile. They are not the same for any two men and they change constantly with the same man. The very words which denote virtues come less and less to mean specific acts, and more the spirit in which conduct occurs." (*Outlines of Ethics*, p. 231.)

(4) Self-examination at the close of a day with a view to self-improvement.

(4) Before retiring to bed, we should daily examine our day's work with a view to discover any fault which it may betray; and we should resolve to avoid such faults in future. We should follow this course from day to day in an earnest and penitential spirit, imploring the help of Providence to give us strength and courage, and scrupulously watching the moral progress which we make. As Pythagoras says—

"Let not soft sleep usurp oblivious sway
Till thrice you've told the deeds that mark'd the day;
Whither thy steps? what thing for thee most fitted
Was aptly done! and what good deed omitted?
And when you've summed the tale, wipe out the bad
With gracious grief, and in the good be glad!"

We should
rise in the
morning with

And if ever we rise from our bed in an idle or negligent mood, we should say to ourselves with

Marcus Aurelius, "I am rising to the work of a human being. Why, then, am I dissatisfied to do the things for which I exist, and for which I was brought into the world?"

a determination to do our duty.

(5) Lastly, we should always try to discharge our duties in a quiet and disinterested way, not being influenced by hope or despondency, expectation or fear. We should, as far as possible, be self-contained and self-dependent. This is well indicated by Matthew Arnold in his poem on '*Self-dependence*' :

(5) Duties should be performed in a quiet and disinterested way. Self-dependence. Matthew Arnold.

"Weary of myself, and sick of asking
What I am, and what I ought to be,
At this vessel's prow I stand, which bears me
Forwards, forwards, o'er the starlit sea.
And a look of passionate desire
O'er the sea and to the stars I send :
"Ye who from my childhood up have calm'd me,
Calm me, ah, compose me to the end !
"Ah, once more," I cried, "ye stars, ye waters,
On my heart your mighty charm renew ;
Still, still let me, as I gaze upon you,
Feel my soul becoming vast like you !"
From the intense, clear, star-sown vault of heaven,
Over the lit sea's unquiet way,
In the rustling night-air came the answer :
"Wouldst thou *be* as these are ? *Live* as they.
"Unaffrighted by the silence round them
Undistracted by the sights they see,
These demand not that the things without them
Yield them love, amusement, sympathy.

“ And with joy the stars perform their shining,
And the sea its long moon-silver'd roll ;
For self-poised they live, nor pine with noting
All the fever of some differing soul.

“ Bounded by themselves, and unregardful
In what state God's other works may be,
In their own tasks all their powers pouring,
These attain the mighty life you see.”

O air-born voice ! long since, severely clear,
A cry like thine in mine own heart I hear :
“ Resolve to be thyself ; and know that he,
Who finds himself, loses his misery ! ”

CHAPTER XV.

MERIT AND DEMERIT.

§ 1. **Right, Duty, Desert, and Merit.** The terms 'right' and 'wrong' are applicable, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 5), to acts as expressive of their moral quality. And such quality, as we have mentioned, must in any concrete case be the one or the other, there being no *via media* between the two. 'Duty', as we saw in the last chapter, is the requirement of the moral law to act in the right direction in any case. Duty thus expresses the claim of the moral law upon us on any occasion. Such requirement, however, implies the possibility on the part of an agent either to act or not to act in its direction. The quality of character revealed by obedience or disobedience is expressed by the terms good or ill 'desert,' 'merit' or 'demerit.' The term 'desert' is generic, implying either a virtuous or a vicious will, while the term 'merit' is specific, signifying only the excellence of character, illustrated in doing what is noble and good. "It may be observed," writes Butler, "concerning our perception of good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent: since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient

'Right' and 'wrong' express the moral qualities of acts.

'Duty' indicates the moral necessity of an agent to act in the direction of right.

'Desert' indicates a quality of character manifested in a virtuous or vicious exercise of will.

'Merit' expresses the excellence of character illustrated in doing what is noble and good.

'Merit', like
'virtue,'
often
indicates
superior
moral
excellence.

Martineau.

to make men act well in many common instances. And, on the other hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to such vices." (*Dissertation on Virtue*.) The term 'merit,' like 'virtue,' tends to be used to express superior moral excellence manifested in doing what is right under great difficulties. When, for example, one goes beyond the requirements of positive law or mutually understood standard of rectitude, then he is said to earn merit for his action. "We might obtain," observes Martineau, "appropriate terms for the distinction which we have to mark, by using the word '*desert*' (qualified, if needful, by the epithet 'good' or 'bad') when including what lies within the sphere of pledged duty, and reserving the word '*merit*' for what lies beyond it." (*Types*, II, p. 245.) Thus, when an individual pays a stipulated sum according to the terms of contract, he may be said to have good desert, but no merit; he earns merit if, out of goodness or generosity, he does more than what is required of him by the contract.

While
'rightness'
expresses the
quality of an
act, '*desert*'
or '*merit*'
expresses the
character of
the agent
with regard
to it.

It is apparent from the foregoing remarks that, while rightness belongs to acts, desert or merit belongs to agents. We talk, no doubt, of meritorious acts; but that is only by transfer of epithet, as illustrating the merit of an agent. It may be mentioned here that the restriction of the term 'merit' only to the performance of those acts which go beyond the positive requirements of duty may serve a jural or social purpose; but such a restriction

is unjustifiable in the strictly moral sphere. We have seen that every case of duty is to be determined by reference to the 'conditions' of a case ; and if these conditions require on any occasion that I should go beyond the terms of a contract or the mutually understood standard, then it is my duty to act as I feel and not simply as defined by contract or expectation. If, to cite an example from Martineau, a debtor, finding his creditor hard pressed for money, pays his dues before the time, then evidently he does not go a whit beyond the requirements of his Conscience. In fact, to do less in such a case, by straining his rights as defined in the contract, would be from the moral point of view a breach of duty, whatever its aspect might be from the legal or social stand-point. In the particular case, duty is to be determined, not merely by reference to the terms of contract, but also by reference to the claims of benevolence. And these evidently require an early payment to meet the wants of the creditor. Such a restriction, therefore, in the use of the terms 'merit' and 'virtue,' however useful in the jural or social sphere, is morally untenable ; nay, we may go farther and maintain that it is morally injurious as tending to lower the standard of duty or rectitude.

We should remember that, while right and duty do not admit of degrees, the essence of desert or merit lies in degree or intensity. As we have said, desert or merit belongs to an agent in virtue of what he achieves ; and the achievements of a man on different occasions express different degrees of strength of

The distinction between 'desert' and 'merit,' however useful from the jural or social stand-point, is morally untenable.

The restriction of 'merit' and 'virtue' to exceptional moral excellence is morally injurious.

Intensive difference, not found in 'right' or 'duty,' characterizes 'desert' and 'merit'.

character. An honest lawyer and a pettifogger will not have the same degree of merit in declining a got-up case. And, so long as character is not formed, one and the same individual may have different degrees of merit or desert on different occasions according to the variation in the intensities of temptations. "The terms 'good' and 'bad,' " remarks Kulpe, "belong to judgments of quality ; the terms 'merit' and 'guilt' to judgments of intensity. Since, however, every determination of intensity presupposes some volitional quality, whose intensity it is, every appreciation of the strength or force of the will must carry with it an estimate of will-quality. Hence only acts of the good will can be meritorious, and only acts of the bad will guilty." (*Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 77.) The degree of desert or merit thus does not depend on the intensity of a passing humour or disposition, but on the strength of a virtuous will withstanding the solicitations of sense and the charms of interest and obeying the dictates of Conscience. It varies with what we call moral courage.

The degree of desert or merit varies with the strength of will.

"True courage is not moved by breath of words,
While the rash bravery of boiling blood
Impetuous knows no settled principle,
A feverish tide, it has its ebbs and flows
As spirits rise or fall, as wine inflames
Or circumstances change ; but inborn courage,
The generous child of fortitude and faith,
Holds its firm empire in the constant soul,
And, like the stead-fast pole-star, never once
From the same fixed and faithful point declines."
(*Hannah More.*)

§ 2. **Character of Merit.** Merit, as mentioned above, depends on the way in which the will is exercised.

"Freely we serve,

Because we freely love, as in our will

To love or not ; in this we stand or fall." (*Milton.*)

As our obedience is a contingency, we earn merit when we obey the moral law ; and the degree of merit is proportioned to the earnestness revealed in obedience, i. e., to the intensity of temptation overcome. "This very strength of temptation," observes Channing, "seems to me to be one of the indications of man's greatness. It shows a being framed to make progress through difficulty, suffering, and conflict; that is, it shows a being designed for the highest order of virtues ; for we all feel by an unerring instinct, that virtue is elevated in proportion to the obstacles, which it surmounts, to the power with which it is chosen, and held fast. I see men placed by their Creator on a field of battle ; but compassed with peril, that they may triumph over it ; and though often overborne, still summoned to new efforts, still privileged to approach the Source of all power."

(*Works*, II, p. 6.) The doctrine of merit is thus inseparable from the doctrine of free-will. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 6.) The greater the strain on will, the greater the merit, for it proves firm fidelity to Conscience. Thus merit declines as virtue increases : the more one shapes his character according to his Conscience, the less he becomes susceptible to the influence of the propensities which dispute its sway ;

The degree of merit varies with the strength of the virtuous will.

The greater the strain on the will, the greater the merit.

Merit declines as virtue

increases.

and consequently less credit is due to him for the individual instances of obedience, however much he may be worthy by reason of his exalted character. To determine merit in a virtuous man, the conditions of trial must be more stringent. The purer the gold, the intenser the fire required for its test.

Some, however, are of opinion that merit varies directly as virtue.

Some writers, however, maintain that merit varies directly as virtue; 'it is but proved virtue'. Again, as this proof of virtue is given to the world, the measure of merit becomes the degree of praise or approbation awarded by it. Thus merit is also described as 'the value set upon virtue.' And it is contended from this stand-point that the less the temptation the greater the merit. Does not, it is urged, the very fact, that one is less susceptible to temptation, show that his character is elevated and so greater credit is due to him? "A man's intrinsic merit," says Leslie Stephen, "is not merely proportioned to his virtue, but is his virtue considered under a particular aspect, namely, as causing the moral approval of his fellows, and that the merit of an action means simply his proved virtue, that virtue, namely, which he must possess in order to do the action in question." (*Science of Ethics*, p. 266.) This is generally the position of determinists, who, not admitting the freedom of will, are necessarily led to explain merit by reference to character as it is moulded by circumstances, aided or not by heredity.

Leslie Stephen.

But merit belongs essentially to the period of strife, while virtue

It may be mentioned, however, that merit belongs essentially to the period of strife and not to the stage of saintly rest. As virtue develops and the character becomes serene, there is left little room for

merit for individual acts. We admire, no doubt, such a character; but the admiration is due to our estimate of the previous faithful service: a victory won brings out the courage and heroism of the combatants, who took part in the battle. Moreover, can we be ever sure of attaining such a character as to become above strife? Such a consciousness, would imply rather conceit and arrogance than any real moral advance. We should walk in humility before Conscience, which is severe judge indeed. The more one advances in the moral path, the more does he feel the difference between the actual and the ideal, and the greater are his efforts to purify his character. "Poor human nature!" exclaims Carlyle, "Is not a man's walking, in truth, always that: 'a succession of falls'? Man can do no other. In this wild element of a Life, he has to struggle onwards; now fallen, deep-abased; and ever, with tears, repentance, with bleeding heart, he has to rise again, struggle again still onwards. That his struggle be a faithful unconquerable one: that is the question of questions. We will put-up with many sad details, if the soul of it were true. Details by themselves will never teach us what it is." (*Heroes and Hero-worship*, Lecture II.) Thus victory in each case reveals merit, in as much as it shows the strife of an honest and faithful heart. As a dark background heightens, and does not detract from, the beauty of a bright figure, so the intensity of a lower propensity overcome brings out the strength of character and virtuous determination in any case.

indicates the excellence of character attained through habitual obedience.

As man scarcely attains perfection, there is always room for merit, more or less.

Carlyle

"They say, best men are moulded out of faults ;
And, for the most, become much more the better
For being a little bad." (*Shakespeare.*)

§ 3. **Conditions of Merit.** From the preceding remarks it appears that the question of merit and demerit can only arise when there is a conflict between the scale of intensity and the scale of excellence of the springs of action. If our inclination be always in harmony with duty, there can never be an occasion for merit or demerit. We attribute merit to an agent who overcomes a strong lower impulse, acting in the direction of a weaker higher impulse. If, for example, the desire for stealing is strong in a thief and the reverence for moral law is weak, then there is merit in him when he overcomes the desire for stealing, yielding to the claim of the moral law. The stronger the lower impulse overcome the greater the merit ; and the weaker the lower impulse yielded to, the greater the demerit. Merit or demerit is thus ultimately connected with a virtuous will. When a strong lower impulse is restrained, that reveals a virtuous will. Similarly, when a person acts in the direction of a weak lower impulse, that shows a perverse will.

The conditions of merit and demerit, accordingly, are :—

(1) The presence of moral law, indicating a course of duty ; or, as Martineau puts it, the presence of a scale of impulses or inclinations arranged in order of moral worth. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 23.)

Merit or demerit involves a conflict between duty and inclination.

The stronger the temptation overcome, the greater the merit ; and the weaker the temptation yielded to, the greater the demerit.

*Conditions of
of Merit and
Demerit :*

(1) The presence of moral law indicating duty, i.e., a scale of impulses in order of moral worth.

(2) The presence of a temptation not in harmony with duty; in the language of Martineau, the presence of a scale of impulses arranged in order of their strength or intensity. The scale of intensity is not the same as the scale of excellence. The one is the source of momentary enjoyment; while the other of perfection and bliss. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, §6.) The perversity of the human constitution, which has ever been the theme of moral discourses, implies that men are often disposed to seek their pleasure instead of their perfection.

"Vain human-kind! fantastic race!

Thy various follies who can trace?

Self-love, ambition, envy, pride,

Their empire in our hearts divide." (*Swift*.)

(3) The temptation in any case must be strong enough to dispute the sway of Conscience. As Martineau says, there must be conflict between the two scales—the scale of intensity and the scale of worth. Without such a conflict, there is no occasion for trial and so no room for merit or demerit. The possible relations between the two scales are either of (A) coincidence or of (B) conflict; and, in the former case, the coincidence may be the outcome of either (a) the scale of intensity merging in the scale of worth, or (b) the scale of worth merging in the scale of intensity. (a) The stage in which the scale of intensity is absorbed in the scale of moral worth is described by Martineau as the stage of saints and gods. In such a stage an individual feels pleasure only in doing what is right;

(2) The presence of temptation, i.e., a scale of impulses in order of intensity.

(3) Conflict between duty and temptation, i.e., between the scale of worth and that of intensity.

Possible relations between the two scales:

(A) concord, or (B) conflict.

(A) In the case of concord, either (a) the scale of intensity may merge in that of worth (as in the case of saints and angels) or (b)

vice versa (as in brutes or devils).

In neither of these two cases of coincidence is there any room for merit.

(B) The case of conflict is illustrated in man. It affords room for trial and merit or demerit.

and he is never even disposed to go against the dictates of Conscience. Such a nature, noble indeed, attracts our reverence ; but there is no room for merit here. (b) Neither is there any room for merit in the stage in which the scale of moral worth is merged in that of intensity. This is the stage of brutes or devils, according as there is the absence or presence of intelligence to devise means for the gratification of the evil propensities. Thus the condition of (A) concord of the two scales marks the extreme stage of either complete perfection or degradation, leaving no room for merit ; while the condition of (B) discord marks the intermediate stage of man, open to temptation and therefore capable of earning merit by obedience. If in the highest stage of moral culture, the higher impulse is always stronger and the lower weaker, in the lowest stage, the lower is always stronger and the higher, weaker. The one feels pleasure in virtue, while the other finds it in vice. As at this extreme stage (whether of perfection or degradation) the conflict between duty and inclination dies out, there is no room left for trial or for merit and demerit : "Organic necessity is beneath them ; free sanctity is above them." (Martineau, *Types*, II, p. 91.) To attribute merit or demerit in such cases is to overlook their distinctive feature and confound them with the stage of conflict visible in man. As Martineau says, "A creature to be *applauded*, must be more than a creature ; a God, to be (in any strict sense) *praised*, must be less than a God." (*Ibid.*)

(4) A pure regard for duty is also an essential condition of merit. If in the case of conflict we act in the right direction on prudential grounds, evidently there can be no merit for such an action. "In exact proportion," says Lecky, "as we believe a desire for personal enjoyment to be the motive of a good act is the merit of the agent diminished. If we believe the motive to be wholly selfish the merit is altogether destroyed. If we believe it to be wholly disinterested the merit is altogether unalloyed." (*History of European Morals*, I, p. 35.)

An individual, to be truly meritorious, must discharge his duty without any attachment and so without any expectation.

"Unskilful he to fawn, or seek for power,
By doctrines fashion'd to the varying hour ;
Far other aims his heart had learn'd to prize,
More bent to raise the wretched than to rise."

(*Goldsmith*.)

The rule of merit, as mentioned above, is, the stronger the temptation overcome the greater the merit, and the weaker the temptation to which we succumb the greater the demerit. "Subjectively considered," writes Kant, "the degree of *imputability* of actions must be estimated by the greatness of the hindrances which have to be overcome. The greater the natural hindrances (of sensibility) and the less the moral hindrance (of duty), the higher the imputation of merit in a *good deed*. For example, if at a considerable sacrifice I rescue from great necessity one who is a complete stranger to myself.

(4) A pure regard for duty ; otherwise an act degenerates into prudence.

The rule of merit and demerit.

Kant.

On the other hand, the less the natural hindrance, and the greater the hindrance from reasons of duty, so much the more is transgression imputed (as ill desert). Hence the state of mind of the agent, whether he acted in the excitement of passion or with cool deliberation, makes an important difference in imputation." (*Metaphysic of Morals*, Abbott, p. 284.)

A case reported in the *Statesman*.

The extent of demerit in the following case, reported in the *Statesman* of the 14th February, 1907, can easily be determined by the reader:—"Gruesome Dacoity at Diamond Harbour. On the night of the 11th instant a dacoity of a daring character took place under gruesome circumstances in the house of Gopal Chunder Halder, a rich resident of Mathurapur in Diamond Harbour. It appears that there was an epidemic of cholera in the village. On the night of the occurrence Gopal Chunder died of cholera and his corpse lay in the court-yard. A few moments later on a son and a daughter of the deceased died also of cholera. While the three corpses were lying in the court-yard and the wife of Gopal was weeping, a gang of armed men appeared and began to belabour the servant with *lathies*. Then the dacoits entered the house, broke open boxes, and carried away valuable documents, costly jewellery, and cash."

Merit or demerit is to be determined by reference to the inner conflict and not the out-

It may be mentioned in this connection that the determination of the merit of an agent merely by reference to external circumstances is always precarious. Even when the circumstances are the

same, the impulses and their intensities may vary in different individuals; and in the case of the same individual the impulses not infrequently vary from time to time. The real merit of an agent is to be measured by reference to his inner conflict, and not by reference to what appears to us in the outward scene. Let us, therefore, discuss now to what extent the subjective or the objective estimate of merit is valid; and how the true merit of an agent can possibly be determined.

ward circumstances.

§ 4. **Subjective Estimate of Merit** If, as we have seen, the degree of merit in any case is determined by the strength of will and purity of motive, the subjective estimate of merit would seem to be the most reliable one. A little examination shows, however, that this is not always the case. An attempt to determine the extent of one's own merit by 'reflections', 'soliloquies', and 'confessions' amounts to coquetting with one's self and tends to beget moral pride. One who really deserves merit will never pause to determine whether he earns it or not, any more than a hero in the battle-field will stop to measure the extent of his self-sacrifice or credit. We err here in either of two ways:—

The subjective estimate of merit is not always reliable.

Self-examination with a view to determine one's own merit may beget moral pride.

(a) We may attach too much importance to what we might have done and thus may be led to attribute merit to ourselves. And at times we measure merit by outward consequences over which we have but little control, instead of by the purity of motive alone. "Many persons," says Helps, "are in the habit of giving such a factitious value to any services

Subjective estimate may err in either of two ways: (a) Arrogant estimate of the worth of one's own acts.

which they may render, that there is but little chance of their being contented with what they are likely to get in return; which, however, may be quite as much as they deserve." (*Essays*.) Such an expectation brings its own penalty in the shape of disappointment and may even lead to pride or contemptuous indifference to the views of others. Of course in the moral sphere, one should be earnest and independent; but gentle firmness is one thing, and overbearing pride or haughtiness is quite another. The truly meritorious man will not think of his merits; he will freely throw himself away. In proportion as we expect the sympathy and support of others for what we regard as our merit we rather lose it. "The universal sentiment of mankind represents self-sacrifice as an essential element of a meritorious act, and means by self-sacrifice the deliberate adoption of the least pleasurable course without the prospect of any pleasure in return." (*History of European Morals*, Vol. I, p. 35.)

(b) Hollow estimate of worth fed by praise and vanity.

(b) There is another risk in the subjective estimate of merit. Weak minds often lean upon others for an estimate of their worth and thus may be misled into an erroneous estimate. Here comes in the injurious influence of praise and fame—

"For praise too dearly lov'd, or warmly sought,
Enfeebles all internal strength of thought,
And the weak soul, within itself unblest,
Leans for all pleasure on another's breast."

(*Goldsmith*.)

One may thus be led to suppose merit in him when really there is none. This is a risk which is present specially in the case of men of power and position who are sometimes induced to believe in their worth by interested attendants. And it not infrequently happens that praise and fame beget vanity* which makes a man a prey to the opinions of others. "That man has fallen into a pitiable state of moral sick-

* Martineau thus distinguishes between the isolated self-esteem, known as *Pride*, and the dependent and sympathetic type of self-esteem known as *Vanity*: "A man in whom such estimate of his own relative merits has become assured, finds adequate satisfaction in self-applause, and makes no bid for the suffrages of others: if they do not recognise his perfections, so much the worse for them: their blindness does not dim his light. This isolated self-esteem is *Pride*,—involving more or less contemptuous indifference to the sentiments of others. More often, the self-admirer is less confident about his own attractions; has in fact a slight suspicion of his own tricks, and wonders whether anybody could say that he had painted himself up: he is not, therefore, quite self-sufficing, and feels a something counterfeit in his own complacency. At the same time, his social affection is perhaps warm, and, at least in its secondary stage, makes him dependent on the sympathy of his fellows; and if so, the first question to which he will seek a response from them will be, 'Do they sustain him in his ruling desire? Do they echo his self-laudation? or, horrible thought! do they "write him down an ass?"' This dependent and sympathetic type of self-esteem is what we mean by *Vanity*: beginning with self-praise, but uneasy till confirmed by other voices; unable, therefore, to refrain from inviting their applause, either by display of what is to win it, or by flattery which cannot pass without reply. To one, who is in this state of mind, the impelling desire is *immediate* and *thirsty*: the praise which he wants is nothing to him, except to be enjoyed: if he is not to hear it, he might as well go without it: it serves its end, only while the appetite is there. Just in this feature it is, that the variety called the *Love of Fame* deviates from the other types of the same fundamental tendency. The resolve of the man who is swayed by it is, not to *enjoy* the public praise, but to *earn* it, even though it may never fall upon his ear, but only wake and render his name musical to later generations. He declines to pay the price of the popularity now in the market, viz., conformity, against his own better insight, with the humours of the hour." (*Types*, II, p. 238.)

ness," writes Helps, "in whose eyes the good opinion of his fellow-men is the test of merits, and their applause the principal reward for exertion." (*Essays*.)

The truly meritorious person is conscious rather of his demerits than of his merits.

These drawbacks indicate how difficult it is to determine by self-examination one's own merits. The truly meritorious man would rather think of his demerits than of his merits. Faithful service only quickens his conscience and sharpens his judgment, thereby intensifying his consciousness of shortcoming. He regards his critics, instead of admirers, as his true friends, for they set him in the right track when he might possibly have wandered. "In solitude," says Adam Smith, "we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves: we are apt to over-rate the good offices we may have done, and the injuries we may have suffered: we are apt to be too much elated by our own good, and too much dejected by our own bad fortune. The conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better temper. The man within the breast, the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct, requires often to be awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence of the real spectator: and it is always from that spectator, from whom we can expect the least sympathy and indulgence, that we are likely to learn the most complete lesson of self-command." (*Moral Sentiments*, Pt. III, Chap. III.) The innate greatness of a meritorious person makes him forget his merits. His goodness casts a perfume of which he is unconscious. His exalted

worth elicits the admiration and excites the envy of even the greatest emperors, to which he pays no heed. Alexander the Great was once led to exclaim, "Were I not Alexander, I would be Diogenes!"

"Good actions crown themselves with lasting bays,
Who well deserves, needs not another's praise."

(*Heath.*)

§ 5. **Objective Estimate of Merit.** Neither is the popular or objective estimate of merit a sure test of it. "The criterion of merit," as Leslie Stephen observes, "is that the motive implied should be truly virtuous." (*Science of Ethics*, Chap. VII, § 14.) And hence arises the difficulty of determining the merits of others, it being often more or less precarious to read aright their motives. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 3.) The difficulty is illustrated in two ways.

The objective estimate is also precarious, as it is difficult to read aright the motives of others.

The difficulty arises—

(a) Even when a man is sincere and honest, he may be so very reserved (as such men generally are) that it is very difficult to discern from outside how he feels or how he is disposed to action. "Fine words and insinuating appearance," says Confucius, "are seldom associated with virtue." But how often are we not captivated by fine words and winning manners! We thus pronounce a man of loud professions as meritorious and one who is hesitating and cautious as egoistic. It is only by long association and careful observation that we can to a certain extent expect to judge of the merits of others. Any bias, haste, or carelessness is prejudicial to such an estimate. Macaulay thus writes of William of

(a) either from the reserved character and silent work of the truly meritorious person,

as in the case
of William of
Orange ;

Orange—"He was born with violent passions and quick sensibilities : but the strength of his emotions was not suspected by the world. From the multitude his joy and his grief, his affection and his resentment, were hidden by a phlegmatic serenity, which made him pass for the most cold-blooded of mankind. Those who brought him good news could seldom detect any sign of pleasure. Those who saw him after a defeat looked in vain for any trace of vexation. He praised and reprimanded, rewarded and punished, with the stern tranquillity of a Mohawk chief : but those who knew him well and saw him near were aware that under all this ice a fierce fire was constantly burning. It was seldom that anger deprived him of power over himself. But when he was really enraged the first outbreak of his passion was terrible. It was indeed scarcely safe to approach him. On these rare occasions, however, as soon as he regained his self-command, he made such ample reparation to those whom he had wronged as tempted them to wish that he would go into a fury again. His affection was impetuous as his wrath. Where he loved, he loved with the whole energy of his strong mind. When death separated him from what he loved, the few who had witnessed his agonies trembled for his reason and his life. To a very small circle of intimate friends, on whose fidelity and secrecy he could absolutely depend, he was a different man from the reserved and stoical William whom the multitude supposed to be destitute of human feelings." (*History of England*, II, pp. 167-168.)

(b) The difficulty is enormously heightened when people whom we are to judge make a show of their seeming worth. Hollow professions and loud declamations or exhortations have generally more effect upon us than any sincere expression of opinion which may appear as cold and fictitious. Thus a Nero may pass for a personification of kindness, and a Socrates or a Christ may be taken as a seducer of youth or a defiler of religion. Nay, we are at times led to judge others, not by personal examination, but by report or reputation in the market. How 'false prophets' and 'ravening wolves in sheep's clothing' are thus often secure in their iniquities, enjoying the sympathy and support of others. An Iago here, or an Angelo there may, therefore, appear before others as 'full of love and honesty'; and, relying on his good name, he may at times venture not only to injure others but also to threaten his just accusers:

"Who will believe thee, Isabel ?

My unsoil'd name, the austereness of my life,
My vouch against you, and my place i'the state,
Will so your accusation overweigh,

That you shall stifle in your own report

And smell of calumny." (Shakespeare.)

The only reliable procedure to estimate the merits of others is to closely observe their acts. Fine words or fine thoughts do not mean much unless converted into action. As the motive of an act is concealed from view, onlookers are driven to gauge the integrity of character by reference to consequences. Thus an act going beyond legal requirements or

(b) or from the loud professions and ostentatious work of insincere men,

as in the case of an Iago or an Angelo.

Only a careful and prolonged study of another's character may reveal his merits or demerits.

We may presume merit when one goes beyond legal or social requirements.

Even common people estimate merit or demerit by reference to the purity of motive, which is the true test.

mutual understanding is generally believed to express the goodness of heart and strength of will, while an act strictly within the limits of such requirement or understanding is taken as an index of moral indifference. Hence the popular restriction of the term 'merit' only to those cases where an individual exceeds his duty as ordinarily conceived. "Merit", says Leslie Stephen, "has a reference to a certain assumed standard : a man is more or less meritorious as he is above or below the ordinary standard in respect of virtue. Therefore conduct has positive merit only in so far as it is more or less difficult for the average man." (*Science of Ethics*, p. 266.) The distinction between merit and desert has thus a meaning from the external—legal and social—point of view ; and this distinction is analogous to the common distinction of duty and obligation referred to in § 7 of the last chapter. Though, however, spectators are thus driven to estimate merit by reference to outward action yet their unsophisticated consciousness leads them to attach more importance to motives than to consequences and, in case of discrepancy, to attribute credit to the former alone. Any interested motive, for example, discovered in beneficence detracts from its merit ; and disinterested devotion similarly heightens merit, even in cases of apparent legal or social conformity. Really it is not the outward action or inaction but the purity of the heart or the strength of the will that determines merit in any case. As the *Geeta* says—

“कर्मेन्द्रियाणि संयम्य य आस्ते मनसा धरन् ।

इन्द्रियार्थान् विमूढात्मा निश्चिन्तारः स उच्यते ॥

यस्मिन्दियाणि मनसा नियम्यारभतेऽञ्जुन ।

कर्मन्द्रियः कर्मयोगमसक्तः स विशिष्यते” ॥ ३।६—७ ॥

“He who, restraining the organs of action, remains inactive, but yet remembers in his heart the objects of sense, he, confused in soul, is called a ‘false devotee.’ But he who, having subdued the senses by the heart (*manas*), Arjuna ! undertakes the devotion of work by the organs of action, without attachment, is highly esteemed.” (Davies’ Translation, III, 6-7.)

§ 6. **True Estimate of Merit.** A true estimate of merit should, accordingly, involve a reference to both the subjective and the objective test. The objective estimate alone is, as we have shown above, highly precarious ; and the subjective estimate also is liable to be partial. A Being who is in us and outside us, who not only watches His creatures with care but also perceives the thoughts of their heart can alone form a true estimate of their merits and demerits.

God alone
can determine
aright the
merit or de-
merit of an
individual.

“—You and I are weavers,

And only God can see

The woof and warp of deed and thought

By which the wondrous robe is wrought

That covers you and me.” (*Helen A. Goodwin.*)

And after Him, an agent himself, if he tries to be accurate, can to a certain extent weigh his merits or demerits. But personal estimate is, as we have seen, often a dangerous practice, tending to beget pride and vanity which warp judgment. So an agent, if disposed at all to measure his moral worth, should supplement his scrupulous self-examination by a sympathetic regard for the views of his critics and enemies, who

The truly meritorious man thinks rather of his duties than of his merits.

Gizycki and Coit.

are likely to notice his shortcomings more easily. But, as we have seen, the truly meritorious man, never pauses to scan his merits or to watch the views of others. He 'does good by stealth and blushes to find it fame.' However humble his station in life may be, he tries his best to do his duty, heedless of mutual understanding or public opinion. His acts, when duly understood, elicit, no doubt, the praise of others; but he is altogether unmindful of it. "In his own judgment," observe Gizycki and Coit, "a morally developed man does not inquire what will give him a claim to receive praise, but simply what is right; and he does not compare himself to others, but with his own moral ideal. Therefore, in reference to himself, he knows only duty, not desert." (*Ethical Philosophy*, p. 103.) He is bent on self-improvement and purification of character:

"Who, not content that former worth stand fast,
Looks forward, persevering to the last,
From well to better, daily self-surpast:
Who, whether praise of him must walk the earth
For ever, and to noble deeds give birth,
Or he must go to dust without his fame,
And leave a dead, unprofitable name,
Finds comfort in himself and in his cause;
And, while the mortal mist is gathering, draws
His breath in confidence of Heaven's applause:
This is the happy warrior; this is he
Whom every man in arms should wish to be."

(*Wordsworth.*)

CHAPTER XVI.

VIRTUE AND WISDOM.

§ 1. **Merit and Virtue.** Previous exposition must have prepared the way for the relation of Merit to Virtue. We have seen that both these terms have been used in generic and specific senses, and also that the specific senses always carry with them extra-moral associations. (*Vide* Chap. XIV, 4 and Chap. XV, § 1.) Merit and Virtue are inseparable from Right and Duty. These terms, though all deriving their sense from the same central fact, indicate different aspects of our moral life. Merit, as explained above, indicates the strength of character revealed in overcoming the lower propensities, while virtue is gradually acquired by successive meritorious acts which go to build up character. Thus as character is formed, the lower propensities are weakened and so merit declines. Merit illustrates the effort of an honest soul bent on moral progress, while virtue indicates the result of this effort, the progress made in the moral sphere. "Virtue," says Martineau, "is harmony won; Merit is the winning of it: the former is a ratified peace; the latter, the conflict whence it results. Were there no strife of inward propensity, were all the affections in the best order to begin with, virtue would be perfect on the same terms on which a Venus or an Apollo would be beautiful, and would itself be first to feel that it

The terms 'Merit' and 'Virtue', as explained above, have been used in generic and specific senses.

Merit and virtue are connected with right and duty.

Merit indicates the strength of character revealed in a particular case; while virtue, the excellence of disposition accruing from habitual obedience.

Merit illustrates the procedure; while virtue, the effect on character.

Martineau.

deserved nothing. But it is not given to the human nature to stroll into its perfection on such a quiet track ; its springs of action do not spontaneously fall into tune, but have to be reduced into accord by a will that knows the scale of right ; and where the discord is loud and strong, the will, in accomplishing its task, will be put to a severe strain, and give evidence of a more resolute intent and power, than where the false intervals are few and small. It is not that the faulty passion confers the merit ; but that the high courage of its enemy and conqueror earns it." (*Types*, II, p. 496.) And, if we believe in the providential regulation of events, we find here an explanation of an anomaly which at times disturbs our faith in the righteous rule of the universe. We not infrequently notice that virtuous men suffer more than others. This evidently brings out the strength of character more clearly than a mere bed of roses. Fidelity and integrity are more conclusively proved by troubles and afflictions than by anything else.

"And why, ye gods, was virtue made to suffer,
Unless this world be but as fire, to purge
Her dross, that she may mount and be a star !"

(*Nat. Lee.*)

Merit varies directly, while virtue inversely, with the intensity of temptation.

Thus, as we saw above, merit varies directly, while virtue inversely, with the intensity of the lower impulse. The weakness of the lower impulse in any case brings out a virtuous character but leaves little room for any credit in case of victory. When, therefore, by the natural bent of mind or by purification of character one is strongly inclined to act in the right

direction, he does not reveal at the time any strength of will in a case of obedience and so he does not betray any merit in such a case. We should not, however, conclude from this that there is little difference between a natural noble disposition and a virtuous character. The one supplies but the material out of which the latter develops by repeated acts of obedience. The difference between good-nature, as it is the effect of constitution, and 'moral virtue' is thus explained by Addison:—"The first may make a man easy in himself and agreeable to others, but implies no merit in him that is possessed of it. A man is no more to be praised upon this account, than because he has a regular pulse or a good digestion. This good-nature however in the constitution, which Mr. Dryden somewhere calls a *milkiness of blood*, is an admirable ground-work for the other. In order therefore to try our good-nature, whether it arises from the body or the mind, whether it be founded in the animal or the rational part of our nature—in a word whether it be such as is entitled to any other reward, besides that secret satisfaction, and contentment of mind which is essential to it, and the kind reception it procures to us in the world, we must examine it by the following rules.

"First, whether it acts with steadiness and uniformity, in sickness and in health, in prosperity and in adversity; if otherwise, it is to be looked upon as nothing else but an irradiation of the mind from some new supply of spirits, or a more kindly circulation of the blood. Sir Francis Bacon mentions a

Virtue, which is acquired by steady obedience, should not be confounded with natural goodness or good-nature.

Addison.

No merit is due for good-nature,

which is a valuable material for moral goodness or virtue.

Points of difference between good-nature and virtue.

(1) The one is fitful, varying with the prevailing mood at any time, while the other is steady, being due to a formed will.

cunning solicitor, who would never ask a favour of a great man before dinner; but took care to prefer his petition at a time when the party petitioned had his mind free from care, and his appetites in good humour. Such a transient temporary good-nature as this is not that philanthropy, that love of mankind, which deserves the title of a moral virtue.

(2) The one is blind, while the other is discriminative.

"The next way of a man's bringing his good-nature to the test, is to consider whether it operates according to the rules of reason and duty; for if, notwithstanding its general benevolence to mankind, it makes no distinction between its objects, if it exerts itself promiscuously towards the deserving and the undeserving, if it relieves alike the idle and the indigent, if it gives itself up to the first petitioner, and lights upon any one rather by accident than choice,—it may pass for an amiable instinct, but must not assume the name of a moral virtue.

(3) The one operates only in agreement with, while the other, even in opposition to, self-interest.

"The third trial of good-nature will be the examining ourselves, whether or no we are able to exert it to our own disadvantage, and employ it on proper objects, notwithstanding any little pain, want, or inconvenience, which may arise to ourselves from it; in a word, whether we are willing to risk any part of our fortune, our reputation, our health or ease, for the benefit of mankind." (*Spectator*, No. 177.)

Thus as Butler points out, "Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent." (*Dissertation on Virtue*.) As, there-

fore, human nature approaches the extreme limits of an angelic or beastly character, it advances or declines in virtue, but loses or gains in merit, until at the extreme points they completely exclude each other. A pure nature attracts our admiration or reverence ; and if we be ever disposed to praise it, it is only by reference to the prior stage of struggle. Likewise there is abhorrence for an altogether degraded life ; and if we be ever inclined to condemn it, it is only by reference to the prior stage of trial and conflict. Organic necessity is beneath praise and blame, while free sanctity is above them. Though, therefore, both virtue and merit as well as sin and demerit refer to character, yet they are connected with different aspects of it. So we should not be surprised that the measure of the one is not the measure of the other. A degraded life gradually sinks even below the possibility of sin. "The measure of our simple repugnance to low character," says Martineau, "is far different from the measure of our moral condemnation ; we recoil from it, as we should from any deformity, in proportion to its visible departure from our ideal of humanity ; we condemn it, in proportion as it has arisen in full sight of what is higher, and taken only paltry bribes from suborning interests or passions." (*Types*, II, p. 83.)

At extreme points, merit and virtue exclude each other.

They express but different aspects of moral character.

§ 2. **Character of Virtue.** Virtue, as we have seen, is a type of character in harmony with moral law. It is not a natural disposition or gift of fortune but an acquired habit to think, feel, and act

Virtue is an excellence of character which is a development out of the due

and
consistent
regulation
of the
several
natural
tendencies.

Aristotle's
testimony.

The virtues,
though a
development
out of good
acts, react on
them and
stimulate
them.

Hence virtue
is a safeguard
against
wrong-doing.

as directed by Conscience. "Moral Virtue," as Aristotle observes, "while distinguished from all natural phenomena by man's power of modifying and improving its materials, is an evolution from those natural impulses which exist even in the brute, and which may be described as natural virtue. These impulses, by association of repeated acts which are not in themselves virtuous, consolidate themselves into a fixed tendency and so gain those characteristics of permanence and purity of purpose, which are involved in formed virtue." (Wallace's *Aristotle*, pp. 97-98.) As, however, most of the facts of our mental and moral constitution are inter-connected and inter-dependent, we find that though the practice of good acts leads to the formation of virtuous tendencies, yet these tendencies in their turn subsequently influence our acts. Thus repeated and uniform exercise of benevolence develops the virtue of charity which in its turn subsequently inclines one to beneficence. Hence the importance of virtue as a safeguard against wrong-doing. We cannot rely so much on natural dispositions as on formed virtues for the discharge of the duties of life. Inborn tendencies, though strong and predominant, are often liable, as Aristotle points out, to run to excess or defect; it is the formed character, under the regulation of reason, which can secure what Aristotle calls the *mean*, i.e., the due adjustment of the relative claims of the several propensities at work. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 5.) Natural tendencies are highly capricious, variable, and, unreliable in their

operation ; while the virtues are comparatively uniform and certain in their action. "The amiable, attractive, mild attributes of the mind," says Channing, "are recommended as of great price in the sight of God, by Him who was emphatically meek and lowly in heart. Still I must say, that all virtue lies in the strength of character or of moral purpose ; for these gentle, sweet, winning qualities rise into virtue only when pervaded and sustained by moral energy. On this they must rest, by this they must be controlled and exalted, or they have no moral worth. I acknowledge love, kindness, to be a great virtue ; but what do I mean by love, when I thus speak ? Do I mean a constitutional tenderness ? an instinctive sympathy ? the natural and almost necessary attachment to friends and benefactors ? the kindness which is inseparable from our social state, and which is never wholly extinguished in the human breast ? In all these emotions of our nature, I see the kind design of God ; I see a beauty ; I see the germ and capacity of an ever-growing charity. But they are not virtues, they are not proper objects of moral approbation, nor do they give any sure pledge of improvement. This natural amiableness I too often see in company with sloth, with uselessness, with the contemptible vanity and dissipation of fashionable life. It is no ground of trust, no promise of fidelity, in any of the great exigencies of life. The love, the benevolence, which I honour as virtue, is not the gift of nature or condition, but the growth and manifestation of the soul's moral power. It is

Channing.

Virtue lies in the strength of character and not merely in natural dispositions.

Natural dispositions are liable to go astray, when not properly regulated.

They lead to moral excellence only when duly controlled.

a spirit chosen as excellent, cherished as divine, protected with a jealous care, and specially fortified by the resistance and subjection of opposite propensities. It is the soul, determining itself to break every chain of selfishness, to enlarge and to invigorate the kind affections, to identify itself with other beings, to sympathize, not with a few, but with all the living and rational children of God, to honour others' worth, to increase and enjoy their happiness, to partake in the universal goodness of the Creator, and to put down within itself every motion of pride, anger, or sensual desire, inconsistent with this pure charity. In other words, it is strength of holy purpose, infused into the kind affections, which raises them into virtues, or gives them a moral worth, not found in constitutional amiableness." (*Works*, Vol. II, p. 108.)

Moralists differ in their estimate of the worth of virtue :

(1) Some hold that it is intrinsically valuable ;

(2) while others contend that it is merely useful.

(1) If the moral quality is unique and its claim is supreme, then virtue must be admitted as

Though, however, it is generally admitted that the virtues are acquired, and not natural, excellences of character, yet there are differences of opinion as to their real value or worth. (1) Some maintain that they are intrinsically desirable without any reference to an ulterior end ; (2) while others contend that their value lies in their utility or usefulness. Let us briefly consider these two views one by one.

(1) If, as we have seen (*Vide* Chaps. IV and XIII), the moral standard is supreme and the moral quality is not resolvable into anything else, then the moral end is intrinsically desirable without any reference to anything else. Our pleasures and enjoy-

ments, rank and emoluments are nothing as compared with virtues. Reprobates and voluptuaries, though snatching passing pleasures, never have the peace of mind which is inseparable from virtue. The balance of our constitution is preserved only then when Conscience is uniformly followed as a guide; and such a uniform course is possible only through the attainment of the virtues. And, since harmony is agreeable and discord painful, the virtues, as the main-springs of harmonious exercise of our powers, are also the sources of serene enjoyment and bliss. From this, however, we are not to conclude that pleasure or happiness is really the end to which the virtues are but means. Happiness, as we have seen, is merely an inseparable adjunct of harmony or virtue. Our being's end is perfection as enjoined by Conscience; and the attainment of the end is followed by peace and pleasure. But these consequences should never be the motives of moral activity.

intrinsically
desirable.

Virtue se-
cures perfec-
tion and
happiness
alike.

"Because right is right, to follow right
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence."

(Tennyson.)

(2) The above view is disputed by hedonists, who, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. X), regard pleasure, and not perfection, as the end of our life. According to them the value of virtue lies in its conduciveness to happiness; and but for such a tendency, there is nothing really desirable in it. "This state of the will," writes Mill, "is a means to good, not intrinsically a good; and does not con-

(2) Hedonists contend that virtue has only a relative and not an absolute value: it is but a means to pleasure or happiness.

Mill.

The law of transference explains the apparently disinterested character of virtue.

The law of transference explains that the interest of the end may be transferred to the means invariably associated with it, as in the case of the love of money.

And the case of virtue is held to be similar,

e.g., veracity.

tradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 61.) The law of transference explains the apparently disinterested operation of virtue in an honest mind, as it explains the seemingly absolute love of money in the case of a miser. "It is by associating the doing right with pleasure, or the doing wrong with pain, or by eliciting and impressing and bringing home to the person's experience the pleasure naturally involved in the one or the pain in the other, that it is possible to call forth that will to be virtuous, which, when confirmed, acts without any thought of either pleasure or pain." (Mill, *Utilitarianism*, p. 60.) Whenever a means and an end are uniformly associated together, the interest of the end is transferred to the means. It is very well illustrated in the case of the love of money: money can purchase diverse pleasures; and hence the interest of the pleasure is transferred by association to money itself, so much so that a miser may even forego the common needs of life (not to speak of luxuries) for the sake of money. And such is alleged to be the case with what are known as virtues. Veracity, for example, is found by experience to be a means to social security and happiness; and thus the interest of the end is transferred to the means so much so that a person may even sacrifice his life in speaking truth.

This reduction of Virtue to Prudence is, however, scarcely justifiable by facts. Men are not machines

made for weighing pleasures and pains, so that nothing else can have any independent value besides these. The human constitution, as we have seen, is a noble structure having a higher end. To deny such an end and to reduce every problem to a hedonistic calculus is to belie consciousness and to sap the only secure foundation of philosophical systems. "It is a calumny on men," observes Carlyle, "to say that they are roused to heroic action by ease, hope of pleasure, recompense,—sugar-plums of any kind, in this world or the next! In the meanest mortal there lies something nobler. The poor swearing soldier, hired to be shot, has his 'honour of a soldier,' different from drill-regulations and the shilling a day. It is not to taste sweet things, but to do noble and true things, and vindicate himself under God's Heaven as a God-made man, that the poorest son of Adam dimly longs. Show him the way of doing that, the dullest day drudge kindles into a hero. They wrong man greatly who say he is to be seduced by ease. Difficulty, abnegation, martyrdom, death are the *allurements* that act on the heart of man. Kindle the inner genial life of him, you have a flame that burns-up all lower considerations. Not happiness, but something higher: one sees this even in the frivolous classes, with their 'point of honour' and the like." (*Hero-worship*, Lect., II.) It is not self-seeking but self-sacrifice which constitutes the essence of virtue. "He that loseth his life shall find it." (*St. Matthew*, X, 39.) It is estimated by reference to the purity of

The latter view is untenable. It reduces virtue to mere prudence.

But the human constitution is made, not for the pursuit of pleasure, but for a nobler end.

To deny this is to falsify consciousness and thus to repudiate the sound philosophical method.

Carlyle.

Virtue does not consist in self-seeking, but in self-sacrifice.

motives and not by reference to the agreeableness of consequences. In fact, similar acts with similar consequences may indicate quite different types of character.

“सक्ताः कर्मण्यविदांसा यथा कुर्वन्ति भारत ।

कुर्याद्विद्वान्मया सक्तयिकीर्षुर्लोकसंग्रहं” ॥ ३ । २ ५ ॥

“What is done by men enslaved by desires may as well be done for the sake of humanity by persons free from all attachments.” (The *Geeta*, III, 25.)

Conditions of
virtue :

§ 3. **Conditions of Virtue.** The circumstances which favour the development of the virtues are the following :—

(1) Honest
determina-
tion of what
is right and
proper under
definite
circum-
stances.

Carlyle.

(1) The prime condition of virtue, as of all moral activity, is sincerity. One should really be in earnest to determine the right course in every case, that he may build up a virtuous character. Carlyle rightly observes, “Dilettantism, hypothesis, speculation, a kind of amateur-search for Truth, toying and coquetting with Truth : this is the sorest sin. The root of all other imaginable sins. It consists in the heart and soul of the man never having been *open* to Truth ;—‘living in a vain show.’ Such a man not only utters and produces falsehoods, but *is* himself a falsehood. The rational moral principle, spark of the Divinity, is sunk deep in him, in quiet paralysis of life-death.” (*Hero-worship*, Lect. II.)

(2) Scrupu-
lous discharge
of every duty,
however
insignificant
it may seem.

(2) To develop a virtuous character one should not merely speculate but act. “Fine thoughts,” says Emerson, “are very much like fine dreams” so long as they are not reduced to action. However humble

a work may be, it should not be slighted but should be regarded as a sacred mission. The scrupulous discharge of what are called the minor duties of life is more conducive to virtuous character than the anxious care for prominent obligations. As the *Geeta* says—

“कायेन मनसा बुद्ध्या केवलैरिन्द्रियैःपि ।

योगिनः कम् कर्षन्ति सङ्गत्यक्तात्मशुद्धये” ॥ ५।११ ॥

“By the body, by the heart (*manas*), by the mind (*buddhi*), even by the senses alone, yogins, giving up attachment, do their work for the purifying of the soul.” (V, 11.)

(3) To strengthen virtuous dispositions we must encounter difficulties and should not shun them. As our muscles grow stronger by exercise, so our moral nature is strengthened by overcoming difficulties.

(3) To strengthen virtue, difficulties should be encountered.

“Virtue's no virtue while it lives secure;
When difficulty waits on't, then 'tis pure.”

(*Quarles*.)

We should remember, however, that in the early period of moral culture too severe a strain should not be put upon the will; for one failure will undo the good effect of ten favourable instances. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, §4.)

(4) As virtue is a habitual disposition, it must be acquired by repeated and uniform exercise. Practice makes perfect any side of our nature. Moral education often proves a failure because it is conducted by fits and starts. A child, punished to-day for a ‘black lie’ and rewarded to-morrow for a

(4) Repeated and uniform practice.

'white', will finally fail to distinguish between black and white lies and will never acquire the virtue of veracity. Similarly temperance will be difficult for a man who now curbs his passions and now freely indulges in them. One case of failure against twenty instances of success is more injurious than ten uniform cases of success without any failure.

(5) Moral watchfulness to preserve the purity of character.

(5) Moral watchfulness or vigilance is also necessary to preserve the purity of character. Virtues at times degenerate into vices by the sophistical pleadings of passions and admirers. A nice sense of honour—not pride nor vanity—often begets an independence of character which enables one to be proof against all baneful influences.

"Say what is honour? 'Tis the finest sense
Of *justice* which the human mind can frame,
Intent each lurking frailty to disclaim,
And guard the way of life from all offence
Suffer'd or done." (Wordsworth.)

Distinction among virtues :

§ 4. **Distinction among Virtues.** We have seen that Duties and Virtues express but different aspects of a single moral life, the one referring to acts, while the other, to the character whence they issue. Like Duties, Virtues also have been distinguished from different stand-points.

(1) Distinction between *Cardinal and Subaltern Virtues*, the one being fundamental, while the other dependent.

(1) From antiquity virtues have been distinguished into *Cardinal and Subaltern*. The cardinal virtues are certain central or pivot virtues on which many subordinate virtues turn. *Plato*, for example, enumerates Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice as the cardinal virtues. *Wisdom* is

the virtue or excellence of reason which is the supreme faculty in man. Next to it is *Courage* which is the virtue of the spirited or combative element, under the regulation of reason. *Temperance* is the virtue of the passions when duly controlled; while *Justice* is the virtue of the entire soul preserving harmony among its different parts. These virtues, according to Plato, should characterize not merely individuals but also communities or commonwealths. In an ideal State, the governing class should be characterized by wisdom; the soldier class, by courage; and the helots or serving class, by temperance; while justice preserves the harmony of the whole. The Greek moralists generally adopt this classification of cardinal virtues and contend that all other virtues are subaltern since they follow from these. The subaltern virtues as minor excellences depend upon the major or cardinal.

Corresponding to this distinction there is the distinction between *Primary and Secondary Virtues*. D'Arcy, for example, writes, "If the attempt were made to draw up a fairly complete list of virtues to suit the present condition of society, it would be scarcely possible to avoid making a distinction between primary virtues, virtues covering a wide range of cognate characteristics, and secondary or derivative virtues which would be included in corresponding groups under the primary virtues. Only in this way would it be possible to avoid illogical division. Thus, if Benevolence were classed as a primary virtue, the secondary virtues grouped

According to Plato, the Cardinal Virtues are—

Wisdom,

Courage,

Temperance,

and Justice.

According to Plato, the constitution of the individual as well as of the commonwealth should be characterized by these virtues.

An analogous distinction has been drawn between *Primary and Secondary Virtues*.

D'Arcy.

The primary virtues are of wide, while the secondary, of narrow, range.

under the head of Benevolence would include philanthropy, patriotism, and perhaps courtesy." (*Short Study of Ethics*, pp. 175-176.)

(2) Distinction between 'Natural' and 'Supernatural' Virtues, the one being acquired by human effort, and the other, infused by God.

The Theological Virtues are Faith, Hope, and Charity.

(2) Virtues have also been distinguished by Christian moralists into 'Natural' or 'acquired by human acts' and 'Supernatural' or 'infused by God.' The former include the cardinal virtues of the Greek moralists, while the latter include what are known as 'Theological Virtues', viz., Faith, Hope, and Charity. This distinction was introduced by *medieval moralists* to improve upon the Greek classification according to the requirements of the Christian Church. "Habituation," says Thomas Aquinas, "contributes to both, but in different ways. It causes acquired virtue; it disposes to infused virtue; and where infused virtue exists, it preserves it and advances it." (*Summa Theol.*)

(3) Distinction between *Natural* and *Artificial* Virtues. The former, being the expression of the demands of human nature, are directly conducive to happiness; while the latter, being due to convention, are indirectly useful.

Hume.

3) *Hume* draws a distinction between *Natural* and *Artificial* Virtues. As, according to him, utility is the common ground of all virtues, he calls those virtues natural where the utility is direct, and those artificial where it is indirect. The effect in the one case is immediate and certain happiness, while in the other, it is comparatively remote and contingent. He mentions meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, and equity as examples of the former; while justice, allegiance, modesty, and good manners as instances of the latter. (See *Treatise*, Bk. III, Pt. III, § 1.) The natural virtues, according to Hume, are but the expression of the demands of human nature and so are support-

ed by its native impulses, while artificial virtues are not so, but are kept up for the well-being of the community.

(4) Virtues have also been distinguished into *Negative and Positive* according as they lead us to desist from or undertake definite courses of action. Thus when temperance or self-control is regarded as a negative virtue, self-culture is viewed as positive; and likewise justice is regarded as a negative form of the active virtue of benevolence. The one restrains, while the other encourages.

(4) Distinction between *Negative and Positive Virtues*, the one restraining while the other inciting.

Connected with this distinction is the distinction often drawn between what are called *Passive and Active Virtues*. Active virtues like benevolence and patriotism urge men forward in certain directions, while passive virtues, like patience and resignation, incline them towards inactivity or desistence.

An analogous distinction between *Passive and Active Virtues*

(5) Since the time of Aristotle, virtues have also been distinguished into *Intellectual and Moral* according as they are connected simply with intellectual culture or concerned with the due regulation of the several impulses of the human mind. Thus while philosophy and wisdom are regarded as intellectual virtues by Aristotle, liberality and temperance are regarded by him as moral virtues. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 5.)

(5) Distinction between *Intellectual and Moral Virtues*, the one concerned with intellectual culture, while the other, with the due regulation of impulses or inclinations. Aristotle.

These distinctions, however, like the corresponding distinctions of Duties (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 7), are more or less arbitrary and one-sided. The unity of our moral constitution precludes the possibility of a sharp demarcation line being drawn between

These distinctions, however, are more or less arbitrary owing to the organic unity of our

constitution, which aims at a harmonious development of the different faculties or tendencies.

As the different virtues are but different expressions of moral perfection, they are all interconnected.

Some of the expressions are unhappy and even misleading.

Channing

different classes of virtues and duties. The different virtues express but different aspects of moral perfection which is the supreme end of our moral life. Thus the so-called artificial virtues are closely connected with the natural, and the negative or passive virtues with the positive or active, and the intellectual virtues with the moral. True beneficence is inseparable from justice, self-control from self-culture, patience from patriotism, and wisdom from temperance. In fact, the connection of the several virtues is so very close owing to the organic unity of our mental and moral constitution, that we can deduce all the virtues from any one of them. As the several virtues indicate only the harmonious development of our moral constitution, any discrepancy among them reveals but discord and moral deformity. Some of the expressions, moreover, are unhappy as fostering erroneous notions. 'Artificial virtue,' for example, does not mean that it rests only on convention; it ultimately draws its sustenance from what is called by contradistinction 'natural virtue,' however indirect and remote the agreeable consequences may be. Similarly, what we call negative and passive virtues may at times be more strenuous than what are described as positive or active. "I fear," writes Channing, "that the importance of strength in the Christian character, has been in some degree obscured by the habit of calling certain Christian graces of singular worth, by the name of *passive* virtues. This name has been given to humility, patience, resignation; and

I fear, that the phrase has led some to regard these noble qualities as allied to inaction, as wanting energy and determination. Now the truth is, that the mind never puts forth greater power over itself, than when, in great trials, it yields up calmly its desires, affections, interests to God. There are seasons, when to be *still* demands immeasurably higher strength than to act. Composure is often the highest result of power. Think you it demands no power to calm the stormy elements of passion, to moderate the vehemence of desire, to throw off the load of dejection, to suppress every repining thought, when the dearest hopes are withered, and to turn the wounded spirit from dangerous reveries and wasting grief, to the quiet discharge of ordinary duties?" (*On Self-Denial*, Works, Vol II, p. 110.)

The passive virtues, for example, involve at times greater strain or exertion than do the so-called active virtues.

§. 5. **Classification of Virtues.** Though the several distinctions of virtues, mentioned in the preceding section, are not tenable, yet some of them are instructive. They suggest a classification of virtues and indicate that there are some which are more comprehensive than others. Thus the distinction between cardinal and subaltern, or primary and secondary, virtues implies that there are certain general acquired tendencies to rectitude which cover many minor or subordinate tendencies. Likewise the distinction between intellectual and moral virtues indicates that some of them pertain more to the cultivation of intelligence, while others are mainly concerned with the regulation of the lower propensities. In seek-

Virtues have been classified by reference to the general forms of moral excellence, and not by reference to the rich variety of comparatively concrete forms.

Classification of virtues must be by reference to the character of the agent.

ing for a principle of classification we should confine our attention to the general tendencies alone, instead of to their minor modifications. To classify duties or virtues by reference to the rich variety of concrete circumstances would be extravagant and impossible. "Virtues," as Dewey and Tufts observe, "are numberless. Every situation, not of a routine order, brings in some special shading, some unique adaptation, of disposition." (*Ethics*, p. 403.) We shall, accordingly, attempt a classification only by reference to the principal varieties. As duties and virtues are closely connected with one another, the principle of one classification may be of some use in the other. We shall, however, be constrained to modify the principle because duties refer only to acts while virtues refer to character. "These two terms, virtue and duty," says Seth, "are two modes of describing the same thing; the former emphasises the inner character and its fundamental excellences, the latter the expression of character in conduct and the primary forms of that expression." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 249.) We may classify acts, to which duties refer, with regard to individuals affected by them, viz., self, others, and God. But any principle of classifying the principal forms of character must primarily have reference to the nature of the agent. In the one, objective reference may preponderate; but in the other, subjective reference is essential. We may, therefore, classify the virtues in the first instance by reference to the different parts of our constitution affected by them. Virtues may be called (I) Physical, (II)

Intellectual, (III) Æsthetic, and (IV) Moral. Of course, we are not to understand by this that any one of these classes refers exclusively to itself. Apart from the implication of the different faculties in one another, we should remember that we have nothing to do here simply with physical, intellectual, or æsthetic exercise. Thus, when we speak of physical, intellectual, or æsthetic virtues, all that we mean is that the habitual tendencies in harmony with Conscience are principally concerned with the cultivation of the physical, the intellectual, or the æsthetic side of our being. We are not at all concerned here with athletic aptitudes, imaginative flights, or æsthetic enjoyments, pure and simple. But such exercises, so far as they are enjoined or prohibited by Conscience, come, as we have seen, within the province of Ethics. So physical, intellectual, and æsthetic virtues in Ethics mean corresponding excellences of character *as enjoined by Conscience*. Apart from moral requirements we have nothing to do with any tendency or exercise here. Physical, intellectual, and æsthetic virtues are also moral virtues in a wide sense of the term. What are described as moral virtues differ from the rest in being exclusively concerned with the regulation of the impulses or lower propensities. With these preliminary remarks let us proceed to notice briefly the principal forms of virtuous character.

Virtues classified by reference to the different parts of the human constitution into
(I) Physical,

(II) Intellectual, (III) Æsthetic, and (IV) Moral.

The different classes of virtues indicate different forms of moral excellence illustrated with regard to different faculties.

I. The Physical Virtues cover *Regard for Health and Physical Culture*. The 'house we live in' must be kept clean and in a sound condition in

(I) The Physical Virtues include Self-preservation

and Physical Culture.

Owing to the close connection of mind and body, morbid physical conditions lead to moral defects.

(II) *The Intellectual Virtues* include Accuracy and Prudence.

Correct estimate of facts.

Prudential regard for well-being.

order that our mental and moral constitution may not suffer. How very careful we often are about our residences and how little attentive to the condition of the dwelling entrusted to us by our Maker! Owing to the close connection of mind and body, any disorder in the latter is apt to produce disorder in the former. We find, for example, that dyspeptics and invalids are generally peevish and unreasonable; and persons wanting in physical strength are also lacking in courage. The passions and lower propensities are often inflamed by unhealthy conditions of body which thus put a severe strain upon our moral powers.

II. *The Intellectual Virtues* include *Accuracy and Prudence*. Accuracy involves love of truth and so a desire to conform our mental constitution to the external. Our mind, like a mirror, must reflect the right relations of things in order that we may live and thrive: our material and spiritual prosperity alike depend on correct knowledge, the absence of which brings misery and ruin. A life of illusions can never be a life of virtue. Knowledge, however, in any case should not be merely theoretical but also practical. If, as Bacon says, knowledge is power, we must try to guide our conduct by it. And this practical aspect illustrates what we call Prudence. "Prudence," says Aristotle, "is a conscious habit of correct thinking on matters of action." (*Nic. Ethics*, VI, 5.) In helping a beggar, for example, we should determine not merely our duty to help, but also the form of charity most effective in the particular case. Reckless conduct involving

vital injury is not excusable. Thoughtless acts are at times due to negligence which brings us guilt and shame. "Prudence," as Butler says, "is a species of virtue, and folly of vice : meaning by *folly*, somewhat quite different from mere incapacity : a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had capacity for." (*Dissertation on Virtue.*)

Butler.

Prudence is a species of Virtue.

III. The *Æsthetic* Virtues include the *Cultured Taste* which enables us to appreciate beauty and sublimity in nature and art. *Æsthetic* refinement enlarges and ennobles our nature ; it is a source not merely of pure pleasure but also of pure activity. The sanctuary of *Nature* is no less instructive and elevating than the sanctuary of a temple, if we have but the corresponding virtues in us to profit by them.

(III) *The Æsthetic Virtues.* Cultured Taste refines and improves our moral nature.

"What, then, is taste but those internal powers,
Active and strong, and feelingly alive
To each fine impulse ? a discerning sense
Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust
From things deformed, or disarranged, or gross
In species ?" (*Akenside.*)

IV. The *Strictly Moral* Virtues may be divided into two classes according as they aim at our own good or that of others. (1) The *Self-regarding* Virtues include (a) Temperance, (b) Perseverance, (c) Courage, (d) Contentment, (e) Humility, and (f) Self-improvement. Humility, involving a modest estimate of one's own powers, is the only secure foundation of true Self-respect, as distinguished from arrogance or conceit.

(IV) *The Strictly Moral Virtues :*

(1) Self-regarding, such as Temperance, Perseverance, Courage, Contentment, Humility, and Self-improvement. Humility is the basis of true Self-respect.

of external; it is mindful of self-respect and not the homage of men.*

*Distinction
between
Conscience
and Prudence.*

§ 6. **Conscience and Prudence.** The distinction between Conscience and Prudence has already been indicated in section 3 of the last chapter. Conscience is concerned with duty, while Prudence with interest. Conscience estimates the relative moral worth of impulses or springs of action; Prudence calculates the consequences of action with a view to secure happiness and avoid misery. Con-

* "A foolish consistency," says Emerson, "is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words and tomorrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict everything you said to-day.—'Ah, so you shall be sure to be misunderstood?'—Is it so bad, then, to be misunderstood? Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be misunderstood." (*Essay on Self-Reliance.*)

The student may consult in this connection the interesting table of virtues given by Muirhead in his *Elements of Ethics* (P. 201). The *Geeta* thus enumerates the principal virtues:—

“अभयं सत्त्वसंशुद्धिज्ञानयोगव्यवर्तिः ।

दानं दमश्च यज्ञश्च स्वाध्यायस्तप आर्जवम् ॥ १

अहिंसा सत्यमक्रोधस्त्यागः शान्तिरपैशुनम् ।

दया भूतेष्वलोलुप्धं मार्दवं क्षौरचापलम् ॥ २

तेजः क्षमा धृतिः शौचमद्रोही नातिमानिता ।

भवन्ति सम्यग् देवीमभिजातस्य भारत ॥ ३

(Chap. XVI, 1—3.)

“Fearlessness, purity of heart, continuance in the devotion of knowledge, alms-giving, self-restraint and sacrifice, solitary reading, penance, uprightness; innocence, truth, freedom from anger, renunciation, tranquillity, good-will, compassion for all, absence of desire or emotion, gentleness, modesty, gravity; vigour, patience, firmness, chastity, absence of vindictiveness and vanity,—these are the conditions, O son of Bharata! of a man who is born for a divine lot.” (Davies' Translation, XVI, 1-3.)

science, as Dr. Martineau remarks, is an affair of insight, while Prudence is an affair of foresight. The one intuitively recognises the relative moral value of the impulses which influence us on any occasion, the other calculates, as the result of past experience, the agreeable or disagreeable consequences of our acts. It is evident from this distinction that there is unanimity or agreement among men in respect of Conscience, while there is the utmost diversity among them in respect of Prudence: though men agree in their fundamental notions of right or wrong, yet there is the greatest difference among them in respect of what they like or dislike.

Men agree with regard to Conscience, but not with regard to Prudence.

If we arrange the impulses or springs of action in scales according to their moral rank or hedonistic value, we get (1) *a moral scale*, in which the highest impulse is placed first and the lowest last, and (2) *a prudential scale*, in which the strongest impulse is placed first and the weakest last. The one scale is determined by moral worth, while the other by intensity. Prudence evidently requires us to act in the direction of the strongest of the contending impulses. As Martineau puts it, "the intenser the thirst, the sweeter the cup of cold water": in other words, the stronger an impulse, the greater the pleasure resulting from its gratification.

The springs of action may be arranged (1) in a scale of relative moral worth and (2) in a scale of relative intensity.

It is evident from the foregoing that (1) the claims of Conscience and Prudence often run counter to each other; but even when they converge they do not coalesce. Acts which are outwardly alike may have very unlike values assigned to them by Con-

(1) Conscience and Prudence are often in conflict.

(2) Prudence is necessarily strengthened with age ; it is not so, however, with Conscience.

science and Prudence. Agreeable acts, if done from good motives, are judged as right, and otherwise they are regarded as wrong. (2) There is also difference in the course of their development. With the increase of years we have ample experience of the consequences of acts ; and thus the force of temptation increases.

“Each nobler aim, repress’d by long control,
Now sinks at last, or feebly mans the soul ;
While low delights succeeding fast behind,
In happier meanness occupy the mind.”

(*Goldsmith.*)

(3) Prudence weakens, while Conscience strengthens, character by fostering gratification in the one case and self-restraint in the other.

The choice between Virtue and Pleasure then gradually becomes a choice of Hercules, in which it becomes often difficult to persist in the right course. The result is that while men increase in Prudence, they generally decline in Virtue. As Martineau says, “In the growth of Prudence there is almost a necessity of nature ; but in even the continuance of Conscience, a contingency of pure and obedient will.” (*Types*, II, p. 72.) (3) Prudence, while nominally securing uniformity of action, is really the fruitful source of instability and inconsistency. It undermines the strength of character and makes the mind a prey to the varying influences of inclination. In pursuing pleasure it really misses it. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 7.) “Prudence,” says Helps, “may enable a man to conquer the world, but not to rule his own heart : it may change one evil passion for another ; but it is not a thing of potency enough to make a man change his nature.” (*Essay on Self-Discipline.*) (4) Conscience and

Prudence differ in their estimates of our mental constitution : the one recognises the due subordination of parts and aims at the harmony of the whole ; while the other pays no more attention to them than is required by the relative intensities of impulses, and aims only at the gratification of the vehement disposition. (5) They differ also in their attitude to the world : the one makes an impartial estimate of the relative claims of its different parts ; while the other subordinates everything to the claims of the agent. So long as our aim is merely pleasure we only use other things and beings for our own benefit. The prudential estimate is thus essentially egoistic and inconsistent with a liberal interpretation of Nature. Tennyson writes—

“But any man that walks the mead,
In bud or blade, or bloom, may find,
According as his humours lead,
A meaning suited to his mind.
And liberal applications lie
In Art like Nature, dearest friend ;
So 'twere to cramp its use, if I
Should hook it to some useful end.”

The estimate of Conscience alone is consistent with a teleological view of creation.

“Each moss,
“Each shell, each crawling insect, holds a rank
Important in the plan of Him who framed
This scale of beings ; holds a rank which, lost,
Would break the chain, and leave behind a gap
Which Nature's self would rue.” (*Thomson.*)

(4) Conscience preserves, while Prudence disturbs, the harmony of our constitution.

(5) Prudence is egoistic, while Conscience is altruistic, in tendency.

§ 7. **Prudence and Wisdom.** The term Prudence, though generally used in the narrow sense explained above, has sometimes been used in a wide sense to cover the proximate as well as the remote consequences of our acts. Let us consider the two senses here with a view to see their bearing on our moral life.

(I) Prudence in a narrow sense takes into account only the immediate results of actions.

It aims, therefore, at the gratification of the strongest desire.

(II) Prudence in a wide sense consults the proximate as well as the remote consequences of acts.

It takes into account—
(1) The effects on health,

(I) Prudence in a narrow sense, as explained above, implies a calculation of the immediate results of our acts with a view to secure the greatest amount of pleasure. Its rule, therefore, is to follow the strongest inclination in any case, as it yields the greatest satisfaction for the time being. But such a course, however agreeable in the present, does not secure real happiness. "Hollow, hollow, all delight." (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 1.) One adopting such a course often suffers in health, reputation, and peace of mind. Hence true Prudence, or Prudence in a wide sense, takes into account *all* the consequences of an act.

(II) Prudence in a wide sense, then, estimates an eligible course by reference to the proximate as well as the remote consequences of an act. Such consequences include, besides the gratification of present impulse, the following factors:—

(1) The effect on health and other permanent interests of life. We find as a rule that virtuous courses of action are conducive to health, while sinful courses are injurious to it. Thus purity, in the long run, brings health and comfort, while corruption brings disease and suffering. As Manu says—

“अधर्मे षष्ठे तावत्ततो भद्राणि पश्यति ।

ततः सपदान् जयति समूलस्तु विनश्यति” ॥ ४।१७४॥

“By immoral action a man indeed prospers, gains various ends, and defeats his enemies; but he perishes at length from his whole root upwards.” (*Manu Sanhita*, IV, 174.) This is quite consistent with our moral expectations and the supremacy of the moral standard as proved before. (*Vide* Chap. XIII.)

(2) The sympathy or antipathy of others constituting society. A virtuous course of action is praised and rewarded, while a sinful course is blamed and punished by society. “A right act,” says the Rev. T. Binney, “strikes the cord that extends through the whole universe, touches all moral intelligence, visits every world, vibrates along its whole extent, and conveys its vibrations to the very bosom of God.” Honesty is not merely a virtue, but is said to be the best policy.

(2) the attitude of society,

(3) The approbation or disapprobation of one's own Conscience. A virtuous course of action brings peace and contentment, while a sinful course brings uneasiness and torment. The pangs of Conscience far outweigh any pleasure which may be purchased by short-sighted Prudence.

and (3) the peace of Conscience.

“Consider all thy actions, and take heed
On stolen bread, tho' it is sweet, to feed
Sin, like a bee, unto thy hive may bring
A little honey, but expect the sting.
Thou may'st conceal thy sin by cunning art,
But Conscience sits a witness in thy heart ;

Which will disturb thy peace, thy rest undo,
For that is witness, judge, and prison too."

(R. Watkins.)

Prudence in
a wide sense
is Wisdom.

Whewell.

Prudence is
the choice of
a desirable
means; while
Wisdom is
the choice of
the proper
end and
means.

Wisdom in-
cludes Con-
science.

Even Pru-
dence in a
narrow sense
may work in
harmony
with Con-
science,

Thus Prudence in a wide sense is not inconsistent with Conscience. This higher Prudence is known as *Wisdom*. Wisdom thus unites economy and virtue; it implies a regard for happiness as well as excellence. "We conceive," says Whewell, "*prudence* as the virtue by which we select the right means for given ends, while *wisdom* implies the selection of right ends as well as of right means." Thus Prudence, anxious for proximate gratification, may pursue a wrong end; but Wisdom aims at true happiness only by reference to virtuous ends. Though the terms Prudence and Wisdom are thus distinguished, yet they are sometimes used synonymously. Generally, however, Wisdom without qualification means higher Prudence; while Prudence without qualification stands for its inferior or narrow form.

Wisdom, or Prudence in a wide sense, is thus closely connected with Conscience. But even conceived in a narrow sense, Prudence is not necessarily antagonistic to Conscience. Their proper spheres, though distinct, are harmonious. When we are confronted with any concrete situation, our first business is to determine our duty. And next our business is to choose that mode of fulfilling our duty which would be consistent with Prudence. This may be illustrated by an example. When we meet a beggar in the street, the first question to decide is whether we should help him. Next we are to decide the form

which our charity should assume. Though Prudence has thus a legitimate sphere of activity, yet it always tries to extend its empire. Such are the charms of passion and allurements of sense that we often forget our true interest and act for the sake of near pleasure. Prudence, accordingly, often leads to luxury, licentiousness, and ruin, until the baneful consequences of our acts teach us to be more mindful of our permanent interests, which, as shown above, include pre-eminently the well-being of our moral life. Thus, necessity gradually leads to Virtue and begets Wisdom. Hence we find that even reprobates in later life become wise and pass for virtuous. "Slight tastes of philosophy," says Bacon, "may perchance move one to atheism, but fuller draughts lead back to religion." And what Bacon says of philosophy and religion is no less true of Prudence and Virtue. Narrow and limited experience may incline one towards Prudence in the early period of life ; but deeper knowledge and wider experience incline him towards Virtue later on. In the earlier stage, when one is led by narrow or false Prudence, he may be so blinded by passion as to regard himself as the centre and end of the universe to whom everything else is but a means of gratification ; he may be

though its tendency ever is to outrun its proper limits.

Though narrow experience may favour Prudence, wider experience leads to Wisdom.

"Said to have a stubborn soul,
That apprehends no further than this world,
And squares his life according."

(*Shakespeare.*)

But experience soon teaches the transitoriness of

human enjoyments and the uncertainty of human life itself:

“Fond man! the vision of a moment made!
Dream of a dream! and shadow of a shade!”

(*Young.*)

Two important conditions favour the development of Wisdom out of Prudence ;
(1) The bitter experience of short-sighted Prudence ;

There are two principal circumstances which bring about a change from a life of mere Prudence to that of Wisdom: (1) The pursuit of pleasure, as we have seen, instead of bringing pleasure, brings only inordinate craving and so uneasiness and misery. Pleasure is like a mirage which always recedes; it is attractive from distance, but its charms are gone when experienced. Pleasures are finally

“Like to the apples on the Dead Sea’s shore,
All ashes to the taste.” (*Byron.*)

and (2) the growing pleasures of a virtuous life.

Experience, therefore, gradually prepares the way for the serene delights of a virtuous life. (2) The other important factor which develops Wisdom is the increasing agreeable experience of a virtuous life. However ‘stern’ Duty may seem in the earlier stages of moral progress, later on we discover her blessings. What was done before with reluctance is afterwards done with alacrity and enthusiasm.

“The path that leads to Virtue’s court is narrow,
Thorny, and up a hill, a bitter journey:
But being gone through, you find all heavenly
sweets.” (*Dekker.*)

Thus if Prudence may preponderate in early life, Wisdom generally supersedes it later on.

§ 8. **Virtue and Wisdom.** If Prudence is based on opinion and is the guide of shallow minds,

Wisdom and Virtue are based on true knowledge and are the guides of profound minds. But though Wisdom and Virtue are thus connected, there are important differences between them.

*Virtue and
Wisdom dis-
tinguished :*

(1) Wisdom calculates happiness in determining a course of action, whether such calculation is restricted to the pleasures of this life alone or extended to cover also the pleasures of the life to come. Thus Paley confounds Virtue with Wisdom when he says that "the difference and the only difference" between Prudence and Virtue is "that in the one case we consider what we shall gain or lose in the present world ; in the other case, we consider also what we shall gain or lose in the world to come." Virtue is altogether disinterested, having no reference to pleasure. A virtuous life is no doubt a happy life because happiness comes *unsought* as the concomitant of the perfect and harmonious exercise of our powers. Wisdom is superior to Prudence, but Virtue is superior to all, even if we consider alone the felicific aspect of Virtue. Peace and serenity of mind can only be secured by Virtue which thus yields the highest happiness, while Wisdom at most can bring us such happiness as is attainable by a consistent regard for our well-being. As the *Geeta* says —

(1) Wisdom is self-regarding, while Virtue is quite disinterested.

The happiness of Virtue comes unsought.

“श्रेयो हि ज्ञानमभ्यासान् ज्ञानाद्भानं विशिष्यते ।

ध्यानान् कर्म फलत्यागस्त्यागाच्चान्तिरनन्तरं ॥ १२।१२ ॥

“For knowledge is better than diligence, meditation is better than knowledge, and renouncing of the fruit of works than meditation ; to renunciation peace is very nigh.” (Davies' Translation, XII, 12.)

(2) Wisdom calculates, while Virtue is led by enthusiasm.

(2) Wisdom goes by rules ; while Virtue by spirit. So long as we have but an extrinsic interest in anything, we require rules for its attainment ; but when anything is intrinsically attractive it is more easily obtained by sincere devotion and earnest pursuit. So long, therefore, as we are moved to a virtuous course of action by a prospect of happiness, we have to look about and guide ourselves by rules to obtain the desired result. True Virtue, however, throws itself freely away without any estimate of what it is likely to gain or lose by. Such devotion, no doubt, brings its own reward in the form of tranquillity and bliss ; but we get them because we do not hanker after them.

“Would you taste the tranquil scene ?
Be sure your bosoms be serene :
Devoid of hate, devoid of strife,
Devoid of all that poisons life ;
And much it 'vails you, in their place,
To graft the love of human race.”

(*Shenstone.*)

(3) Wisdom is anxious to secure a favourable issue, while Virtue is resigned.

(3). The essence of our moral life is well-regulated activity. If entire nature is an object-lesson of incessant work, why should man be idle ? Nay, idleness, as we have seen, is a misnomer, implying merely misdirected activity. Now the activities of Wisdom and Virtue are of a different character. The one acts for the sake of pleasure, while the other for duty ; the one is based on expectation, while the other is devoid of any attachment ; the one is anxious to secure a favourable issue, while the

other is regardless of consequences. From this we are not to conclude that the activity of Virtue is of a reckless character; it is not the heedlessness or impetuosity of passion, but the resignation born of fidelity and devotion. Thus, while Wisdom is busily active, Virtue is resigned. The activity of virtuous life is not economical, superficial, and meddlesome, which characterize wisdom, but free, deep, and abiding. The one may be ostentatious, while the other is invariably quiet. How often do we not see one's vanity or greed peering through his wisely-put-on cloak of Virtue? The activity of Wisdom begets vanity, while that of Virtue fosters meekness and humility. The one is conscious how great its achievements are and judges acts by reference to consequences, while the other is always conscious of its littleness, knowing fully well that even moles and feathers go by laws instituted by Providence, and judges acts by the purity of motives. As the Gesta says—

The one may foster pride, while the other is consistent only with humility and diffidence.

“यत्स्वात्मरतिरेव स्यात् आत्मदमश्च मानवः

आत्मन्येव च सन्तुष्टस्तस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥३॥१७॥

नैव तस्य कृतेनार्थो नाकृतेनेह कथन ।

न चास्य सर्वभूतेषु कश्चिदर्थव्यपाश्रयः ॥१८॥

तस्मादसक्तः सततं कार्यं कर्म समाचर ।

असक्तोऽप्यचरन् कर्म परमाप्नोति पुण्यः ॥१९॥

“But the man who can be happy in himself, pleased with himself, and contented with himself alone, for him nothing remains to be done.

“For this man has no interest whatever in what is done or left undone here below, nor for him is

there any occasion whatever of seeking for succour from any living thing.

"Wherefore apply thyself to work that ought to be done, but always without attachment, for the man who applies himself to work without attachment attains to the Supreme." (Davies' Translation, III, 17-19.)

Virtue is not
unmindful
of true
Prudence,
because it is
obligatory.

Butler.

From the above remarks it should not be inferred that the virtuous man is unmindful of his true interests. Attention to health, knowledge, or æsthetic culture is paid, not for the sake of enjoyments, but for the sake of duty. Prudence is now seen employed in the service of Virtue. "It deserves to be considered," writes Butler, "whether men are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to their care. It should seem, that a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence, in our language; it should seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others." (*Dissertation on Virtue*). Virtue thus secures both interest and peace, happiness and excellence:

"What, what is virtue, but repose of mind,
A pure ethereal calm, that knows no storm;

Above the reach of wild Ambition's wind,
Above those passions that this world deform,
And torture man." (*Thomson*.)

(4) "Our words and actions," says Emerson, "to be fair must be timely." (*Essay on Prudence*.) Wisdom would decide the season of action by reference to the interest of the agent and would pay only so much attention to the interests of others as may be connected with it. A virtuous man, however, would determine the propriety of an act by reference to the interests of others, even at the sacrifice of his own. And in this connection it may be mentioned that Wisdom and Virtue would decide differently with regard to the choice of the calling or vocation in life. The one would decide by reference to worldly prospect, while the other by reference to spiritual gain. The ethical importance of the choice of a vocation has justly been emphasized in modern times by Schleiermacher. Having found out one's capacity and sphere of usefulness, an individual should work with his whole heart to contribute to the general fund of Providence. "Character," says Gæthe, "consists in a man pursuing the things of which he feels himself capable." One should not, therefore, by a vain estimate of his powers, try to reach the clouds. The estimate of Virtue is always based on humility and resignation. A virtuous man exercises his choice only within the limits assigned him by the Creator and determined by personal insight and experience. Within his own sphere he is happy and contented.

(4) Wisdom bides opportunity, while Virtue is mindful of duty alone.

Vocation is affected by Wisdom and Virtue.

Importance of vocation

Schleiermacher.

Gæthe.

A virtuous man is contented within his own sphere.

"How happy is he born and taught,
 That serveth not another's will ;
 Whose armour is his honest thought,
 And simple truth his utmost skill !
 Whose passions not his masters are,
 Whose soul is still prepared for death,
 Not tied unto the world with care
 Of public fame or private breath." (*Wotton.*)

§ 9. **Virtue and Destiny.** The preceding remarks lead us to consider the relation of Virtue to Destiny. It is the general belief of mankind that every one has his role assigned by Providence in this great drama of the universe. Let us see to what extent such a belief harmonizes with the account of Virtue given above. In dwelling on this topic we shall take Destiny in a wide sense, covering (1) what befalls us in the present life as well as (2) what is expected in the life to come, if there be any.

(1) We have seen that morality is restricted only to the internal sphere of choice and has nothing to do with the outer sphere of consequences which are beyond our control. Of course, there may be higher laws connecting the earnestness or fickleness of choice with success or failure in the external world, as there is the law of conservation of energy uniting the operations of the different forms of physical force. As in psychology we admit the operation of psychical, physiological, and physical laws and also their correspondence, so in ethics, we should admit the operation of moral and natural laws and their harmony. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 8.) The doctrine of *Karma* or

Virtue affects
 Destiny.

Destiny is
 taken in a
 wide sense to
 cover (1) the
 experiences
 of the
 present life
 as well as (2)
 those of the
 future.

(1) Within
 the sphere
 assigned
 by Provi-
 dence, one
 has ample
 room for
 choice to
 improve or
 degrade his
 lot and
 character.

the objective morality of Hegel does not conflict with the doctrine of virtue. Though the course of natural events is regulated by Providence for the good of the whole, yet we may secure or miss our own good by the character of our choice, which may or may not fall in with the ways of Providence. But within the sphere allotted to us we should work earnestly that we may not prove ourselves to be unprofitable servants and so unworthy of any further favour at his hands. "Remember," says Epictetus, "that you are an actor of just such a part as is assigned you by the Poet of the play, of a short part, if the part be short ; of a long part, if it be long. Should He wish you to act the part of a beggar, take care to act it naturally and nobly ; and the same if it be the part of a lame man, or a ruler, or a private man ; for *this* is in your power, to act well the part assigned to you ; but to *choose* that part is the function of another." To work is our lot ; and we should work with all the honesty, fidelity, and earnestness we can command, according to the light and power given us by our Maker. "Accept the place," writes Emerson, "the Divine Providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries, the connection of events. Great men have always done so, and confided themselves child-like to the genius of their age, betraying their perception that the absolutely trustworthy was seated at their heart, working through their hands, predominating in all their being. And we are now men, and must accept in the highest mind the same transcendent destiny ;

There may be higher laws connecting moral with natural laws.

We should play our part honestly and earnestly.

Epictetus.

Emerson.

and not minors and invalids in a protected corner, not cowards fleeing before a revolution, but guides, redeemers, and benefactors, obeying the Almighty effort and advancing on Chaos and the Dark." (Essay on *Self-Reliance*.)

(2) The existence of a future life is not inconsistent with the above theory of virtue and obligation.

The uncertainty of Divine Existence and of future life is alone consistent with true moral probation, as no egoistic or prudential consideration enters in such a case into our moral life.

(2) Without trespassing on the sphere of metaphysics, we may only mention that the universal faith of mankind in a future state, determined by our moral efforts, is not inconsistent with the doctrine of virtue set forth above. We mentioned before that, to save the purity of moral trial, the Great Task Master has hidden Himself from our view and has also concealed our future destiny from us, beyond the premonitions of Conscience and Instinct. Some may even exclaim—

"Ask not bodies doomed to die,
To what abode they go,
Since knowledge is but sorrows spy,
It is not safe to know." (*Davenant*.)

But whether we inquire or not, the belief in a future life is involved in our moral experience.

"Sure there is none but fears a future state ;
And when the most obdurate swear they do not,
Their trembling hearts belie their boasting
tongues." (*Dryden*.)

A future life of rewards and punishments accords with the degrees of virtue, merit, and

Now such a faith is quite consistent with the account of merit and virtue given above. The degrees of merit and virtue are expected to settle the forms and grades of our future existence. "It is as plainly a general law of nature," observes Butler, "that we

should, with regard to our temporal interest, form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, use, and discipline, as anything whatever is a natural law, chiefly in the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of it. And the alternative is left to our choice; either to improve ourselves and better our condition, or, in default of such improvement, to remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the qualifications necessary for it." (*Analogy*, Pt. I, Chap. V.) We find, accordingly, in every religion more or less explicit reference to the various forms of rewards and punishments awarded in future life according to the different degrees of merit and virtue. The Greek view of Tartarus, the Christian account of Hell and Purgatory, so vividly painted by Dante in his *Divine Comedy*, the Mohammedan view of Paradise, and the Hindu notion of future life—all express, more or less adequately, the natural expectations of mankind. We are not concerned here with the religious or metaphysical question of locating departed souls in purgatory, hell, or heaven, or in the different planets of this vast universe.

demerit, and the consequent moral expectations.

Different conceptions of heaven and hell.

"Bright star of eve, that send'st thy softening
ray

Through the dim twilight of this nether sky,

I hail thy beam like rising of the day,

Hast thou a home for me when I shall die?

"Is there a spot within thy radiant sphere,
Where love, and faith, and truth, again may dwell :
Where I may seek the rest I find not here,
And clasp the cherished forms I loved so well ?"

We have to do here only with the moral aspect of the question. And it seems that our future destiny is determined by the character formed here. We watch with reverence the hero who towards the end of this mortal journey is bound for

"The undiscover'd country from whose bourn
No traveller returns." (*Hamlet*, III, 1.)

As, for the benefit of His creatures, Providence regulates all events by law and not by caprice, so in the momentous question of future existence He is likely to regulate our destiny by our work. And we carry in our character an abiding record of our life-work which entitles us to a station according to the degree of perfection attained. Our character is, so to speak, a phonograph, recording the deeds of our life and reflecting merit or demerit before the Righteous Judge, who rules according to universal laws communicated to His creatures.* And, even if we ignore a future existence, we may say that our destiny in this world is to a great extent modified by the character of our moral work. A virtuous man may be put to a severe trial which brings out the

The hypothesis that our future life is determined by the degree of perfection attained is not inconsistent with reason.

The reign of law is admissible in morals as in other spheres.

Character is a record of life-work.

* The Hindu belief in *Chitra Gupta* (implying hidden photograph or picture) as Pluto's accountant, keeping a diary of human deeds, may thus be taken as an allegorical representation of our true inner character expressing the degree of moral perfection attained. The abiding and infallible record of moral attainment stands personified in चित्रगुप्तः.

strength of his character ; but all the while he is above even an emperor in genuine happiness and conquest of the world. The sufferings of a Job or of a Nala Raja mean nothing to them, while they have the effect of purifying and ennobling their nature as well as that of others. Though we have been ushered into the world with a certain mission, yet we have our destiny in our keeping and can make it good or bad according to the use we make of our faculties and the fidelity with which we discharge our duties.

Our destiny,
here or else-
where, seems
to be in our
own keeping.

"Man is his own star ; and the soul that can
Render an honest and a perfect man,
Commands all light, all influence, all fate ;
Nothing to him falls early or too late.
Our acts our angels are, or good or ill,
Our fatal shadows that walk by us still."

(Epilogue to Beaumont and Fletcher's
Honest Man's Fortunes.)

BOOK IV.

EMOTIVE ELEMENTS.

CHAPTER XVII.

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

§ 1. Characteristics of the Moral Sentiments.

The moral sentiments are the feelings connected with moral nature.

They accompany moral judgments and are either pleasurable or painful.

They are (1) highly representative and (2) directed to moral quality.

Having discussed in the preceding chapters the cognitive factors of our moral life, let us now turn our attention to the emotive elements. The moral sentiments are the feelings connected with the moral nature; they are the characteristic emotive experiences due to the apprehension of moral quality, which is expressed in moral principles and revealed in moral acts and agents. The moral sentiments accompany moral judgments and have either an agreeable or disagreeable quality. They are to be distinguished from other feelings by the fact that (1) they are more representative in character than the sense-feelings and the concrete emotions, and (2) they are directed to the moral quality or worth. From these two features follow the characteristics of the moral sentiments. These characteristics are necessarily determined by the nature of the moral quality of which the sentiments are but subjective effects. We have seen that the moral quality is unique and imperative, and its knowledge is self-evident, necessary, and universal. The moral sentiments

Characteristics of the moral

are thus essentially—(1) *disinterested*, devoid of any reference to self-interest ; (2) *social*, revealing a common moral nature, common ties, rights, and duties, and contributing to general happiness ; (3) *practical*, directed to acts and agents and not to passive experiences or things ; and (4) *regulative or imperative*, influencing us, more or less powerfully, to adopt a course which is viewed as obligatory.

All these traits of the moral sentiments are derived from the moral quality which calls them forth.

These sentiments illustrate but the general law of human nature that sensibility accompanies activity : the exercise of every organ or faculty has its concomitant sentient experience ; the exercise of our moral nature, accordingly, involves the experience of the moral sentiments. As Hume remarks, "A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey ; and when presented to us, though only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us." (*Dissertation on the Passions*, § 2.)

§ 2. **Origin of Moral Sentiments.** The moral sentiments, though usually associated with other emotions—such as resentment, grief, sympathy, admiration, etc., are in their essence unique and elementary. They express in various degrees our regard for the right and our hatred for the wrong.

The empiricists, however, are disinclined to accept them as elementary. They contend that the sentiments are highly complex, being a product of several factors, partly emotional and partly rational. The sentiments are explained as a development out

They are (1) disinterested, (2) social,

(3) practical,

and (4) regulative.

The moral sentiments illustrate the fact that sensibility accompanies activity.

Hume's testimony.

The moral sentiments, excited by moral quality, are unique and elementary like it.

The empiricists explain them as an evolution out

of egoistic,
ego-altruistic,
and altruistic
feelings,
aided by
by reflection.

of (1) egoistic, (2) ego-altruistic, (3) altruistic feelings, deepened and refined by (4) reflection. The evolution is traced thus :—(1) When a child is rewarded for certain acts and punished for others, the child comes to associate pleasure with the one class and pain with the other class of acts ; and thus in future he is led to perform the one, out of expectation of reward, and avoid the other, for fear of punishment. (2) As the ego-altruistic feelings develop, love of praise and repugnance to blame supply additional motives for performing the acts which are recommended and avoiding those which are condemned. (3) With the development of sympathy, love and affection also contribute their share to the evolution of the moral sentiments by prompting the child to do what his parents or elders command and to avoid what they prohibit. (4) Finally, when, with the development of intelligence, the child begins to understand the meanings of commands or prohibitions, he would realize the significance of moral precepts and thus would be disposed to follow them on rational grounds. It is to be remembered in this connection that the element of authority associated with the moral sentiment is explained by reference to social enforcement or compulsion : what is found enforced comes to be regarded as imperative.

Such an explanation, however, is untenable. For—

This explanation of the moral sentiments as derivative is evidently unsatisfactory. Like the moral quality, the connected sentiment is, in its essence, simple and *sui generis*. (a) It is more patent in the child than in the adult, in the rustic

than in the educated: experience, instead of developing it, rather tends to weaken, if not to quench, its pristine intensity. As Martineau says, "To find the true instinct of conscience, we may more often go with hope to the child, than to the grand-parents."

(*Types*, ii, p. 72.) (b) Again, the element of authority can never properly be evolved out of an experience of compulsion or social enforcement: enforcement is but the expression, and not the source, of the imperative nature of morality. (c) Furthermore, it is not true that the moral sentiments are blind at first and become rational afterwards: they always imply moral quality, which is self-evident since the dawn of moral consciousness.

§ 3. Relation of Moral Sentiments to Moral Judgments.

Moralists are not agreed as to the exact relation of the moral sentiments to the moral judgments. (1) The supporters of 'Moral Sense Theory' generally hold that moral sentiment precedes moral judgment. Hume, for example, mentions that we are spontaneously pleased or displeased with an action, and this affective experience is the ground of subsequent moral estimate. But for such prior agreeable or disagreeable experience, we have no means of determining what is right or wrong. Morality is thus taken as resting, not on 'reason', but on 'sentiment.'

(2) The supporters of the 'Rational Theory', on the other hand, contend that moral judgments precede the sentiments. If, they ask, we have no knowledge of the moral quality of an act, how can we be affected either agreeably or disagreeably by it?

(a) the sentiments are stronger before the multiplication of experience;

(b) they can never be excited by arbitrary enforcement;

and (c) they always rest on conviction.

Two conflicting views:

(1) Some hold that moral judgments are based on moral sentiments;

(2) while others contend that the sentiments are based on judgments.

The latter view seems to be correct on the following grounds :—

(a) Moral estimates are not blind, but enlightened.

(b) They involve discrimination.

(c) Personal consciousness supports the view.

(d) It is in harmony with the supremacy of reason in the human constitution.

Of these two views, the latter seems to be eligible on the following grounds :—(a) Our moral estimates are not blind, but enlightened : the moral quality does not merely move us but convinces us. (b) As we are not affected equally by all moral acts, the moral sentiments presuppose discrimination. This discrimination again is, not of palpable outward features, but of comparatively obscure inward impulses and relations, any variation in which would cause a difference in the moral sentiment. This clearly shows that moral sentiment always presupposes judgment involving discrimination and comparison. (c) Moreover, in morals, we do not begin with judging others : it is not true that we are first pleased or displeased with others' acts and then we judge ourselves by analogy ; rather, in every case, moral estimate is primarily subjective. Even when we judge others, we do so by reference to springs of action which we can understand only by an appeal to self-consciousness. And consciousness testifies to the fact that we first form a moral estimate or judgment and then experience a feeling which chimes in with it. (d) Finally, the first view seems to be inconsistent with the supreme place of reason in the human constitution : if generally human life is guided by reason, this must pre-eminently be true in the moral sphere which is the highest and noblest part of human nature. (*Vide* Chap. XIII.) Hence moral sentiments can never be the basis of moral judgments ; the latter really determine the former. We are affected agreeably or disagreeably accord-

ing as we recognise higher or lower moral worth. We have no control over these sentiments other than the control which we may exercise over the moral judgments. The sentiments necessarily follow the judgments, directed to acts or agents.

The moral sentiments invariably follow moral judgments.

§ 4. **Classification of Moral Sentiments.** Moral sentiments may, accordingly, be classified into (I) the feeling of Reverence directed to the moral law itself, and (II) the feelings directed to moral acts or agents.

(I) The Sentiment of Reverence springs spontaneously in the mind when we contemplate the moral law : it excites a feeling of admiration, love, and awe, and claims universal homage. The moral quality, being the expression of supreme perfection, secures ready acquiescence and profound respect. "There are two things," writes Kant, "which fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them : *the starry heavens above and the moral law within.*"

(I) The sentiment of Reverence directed to Moral Law.

(II) The moral sentiments which accompany our moral estimates may be divided into (1) those directed to acts, and (2) those directed to agents.

(II) Moral sentiments directed to (1) acts and (2) agents.

(1) The moral sentiments directed to acts are either of the character of an agreeable experience, like the sentiment of beauty, or of the character of a disagreeable experience, like the sentiment of deformity. A right action is contemplated with satisfaction ; while a wrong action, with pain or repugnance. The one, like a beautiful object, pleases us, while the

(1) A right action excites pleasure ; while a wrong action, pain.

other like an ugly object displeases us. As Pope says—

“Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen.”

(2) The sentiments, directed to agents, may be (a) either with regard to others or (b) with regard to self.

(a) The sentiments directed towards others may assume the form of either esteem or hatred.

(b) The sentiments directed towards self assume the form of self-approval or self-condemnation, which, in its intense form, is called shame or remorse.

Shame as a healthy moral sentiment should be distinguished from its

(2) The moral sentiments directed to agents may again be subdivided into (a) those directed towards others, and (b) those directed towards self. (a) Moral sentiments when directed towards others take the form of affections, *i.e.*, of love or hate. An agent who has performed a right action is the object of admiration and esteem, while an agent who has acted wrongly is the object of disrespect and aversion. This love or hate is primarily directed to moral excellence or pravity, and secondarily to individuals as illustrating it in their lives. Martineau says, “As each spring of action, in the ascending scale, has diviner right over us, so have the persons that become its embodiment a corresponding command of our reverence and trust.” (*Types*, ii, pp. 64-5.) (b) Moral sentiments, when directed towards self, take the form of self-approval or self-approbation, when the act performed is conceived as right, or of self-reproach or self-condemnation, when the act performed is viewed as wrong. Shame and Remorse are but intenser forms of self-condemnation. *Shame*, however, should be distinguished from what is called *False Shame*. Shame, though primarily a moral sentiment, gradually comes to include other painful experiences analogous to it. “We are,” says Fowler, “strictly speaking said to be ashamed when we are discovered in doing that which public opinion or

the opinion of our friends or associates requires us not to do, or in forbearing to do that which the same opinion requires us to do." (*Principles of Morals*, Part II, p. 170.) As, however, public opinion is not co-extensive with morality, Shame is naturally extended to cover more than what is moral. The term 'Shame' illustrates very well the 'transitive application of words.' Having its basis in our moral constitution, Shame is directed, in the first instance, to what is condemned by Conscience or the (common) moral nature of man, and then, by association, to whatever is viewed by others with disapprobation. And next it may include feelings due to wounded pride or vanity. This last form illustrates what we call *False Shame*. An individual sets up for himself a standard of decency, dignity, or politeness; and he experiences a feeling akin to shame when he imagines himself as falling below it. Thus, 'to keep up appearances', many a person has been led astray. Though shame, therefore, is a healthy moral feeling, tending to preserve moral purity, false shame is a disease which weakens our moral constitution. As Fowler says, "A man ought not to be ashamed of that which he cannot help, of his race, his origin, his condition, his poverty, his appearance, his lack of early advantages, or of anything which is due to causes beyond his own control; and, if he encourages rather than represses the disposition to entertain this feeling, he is probably laying up for himself stores of incalculable unhappiness." (*Ibid.*, p. 171.) And

perverted or morbid form, known as false shame.

By association the sphere of shame widens, leading to false shame.

False shame weakens our moral nature and prepares the way for moral degradation.

Empiricists confound shame with false shame.

Mill.

we may add that he thus becomes not merely unhappy but also depraved. False shame undermines moral strength, fosters vanity, causes improvidence, and leads to hypocrisy and deceit. It is thus evident that shame is original, while false shame is derivative. The one is fresh and acute in early years, and it may even disappear in later life; while the other is absent in infancy, and it grows with the growth of experience. The one is, as it were, the native stock and the other is but its excrescence. And empirical writers often make everything of this secondary growth, ignoring the presence of the primitive factor altogether. Mill, for example, regards "the sense of shame" as "obviously following the opinion of others and at least in early years" as "wholly determined by it." He writes, "A child is ashamed of doing what he is told is wrong; but so is he also ashamed of doing what he knows is right, if he expects to be laughed at for doing it; he is ashamed of being duller than another child, of being ugly, of being poor, of not having fine clothes, of not being able to run, or wrestle, or box so well as another. He is ashamed of whatever causes him to be thought less of by the persons who surround him. This feeling of shame is accounted for by obvious associations." (Mill's *Dissertations*, Vol. I, p. 136.) See Chapter XXI, § 4.

§ 5. Moral Sentiments Influencing Judgment and Conduct. The moral sentiments are thus the invariable concomitants of our moral estimates. But the moral sentiments, though ordinarily following

moral judgments, often react upon these. When there is a moral sentiment connected with an act, moral judgment is usually affected or modified by it. Often do we find moral judgments to be in accord with the prevailing sentiments owing to unreflecting acquiescence : when, as the result of tradition or custom, a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation is associated with an act, the resulting moral judgment is usually in harmony or unison with the feeling. No doubt, when personal reflection alters the judgment, the prior sentiment would disappear ; and subsequently there will be a moral sentiment in harmony with the modified judgment. The practices, for example, of scapegoat, of sacrificing the firstborn children in fulfilment of religious vows, of immoral rites, once supported by wrong moral sentiments, are abandoned when judgments are enlightened.

Moral sentiments often influence moral judgments and conduct.

When, however, the judgments are altered, the sentiments also change.

The moral sentiments, like other feelings, have stimulating as well as restraining power. A feeling associated with a judgment begets an impulse which is in harmony with the character of the feeling. The agreeable moral sentiments prompt us to action, while the disagreeable sentiments act as deterrents : the former urge us to do what is conceived as right, while the latter restrain us from doing what is viewed as wrong. Thus impulses to action are, to a great extent, modified by moral sentiments. (*Vide* Chap. XIX, § 2.)

The agreeable moral sentiments impel us to action, while those that are disagreeable restrain us from activity.

§ 6. **Function of the Moral Sentiments.** The moral sentiments are popularly regarded as the very 'voice of conscience,' cheering one in the path of

The moral sentiments constitute the sanctions

of morality, cheering an individual when he acts rightly and tormenting him when he commits a wrong.

They are signs, but not the standard, of moral worth.

When a judgment is wrong, the attendant sentiment is misleading.

The moral sentiments tend to preserve the purity and harmony of our moral constitution.

Feelings are ordinarily indices to the proper or improper use of organs and faculties.

duty and punishing him when he goes astray. But though the sentiments are a valuable support of morality, yet they do not constitute its standard. They are, as explained above, determined by moral judgments; and if a judgment be erroneous, the sentiment becomes misleading. As Calderwood says, "Whenever thought is faulty, sentiment must be astray, and the only deliverance from serious consequences must lie in the criticism of our own thought, which must have its test in moral law, the knowledge of which is more or less easily accessible and at immediate command." (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 214.) Thus moral sentiments are never sure tests of the moral qualities of acts; they are at best but indices to such qualities in the majority of instances.

The function of the moral sentiments is evidently to preserve our moral nature intact. They are apparently meant as a check against wrong-doing and continuance in immorality:

"Conscious remorse, and anguish must be felt,
To curb desire, to break the stubborn will,
And work a second nature in the soul,
Ere virtue can resume the place she lost."

(Rowe.)

Feelings may generally be regarded as indices to the legitimate or illegitimate uses of our powers or dispositions. If, for example, the muscles be strong and healthy, these should be exercised; and the exercise is accompanied by pleasure, while excessive exercise or the want of it is attended with pain. Similarly, in the intellectual sphere harmony

produces pleasure, and contradiction, pain. And, likewise, in the moral sphere, the proper exercise of our powers is attended with happiness; and an improper exercise, with misery. Thus pleasures and pains may be viewed as rewards or penalties of Nature (physical and moral) for obeying or violating her laws—physical, intellectual, or moral. 'Nature', however, should be liberally construed to mean, not merely the outward universe, but any *fixed constitution*, physical or psychical: if there are laws, their observance is sure to bring us rewards, and their neglect or violation, due penalties. Bain, in disputing this teleological significance of Natural Laws, remarks, "Night exposure may be more injurious to the policeman than to the thief; immunity is purchased not by virtuous conduct as regards others, but by prudential care as regards self." (*Logic, Induction*, p. 9.) This remark, however, is based on a confusion. Bain forgets that every law has its appropriate penalty: one, who transgresses physical laws, suffers mainly in health, while one violating moral laws suffers mainly in mind. I say 'mainly', for, if the entire (physical and mental) universe is an organic unity, a certain correspondence or harmony is naturally expected among its different parts. (*Vide* Chap. XIII and Chap. XVI, § 6.)

Spencer's law of "connections between pleasure and beneficial action and between pain and detrimental action" (*Data of Ethics*, p. 87) may, therefore, be accepted as a general truth, subject, however, to suitable qualification: pleasure does not constitute,

Nature, as a fixed constitution, brings pleasure when her laws are observed, and pain when they are transgressed.

Bain's denial of teleology is due to confusion.

Spencer's law of self-conservation has an element of truth in it.

It indicates that pleasure or pain is an index to the right or wrong use of our powers.

Habit modifies the moral sentiments.

not does it lead to, benefit, any more than pain constitutes, or leads to, injury. Pleasures and pains are but indices or signs of the proper or improper exercise of our powers. This law, however, is only palpably illustrated in normally constituted individuals. Our being is complex and so subject to the regulation of diverse laws. When the convergence or conflict of different laws brings about a complex result, it seems to us to be anomalous because we are unable to decipher all these elements ; but, rightly understood, there is nothing extraordinary in it. Thus, when the Law of Habit is superinduced upon our simple moral nature, we may notice certain peculiarities likely to disturb our faith in laws. Continuance in immorality, for example, strengthens the sway of impulse, weakens the voice of Conscience, and gradually deadens our moral sensibility.

“ ’Tis fearful building upon any sin :
One mischief enter’d brings another in ;
The second pulls a third, the third draws more,
And they for all the rest set ope the door ;
Till custom take away the judging sense,
That to offend we think it no offence.”

(*Smith.*)

The sentiments are blunted by continuance in immorality

The contumely of Will in uniformly rejecting the claim of the higher impulses, coupled with the law that we are disposed to seek pleasure and avoid pain, renders it inevitable that we gradually pay less and less attention to the voice of conscience and the appeal of the moral sentiments. So, if the moral

sentiments are fresh and acute in a healthy moral nature, it is because there is use for them there: while the Law of Economy and the other laws of mind require that they should almost be absent from a fallen nature, seeing that their function is gone.

It is to be remembered in this connection that, as the moral sentiments are the sentient effects produced by the contemplation of moral quality, they are not felt where no such quality is found. Thus the sentiments cannot properly be directed towards individuals sunk in immorality: when wrongdoing becomes habitual and evil dispositions establish their undisputed sway, acts become spontaneous and cease to be voluntary. With the disappearance of conflict, the conditions of free choice and morality also disappear; and an agent in such a condition ceases to be a man. As Dr. Martineau says, "The characteristic *human* element is gone; *the man* has disappeared; and in his place there stands either *brute* or *devil*." (*Types*, ii, p. 88.) Such an agent is rather an object of pity than of condemnation. Milton rightly says of such a nature—

Brutes and fallen natures are rather objects of pity than of condemnation.

"Farewell hope, and with hope, farewell fear,
Farewell remorse: all good to me is lost;
Evil, be thou my good." (P. L. Bk. VI.)

CHAPTER XVIII.

MORAL SANCTIONS.

Sanction is
what enforces
a line of
action :

objectively,
it implies
authoritative
prescription ;
subjectively,
the feelings
which may
operate as
motives.

§ 1. **What is Sanction?** Having considered the moral sentiments as the santient effects of our moral constitution, let us now proceed to determine the character of the moral sanctions which are closely connected with them. Sanction* (Lat. *sanctio*, from *sancire*, to render sacred or inviolable) in a wide sense stands for anything which renders a course of action binding, and so ordinarily inviolable, by enforcing it with penalty in the case of violation and with reward in the case observance. Objectively, 'sanction' implies authoritative prescription, en-

* "Sanctio, in Latin, was used to signify the *act of binding*, and, by a common grammatical transition, *anything which serves to bind a man*; to wit, to the observance of such or such a mode of conduct. According to a Latin grammarian, the import of the word is derived by rather a far-fetched process (such as those commonly are, and in a great measure indeed must be, by which intellectual ideas are derived from sensible ones) from the word *sanguis*, blood: because, among the Romans, with a view to inculcate into the people a persuasion that such or such a mode of conduct would be rendered obligatory upon a man by the force of what I call the religious sanction (that is, that he would be made to suffer by the extraordinary interposition of some superior being, if he failed to observe the mode of conduct in question) certain ceremonies the blood of victims was made use of." (Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 24, foot-note.)

joining certain lines of conduct; and subjectively it expresses the feelings which, through ideal factors may serve as motives for the performance of what is required and the avoidance of what is forbidden. As the objective and subjective sides are closely connected, the term 'sanction' often carries a mixed reference—referring now to the exercise of authority enforcing conduct and now to the motives which induce obedience. Even in Bentham, who has brought into prominence the question of 'sanctions' in morals and jurisprudence, such a mixed reference is noticeable. He writes, "A sanction then is a source of obligatory powers or *motives*: that is, of *pains* and *pleasures*; which, according as they are connected with such or such modes of conduct, operate, and are indeed the only things which can operate, as *motives*." (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 25.) And he observes, "The exciting cause, the pleasure or pain produced by it, and the intention produced by such pleasure or pain in the character of a motive, are objects so intimately connected, that, in what follows, I fear I have not, on every occasion been able to keep them sufficiently distinct. (*Ibid.*, p. 44, foot-note.)

'Sanction' thus often involves a mixed reference,

even in Bentham.

Sanction thus involves reference to an authority which is bent upon enforcing what it considers as right and desirable, and which attaches rewards or penalties to certain classes of acts for the attainment of its object. In the political sphere these rewards and penalties are taken as the sanctions of law, as

'Sanction' pre-supposes authority, administering rewards and penalties.

Rewards and penalties—
specially the
latter—
constitute
the *legal*
sanctions.

without them it loses its force. "The real meaning of all Law," writes Halland, "is that, unless things proceed in the manner prescribed by it, the State will, either of its own accord or if called upon, intervene. This intervention of the State is what is called the 'sanction' of law." (*Jurisprudence*, Chap. VIII, pp. 77-78.) This intervention of the State is manifested either in the form of reward, encouraging certain acts, or, as is frequently the case, in the form of penalty, condemning others. The importance of rewards and penalties as 'sanctions' is evident from the fact that without them men, who are often influenced by considerations of self-interest and self-satisfaction, may not obey the laws, however useful and beneficent they may be in their general tendency. Sanctions, therefore, are supplementary artifices which aim at keeping the laws alive. The intention of law is to promote common welfare; while the intention of sanction is to preserve a law by enforcing it. In the moral sphere, sanctions, accordingly, are those collateral circumstances which conspire to preserve the operation of moral laws. A sanction is thus "Any influence, whether negative or positive, whether of the nature of punishment or of reward, which enforces the observance of the moral law, or stimulates to such observance." (*Seth*.)

Legal sanctions are thus supplementary measures for enforcing laws.

Moral sanctions are concomitant circumstances which tend to enforce moral laws.

Moral sanctions are influences enforcing obedience.

§ 2. **Moral Sanctions.** Moral sanctions, as indicated above, cover all those influences which serve to enforce the observance of moral laws. These

sanctions do not constitute morality ; they are but collateral circumstances which serve to enforce it. Among these circumstances we notice three important factors :—

They are—

(1) The moral sentiments which, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. XVII, § 6), tend to preserve the purity of our moral constitution by rendering virtue agreeable and sin painful. We have also seen that these sentiments continue fresh and strong in a faithful mind, bent on doing what is right, and that their acuteness diminishes with persistence in the wrong course. These sentiments are thus a powerful support of morality which otherwise, though not losing its authority or imperative-ness, would have been impaired in respect of efficacy.

(1) The moral sentiments,

(2) The opinion of society (including the laws of the State) which merely expresses the moral sentiments of others. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 7 and Chap. V, § 4.) The essentially social nature of man leads him to seek the sympathy and avoid the antipathy of others ; and, when obeying or transgressing a moral law, every individual is generally conscious in himself of what he can expect from others. The approbation and condemnation of society reveal the same moral nature which an individual feels in himself ; and they carry weight with him simply because they echo his own sentiments. The essence of punishment, as we have seen (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 15), lies in its retributory aspect and not merely in its aspect as a painful experience.

(2) social opinion,

and (3) the effects on health.

(3) The physical sufferings connected with the failure of health, which moral transgression entails. We have seen (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 6) that sin generally brings its own penalty in the form of disease and ill-health, sooner or later. How often is the health impaired by excesses and a tormenting conscience !

The sanctions prove the unity of the universe and the supremacy of the moral standard.

They are ultimately feelings.

They do not constitute the moral standard ; they are but its indices.

All these facts go to show that the entire constitution of nature and mind tends to support the claim of our moral nature. (*Vide* Chap. XIII.) All these sanctions—personal, social, political, and physical—are, however, mere collateral supports of morality, which primarily rests on its own basis and carries its own authority. They are ultimately feelings excited by the operation of our moral, social, and physical constitution, all of which are closely connected with one another. We have seen, however, that feelings are, under normal conditions, indices to the legitimate or illegitimate exercise of our powers. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4 and Chap. XVII.) They do not constitute the standard, but merely indicate it. These sanctions, therefore, as pleasurable or painful consequences of moral acts, may generally be regarded as confirmatory evidences of their moral quality. As the smooth play or the irksome fretting of machinery can never be viewed as an end for which machines have been set agoing ; as it is but a collateral effect indicating whether machines are in or out of order ; so an agreeable experience is ordinarily an index to the rightness, and a painful experience, to the wrongness, of a moral act. We

must remember, however, that the terms 'pleasure' and 'pain' should be construed in a broad sense, so as to include the pleasures and pains of our moral life. The feeling of approbation or of remorse evidently constitutes an important factor of our happiness or misery. Whenever we exercise our powers in the direction indicated by conscience, we experience pleasure: we have the peace of mind, we enjoy good health, and we secure the good-will and sympathy of others. All these indicate that we are in the right track—in the direction of what is morally good or right. If, on the other hand, we act wrongly, we are unhappy: we are uneasy in mind, we suffer in health, and we lose the sympathy of others. These clearly indicate that we are away from the right track—away from the direction approved by our moral nature. Thus, it is apparent that the experiences of pleasure and pain by themselves do not constitute the moral quality of an act; they merely suggest it, being its indices.

§ 3. Bentham's Account. The above account of the moral sanctions is, however, not accepted by utilitarian writers. Bentham, for example, understands by them the pleasures and pains which constitute motives for the performance of acts conducive to social welfare and so viewed as right. We have seen (*Vide* Chap. X, § 8) that, according to Bentham, men are moved only by considerations of pleasure and pain and that to every individual "his interest must, to himself, be the primary interest." Pleasures and pains are thus, as he says, the "*final causes*" or ends of all rational

The above view is disputed by utilitarians.

Sanctions, according to Bentham, are pleasures and pains operating as motives for moral conduct.

activity. And the moral standard, according to him, is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Now the problem with Bentham is how to regulate the conduct of individuals, who are essentially egoistic in nature, so as to secure the well-being of the community. This evidently can be done only through pleasures and pains as the "two sovereign masters" under whose government "nature has placed mankind." Thus we come to study pleasures and pains from their aspect as '*final causes*' to their aspect as '*efficient causes or means*.' And when pleasures and pains are viewed as agencies for the regulation of human conduct to promote moral ends, they are called sanctions * "The pain or pleasure, which is attached to a law," he writes, "forms what is called its sanction." And he enumerates four classes of sanctions : (1) Physical, (2) Political, (3) Moral, and (4) Religious.

Four classes
of sanctions :

(1) Physical,

(1) By *Physical Sanction* we are to understand the pleasurable or painful experiences which are the outcome of the natural constitution of the universe. A person putting his finger in fire experiences pain. This is a physical sanction, as it happens in "the ordinary course of nature."

(2) Political,

(2) *Political Sanction* implies the pleasurable or painful experiences coming to us from a sovereign authority or ruler. If, for example, a thief is punished for stealing, political sanction is illustrated.

* "Bentham uses this term to include both pleasures and pains ; but it is to be observed that Austin and (I believe) the whole school of jurists who have followed him restrict the term to pains—these being the kind of motives with which the legislator and judge are almost exclusively concerned." (Sidgwick, *Outlines of the History of Ethics*, p. 233, foot-note.)

(3) When the pleasurable or painful experiences come to us from members of society, not constituting sovereign authority, we have the *Moral or Popular Sanction*. When, for example, a man is outcasted for some act, the moral sanction is illustrated. (3) Popular or Moral,

(4) The *Religious Sanction* is manifested in the shape of pleasurable or painful experiences viewed as coming to us from a supernatural being—(God). When, for example, a person suffers for sin, the religious sanction is illustrated.* and (4) Religious.

Bentham illustrates his 'Sanctions' thus: "A man's goods, or his person, are consumed by fire. If this happened to him by what is called an accident, it was a calamity: if by reason of his own imprudence (for instance, from his neglecting to put his candle out) it may be styled a punishment of the physical sanction: if it happened to him by the sentence of the political magistrate, a punishment belonging to the political sanction; that is, what is commonly called a punishment: if for want of any assistance which his *neighbour* withheld from him out of some dislike to his *moral* character, a punishment of the *moral* sanction: if by an immediate act of *God's* displeasure, manifested on account of some *sin* committed by him, or through any distraction of mind, occasioned by the dread of such displeasure, a punishment of the *religious* sanction." (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chap. III, § 9.) Bentham's example.

* Mackenzie writes, "It should be observed that the use of terms is not quite uniform. Bentham's Political Sanction is sometimes described as the *Legal Sanction*; and his Moral or Popular Sanction is frequently described as the *Social Sanction*: while the term "*Moral Sanction*" is reserved for *Mill's Internal Sanction*. This use of the terms seems preferable to Bentham's." (*Ethics*, p. 265, foot-note.)

The physical sanction, according to him, is the ground-work.

It may be mentioned in this connection that Bentham regards the physical sanction as "the ground-work" or fundamental, to which all other sanctions may finally be reduced. "This may operate in any case, (that is any of the pains or pleasures belonging to it may operate) independently of *them*: none of *them* can operate but by means of this. In a word, the powers of nature may operate of themselves; but neither the magistrate, nor men at large, *can* operate, nor is God in the case in question *supposed* to operate, but through the powers of nature." (*Ibid.*, Chap. III, § 11.)

We shall examine Bentham's view in § 5.

Mill regards the above sanctions as 'external.' His internal sanction is composed of moral sentiments.

Mill's criticism of Bentham's view.

§ 4. **Mill's Account.** Mill regards all the above forms of sanction as "external," as distinguished from what he calls the 'internal' sanction of conscience, *viz.*, the moral sentiments. The essence of our moral life, he says, lies in self-improvement and not in constraint from external authority, natural or social. "Morality," says Mill, "consists of two parts. One of these is self-education; the training, by the human being himself, of his affections and will. That department is a blank in Bentham's system. The other and co-equal part, the regulation of his outward actions, must be altogether halting and imperfect without the first; for how can we judge in what manner many an action will affect even the worldly interests of ourselves or others, unless we take in, as part of the question, its influence on the regulation of our, or their, affections and desires? A moralist on Bentham's principles may get as far as this, that he ought not to slay, burn, or steal; but what will be his qualifications for regulating the nicer shades of human behaviour, or for laying down even the greater moralities as to those facts in human life which tend

to influence the depths of the character quite independently of any influence on worldly circumstances." (*Dissertations*, Vol. I, pp. 363—364.) As Mill says, "Bentham's idea of the world is that of a collection of persons pursuing each his separate interest or pleasure, and the prevention of whom from jostling one another more than is unavoidable, may be attempted by hopes and fears derived from three sources—the law, religion, and public opinion. To these three powers, considered as binding human conduct, he gave the name of *sanctions*." (*Ibid.*, pp. 362-363.) And Mill observes with regard to this view, "It will do nothing for the conduct of the individual, beyond prescribing some of the more obvious dictates of worldly prudence, and outward probity and beneficence. There is no need to expatiate on the deficiencies of a system of ethics which does not pretend to aid individuals in the formation of their own character; which recognises no such wish as that of self-culture, we may even say no such power, as existing in human nature." (*Ibid.*, p. 363.)

Mill, accordingly, tries to discover "a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality"; and he finds "this firm foundation" in "the social feelings of mankind, the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures." (*Utilitarianism*, 46.) Thus "the ultimate sanction of all morality," according to him, is "a subjective feeling in our own minds." (*Ibid.*, p. 42.) "The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same—a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking

Social feeling is regarded by Mill as the basis of moral conduct.

Moral sanction is a subjective feeling.

It is essentially connected with the social feeling, which is the foundation of morality.

from it as an impossibility." (*Ibid.*, p. 41.) And this element of pain is evidently due to the social feelings which constitute "a powerful principle in human nature." (*Ibid.*, p. 46.) Mill, accordingly, writes, "The deeply-rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.....This conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality. This it is which makes any mind, of well-developed feelings, work with, and not against, the outward motives to care for others, afforded by what I have called the external sanctions; and when those sanctions are wanting, or act in an opposite direction, constitutes in itself a powerful internal binding force, in proportion to the sensitiveness and thoughtfulness of the character; since few but those whose mind is a moral blank, could bear to lay out their course of life on the plan of paying no regard to others except so far as their own private interest compels." (*Ibid.*, pp. 50—51.)

Bentham's account may be true in jurisprudence, but not in morals.

§ 5. **Criticism of the Utilitarian View.** That Bentham's account is unsatisfactory from the moral stand-point is evident from the preceding remarks of Mill. However satisfactory Bentham's account is in the sphere of jurisprudence, which aims at regulating conduct or outward acts, it is altogether incorrect in the department of morals, which is concerned only with the inner character or disposition. "It is fortunate for the world," says Mill, "that Bentham's taste lay rather in the direction of juris-

prudential than of properly ethical inquiry." (*Dissertations*, I, p. 364.) Bentham overlooks the cardinal fact of our moral life that its excellence depends entirely on its spontaneous and natural character and that its spirit is gone as soon as extraneous considerations in the form of constraint or allurements are introduced. To enforce a moral law by foreign authority or influence is to destroy its very essence. "It is said," observes Janet, "that without rewards and penalties, the law will be ineffectual. I reply; It will be what it will be; but if, to make it efficacious, you annihilate it, what will you have gained"? (*Theory of Morals*, p. 455.)

Freedom is the essence of our moral nature, which is never compatible with constraint.

The so-called 'internal sanction' of Mill is also inadmissible in morals in the form in which he uses it. According to him, the painful experience, resulting from the performance of what is wrong, is the proper moral sanction: it is a safeguard against wrong-doing and an impulse towards what is right. But whenever the moral sentiments are employed as a *means* of obedience, there is legality and not morality. The moral constitution tends, as we have tried to show (*Vide* Chap. XIII), to preserve the purity of our life as well as to promote the being and well-being of the different parts of the universe. The moral sentiments when used as motives serve the latter purpose by tending to protect general interests; and our conduct then becomes prudential instead of moral. If, for example, one refrains from wrong-doing to avoid the sufferings connected with his moral nature, then he may rather be described as an economist of

Mill's 'internal sanction' can neither be accepted as a moral motive.

Such a sanction explains prudence

but not
virtue,
which is
disinterested
in character.

Hedonistic
account of
sanctions is
self-contradictory.

pleasure than as a hero in this moral drama of the world. Nay, such a supposition involves a contradiction: to be susceptible to the influence of the moral sentiments one must really be virtuous and act quite in a disinterested way; while to introduce a consideration of interest is to deny the presence of virtue. "To any but the Hedonist," says Muirhead, "the phrase 'sanctions of morality' is suspiciously like a contradiction in terms. Conduct which issues from regard for these sanctions is *not* morality, if by that we mean conduct which is morally approved. It may conform to a certain type and be externally indistinguishable from good conduct, but it is not *good*. The man who is temperate because he desires the pleasures of temperance (whether these be earthly or heavenly, physical or social) is, as Plato pointed out, temperate by reason of a kind of intemperance. Similarly, the man who is courageous from fear of the pains which will be the consequence of cowardice is courageous by reason of a kind of cowardice. Appeals to the so-called moral sanction, i.e., to the pleasures of a good conscience (or the pains of remorse), as a motive to good conduct, appear, moreover, to involve an additional absurdity. The pleasure in question depends upon the approval of conscience, and this in turn depends on the disinterestedness of the conduct, i.e., upon the exclusion of the idea of personal pleasure from the motive. To point therefore to the pleasure likely to result from such approval, as a reason for well-doing, is to suggest a motive which, if accepted, would render approval impossible." (*Ele-*

ments of Ethics, pp. 103-104.) From this, however, it is not to be inferred that the moral sentiments are morally useless. In a healthy moral nature, they serve as checks upon transgression but not as motives for virtuous action. Moreover, the pangs of conscience may, through prudence, modify our character, which may subsequently be led to moral activity by moral considerations alone. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 4.) The moral sentiments are designed by nature as effects—as rewards and penalties for obedience and transgression; but if we convert them into “efficient causes or means,” we frustrate this design and change Virtue into Prudence. The efficacy of the sentiments lies in their reference to retributive justice and not merely in their sentient aspect as pleasure or pain.

In a healthy moral constitution, the moral sentiments are useful checks.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the distinction drawn by Mill between the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ sanction may itself be questioned. (a) All sanctions may ultimately be regarded in a certain sense as equally internal, in as much as they refer to the sentient experiences of a self: apart from the mental effect none of the sanctions enumerated above can have any value. (b) Again, all the sanctions may likewise be called external in as much as they are strictly speaking foreign to our moral nature. Even the so-called internal sanction of Mill may thus be regarded as external, as it is but a concomitant and not the essence of our moral life.

Mill’s distinction of sanctions is not really tenable.

For these reasons it is apparent that the sanctions, whether called external or internal, do not constitute morality. They presuppose a moral nature pronoun-

The moral sanctions presuppose a moral nature or standard.

The sanctions are confirmatory evidences of moral quality.

cing judgment "according to each man's spontaneous disposition, and not according to any settled or concerted rule." (Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Chap. III, § 5, p. 25.) A sanction is but an index to the moral quality of an act. It may, no doubt, be described as external when it comes from the natural or the social constitution of the world: when, for example, a sinful person suffers in health or is condemned by society, the failure of health or the condemnation of society is an index to his wrong-doing. If we live in a world which is under the moral administration of a Righteous Governor, we do but expect such results when we act wrongly. (*Vide* Chap. XIII.) These, however, presuppose a moral constitution and form but an index to the moral quality of an act. A sanction, again, may be considered as internal when it manifests itself in the shape of the moral sentiments, approval or disapproval, shame or remorse. But these experiences, too, presuppose a moral constitution; they are to be viewed as but indices to the moral qualities of acts. "Sanction and Motive," says Calderwood, "are both essentially different from Obligation. *Sanction* is a confirmation of the moral character of an action, which follows it in experience. *Motive* is that which induces or impels a man to do an action, whether that action be right or wrong. *Obligation* is the binding of a moral agent to do that which is right, whether he incline or not; and to refrain from doing a wrong action, however much he incline to do it." (*Moral Philosophy*, pp. 148-149.)

§ 6. Theories of Reward and Punishment.

Let us conclude this chapter with a brief reference to the theories of reward and punishment, which, from the utilitarian stand-point, constitute an important source of the moral sanctions. Of the several sanctions, mentioned by Bentham, the political sanction is the most important, as it is backed by definite authority and enforced by definite penalties. Bain makes the political sanction the sole foundation of his Ethics; and its importance is no less great in the systems of Bentham and Mill. Let us, therefore, consider the theories of reward and punishment with special reference to this sanction.

Two principal theories have been held with regard to the distribution of reward and punishment. (1) Some writers contend that such distribution should be consonant with justice and the moral sense of mankind; (2) while others hold that it should be determined only by considerations of expediency, the preservation of society being the chief end of the State. The former is known as the *Retributive Theory*, while the latter, as the *Reformation Theory*. Let us consider these two theories one by one.

(1) *The Retributive Theory.* According to this view, reward and punishment, to be effective, must appeal to the moral sense of mankind and should be administered on the eternal principles of equity and justice. The supporters of this view, however, are divided as to the form and degree of punishment to be inflicted on offenders. (a) Some contend that

Reward and Punishment are closely connected with the moral sanctions.

Theories of Reward and Punishment:

(1) the Retributive Theory;

(2) the Reformation Theory.

(1) The Retributive Theory is based on justice.

It wears two forms:

(a) Rigoristic,
judging
offences
abstractly ;

(b) Mollified
form, judg-
ing offences
by reference
to the charac-
ter and
environment
of the
offender.

(2) The
Reformation
Theory is
based on
utility.

It wears
two forms :

(a) Criminal
Anthropo-
logy,

punishment should always be adjusted to the character of the offence : if the offence is serious, the punishment should be severe ; and if the offence is trivial, the punishment should proportionately be light. Thus, without taking into consideration the extenuating circumstances connected with individuality or environment, an offence should be dealt with according to its gravity or triviality. This may be described as the *Rigoristic View*. (b) Others maintain that, in administering justice, we should take into consideration the peculiarities of a case and should correspondingly modify the penalty. When the strain on the will is great, there is a mitigating circumstance ; while otherwise, the offence is to be taken as great. This may be described as the *Mollified View*.

(2) *The Reformation Theory*. According to this view the end of reward or punishment is merely social protection. It is urged that the disciplinary value of pleasure and pain, and chiefly of the latter, is a familiar fact of the animal constitution ; and their value is heightened in the case of man who, being endowed with reason, becomes specially amenable to such discipline. Hence we find the general employment of pain as a means of personal and social training, and its importance as an engine of social security. Thus, utility and not justice, policy and not retribution, underlies the administration of reward and punishment from this stand-point. There are also two principal subdivisions of this view. (a) The supporters of the one maintain that transgression is often the outcome of defects in mental and moral

constitution connected with physiological peculiarities. Constitutional defects—whether atavistic or pathological—incline malefactors towards the commission of certain crimes which it is well-nigh impossible for them to resist. Some of these men suffer from such extreme nervous excitement that they may be regarded as on the borderland of insanity (e. g., in Kleptomania); and it is computed that this class constitutes about ten percent of the prison population. Punishment, according to their view, should always be adapted to the requirements of a case and should principally take the form of detention and imprisonment, until the criminal is at least partially cured of his malady. The supporters of this view are known as *Criminal Anthropologists*, since they attribute all crimes to anthropological conditions or peculiarities in the human constitution.

attributing crimes to personal peculiarities ;

(b) The advocates of the other view contend that crimes are often the outcome of unfavourable social circumstances, chief of which is the economical. The responsibility rests not so much with the criminal as with the society that moulds his character from infancy. Repression of crimes, therefore, without improving the social and economic conditions is not only useless but injurious : it merely exasperates him without tending to remove the primary source of crimes. The supporters of this view are known as *Criminal Sociologists*.

(b) Criminal Sociology, attributing crimes to defective social conditions.

When we examine a little closely the grounds of reward and punishment, we find that they ultimately rest on the moral sentiments of mankind. That

The Retributive Theory is supported

by psychological and sociological facts.

The efficacy of reward or punishment depends on its appeal to the moral sentiments.

the moral sentiments are not the product of reward and punishment is evident from the fact that we do not regard everything as good which is rewarded, nor everything as bad which is punished. Our sentiments of approval and disapproval, far from being derived from reward and punishment, give to them the efficacy they possess as instruments for correction. Any reward or punishment which shocks the moral sentiments of mankind, fails in its purpose and becomes an object of hatred and condemnation. Thus the Retributive Theory, in explaining reward and punishment by reference to the sense of justice, takes a proper view of them. To attribute transgression to mere physical or social peculiarities, is to render an individual irresponsible and to pronounce punishment unjustifiable. The efficacy of punishment lies, as mentioned above, in its retributory effect and not merely in its being a painful experience. We find, accordingly, that "The new anthropological school of Italian penalists finds in the habitual criminal characteristics which, on the one hand, render him irresponsible for his acts, and on the other hand forbid any hope of his reclamation." (Holland, *Elements of Jurisprudence*, p. 330, foot-note.) Reward or punishment, even when administered as a matter of policy, must be supported by the moral sense of mankind. To accomplish its end, a policy, not based on moral convictions, must at least be in outward conformity with them. The success of a policy is generally due to its covert procedure; and when it is detected

as going against the principles of justice and rectitude it is treated as a fraud.

Though, however, the retributory theory is correct, yet it is not tenable in its extreme rigoristic form. An offence is an offence committed by an individual, so that it is always relative to the motive and character of the agent. Since the end of the eighteenth century, the humanitarian movement has done much to dispel the erroneous abstract notion of crime and to treat it as a concrete act to be interpreted by reference to the concrete personality of the criminal. And, if the essence of such personality is rational self-determination, then reward or punishment should appeal more to reason and moral sense, than to corporal punishment or fear. Hence we find the tendency in modern times to gradually do away with such ferocious penalties as branding, whipping, flogging, mutilating, and gibbeting, and to introduce in their place more rational and wholesome punishments, such as solitary imprisonment, reformatory institutions, securities for good behaviour, incitement to good conduct and honesty, fining, admonition, and probation of first offenders. Thus we see that the so-called sanctions of morality do not rest on reward and punishment; reward and punishment, on the contrary, depend for their efficacy on the moral sentiments or sanctions.

The Mollified View is the tenable one, as a crime is always relative to the character and circumstances of the criminal.

The modern tendency is to adapt reward or punishment to the moral needs of a criminal.

BOOK V.

CONATIVE ELEMENTS.

CHAPTER XIX.

SPRINGS OF ACTION.

§ 1. **Sources of Action.** Having considered the Intellectual and Emotional phases of our moral nature, let us now examine the Active or Conative phase. We have seen that morality is specially concerned with the active or voluntary side of our nature and not with the mere cognitive or emotional side. But voluntary activity involves (1) the impulses which prompt us to action and (2) an exercise of will or choice that decides which of them should find expression in action, in case of a conflict among them. We shall, in the present chapter, confine our attention to the first of these two conative factors, while in the next chapter we shall discuss the character of the second.

The impulses or springs of action are really the sources of all activity. Will merely regulates it in case of a conflict or discord among them. They are, properly speaking, the materials, the due adjustment of which is the object of our moral life; and this adjustment is effected by Will under the guidance of Conscience. These impulses sometimes operate subconsciously in the form vague and rudimentary

Conation includes (1) the Impulses and (2) the Will.

The present chapter is devoted to the exposition of Impulses.

The Impulses are the active tendencies regulated by Will.

cravings, such as hunger or longing for exercise, and sometimes, consciously in the form of definite desires, striving after a conscious end. But all of them are primarily due to our constitution implying wants, organic or psychical. But for subjective need there can never be an objective craving, i.e., an impulse directed towards an object. Without a subjective reference all objects are colourless and indifferent to us. Thus viewed, even desires have an original or primitive basis, at least in the form of a craving for what is agreeable and an aversion to what is painful. In referring to "the Original or Instinctive root of volition," Sully writes, "Such is the impulse to seek that which is agreeable and beneficial, and to avoid what is painful and harmful. This impulse to action or active disposition is primordial, and has to be presupposed in any attempt to account for the growth of the volitional process. It shows itself, first of all, in a sub-conscious form, in what is sometimes specially marked off as *Impulse* (German "Trieb"), that is, a rudimentary and essentially vague process of craving, or striving. In later and clearly conscious form it becomes what we know as *Desire*." (*Outlines of Psychology*, pp. 377-378.)

Besides, however, the general primitive susceptibility and appetency, there are certain special original tendencies known as instincts, the range of which varies in different grades of animal existence. These instincts resemble rational impulses in having definite ends which they seek to realize. But these ends operate unconsciously in the case of instincts,

Impulses may be either vague cravings or definite desires; but they always imply a subjective need.

Thus desires also involve a primitive want.

Besides general primitive tendencies, in the form of vague craving for what is agreeable or aversion to what is painful, there are special original impulses in the form of Instincts.

Instincts, like desires, are directed to definite ends ; but the ends operate, in the one case, unconsciously, while in the other, consciously.

Instincts are natural provisions for the conduct of life.

while they operate consciously in rational impulses. "An instinctive act," says Dewey, "may be defined as one to which an individual feels himself impelled without knowing the end to be accomplished, yet with ability to select the proper means for its attainment." (*Psychology*, p. 353.) If we take a teleological view of the universe and so of the natural constitution of animals, then we may say that the end, in the case of instincts, has been implanted by the Creator as a working force in such a constitution to provide for its wants.

"Let cavillers deny

That brutes have reason ; sure 'tis something more,
'Tis Heaven directs, and stratagems inspire,
Beyond the short extent of human thought."

(*Somerville.*)

Hence they are more infallible than Reason in securing their ends.

Thus we find that 'blind' instincts are more infallible than 'rational' impulses. Pope writes —

"Say, where full Instinct is th' unerring guide,
What Pope or Council can they need beside ?
Reason, however able, cool at best,
Cares not for service, or but serves when prest,
Stays 'till we call, and then not often near ;
But honest Instinct comes a volunteer,
Sure never to o'er-shoot, but just to hit ;
While still too wide or short is human Wit ;
Sure by quick Nature happiness to gain,
Which heavier Reason labours at in vain."

Empiricists deny the presence of instincts ; and evolu-

The existence of instincts in man has, however, been disputed by empiricists ; and evolutionists too admit them only in the later generations of mankind,

who, it is alleged, have inherited them as the cumulative effect of ancestral experience. It is urged by the supporters of this view that originally the instincts had no place in the human constitution, which has gradually acquired these tendencies as the outcome of repeated and uniform acts in definite directions. Acts, from the empirical stand-point, are always the product of desires, which aim at some agreeable experience. When such acts become habitual we forget, it is said, their origin and mistake them for instincts. But the question naturally occurs to us, how did we get the first pleasure, the idea of which moves us to action? "If," as Martineau observes, "we have nothing to carry us to the pleasure, the pleasure must of its own accord arrive at us: it hits upon our sense, or our sense stumbles upon it, without any inner relation by which they find each other out; and our stock of desires and volitions is at the mercy of an accidental sensitive experience. Is this picture a true one,—of man in equilibrium, without forces hither or thither, and of an outer world walking up to him and flinging at him pains and pleasures, to wake him up? Can anything be more perverse than thus to attribute all the stir and activity to the external scene, and all the indifference to him? Is he not introduced as a *living being* among given objects? and is it not just the characteristic of the living being to be stocked with forces that determine his lines of direction in the field on which he is set, and find out what suits him there? The experience-philosophers forget that,

tionists admit them only in the later generations of animal history, as the product of ancestral experience.

But life is inexplicable without the instincts.

without instinctive forces, there would be no experience to be had, in a world where the food does not drop into the mouth and the stream does not leap up at the lips, and no spontaneous blankets fall on and off the shoulders with winter winds and summer heat. In the relation between our nature and the objects that gratify it, it is most evidently the nature that finds the objects and performs the active part; and but for the heat within, the cold matter of the world would be no fuel, and turn into no flame of joy.

As food is sweet only to the hungry, so, universally, is propensity the prior condition of pleasure, not pleasure of propensity." (*Types*. II, pp. 136-137.)

In fact, all natural propensities and inclinations crave for *objects*, calculated to gratify them, and not for pleasures which arise from their gratification. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 7.) "That all particular appetites and passions are towards *external things themselves*, distinct from the *pleasure arising from them*, is manifested from hence; that there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between the object and the passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an affection or appetite to one thing more than another." (Butler, *Sermon* XI. Bohn's Edition, p. 486.)

§ 2. **Impulses and Emotions.** Impulses, as active tendencies, should be distinguished from Emotions, which, as pleasurable or painful experiences, are passive feelings excited by certain repre-

Pleasures are mere sentient effects resulting from the gratification of instincts and desires, which are directed to objects.

While the Impulses are incentives to action, the Emotions are

sentations. When we describe the Impulses as active and the Emotions as passive, we do not mean to say that they are absolutely so; they are but different phases of one and the same mind, revealing now more of the one and now more of the other aspect. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) Thus Impulses, as general tendencies to action, have often an emotional basis; and Emotions, as expressive of a disturbance in our constitution, are apt to find expression in action. But though, like the other sides of our mental and moral life, they are thus closely connected, they are not to be regarded as identical. Feelings generally have a tendency to issue in action, physical or mental: they are but natural sluices directing the spontaneous flow of energy. But a sluice-gate is not to be confounded with the stream which it regulates. Feelings as such are mere passive experiences, having the capacity of directing energy, by reason of the organic unity of our constitution.* Such a capacity is illustrated even in the case of the representative Emotions and the abstract Sentiments, which call forth organic or mental activities in the form of physical disturbance or psychical concentration. So

primarily
restraints
upon
activity.

Feelings tend
to direct
energy and
thus to beget
Impulses.

* "Every feeling," writes Bain, "in proportion to its strength, is accompanied with movements, and with changes in the organic functions. If a feeling has no such apparent accompaniments, we conclude, either that it is weak, or that there is an effort of voluntary (and, it may be, habitual) suppression." (*Mental and Moral Science*, p. 216.) And he defines the *Law of Diffusion* expressive of the connection thus: "According as an impression is accompanied with Feeling, the aroused currents *diffuse* themselves freely over the brain, leading to a general agitation of the moving organs, as well as affecting the viscera." (*Ibid.*)

natural is this connection that the organic disturbance, in the one case, enters into the very texture of the Emotions in the form of somatic resonance; and the reflective attention, in the other, colours the very nature of the Sentiments as calm and contemplative emotions. But the activities thus conjoined with feelings are of a reflex character merely helping their expression. The active tendencies never operate as conscious impulses unless modified by reflection. "Emotion," says Calderwood, "is agitation of feeling, attended by more or less physical disturbance, and always implies a sense of weakness. The Emotions, in common with the Impulses, imply movement of our inner nature; but Desires and Affections are movements towards their objects. Emotions are movements from their objects. Their restraining power is experienced with great diversity of degree, and at their height they attain an overwhelming force, paralysing the other energies." (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 161.)

Distinction
between
Emotions
and Impulses

Emotions and
Impulses,
though
primarily of
opposite
characters,
often
influence each
other.

Emotions of
moderate
intensity

Though emotions are thus passive modifications of the mind, acted upon by appropriate objects, yet such modifications often intensify active impulses which promote their ends. In order to such intensification, however, the emotions must be of moderate strength, as a severe exercise of the mind in one direction precludes at the time a corresponding exercise of it in another. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) Thus, in an extreme form, Wonder stupifies, Fear paralyses, Anger befools, and Grief depresses; while in a moderate form, Wonder quickens curiosity,

Fear stimulates desire for security, Anger prompts revenge, and Grief augments sympathy and meditation. And it may be mentioned here that Impulses in their turn may likewise stimulate Emotions, such as when an individual is provoked or terrified by objects thwarting his inclinations or desires. Such reciprocal influence is at once seen to be natural, when we remember the organic unity of our mental constitution. The intellectual, emotional, and conative elements are but varying expressions of the same mind, even when influenced by the same object. As Dewey says, "The sensation of hunger, so far as it gives us information of the state of our body, is the basis of knowledge; so far as it is a pleasureable or painful affection of self, it is feeling; so far as it is the tendency to react upon this feeling, and satisfy it, by bringing about some objective change, it is impulse." (*Psychology*, p. 349.) The close connection of Emotions and Impulses is further illustrated in the parallelism in the courses of their development: corresponding to the difference of Emotions and Sentiments we have, in the sphere of activity, the difference between such concrete Impulses as Sympathy and Emulation and such abstract Desires as Virtue and Honour.

§ 3. Classification of Impulses or Springs of Action. Impulses* or Springs of Action have

generally intensify connected Springs of Action.

The close connection is due to the organic unity of the mind.

Classification of Impulses.

* The term 'Impulse' has been used in a wide and a narrow sense. In a wide sense it covers all conscious tendencies to action which influence the Will, as distinguished from reflex and spontaneous activities, which are purely organic and non-voluntary. Instincts, prompting us to activity with some accompani-

been classified (1) ethically and (2) psychologically.

(1) *Ethical Classification,*

based on
relative
moral worth.

(Shaftesbury,
Hutcheson,
and Mar-
tineau).

But such a
scale is im-
practicable
and useless.

(1) The **Ethical Classification**, we have seen, is based on the relative moral value of the several springs of action. Thus Shaftesbury, for moral purposes, divides the springs of action into selfish and social; and Hutcheson practically adopts the same classification in his distinction of self-love and benevolence. Martineau's moral scale is more complete (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 23); but, as we have seen (Chap. IX, § 24), such a task is impracticable, owing to the inexhaustible variety of concrete impulses, and is also scientifically useless. Thus, Hutcheson, though maintaining that "There is a plain gradation in the objects of our approbation and condemnation, from the indifferent actions ascending to the highest

ment of consciousness, however vague and faint, as well as fully developed Desires with explicit consciousness, thus come within the range of 'Impulse.' Some writers, however, use the term in the narrow sense of instinctive tendencies alone, without any distinct consciousness of self, which is taken to be the distinguishing mark of desires. Referring to this distinction between 'Instinctive Impulse' and 'Desire,' Green writes, "The latter involves a consciousness of its object, which in turn implies a consciousness of self. In this consciousness of objects which is also that of self, or of self which is also a consciousness of objects, we have the distinguishing characteristic of desire (as we know it), of understanding and of will, as compared with those processes of the animal soul with which they are apt to be confused. And this consciousness is also the common basis which unites desire, understanding, and will with each other." (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 123.) We have used the term in the wide sense of any conscious active tendency, whether instinctive or not. It is, therefore, synonymous with a spring of action, primary or secondary. Thus Sidgwick distinguishes between 'Self-regarding' and 'Extra-regarding' Impulses and maintains that "So far from our conscious active impulses being always directed towards the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain for ourselves, we can find everywhere in consciousness extra-regarding impulses, directed towards something that is not pleasure, nor relief from pain." (*Methods*, p. 53.)

virtue, or descending to the lowest vice," admits, "It is not easy to settle exactly the several intermediate steps in due order, but the highest and lowest [viz., benevolence and self-love] are manifest." (*System*, I, iv, p. 64.)

(2) The Psychological Classification of the springs of action is due to their points of similarity and dissimilarity as mental phenomena. Thus instincts as subconscious primitive cravings are distinguished from conscious and derivative desires; and desires, again, as bent upon personal advantage, are distinguished from affections, directed to the good of others. And, among instincts, desires, and affections, we may still draw differences according as they are modified in different cases by varieties in their objects, thus preparing the way for further subdivisions. We may, accordingly, subdivide instincts into physical (e. g., hunger and thirst) and mental (e. g., sympathy, parental affection); and the latter again we may divide into self-regarding (e. g., the instinct of self-preservation) and other-regarding (e. g., the affections). Similarly, we may subdivide desires and affections, as they vary owing to variations in their objects or other attendant circumstances. Before attempting, however, such a classification ourselves, let us briefly notice what great thinkers have thought on the point.

(2) *Psychological Classification*, based on the points of similarity and dissimilarity as mental phenomena.

Different views on the subject.

1. **Plato's Classification.** Plato classifies the springs of action into three, viz., reason, spirited impulses, and appetites, and attributes virtue or

Plato's account

is relative
to his
political
end.

moral excellence to their harmony, *i. e.*, the due regulation of the appetites or non-rational impulses by Reason. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, §4.) This classification is evidently defective and incomplete as overlooking many prominent desires and affections of the human mind. It was designed rather to serve the purpose of his ideal commonwealth, in which the several classes—governors, soldiers, and helots—should be placed in due subordination by reference to their respective virtues of wisdom, courage, and temperance.

Aristotle's
account

2. **Aristotle's Classification.** Aristotle, no doubt, gives a comparatively long list of impulses as well as of the virtues which arise from their due regulation (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 5); but his list is purely empirical, without any principle or system.

is empirical.

The Cartesian
account

3. **The Cartesian Account.** Descartes and Malebranche attempt a classification of the springs of action, which is substantially adopted by Spinoza. And all of them maintain that, in the moral sphere, the impulses have their relative moral value which should regulate our choice. The essence of virtue, as Malebranche says, is to be found in the "Love for their law of order." The list of the instinctive impulses or 'primary affections' is thus given by them: Wonder, Love, Hate, Desire, Joy, and Grief. This classification indicates confusion and cross division. Emotions (*e. g.*, Wonder) are confounded with Impulses (*e. g.*, Desire); and Joy or Grief does not exclude altogether Desire, Love, or Hate.

involves
confusion and
cross
division.

4. In Hobbes and Hutcheson we find the tendency to extreme simplification : Hobbes reduces all the springs of action to mere Self-love ; while Hutcheson supplements it by Benevolence. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 12 and Chap. X, § 14.) But the diverse springs of human activity can never be thus traced to the influence of a single impulse or the conflicting tendencies of only two rival combatants.

Hobbes and Hutcheson aim at extreme simplification.

5. Reid classifies active impulses into mechanical, animal, and rational. Dugald Stewart appropriately characterizes Reid's classification as capricious, for if the appetites have been termed 'animal principles', because they are common to men and brutes, there is no reason why instincts, which are also common to men and brutes, should be called 'mechanical.' Stewart's own classification is—Appetites, Desires, Affections, Self-love, and Moral Faculty.

Reid's classification

is inadequate and inconsistent.

Dugald Stewart's classification.

6. Martineau's Classification. Martineau, approving the principle of Stewart's classification, first distinguishes between the Primary and the Secondary Springs of Action. The *Primary Springs of Action* have been defined by him as those impulses which urge a man, "in the way of unreflecting instinct, to appropriate objects or natural expression"; and the *Secondary Springs of Action*, as those "which supervene upon self-knowledge and experience, and in which the preconception is present of an end gratifying to some recognised feeling." When, for example, one is prompted by instinctive hunger to take his food for nourishment, a primary spring of action is illustrated; but when, after

Martineau's classification.

(I) The Primary Springs of Action or instinctive tendencies.

(II) The Secondary Springs of Action.

tasting a certain food and having, say, an agreeable experience, one subsequently desires to take the food again for the pleasure of the palate and not for satisfying hunger, then the secondary transformation of hunger is illustrated.

Four classes of the *Primary Springs of Action*.

(1) *Propensions*, tending to preserve the life of the individual as well as that of the species, include (a) the appetites and (b) animal spontaneity.

(2) *Passions*, tending to protect life from injury, include (a) antipathy, (b) anger, and (c) fear.

I. *The Primary Springs of Action* have been classified into four groups:—

(1.) *Propensions*. “They are the forces of first necessity for the mere physical life in its individual maintenance or successive continuance, and exhibit the lowest terms on which it could hold its footing in the world at all.” (*Types*, ii, p. 140.) The propensions include—(a) the *Organic Appetites* (such as hunger, thirst, and sex) and (b) *Animal Spontaneity* (such as “the intermittent springiness and spontaneity of exercise and labour, the vivacious contempt of obstacles and pure triumph of energy”).

(2) *Passions*. They are excited by “painful and uncongenial” objects and are “invariably *repulsions*, thrusting away what is hurtful or inharmonious, or else withdrawing us thence. By this common feature they indicate their proper function; they are evidently provisions for entrenching our nature in security amid threatening or invading ills, and removing to a great distance whatever jars with its appointed life. These passions are three; distributing themselves according to the three elements of time, and visiting with a distinct feeling what is repugnant to us in the present, in the past, and in the future. Towards an object of natural aversion immediately before us

we feel *Antipathy* ; towards that which has just hurt us, we experience *Anger* ; towards that which menaces us with evil, we look with *Fear*." (*Ibid.*, p. 141.)

(3) *Affections*. They are *attractions* towards other persons or animals "reminding us of our kind, if not belonging to it." They imply reciprocity of feeling and are properly directed to personal beings : "They single out," says Martineau, "*personal beings* like ourselves as their indispensable objects ; or if, at their inferior margin, they extend somewhat further down, it is only to take in living beings regarded by them as quasi-personal and drawn into the human analogy." (*Ibid.*, p. 145.) They are—*Parental*, *Social*, and *Compassionate*.

(3) *Affections*, tending to the good of others, include (a) parental, (b) social, and (c) compassionate tender feelings.

(4) *Sentiments*. They are directed towards "*ideal relations*, objects of apprehension or thought that are above us, yet potentially ours." (P. 151.) They are aspirations after "what is higher than ourselves, whether recognised as personal or not." They are *Wonder* or the intellectual sentiment, prompting us to inquire into the causes of events, *Admiration* or the æsthetic sentiment, directed towards beauty, and *Reverence* or the moral sentiment, directed towards "transcendent goodness," as represented in the exalted personalities of heroes, saints, and gods.

(4) *Sentiments*, directed towards ideal relations, include (a) wonder, (b) admiration, and (c) reverence, which are the intellectual, æsthetic, and moral forms respectively. *Corresponding Secondary Modifications:*

II. The corresponding *Secondary Springs of Action* include—

(1) *Secondary Propensions*, such as *Gluttony*, *Voluptuousness*, the *Love of Ease*, *Power*, or *Money*.

(1) *Secondary Propensions*, such as gluttony, voluptuousness, and greed.

(2) *Secondary Passions*, such as *Malice* or *Ill-*

(2) *Secondary*

Passions, such as malice, vindictiveness, and mistrust.

(3) Secondary Affections or Sentimentality.

will (with its expression in *Censoriousness*), *Vindictiveness* or the cherishing of resentment, and *Suspiciousness* or *Mistrust*.

(3) *Secondary Affections* or *Sentimentality*, such as love of the pleasures of company or of compassion. "If," writes Martineau, "instead of family affection, freely spent on the members of a home, there is a self-regarding play with them, as instruments of sympathetic interest; if, instead of social affection, flowing out upon companions and equals, there is the mere love of society as a means of tasting the fruits of such affection; if, instead of Compassion, there grows up a taste for exciting and indulging Pity; this change is accurately described by saying, that it is a transition from natural health to sentimental disease." (*Ibid.*, p. 177.)

(4) Secondary Sentiments, such as love of self-culture, æstheticism, and interest in religion.

(4) *Secondary Sentiments*, such as *Love of Self-culture*, *Æstheticism*, and *Interest in Religion*. These include the cultivation of the intellectual, æsthetic, and moral sentiments for the sake of the pleasure which they bring.

There are *Compound Springs of Action* arising from the combination of the above elements according to the laws of association.

These are the elementary impulses, primary and secondary, which by their different combinations give rise to various *Compound Springs of Action*. The combinations take place according to the laws of association, viz., those of transference, sympathy, and distance. And thus we get, according to Martineau, the diverse tendencies to action which constitute the materials of our moral life.

Martineau's classification, though com-

Martineau, no doubt, has done much in bringing into prominence the doctrine of Impulses and in

giving a luminous exposition of their principal forms and varieties. Nevertheless his list is more or less arbitrary and empirical. (1) His list is, accordingly, incomplete. There is no mention, for example, of filial or fraternal affection; and the rational impulses, prudential and moral, have been excluded. (2) In his classification he has mixed up impulses and emotions which, as explained above, are distinct mental phenomena, though often closely connected. The passions, for example, are strong and deep feelings which, by reason of their intensity, get a firm hold of the mind and agitate it violently. Hence, popularly, the term is restricted to anger, though, not infrequently, it indicates such ardent dispositions as love and hate. The sentiments, likewise, are abstract emotions or highly refined feelings which yield quiet and lasting satisfaction. Fear, anger, or antipathy,—wonder, admiration, or reverence,—by itself does not move us to action. In their intense form, they even paralyse activity, as when one is benumbed or stupefied by fear, anger, or wonder. In their moderate form, no doubt, they intensify the associated desires or impulses tending to restore mental equilibrium. Thus anger may prompt retaliation; fear, flight; and wonder, curiosity. But these active impulses prompted by emotions should never be confounded with them.


Proposed Classification. Having considered the different views of the Springs of Action, let us attempt a classification which may be represented in outline thus:—

paratively full, is arbitrary and empirical.

(1) It is incomplete;

and (2) it includes factors which are not properly impulses.

*Proposed
Classification.*



Rational and Non-rational Springs of Action.

We may first classify the Springs of Action into *Rational* and *Non-rational*, according as the exercise of reason or thought is prominently involved or not, in the form of general notions and principles of action. Strictly speaking, in the human constitution, all impulses in adult life are more or less attended with thought. Every desire has, as Mackenzie puts it, its own "universe" determined by a special circle of ideas subserving a definite end, such as health, wealth, or honour. Different desires have thus different universes or ends, which at times come in conflict with one another. As, however, more abstract or comprehensive ends are formed, such conflicts are transcended and life comes more and more under the controlling influence of what may be called the rational impulses, such as Prudence and

Virtue. They are rational in the sense that they involve an exercise of thought or reason in a prominent form, for elements of reason may be supposed to exist even in what we call Instincts. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) Reason reflects Nature, and Instinct is but its unconscious operation.

"Instinct and reason how can we divide ?

"Tis the fool's ignorance, and the pedant's
pride."* (*Prior*)

(A) *Non-rational* impulses are either of the character of (I) blind *Instinct* or of the character of (II) open-eyed *Desire*. (I) The Instincts are untaught aptitudes, beneficial to life; they always imply ends to which they are directed, though these ends, as mentioned above, operate unconsciously in the minds of the animals prompted by them. The Instincts as known to us are the either (1) *Self-regarding*, seeking one's own good, or (2) *Other-regarding*, aiming at the good of others. (1) The *Self-regarding Instincts*, again, are either (a) *organic* (viz., the appetites) or (b) *mental* (such as curiosity, self-advancement, and self-preservation). (2) The *Other-regarding Instincts* are the *Affections*, in the proper sense of the term, which urge us to promote the well-being of others quite in a disinterested way.

(A) Non-rational
Impulses :
(I) Instincts
which blindly
prompt us
to activity.

Instincts
are either (1)
self-
regarding,
or (2) other-
regarding.

*" The spider's touch, how exquisitely fine !
Feels at each thread, and lives along the line :
In the nice bee, what sense so subtly true
From pois'nous herbs extracts the healing dew ?
How Instinct varies in the grov'ling swine,
Compar'd, half-reas'ning elephant, with thine !
'Twixt that, and Reason, what a nice barrier,
For ever sep'rate, yet for ever near !" (*Pope.*)

These Affections are (a) *Domestic* (including parental, filial, fraternal, and conjugal forms), (b) *Social* (such as friendship, courtesy, humility), or (c) *Compassionate* (such as sympathy, pity, mercy.) The presence of disinterested affections has, no doubt, been disputed by egoistic writers like Hobbes, Helvetius, and Mandeville (*Vide* Chap. X, § 5); but, to every impartial observer, their presence is a patent psychological fact. Nay, the very existence of animal creation would be jeopardized without them. "Pain and sorrow," says Butler, "have a right to our assistance; compassion puts us in mind of the debt, and that we owe it to ourselves as well as to others." Compassion is really Nature's milk put in the human breast to sustain the afflicted.

II. The other class of Non-rational Impulses is the *Desires* which move us to action for some conscious end in view. The attainment of the end brings satisfaction to the agent; and the expectation of such satisfaction gives urgency to a desire. The principal desires which sway the human mind are—desire (1) *of knowledge*, (2) *of society*, (3) *of esteem*, (4) *of power*, and (5) *of gain*. The desire of society is distinguished from social affections by the fact that it is directed to other persons not for their good, but for our own. It comes under what Martineau describes as Sentimentality.

(B) The Rational Impulses include the (1) *prudential* and (2) *moral* judgments with their attendant dispositions. "Judgments," says Calderwood, "do not simply and of themselves perform the

II. Desires which influence us with a consciousness of some end in view.

(B) Rational Impulses:
(1) Prudence;
(2) Virtue.

function of impulse, but these two classes of judgments have associated with them certain dispositions whose impelling force operates with the judgments. These dispositions are, desire of personal advantage (often called, self-love) with expectation or hope; and reverence for moral law, with devotion to the Deity as Moral Governor. Without the judgments, the attendant dispositions are not experienced. The judgments, therefore, are properly regarded as the origin of impelling force. On the other hand, without the attendant disposition, the judgments would fail to perform the part of an impulse. The presence of these dispositions depends not upon the circumstances in which a man is placed, but upon the degree of intellectual energy bestowed upon the question how far duty or interest is involved. This, therefore, establishes the intellectual origin of the impulse." (*Moral Philosophy*, p. 156.)

Martineau refuses to recognize these as an independent class of Impulses, regarding them as simply 'general conceptions,' symbolizing concrete tendencies represented by the other impulses. Referring to the 'love of right,' he observes, "But the superiority to which I yield myself is the same as before; and this is no more a new spring of action than the law of gravitation, when defined, supplies a new force added on to that by which the rain falls." (*Types*, II, p. 284.) It may be mentioned, however, that though, objectively, rainfall is but a particular case of gravity, yet, subjectively, there is great difference between a law and a case, a

Martineau
rejects rational
impulses
on the ground
that they are
mere 'general
conceptions.

But ideal and abiding ends, influenced by feeling, are often powerful incentives to action.

concept and a percept, as well as between their attendant emotions and consequent dispositions. The influence of ideal and permanent ends on our volition is a patent fact of our mental life admitted by all psychologists. There is certainly great difference between the concrete impulses, which furnish concrete moral problems, and the comparatively general tendencies, determined by concepts, which to a great extent pre-determine the character of the moral experience we wish to have. In the words of Martineau himself, "When once I have been furnished with this generalisation, I shall go into every particular moral trial with the conception in my mind, and with the desire that, among the competitors about to appeal to my will, I may accept the highest." (*Ibid.*, p. 284.) And the same remark applies to prudential impulses or dispositions. (*Vide* next section.)

Desires involve a consciousness of end, while instinctive impulses do not.

§ 4. **Character of Desires.** As, in adult life, moral problems are often started by the conflict of Desires and Affections, let us consider them a little more fully to guard against any possible confusion or misapprehension. We shall confine our attention to Desires in the present section and shall examine the character of Affections in the next. *Desires* are to be distinguished from instinctive impulses by the fact that the consciousness of an end gratifying to the agent is present in the former case, while it is absent in the latter. "Desire," says Dewey, "is the impulse plus the feeling of satisfaction got in its realization. But impulse is always towards an end,

and the satisfaction is because this end has been reached. Desire merely adds the knowledge or feeling of that line of conduct or of that object in which the impulse will fulfil itself. Desire is the impulse in its known objective connection. The pleasure is one element in it, and an element subordinated to the objective experience." (*Psychology*, p. 362.)

Analysis of Desire. Desire as a fact of our conscious life involves the (I) Cognitive, (II) Emotive, and (III) Conative elements. Let us consider these elements one by one:—

*Analysis of
Desire :*

(I) *The Cognitive Elements.* (1) The consciousness of want, more or less distinct and definite, underlies every state of desire. If one, for example, be altogether self-satisfied, then there would be no room for desires in him. But generally we find that people, who are satisfied in some, are not satisfied in other, respects. Thus a hermit or recluse, though not moved by worldly desires, may still be influenced by desires relating to the Future State. (2) There must also be the representation of an end or object which is believed to be capable of removing the want. The consciousness of the difference between the present unrealized condition of self and its realized condition, when the object of desire is attained, is essential to every desire. "Desire," writes Dewey, "implies a consciousness which can distinguish between its actual state and a possible future state, and is aware of the means by which this future state can be brought into

(I) Cognitive
Elements :
(1) Conscious-
ness of want.

(2) Represen-
tation of an
object expect-
ed to re-
move the
want.

(3) Consciousness of interval between present want and its gratification.

(4) Consciousness of difference between representation and presentation.

existence. It involves a permanent self which regards itself both as a present and future self, and acts with reference to their connection. It involves, in short, a self which can project or objectify itself." (*Psychology*, p. 363.) (3) There must, moreover, be the consciousness of distance or interval between the present feeling of want and its anticipated removal by the attainment of the appropriate object. If the consciousness of want and the representation of a suitable object be immediately followed by its attainment, then no room is left for desire. The incipient desire expires, the moment the want is removed. (4) From these it is evident that there must be a clear and even acute consciousness of the difference between the representation and its presentative basis in order to the presence of desire. If one derives as much satisfaction from a representation as from the corresponding presentation, then desire is quenched the moment it rises. Thus in the case of day-dreamers there may be a want followed by a representation which by reason of its vividness and intensity satisfies it and thus leaves no room for the emergence of a desire. "If," as is said, "wishes were horses, beggars would ride."*

* Sir James Mackintosh, speaking of his younger years, mentions, "Reading of Echard's Roman History led me into a ridiculous habit from which I shall never be totally free. I used to fancy myself Emperor of Constantinople. I distributed offices and provinces among my school fellows. I loaded my favourites with dignity and power, and I often made the objects of my dislike feel the weight of my imperial resentment. I carried on the series of political events in solitude for several

✓(II) *The Emotive Elements.* Mere consciousness of want and the representation of an object expected to remove it are not adequate, however, to give rise to Desire. I may, for example, be conscious of my imperfection and be also aware of the circumstances which are likely to remove it; but still I am not moved by any desire, so long as I do not experience pain at my short-coming, which prompts me to seek relief in some form of activity constituting the very essence of desire. It should not, however, be inferred from this that pleasure is the real object of desire: pleasure is merely the accompaniment of restored equilibrium, the index to the fact that the object of desire is attained. "This view," as Dewey observes, "overlooks two facts. First, the pleasure is a mere abstraction; the concrete existence is the object which gives the pleasure. It is quite true that no object would be desired unless it were in that relation to self which we call feeling, that is, pleasure or happiness; but it is just as true that what is desired is not the

II Emotive
Elements:

(1) Conscious-
ness of pain
due to want.

Pleasure is
not the object
of desire.

hours. I resumed them and continued them from day to day for months. Ever since I have been more prone to building castles in the air than most others. My castle building has always been of a singular kind. It was not the anticipation of a sanguine disposition expecting extraordinary success in its pursuits. My disposition is not sanguine, and my visions have generally regarded things as much unconnected with my ordinary pursuits and as little to be expected as the crown of Constantinople at the school of Fortrose. These fancies indeed have never amounted to conviction, or, in other words, they have never influenced my action, but I must confess they have often been as steady and of as regular occurrence as conviction itself, and that they have sometimes created a little faint expectation, or state of mind, in which my wonder that they should be realized would not be so great as it naturally ought to be."

pleasure, but the object which affords pleasure. The other fact which is overlooked is that we do not desire the object *because* it gives us pleasure; but that it gives us pleasure because it satisfies the impulse which, in connection with the idea of the object, constitutes the desire. The child desires the apple, for he has the idea of the apple as satisfying his impulse. Only for this reason does he conceive it as pleasure-giving. Pleasure follows after the desire, rather than determines it." (*Ibid.*, pp. 361—362.)

It is apparent from the preceding remarks that desires are generally doubly painful: first, they are born of want which is ordinarily more or less painful; and, secondly, the continuance of a desire is itself a painful experience pressing for relief. It is the painful element which incites the active tendency to get the object on which desire fastens.

(III) *The Conative Elements.* In spite of the intellectual and emotional elements referred to above, there would be no desire if there be no active tendency ready to emerge at their call. I may have a consciousness of want and also a representation of what is likely to remove it, and yet I may not be moved by desire owing to the deficiency of psycho-physical energy or the conscious inability to attain the object of desire. Hence is it we find that the same feelings of want and the same representations do not always excite desires, or desires of the same intensity. "The impulse or striving to act," as Ward observes, "will be stronger the

(2) The continuance of a desire is an additional source of pain.

Conative Elements :

The active attitude on any occasion determines the rise of a desire, when suitable feeling and representation are present.

greater the available energy, the fewer the present outlets, and, habits apart, the fresher the new opening for activity." (*Encyclo. Brit.*, XX, p. 74.) When we are actively disposed, consciousness of want coupled with an appropriate representation excites desire urging us to action. "At times, when there is a lack of present interests, or when these have begun to wane, or when there is positive pain, attention is ready to fasten on any new suggestion that calls for more activity, requires a change of active attitude, or promises relief. Such spontaneous concentration of attention ensures greater vividness to the new idea, whatever it be, and to its belongings." (*Ibid.*, p. 74.) As, however, we are conscious of a difference between a presentation and its representation, the representation called up cannot satisfy the craving which is ordinarily more vehement and absorbing than such a representation. Thus, as Ward points out, "The source of desire lies essentially in this excess of the active reaction above the intensity of the representation, (the one constituting the 'impulse', the other the 'object' of desire, or the desideratum)".

From the above account, it is apparent that though the intellectual, emotional, and conative factors enter into desire, the last factor is really the predominant one, giving to desire its essentially active feature. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) And this activity is called forth, as indicated above, by the feeling of want rather than by the prospect of pleasure, as is usually supposed. "The best proof

Desire is essentially active, as the conative element is pre-dominant.

Desire is
occasioned
by want and
not by a
prospect of
pleasure.

Ward's
testimony.

of this," writes Ward, "lies in certain habitual desires. Pleasures are diminished by repetition, whilst habits are strengthened by it; if the intensity of desire, therefore, were proportioned to the "pleasure value" of its gratification, the desire for renewed gratification should diminish as this pleasure grows less; but, if the present pain of restraint from action determines the intensity of desire, this should increase as the action becomes habitual. And observation seems to show that, unless prudence suggest the forcible suppression of belated desires or the active energies themselves fail, desires do in fact become more imperious, although less productive of positive pleasure, as time goes on." (*Ibid.*, p. 75.)

Desires mark
the represent-
ative stage
of conative
development.

The most
representa-
tive impulses
are the
ideal ends
influencing
us to action.

Stout.

It may be mentioned in this connection that Desires represent the representative stage of conative development, the perceptual stage being represented by instinctive impulses and other motor adjustments in response to actual stimuli. The course of conative development follows the general course of mental development indicated in chapter V, §4. As abstract thought represents the highest stage of intellectual development, so in the sphere of conation, the highest impulses to activity are the rational or ideal ends referred to in the last section. As Stout observes, "With the development of ideational thought, higher forms of desire arise. The process of generalisation brings with it generalised conative tendencies. We aim at the fulfilment of rules of conduct instead of the production of

this or that special result in this or that particular case. Ideal construction sets before us ends which have never been previously realised. These ends may be so complex that they can only be realised gradually by activities persistently renewed as opportunity allows. The writing of a book and sometimes the reading of it, may serve as an example. Sometimes the ideally constructed ends are such as the individual recognises to be unattainable in his own lifetime. He can only contribute his share towards bringing them to pass. Sometimes there is a doubt whether they can be completely attained, or even a certainty that they cannot be completely attained. Ends of this last kind are the highest, and are generally called 'ideals.' " (*Manual of Psychology*, pp. 600-601.)

§ 5. Affections Distinguished from Desires.

Having considered Desires, let us now turn our attention to *Affections*. Attempts have, no doubt, been made to deduce Affections from Desires, Sympathy from Self-love; but such attempts must necessarily fail, since no process of association can explain the genesis of pure regard for the well-being of others out of self-interest. This is evident from the fact that we cease to praise or admire an act of self-sacrifice when we find it to be but an aspect of self-seeking. Moreover, as Hutcheson points out, the anxiety of persons in their death-bed for their children and relatives precludes the supposition of self-regard in such cases and proves conclusively the disinterested character of our

Affections, as other-regarding impulses, cannot possibly be derived from Desires, which are self-regarding.

Testimonies of Hutcheson,

Adam
Smith,

Affections. "Sympathy," writes Adam Smith, "cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle. When I sympathize with your sorrow or your indignation, it may be pretended, indeed, that my emotion is founded in self-love, because it arises from bringing your case home to myself, from putting myself in your situation, and thence conceiving what I should feel in the like circumstances. But though sympathy is very properly said to arise from an imaginary change of situations with the person principally concerned, yet this imaginary change is not supposed to happen to me in my own person and character, but in that of the person with whom I sympathize. When I condole with you for the loss of your only son, in order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son was unfortunately to die: but I consider what I should suffer if I was really you, and I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the least upon my own. It is not, therefore, in the least selfish. How can that be regarded as a selfish passion, which does not arise even from the imagination of anything that has befallen, or that relates to myself, in my own proper person and character, but which is entirely occupied about what relates to you? A man may sympathize with a woman in child-bed; though it is impossible that he should conceive himself as suffering her pains in his

own person and character. That whole account of human nature, however, which deduces all sentiments and affections from self-love, which has made so much noise in the world, but which, so far as I know, has never yet fully and distinctly explained, seems to me to have arisen from some confused misapprehension of the system of sympathy." (*Moral Sentiments*, Part VII, Sec. 3, Chap. 1.) And even sceptics are constrained to admit that Affections are quite disinterested. Hume, for example, observes, "Love is always followed by a desire of happiness to the person beloved, and an aversion to his misery; as hatred produces a desire of the misery, and an aversion to the happiness of the person hated. These opposite desires seem to be originally and primarily conjoined with the passions of love and hatred. It is a constitution of nature, of which we can give no farther explication." (*Dissertation on the Passions*, Sec. 3.) and Hume.

Desires and Affections are opposite in character and tendency: the former imply deficiency or want; while the latter, fullness or spontaneous outflow of the heart. In the case of the one we seek personal enjoyment, while in the other, the good of others. Desires are directed to all classes of objects, whether animate or inanimate; but Affections are directed to persons and, only in a subordinate degree, to lower animals. Similarity of constitution and reciprocity of feelings are the general conditions of all Affections; but these are not essential to the presence of Desires. Owing to these contrasts, Desires and Affections

Desires and Affections are opposite in character and tendency.

- (1) Desires imply want, while Affections, fullness
(2) In the one case we seek personal enjoyment, while in the other, the

good of
others.

(3) Desires are directed to all kinds of objects, while Affections, to persons.

Thus Desires and Affections are often in conflict, which may be intensified with experience.

Channing.

often come into conflict, so that, as the proverb goes, 'It is impossible to love and to be wise.' The conflict of these opposite tendencies is not infrequently heightened by gratification and experience, which generally incline us to seek what is agreeable instead of what is eligible. "Our appetites and desires," says Channing, "carry with them a principle of growth or tendency to enlargement. They expand by indulgence, and, if not restrained, they fill and exhaust the soul, and hence are to be strictly watched over and denied. Nature has set bounds to the desires of the brute, but not to human desire, which partakes of the illimitableness of the soul to which it belongs. In brutes, for example, the animal appetites impel to a certain round of simple gratifications, beyond which they never pass. But man, having imagination and invention, is able by these noble faculties to whet his sensual desires indefinitely. He is able to form new combinations of animal pleasures, and to provoke appetite by stimulants. The East gives up its spices, and the South holds not back its vintage. Sea and land are rifled for luxuries. Whilst the animal finds its nourishment in a few plants, perhaps in a single blade, man's table groans under the spoils of all regions; and the consequence is, that in not a few cases the whole strength of the soul runs into appetite, just as some rich soil shoots up into poisonous weeds, and man, the rational creature of God, degenerates into the most thorough sensualist." (*Works*, II, p. 103.)

Though, however, the Desires and Affections are thus in their nature opposed, yet such is the harmony of our mental and moral constitution that, in spite of their natural contrariety, they become co-partners in the transactions of life and, by their mutual restraints and adjustment, serve to promote the true end of life. Desires are refined and enlarged by Affections, and Affections too become enriched and deepened by Desires. We can more effectively enter into the feelings of others and thus promote their well-being through our own satisfactions and disappointments. The natural instincts acquire a definite sense only through the teachings of experience, an important part of which is contributed by the Desires. The following lines of Pope, therefore, are not altogether untrue :

"God loves from Whole to Parts : but human soul
Must rise from Individual to the Whole.
Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake ;
The centre mov'd, a circle straight succeeds,
Another still, and still another spreads ;
Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace ;
His country next ; and next all human race ;
Wide and more wide, th' o'erflowings of the mind
Take ev'ry creature in, of ev'ry kind ;
Earth smiles around, with boundless bounty blest,
And Heav'n beholds its image in his breast."

(*Pope.*)

It may be mentioned in this connection that our moral nature imposes a greater restraint upon Desires

Desires and Affections, though thus opposed, are harmoniously blended in our moral constitution, promoting the best interests of the individual and of the community.

Our moral nature imposes a

greater restraint upon Desires, as these often prompt us to seek our interests contrary to the dictates of Conscience.

than upon Affections. We are oftener liable to go astray by a prospect of good to ourselves than by an impulse to do good to others. This reveals the superior claim of Affections, and also that the claim of those that are of wider range is generally higher than that of the more restricted ones. As Fenelon has said, "We owe more to humanity than to our own country, more to our country than to our family, more to our family than to our friends, more to our friends than to ourselves; and, within ourselves, we owe more to the soul than to the body, and more to the body as a whole than to each one of its parts."

Desire is of what is attainable, while Wish may be idle.

§ 6. **Desire, Wish, and Volition.** All these terms are at times used synonymously; but still there are differences among them. "The difference between wish and desire," says Kames, "seems to be, that desire is directed to what is obtainable, and a wish may be directed to what is obtainable or not." Thus, in the case of Desire a representation of the means necessary to its satisfaction is more or less distinctly present in the mind, thereby producing the conviction that its object is attainable; while in the case of Wish no such representation or conviction is necessarily present. Hence we often describe wishes as 'idle.' The active tendency being the same, wishes are based more on feeling, while desires, on knowledge. And wishes being more emotional in character are generally more intense and vivid. Hence a wish has sometimes been described as "an effective desire." But, though a wish may be intense

The emotional factor is more prominent in Wish.

or strong by reason of its feeling-tone, yet it cannot strictly be called "an effective desire." In respect of efficacy desires stand higher than mere wishes.

Desires
are more
effective than
Wishes.

Wish has at times been confounded with Will, because in respect of ardour or energy both resemble to a great extent; but the energy, in the one case, takes the form of mere idle craving, while, in the other, of choice or action. "The wishing of a thing," observes South, "is not properly the willing of it; it imports no more than an idle, unoperative, complacency in, and desire of, the object." Thus the active decision of Will is quite different from the prompting of an eager, but comparatively blind, Wish. "It might seem at first," writes Mackenzie, "that if a wish is a dominant desire it must always issue in will. But this is not the case. The reason is that a wish is often of an abstract character, directed towards some single element in a concrete event, without reference to the accompanying circumstances." (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 53.) If, therefore, "a wish is often of an abstract character," overlooking "the accompanying circumstances," then it is 'dominant' in the sense of ardent or vehement, but not in the sense of 'effective' or issuing in action. In order that a wish may be 'effective', it must take into account the concrete situation, so as to lead to volition or choice.

Though Wish
resembles
Will in
ardour, yet
the energy
in the one
case is only
of the charac-
ter of idle
craving,
while in the
other, it is of
the form of
rational
choice.

"In idle wishes fools supinely stay;

Be there a will,—and wisdom finds a way."

(Crabb.)

Will, as we shall see in the next chapter, is concerned with the control of the desires or impulses;

Will is
concerned
with the

control of
impulses.

Volition is
an exercise of
Will.

The lower
propensities,
if not duly
controlled,
tend to
degrade
human
nature.

and Volition is but a concrete exercise of Will. "The process by which the concrete forms of volition are built up from the crude material of impulse" is thus indicated by Dewey: "First there is awakened the state of mind known as *desire*; there is then a conflict of desires; this is concluded by the process of deliberation and *choice*; these result in the formation of an end of action which serves as the purpose or *motive* of action; this purpose is then, through the medium of its felt desirability, handed over, as it were, to the realm of the impulses, which realize it." (*Psychology*, p. 360.) We shall consider the character of Will and Motive in the next chapter, as well as the relation which these bear to Impulses and Desires. Uncontrolled by Will, the lower propensities may grow wild and may even employ the higher faculties in their service to serve their ignoble ends. "It is an interesting and solemn reflection," observes Channing, "that the very nobleness of human nature may become the means and instrument of degradation. The powers which ally us to God, when pressed into the service of desire and appetite, enlarge desire into monstrous excess, and irritate appetite into fury. The rapidity of thought, the richness of imagination, the resources of invention, when enslaved to any passion, give it an extent and energy unknown to inferior natures; and just in proportion as this usurper establishes its empire over us, all the nobler attainments and products of the soul perish. Truth, virtue, honour, religion, hope, faith, charity, die."

(*Works*, II, p. 103.) We find, accordingly, in the Hindu Scriptures, the evil propensities of the soul described as *Ripus* or enemies. They are six in number, viz., (1) Sensual Desires (कामः), (2) Irascibility (क्रोधः), (3) Greed (लोभः), (4) Infatuation (मोहः), (5) Self-conceit (मदः), and (6) Maliciousness (मात्सर्यं). When not regulated or controlled they may lead men to any excess. As Bacon says, "Certainly it is the nature of extreme self-lovers as they will set a house on fire and it were but to roast their eggs." (*Essay on Wisdom*.) But, properly controlled, they give rise to the several virtues. Thus the virtues, arising from the due regulation of the six propensities mentioned above, are—(1) Equanimity (समः), (2) Self-command (दमः), (3) Self-restraint (यमः), (4) Sympathy (दया), (5) Sincerity (दाक्षिण्यं), and (6) Justice (धर्मः). The source of virtue is thus a well-regulated Will. Without it life is completely at the mercy of the passing propensions and passions. A man then degenerates into a brute.

"His soul, like bark with rudder lost
On passion's changeful tide was tost ;
Nor vice nor virtue had the power
Beyond th' impression of the hour ;
And O, when passion rules, how rare
The hours that fall to virtue's share !" (*Scott*.)

The evil propensities are, accordingly, described in the Hindu Scriptures as *Ripus* or enemies, which are six in number.

When properly regulated, they give rise to the virtues.

Honest Will is thus the source of all virtue.

CHAPTER XX.

WILL.

Man, though influenced in various ways on any occasion, can improve or debase his nature by the character of his choice.

§ 1. **Importance of Will.** As all moral acts are voluntary acts, the importance of Will in the moral sphere is evidently very great. At any time we are moved by a variety of influences; but the character of an act depends not on these alone but on our regulation of them. Man is a

“Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confus’d;
Still by himself abus’d, or disabus’d;
Created half to rise, and half to fall;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;
Sole judge of Truth, in endless Error hurl’d:
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!”

(*Pope.*)

The superiority of man lies in the ability to control and regulate the several propensities, which sway his mind. Though placed in the midst of adverse circumstances and baneful influences, he yet can chalk out a path for himself by the determination of his Will. It is, no doubt, true that the influences at work on any occasion restrict the sphere of choice; but within these limits man can ennoble or debase himself by the character of his choice. } Conscience supplies the light in the moral sphere, but Will supplies the energy—not in the form of blind appetency but in the form of rational choice. It is this power of election that raises man above his

Rational will is the distinctive endowment of man, which enables him to rise or fall.

circumstances and makes him responsible for his acts. This power of free determination constitutes the dignity of man; for it is in his own power either to stand or fall. If, as we have said, he prefers a higher to a lower impulse, the glory is his; while if he succumbs to the latter, he alone is to blame. The several impulses, mentioned above, suggest but courses of action. Conscience enables us to discern which of these courses is eligible at the time. It depends on Will whether to act according to the dictates of Conscience or not. Thus, Will is the executive power of the soul that brings credit or discredit to an agent according to the way in which he exercises his power. As the *Geeta* says—

Conscience
supplies the
light; and
Will, the
energy.

“इन्द्रियाणि पराण्याहुरिन्द्रियेभ्यः परं मनः ।

मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्योवुद्धेः परतस्तु सः ॥

एवं बुद्धेः परं बुद्धा संस्तुभ्यात्मानमात्मना ।

अहि शत्रुं महाबाहो कामदुर् दुरासदम् ॥ ३।४२-४३ ॥

“Men say that the senses are great; the heart (*manas*) is greater than the senses; the mind (*buddhi*) is greater than the heart, but this [knowledge] is greater than the mind.

“Knowing, then, that this is greater than the mind, strengthen thyself by thyself, O large-armed one! and slay this foe [Desire], which takes forms at will and is hard to meet.” (Davies' Translation, III, 42-43.)

§ 2. **Nature of Will.** In determining the character of Will we should not lose sight of the unity of our mental constitution. The different faculties are not detached entities but different

Will is essentially rational.

It involves choice.

Causality pervades the universe.

Two forms of cause :

(1) 'Blind' cause, illustrated in natural causality.

(2) 'Originative' cause, illustrated in human choice.

The mind is a blind cause so far as its susceptibility

expressions of one and the same mind. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) Thus, Will is essentially rational in character, so that Schopenhauer's extension of the term to cover every form of effort or energy is unjustifiable. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 12.) Will, as pointed out by Aristotle and Kant, is but Reason acting, energizing, or choosing. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 20 and Chap. XII, § 5.) Hence an exercise of Will always involves choice and discrimination. When two or more impulses are present before the mind, it compares them and then decides to act in a certain direction.

All objects in the universe are charged with forces and so endowed with capacity for work. Thus, we find causality ruling the universe. But causality, as Dr. Ward points out, is revealed in either of two ways: (1) a cause may be 'blind,' or (2) it may be 'originative.' (1) The former is illustrated when it is constrained to act in a certain direction by the invariable laws of nature; (2) while the latter is exemplified in the production of an effect according to its own determination. The sun, for example, is a cause of light and heat; but it is a blind cause, for its causality is exercised according to the inflexible laws of nature: in such a case "The proximate cause has its own proper effect marked out for it by strictest and most absolute necessity." (Ward, *Philosophy of Theism*, Vol. I, p. 378.) But the mind, in resisting an impulse, exercises originative causality, for it freely employs its power in any direction it likes. The mind, however, may be both a blind and originative cause. The rise of desires and inclina-

tions, for example, is due to the blind causality of the mind, since their rise is determined by definite laws under certain circumstances. As Ward observes, "My soul possesses certain forces and properties; my body possesses certain forces and properties; and on the occurrence of certain given circumstances, on a certain given occasion, the two substances produce, by their joint causative agency, that phenomenon of the former which is called, e. g., an 'emotion.'" (*Ibid.*, p. 379.) What we call the passivity of mind involves also some activity, which is evoked by external stimuli. Without capacity there can be no experience. Now, of the two forms of cause, the originative one is the more important and fundamental, for 'blind' cause is determined in its operation by laws external to itself. We may go even a little further and maintain that the originative cause is the only causality in the proper sense of the term, for it, being free and undetermined, is the ultimate source of all activity. The activity which 'blind' causes exercise is derived from 'originative' cause which settles also the inflexible laws of their operation. The originative cause being free and discriminative is rational; and it is the characteristic of the First Cause of the universe as well as of human personality. Referring to the mind's resistance to an impulse, Ward observes, "My soul in producing a psychical phenomenon of this kind acts as an 'originative' cause: it acts in virtue of a power (which it is thereby shown, within certain limits, to possess) of *choosing an alternative*. As a blind cause, it is co-operating

is concerned; and it is an originative cause, so far as free choice is concerned.

Dr. Ward's testimony.

The originative cause is properly speaking the only cause,

and is essentially free and rational.

It is the distinctive feature of God and man.

The mind as, a blind cause, is the source of impulses;

and, as an originative cause, it is the parent of choice.

The originative cause is Will, which is the ground of responsibility in man.

with my body in producing its own preponderating spontaneous impulse; and, at the same moment, as an originative cause, it is effecting its own free *resistance* to that impulse." (*Ibid.*, p. 381.) This originative cause is what we call Will. Will is the distinguishing feature of rational creatures and is the ground of their responsibility. Milton thus expresses the importance of Will in responsible beings, whose glory lies in their ability to rise or fall. Raphael, addressing Adam, says:—

"God made thee perfect, not immutable ;
And good he made thee, but to persevere
He left it in thy power ; ordained thy will,
By nature free, not over-ruled by fate
Inextricable, or strict necessity :
Our voluntary service he requires,
Not our necessitated ; such with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find ; for how
Can hearts, not free, be tried whether they serve
Willing or no, who will but what they must
By destiny, and can no other choose ?"

Determinists, however, ignore the distinction between 'blind' and 'originative' cause, as every event, according to them, is determined by necessary conditions,

The above view of Will, however, is not accepted by all writers. The distinction between 'blind' and 'originative' causes is regarded by some as unmeaning, since, according to them, all activity, external or internal, is necessarily determined by conditions. Nothing in this universe, it is urged, is undetermined and free; and so what we call Will is constrained in its sphere of activity by factors or conditions external to itself. "A volition," writes Mill, "is a moral effect, which follows the corres-

ponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical effects follow their physical causes. Whether it *must* do so, I acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant, be the phenomenon moral or physical; and I condemn, accordingly, the word Necessity as applied to either case. All I know is, that it always *does*." (*Examination of Hamilton*, p. 562.)

We shall examine this position in section 6. But we may mention here that the school of Mill is naturally averse to the admission of a necessary connection between cause and effect. Such an admission would imply a consciousness of the expenditure of energy which serves to connect cause with effect. The empiricists, however, leave no room for anything else than phenomena in their systems, and so they cannot allow the presence of a volitional energy, which serves to produce effects and reveals the necessary connection between the originating cause and its issue. Thus they recognise merely phenomenal succession as presented to us and so can speak only of a consequent as *actually* following an antecedent but not that it '*must*' follow. To what extent this phenomenal theory of causation is correct we shall examine in section 5.

and nothing is undetermined or free.

Mill.

This view is usually associated with phenomenalism, which leaves no room for energy or origination cause.

We shall examine this view in § 5.

§ 3. Conditions of the Exercise of Will. We have seen that Will is essentially rational in character. An exercise of Will thus always involves discrimination. The following are the conditions of such an exercise:—

Conditions of Volition :

(1) The presentation of circumstances suited to call forth desires or impulses which urge us to

(1) Occasion or opportunity.

activity. There must be an occasion for an exercise of Will; and such an occasion is furnished by objects, relations, and changes in the sphere of our activity which prompt us to take this course or that.

(2) The presence of impulses.

We are not responsible for the mere rise of impulses or desires in our minds, though we are responsible for even the continuance of such impulses or desires.

(2) The rise of desires or impulses in the mind which prompt us to act in certain directions. Though by dwelling on certain circumstances we may favour the rise of certain desires in our minds, yet generally these arise unsolicited, simply by natural laws. We are, accordingly, not responsible for the mere rise or decline of an impulse; but we are responsible even for its continuance. Thus, the spontaneous rise of propensities, which we call bad, does not vitiate the mind, though their continuance does.

"Evil into the mind of God or man
May come and go, so unapproved, and leave
No spot or blame behind." (Milton.)

The rise of such a desire indicates, no doubt, that a nature is corrupt and that the character is not properly developed; but its mere initial presence in the mind does not bring it any fresh guilt. The impulses are but the materials from among which a choice is to be made.

(3) Conflict among impulses affording room for comparison and choice.

(3) There must be a conflict of impulses in order that the mind may be called upon to decide between the claims of the rival solicitations. If there be no conflict, the mind is led to act in the direction of an all-absorbing impulse, which at the time has no rival to dispute its sway. Of course, the mind may pause and put a check upon the career of an impulse and thus start an alternative course of

activity. In such a case an alternative is apparently supplied by the agency of the mind in reference to certain circumstances, affording an occasion for the intervention of the Will. But even here, if we examine with care, we discover that the alternatives were *suggested* to the mind at the outset which led it to pause and reflect. Thus, without alternative possibilities or rival impulses, there can be no room for an exercise of Will.

(4) The comparison of the impulses with regard to their relative intensities or worth in order to fix upon a definite course of action. Such comparison involves an exercise of attention which is the beginning of an exercise of Will. Whenever we direct our attention to an impulse, we intensify its force; and the withdrawal of attention from it likewise implies its decline. So that, if subsequently we yield to the stronger impulse, it is because we, by the direction of attention, gave the motive its strength.

(5) The act of choice which fixes upon a definite course of action after the due comparison of the rival claims of conflicting impulses. The difference between this condition and the last is intelligible by reference to the transition from reflex to voluntary attention and the development of definite preference out of rudimentary discrimination. In reflex attention our notice is attracted by a fact which for the time being exercises an influence on our mind. Thus, a comparison may be *started*, but never continued by reflex attention. The continuance of a comparison, or what we call active comparison, involves the intervention of Will, which thus begins to exercise its

(4) Deliberation, or active comparison of conflicting impulses.

The initial stage of volition is attention, which strengthens or weakens an impulse by concentration or abstraction.

(5) Choice, or determination to act in a definite direction.

If finally the stronger motive determines a course of action, it is because the Will, in the form of attention, gave the motive its strength.

influence upon its materials by either strengthening or weakening their force. And if we subsequently choose that which seems to be stronger, it is because we voluntarily developed its strength by dwelling on concomitant circumstances. Thus volitional exercise is illustrated either in the fully developed or mature form of choice or in the rudimentary form of attentive intensification of impulses.

✓ 4. **Motive, End, and Intention.** The difficulty of ascertaining the true character of Will is connected partly at least with the ambiguity of the term Motive which is taken to be its determining condition. The term 'Motive' has been used by moralists in two very different senses :

Ambiguous use of the term 'Motive'.

(1) It is used by some in the sense of 'feeling' which incites us to action. Hoffding,

Locke,

Bentham,

(1) It has been used in the sense of *feeling* which urges us to action. Hoffding, for example, defines motive as "The feeling excited by the idea of the end." (*Psychology*, Eng. Translation, p. 324.) Locke similarly writes, "The motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present satisfaction in it ; the motive to change is always some uneasiness : nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for shortness' sake we will call 'determining of the will.'" (*Essay*, Book II, Chap. XXI, § 29.) Bentham, likewise, maintains that "A motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain, operating in a certain manner." (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, p. 102.) "A motive," says Mill, "being a

desire or aversion, is proportional to the pleasantness, as conceived by us, of the thing desired, or the painfulness of the thing shunned." (*Examination of Hamilton*, p. 589.) So Dr. Bain: "Various motives—present or prospective pleasures and pains—concur in urging us to act." (*Emotions and Will*, p. 550.)

Mill,

Bain.

(2) The term has also been used in the sense of *an end fixed upon* for the execution of an act. Green, for example, defines motive as "An idea of an end, which a self-conscious subject presents to itself, and which it strives and tends to realise." (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 93.) D'Arcy also speaks of "The idea of the end as the motive of action" (*Short Study of Ethics*, p. 90); and Mackenzie says, "The motive, that which induces us to act, is the thought of a desirable end." (*Manual of Ethics*, p. 64.) Muirhead similarly defines motive as "The idea of the object which, through congruity with the character of the self, moves the will." (*Elements of Ethics*, p. 60.)

(2) By others, it is used in the sense of the end chosen or selected.

Green.

D'Arcy,

Mackenzie,

Muirhead.

Both these uses are sanctioned by literature; and the popular use is still more vague. Feeling as such can never prompt us to activity. Feeling as it rises in intensity rather paralyses than moves us. When a feeling is associated with an idea or representation at a moment when we are actively disposed, it begets desire, which moves us to action. (*Vide Chap. XIX, § 4.*) But at one and the same moment we may be influenced by several desires all of which we do not regard as motives. Moreover, that feeling or desire is distinct from motive is apparent from

But feeling as such is not an impulse to action.

Intense feeling paralyses.

The moral quality is determined by motive or end selected, and not by feeling or desire.

The intensity of impulse is rather a mitigating circumstance.

Motive is a resolve.

Ward.

the fact that we determine the moral quality in any case by the latter and never by the former. Nay, if an individual can prove that he has committed an offence under grave or sudden provocation, that would serve as an extenuating circumstance. While the intensity of a motive for crime heightens its criminality, the intensity of a desire or a feeling, occasioned by circumstances, lessens it. In proportion as inclination becomes masterful, an action is withdrawn from the moral sphere and regarded simply as a natural phenomenon. The fact is that, whenever we refer to the motive of an act, we proceed from the act to something in the character of the agent, which explains this and other similar acts. The motive, accordingly, is not a passing feeling or desire, but a resolve or elected end of an action. As Ward says, "'Desire' is one thing, 'resolve' another; and men not unfrequently both 'resolve' and act, in *opposition* to their 'desire.'" (*Philosophy of Theism*, Vol. I, p. 289.) He thus explains the use of the term motive: "We used the word 'motive' in a different sense from Dr. Bain. What Dr. Bain calls a 'motive' we called an 'attraction.' According to our use of terms, to ask what is my 'motive' for some action, is to ask what is that end which I have resolved to pursue, and for the sake of which I resolve on the performance of that action. But if a *Determinist* asks me what is my 'motive' for some action, he means to ask me what is the attraction which allures (and infallibly determines) me to do what I do. By 'motive' *he* means

an 'attraction'; but by 'motive' we mean, not a certain *attraction*, or a certain *solicitation*, but a certain governing *resolve*." (*Ibid.*, p. 339, foot-note.)

Motive is thus the end which we fix upon on any occasion to do an act; and the moral quality of an act depends on the worth of the motive or resolve. When we say that the moral worth of an action is determined by its motive, we mean that it is determined by the impulse selected and not by the impulse rejected. Each impulse is relative to an end, explicitly or implicitly operating in the mind. It may be influenced by various ends; but the one selected on any occasion becomes the motive of action. A motive is called good or bad because it expresses the character of the agent through his choice. "Action," as Mr. Stocks observes, "is character in activity and motive is that side of character from which a given act is more particularly thought to proceed." (*Mind*, January, 1911, p. 65.)

Motive, then, implies the end with which the self identifies itself for achieving a result—subjective or objective. It is the selected end charged with feeling and impelling an individual to a definite course of action. There is thus great difference between motive and result, the one is the end aimed at, the other is the issue accomplished; the one is ideal, while the other is actual. And this difference between motive, as a subjective condition prior to action, and result, as an objective event caused by it, stands, in whatever sense we may take the term 'motive'. Referring to the ambiguity of

A motive is called good or bad, as reflecting the character of the agent.

Stocks.

Motive is thus the end with which the self identifies itself.

Difference between motive and result.

Fowler.

of this term, Fowler writes, "Sometimes it is employed to signify the end or object which the agent has in view, sometimes the appetite, desire, affection, or moral habitude which prompts him to seek that end. Thus we say, almost indifferently, that a man's motive is selfishness, or to aggrandise himself, or, more specifically, to make money or reputation; that it is compassion, or to relieve misery, or to alleviate the sufferings of some particular person; that it is ambition, or to obtain some place or honour. But, in either sense of the word, the distinction between motives and results seems to be the same." (*Principles of Morals*, II, p. 195.) It may, however, be mentioned in this connection that the expression 'conflict of motives' is intelligible only when we take 'motives' in the sense of impelling forces or tendencies to action and not in the sense of ends selected. We may, no doubt, be pulled in hostile directions by two conflicting impulses; but whenever one of them is selected as the motive of action, the conflict ends. Dewey very properly observes, "A desire when chosen becomes a *motive*. We often speak of a conflict of motives, but in strict use this is improper. There is a conflict of desires, but the formation of a motive is the cessation of the conflict by settling the self upon some one motive. A motive is sometimes spoken of as the strongest desire. This may be either false or a mere truism. It is not true if it is meant to imply that the desires carry on a conflict with each other till all but the strongest is ex-

'Conflict of motives' really means conflict of impulses or desires.

Dewey.

hausted, and this survives by sheer preponderance of force. No such conflict goes on. The conflict of desires in the conflict of self with self. The conflict of desires ends when the self reconciles or concludes this internal struggle by setting itself in some one direction, by choosing to realize itself in the line laid down by some one desire. This desire is then the strongest, because the whole force of the self is thrown into it. This desire, in short, is nothing but the self having formed a definite purpose. It is now a motive or spring to action; it is the end of action. The action is only the reaching of this end, the execution of the motive. It gives us no new information to say that the act is determined by the motive, for the motive is the act which the self chooses to perform." (*Psychology*, pp. 366-367.)

The term *Intention* has come into prominence in this connection owing to the advocacy of the Utilitarian writers that the moral quality of an act is really determined by it and not by the motive. The difference between motive and intention, as drawn by them, is that in the one case we merely consider that *for the sake of which* an act is done, while in the other, *all the contemplated results*—both that *for the sake of which* and that *in spite of which* it is done. The one indicates merely the emotional condition, "the conscious impulse to action, whether desire or aversion" (*Sidgwick*), while the other stands for the entire contemplated effects. Intention thus includes both the positive and negative ele-

The utilitarian distinction of motive and intention.

Motive is taken to be an inducement to action, while intention covers the deterrent considerations as well.

The morality of an act is said to be determined by the intention.

Mill.

'Intention', referring to the entire consequences of an act, is thus wider than 'motive', which refers to the ultimate consequences alone.

The above distinction is closely connected with the controversy of the true object of moral judgment and the question of free-will and necessity.

ments involved in choice, while motive stands only for the former. "The morality of the action," says Mill, "depends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent *wills to do*. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, if it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality: though it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent, especially if it indicates a good or a bad habitual *disposition*—a bent of character from which useful, or from which hurtful actions are likely to arise." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 27, foot-note.) When, for example, a thief steals, his motive is love of gain; but his intention includes also injury to others in respect of their property. Hence his act is wrong. The motive is thus included in the intention and may be characterized as the "ultimate intention": it refers to the ultimate consequences for which an act is done—while intention refers also to the consequences connected with the means. The motive of a guardian in punishing his ward is his improvement; but intention covers also the infliction of pain connected with punishment.

The above distinction between motive and intention is closely connected with the fundamental moral controversy, whether the moral quality is determined by motive or consequences. As we have already discussed the question in detail in the preceding chapters, it does not require a further treatment here. We may, however, mention that Mill himself admits that the motive "makes a great

difference in our moral estimation of the agent." The two senses in which the term 'motive' has been used are connected with the doctrines of Free-will and Necessity. The necessitarians hold that circumstances give rise to feeling, which, in the shape of motive, determines the exercise of Will; while the libertarians contend that the rational soul freely chooses a course of action by reference to alternative possibilities. Without entering into this question here, which we shall discuss in section 6, we may only observe that, according to the one view, Will is, as it were, pushed from behind, while, according to the other, it is drawn on by what lies before. The essentially prospective character of volition is admitted even by necessarian writers. The same act occasioned by the same circumstances and urged by the same feelings, may vary in moral character according to variation in motive or elected end of action. A philanthropist and a merchant, for example, may both be moved by pleasurable feelings; but their acts widely differ in moral quality owing to difference in their motives.

The essentially prospective character of will or volition is often missed by determinists.

The moral quality is evidently determined by motive or end.

" 'Tis the temptation of the devil
That makes all human actions evil;
For saints may do the same thing by
The spirit, in sincerity,
Which other men are tempted to,
And at the devil's instance do:
And yet the actions be contrary,
Just as the saints and wicked vary."

(But. *Hud.*)

§ 5. **Will and Causality.** To determine the relation of these, let us first enquire into (1) their character and (2) the question of their relative priority as facts of personal experience.

(1) *The question of the character of will.* Will is a power of rational choice exercised upon conflicting impulses, influencing the mind.

By regulating attention we can strengthen or weaken such impulses.

(1) *Will*, as we have seen, implies rational choice from among the materials supplied to it. (*Vide* § 2.) Whenever conflicting impulses attract us in different directions, we decide to act in either direction we like. Consciousness testifies to the fact that by the direction of attention to one impulse we strengthen it, and by the withdrawal of attention from another we weaken it. So that, if finally we act in the direction of the stronger impulse, it is because we, by dwelling on it, intensify its force. Attention, we know, has two aspects—positive and negative; the former is illustrated in concentration, and the latter in abstraction. The two sides go together. Whenever we direct our attention to something, we withdraw our attention from something else. The effect of attention upon any fact to which it is directed is to raise it in point of vividness, distinctness, and clearness, and to lower in these respects other competing impressions or impulses. Thus, when pulled, as it were, in different directions by rival impulses, we cast our lot on this side or on that, according to our requirements, and leave the rest in the shade. An impulse is but a modification of the mind. When one such modification is intensified by the expenditure of personal energy, any other modification inconsistent with it is naturally weakened and finally sup-

pressed. We are thus immediately aware of ourselves being the causes of our own determinations, when prompted by conflicting impulses : it is left to us either to persist in a course of action or to desist from it. Buddha well observes, "As when a house-roof is not properly secured, then the rain finds a way through it and drops within, so when the thoughts are not carefully controlled, the desires will soon bore through all our good resolutions. But as when a roof is well stopped then the water cannot leak through, so by controlling one's thoughts, and acting with reflection, no such desires can arise or disturb us." (*Dhammapada*, Sec. IX.)

We are thus the causes of our own determinations.

Causality, as the agency of a cause, explains the relation of cause and effect by showing how the latter is produced by the former. The causal relation as observed in Nature is, no doubt, uniform and invariable ; but uniformity or invariability is not essential to the causal conception. Nature is an aggregate of diverse laws which generally converge on the production of definite results. In chemical combination, for example, certain elements mixed in certain proportions yield definite compounds. The law of definite proportions is thus associated with the law of chemical affinity in the production of a chemical compound. But the law of definite proportions, though essential to the uniform operation of Nature and so to our coherent experience and expectation, is not theoretically inseparable from the very nature of chemical combination. Mere definite proportions without chemical affinity can never give rise to a

Causality implies an agency to produce an effect,

but not necessarily uniformity.

Uniformity is essential to experience and expectation.

compound. But the supposition of chemical affinity alone yielding chemical compounds, without any definite rule or room for expectation, is not *ipso facto* absurd. All that can be said is that, on such a supposition, an effect would be produced but could never be predicted. In such a world there would be continual surprises, without any consistent experience in the proper sense of the term: each event will have to be judged by itself, without affording any clue to the interpretation of the rest. There would thus be causation, though no uniformity. In such a world it would be difficult for creatures to live, for they would not be able to form any expectation or calculation with regard to an unknown event; but events in such a world may still be produced by causes. Thus causality merely implies efficiency or capability to produce an effect. Whether such efficiency is employed uniformly or not, is not a question within the proper sphere of causality at all. "The idea of causation," as Dr. Ward observes, "in no way whatever depends on the uniformity of nature." (*Philosophy of Theism*, Vol. I, p. 333.)

Dr. Ward's testimony.

The law of causation is a synthetic judgment *a priori* proved by personal experience.

The law of causation, as Kant points out, is a synthetic judgment *a priori*. That whatever has a commencement has a cause can not be regarded as an analytical judgment, because the notion of commencement does not necessarily involve the notion of cause. These two ideas are connected together by personal experience, which reveals that every determination is caused or produced by mental agency. The vacillating or wavering condition of the mind

when it is swayed by conflicting impulses is changed into determination or resolution by the expenditure of personal energy in the form of what we call 'choice.' If causation illustrates conservation of energy, it is because we have an immediate knowledge of the transformation of mental energy from one form into another on the occasion of a volition. We have already mentioned that every experience implies some expenditure of personal energy—however slight; what we call the passivity of mind thus involves an element of activity. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) When, therefore, the mind is modified in two distinct ways corresponding to two distinct impulses, such modification assumes a definite shape by the expenditure of what we call volitional energy: the prior indeterminate attitude is changed into a determinate form by an act of choice. Thus the connection between cause and effect is directly revealed by volitional exercise which converts a vague potentiality into a definite actuality, an indeterminate craving to act in this way or that into a determinate resolution to act in a definite direction.

Volition directly reveals the connection between cause and effect.

A distinction has sometimes been drawn between the law of causation and the law of uniformity of nature with regard to their origin. Martineau, for example, maintains that the former is intuitive while the latter is derivative in character: "We must carefully distinguish," he writes, "between the *a posteriori* reliance on the 'uniformity of nature,' and the *a priori* belief that 'all phenomena are derivative.'" (*Study of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 158.)

Martineau regards the law of causation as *a priori* and the law of uniformity as *a posteriori*;

but both the laws seem to be *a priori* in character.

Such a supposition is consistent with teleology.

The law of uniformity may be viewed as but an aspect of the law of identity.

This distinction, however, seems to be untenable. Whether the law of causation can possibly be derived from experience, we shall examine just now. But it appears to us that both the laws of causation and uniformity are *a priori* in origin, conditioning our future experience. And, if we believe in a teleological or biological correspondence between nature and mind, such a supposition does not appear to be groundless. If the mental world vibrates in unison with the material, then it is but natural that we should expect a cause whenever an event happens in nature. Our anticipation is in accordance with the ways of the world. An infant, for example, tossed a little too high would betray all the signs of fear, though previously it had no experience of gravitation, nor had it worked out a problem of mechanics. If, therefore, in nature every event has a cause, and this cause operates uniformly in the production of an effect, then it is but natural to expect that the mind should be predisposed to construe events as caused and uniform in their occurrence. Hence is it that we are unable to conceive an event as uncaused and also, unless prompted by repeated experiences to the contrary, that the same cause under the same circumstances may give rise to different effects. In fact the law of uniformity of nature may be regarded as but an aspect of the law of identity: when we say that Nature is uniform, we mean that her operation is identical in like circumstances: the same effects are produced by the same causes. Even empirical writers are at times forced

to admit that we are often led to form our expectations by "the mere instinct of generalization."* A child, for example, who has seen but one cow that is red would expect other cows to be of the same colour. Likewise, a child who had painful experience from a surgeon, dressed in a peculiar fashion, begins to cry when seeing afterwards a person similarly dressed. Such expectations are but the expression of "the instinct of generalization"; and they continue, unless contradicted by subsequent experience. So, we are predisposed to construe Nature as uniform, unless contrary experience tends to show that she is variable and capricious in her conduct. And if such apparently be our experience, we are surprised at the diversity, our natural tendency being towards unity, identity, or uniformity.

Admission of empiricists.

(2) The above exposition must have prepared the way for an answer to the next question of the relative priority of the two experiences of volition and causation. (a) The empiricists generally contend that we have first a knowledge of causation in the external world and then we come to interpret volition in the light of this knowledge. Starting with experience they interpret causation as mere sequence. From the stand-point of an outward observer we can observe only phenomenal relations,

(2) *The question of the relative priority of volition and causation.*

(a) *The empirical view.*

The law of causation is said to be primarily

* Bain writes—"That change of every kind whatsoever follows on a definite prior change, could not be affirmed in early times, except by the mere instinct of generalization, which is no proof." (*Inductive Logic*, p. 113.) It is, of course, no proof of *objective sequence*, but it is proof of *subjective conviction or tendency*.

derived from
outer experi-
ence and then
applied to
the interpre-
tation of the
phenomena
of inner life.

Hume,

Mill,

distinguished as co-existent or successive; and in the latter case we distinguish between variable and invariable succession. Finding the operation of cause to be uniform in nature we come to regard, with Hume, invariability as a mark of causation. And if personal experience reveals that the cause inevitably gives rise to the effect, we are led to hold, with Mill, that the cause is not merely the invariable but also the unconditional antecedent. Thus, the cause is defined as 'the invariable and unconditional antecedent,' and this physical theory of causation is then forced upon the workings of our own mind. Mill, for example, advances the following argument for subjecting the Human Will to the universal law of (physical) causation: "To the universality which mankind are agreed in ascribing to the Law of Causation, there is one claim of exception, one disputed case, that of the Human Will; the determinations of which, a large class of metaphysicians are not willing to regard as following the causes called motives, according to as strict laws as those which they suppose to exist in the world of mere matter. This controverted point will undergo a special examination when we come to treat particularly of the Logic of the Moral Sciences. In the mean time I may remark that these metaphysicians, who, it must be observed, ground the main part of their objection on the supposed repugnance of the doctrine in question to our consciousness, seem to me to mistake the fact which consciousness testifies against. What is really in contradiction to con-

sciousness, they would, I think, on strict self-examination, find to be, the application to human actions and volitions of the ideas involved in the common use of the term Necessity; which I agree with them in objecting to. But if they would consider that by saying that a person's actions *necessarily* follow from his character, all that is really meant (for no more is meant in any case whatever of causation) is that he invariably *does* act in conformity to his character, and that any one who thoroughly knew his character could certainly predict how he would act in any supposable case; they probably would not find this doctrine either contrary to their experience or revolting to their feelings. And no more than this is contended for by any one but an Asiatic fatalist." (*Logic*, Vol. I, p. 380, footnote.) (b) It is contended on the other side that we have first an experience of volition which reveals the causal connection in the manner indicated above. It may be said in support of this view that causation is an intelligible relation the true import of which can be gathered only by reflective analysis and not by sense-perception. Had causation been a sense-quality, the testimony of the senses would have been final. It expresses, however, a connection among phenomena which apart from it are perceptible but not intelligible. As mere spectators of the world we may observe bare succession or coexistence, without any suspicion of causal link. The phenomenal theory of causation regards the cause as a mere premonitory sign of the consequent. The cause, however, is not

Human action, according to this view, follows necessarily from character and circumstances.

(b) *The intuitional account.*

Causation is directly revealed in volition, which becomes the key to the interpretation of outer events.

Causation is an intelligible relation apprehended by reason, and not a sense-quality perceived by sense.

The cause is not merely a premonitory sign, but an efficient agent.

Mill practically admits this, when he describes the cause as the 'unconditional antecedent'

and holds that an effect is necessary so long as its cause is not controlled.

Necessary connection can be known only through volitional, and not sensuous, experience.

Volition, then, gives us a direct knowledge of causality, which is gradually extended to the interpretation of the phenomena of the external world.

Testimonies of Zeller,

merely a herald announcing the approach of the consequent; it is an agent which gives rise to the effect. This is practically admitted by Mill himself, according to whom 'unconditionality' is the distinguishing mark of causation. Under cover of this word Mill surreptitiously introduces the notion of agency into the cause: only that antecedent which, without any other condition, *can produce* the effect is fit to be regarded as cause. The idea of necessary connection is so interwoven with the character of the causal relation that Mill himself, in spite of his protest, is forced to admit that "The causes on which action depends are never uncontrollable, and any given effect is only necessary provided that the causes tending to produce it are not controlled." (*System of Logic*, Bk. VI, Ch. II, § 3.) So long, therefore, as a cause is not counteracted its effect is inevitable; we come then to the 'must' beyond the 'does' of Mill. This conviction we can only have from the stand-point of an agent and never from the stand-point of a mere outward observer.

Thus the relation of Will to Causality is that we have an immediate knowledge of the latter in the exercise of the former; and, having gathered the notion there, we extend it to the external world for the interpretation of its changes. "When man begins," says Zeller, "to reflect on the grounds of things, the question of the *Why* (*Warum*) is forced upon him first by particular phenomena of the more striking kind, and in course of time by continually more of them, and in answer to this question the

first notions of causality are formed ; he is at the outset guided in this matter by no other clue than the analogy of his own Willing and Doing. For *we ourselves are the one only cause of whose mode of action we have immediate knowledge, through inner intuition.* In the case of every other, though we may perceive its effects, we can only infer from the facts, and cannot immediately learn by perception of the facts, the mode and kind of way in which those effects arise, and the connection of them with their cause." Mansel likewise observes, "The causal judgment, as usually understood, appears to contain something more than the idea of antecedence. The cause is supposed not merely to precede the effect, but to have *power* to produce it. Whether the notion of *invariable recurrence* is included or not, it seems at least to be regarded as certain that *upon any one occasion* the effect is so far completely dependent upon the cause that, the latter being given, the former *cannot but* take place. The explanation of this impression may, we think, be found in another association derived from the personal causality manifested in volition. In the exercise of an act of will I am intuitively conscious of two things :—First, that I am acted upon, though not necessitated by, motives : secondly, that I act upon my own determinations as their producing cause. In the first relation I am conscious of a choice between two alternatives ; that is to say, that from certain given antecedent motives a particular consequent may or may not follow, as I

Mansel,

choose to determine. In the second relation I am conscious of an exercise of power; the final determination being called into existence by an act of my own will. To this intuition may be traced the origin of the idea of power and of causation, in a sense distinct from that of mere temporal antecedence. The power of which I am presentatively conscious in myself I transfer representatively to other agents whom I suppose to be similarly constituted to myself; and thus I regard other men as being, like myself, the efficient causes of their own determinations, and, through their determinations, of their actions." (*Metaphysics*, pp. 268-270.) According to Martineau also "Causality is identical with our self-knowledge of the exercise of will; and that exercise, presupposing the presence of two or more possibles, consists in turning one of them into an actuality, and so replacing what was previously contingent by what is now necessary." (*Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 241.)

and Martineau.

Gradually the difference is noted between the internal cause as intelligent and free and the external cause as blind and mechanical.

Though, however, the external cause is thus interpreted by reference to the internal, yet a distinction gradually comes to be drawn between the two. At the outset, no doubt, children attribute intention and consciousness to external causes and expect also variations such as are observable in the case of human volition. But experience soon teaches that the ways of the external world are inflexible and characterised by hard necessity,* though the

* Reflection reveals that the uniform operation of natural causes and hence the fixed character of natural laws is conducive

volitions of the human mind are variable and amenable to reason. And this contrast does not affect in the least the moral theory put forward in the preceding pages. Objective necessity does not exclude subjective freedom. Though outward results are under the regulation of Providence, yet the regulation of motives is left entirely to ourselves. And we have seen that the morality of an act depends not on its consequences but on its motive. The conditions of moral probation are satisfied when we have been given the power of free choice, though such choice may not have any control over outer results except so far as these are regulated by more comprehensive laws. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 9.) If, for example, after securing all the egresses of a household, its owner entrusts his servants with valuables, then the trial of such servants would be adequate by their efforts, though these may not be successful. Thus, the objective morality of Hegel is not at all inconsistent with the subjective morality of Common Sense. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 3.) So

Subjective freedom is not inconsistent with objective necessity.

Objective morality does not exclude the subjective :

to the well-being of finite creatures, who otherwise will not be able to form any expectation and guide their conduct in this temporary abode of theirs. Laws, and not caprice, can alone render experience possible and this world habitable. Extravagant expectations of divine interposition are thus inconsistent with teleology. As Pope asks—

“Think we, like some weak Prince, th’ Eternal Cause
Prone for his fav’rites to reverse his laws?
Shall burning *Ætna*, if a sage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires?
On air or sea new motions be imprest,
Oh blameless *Bethel*! to relieve thy breast?
When the loose mountain trembles from on high,
Shall gravitation cease, if you go by?” (*Essay on Man.*)

far as the outward results are concerned we may say :—

“प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः ।

अहङ्कारविमूढात्मा कर्ताहमिति मन्यते” ॥

(*The Geeta*, III, 27.)

Providential regulation of events does not exclude personal control over motives, or impulses.

“Actions are wrought by the energies of nature only. The self, deluded by egoism, thinketh: ‘I am the doer.’” (Miss Annie Besant’s Translation.) Our aim should thus be to secure the purity of motive and not an agreeable issue. As the *Geeta* teaches :—

“कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन ।

मा कर्मफलहेतुर्भमां ते सङ्गोऽस्त्वकर्मणि ॥ २।४७ ॥

“Thy business is with the action only, never with its fruits; so let not the fruit of action be thy motive, nor be thou to inaction attached.” (Miss Annie Besant’s Translation.)

§ 6. **Free-will and Necessity.** The problem of free-will and necessity, though primarily a psychological question, has also an ethical and a theological importance. Without entering into the theological controversy of Calvinism and Arminianism,* we shall confine our attention here only to the psychological and ethical aspects of the problem. Let us consider these two aspects one by one.

* John Calvin (1509-1564) popularized the predestinarian views of St. Augustine in all their rigour, leaving no room for free choice, merit, or virtue. Arminius (1560-1609), on the other hand, strongly advocated the doctrine of free-will and the merit of good works, previously taught by Pelagius (fl. 400 A. D.). Calvinism accepts, while Arminianism rejects, the doctrine of original sin or the taint of Adam. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 8.)

(I) **The Psychological Aspect.**—This aspect of the controversy depends on the relation of motive to volition. The advocates of human freedom urge that the mind has the power to act in any direction it likes, apart from the initial strength of impulses. "At whatever moment and within whatever sphere," writes Dr. Ward, "my soul has the proximate power of acting as an originaive cause—whether it *exercise* that power or no—at that moment and within that sphere my 'will' is said to be 'free'" (*Philosophy of Theism*, Vol. I, p. 384.) The necessarians, on the other hand, contend that the strongest desire or motive determines volition or the course of action on any occasion. Let us illustrate our remarks by an example. If a religious mendicant begs only for a penny and refuses the offer of a sovereign, his conduct may be construed as supporting the doctrine of freedom, in as much as he apparently acts in the direction of a weaker impulse, rejecting the stronger temptation for a sovereign. But a necessitarian would say that though the attraction of a penny is less than that of a sovereign, yet action is not really in the direction of a weaker impulse. The mendicant wants to show that he is above temptation; so that his vanity coupled with the desire for a penny far outweighs the mere desire for a sovereign. Thus, when the individual apparently acts in the direction of a weaker impulse, he really acts in the direction of a stronger: the combined influence of vanity and gain, it is urged, is evidently stronger than mere love of gain. We mis-

(I) *The Psychological Aspect of the Question.*

The libertarians admit the power of free choice in man,

while the necessarians deny such a power and maintain that the strongest impulse or desire in any case determines volition.

Illustration of a religious mendicant.

take necessity for freedom simply because our analysis of the situation is imperfect. If, in any case, we take the trouble of adequately analysing all the impulses at work, we shall discover that action is always in the direction of the strongest desire, as the inclination of a balance is always in the direction of the heavier weight. "Men," says Spinoza, "think themselves free in as much as they are conscious of their volitions and desires and never even dream, in their ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and desire." (*Ethics*, Book I, Appendix, p. 75. Elwes' Translation.)

Mill prefers the term 'Determinism' to 'Necessity.'

A man, according to him, may be said to be 'free' when there is absence of external constraint.

Jonathan Edwards.

Bain.

The question, however, is not one of the presence or absence of

Mill objects to the appellation 'necessity' as a badge of the deterministic doctrine as it leaves no room for freedom. He prefers "the fairer name of *Determinism*" and contends that there is room for freedom even in the so-called doctrine of necessity. A man may be said to be free when he is free from outer constraint or compulsion. The freedom of an agent, according to this view, merely means his "Being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting, in any respect, as he wills." (Jonathan Edwards, *The Will*, Part I, Sec. 5.) Bain likewise observes, "The proper meaning of 'free' is the absence of external compulsion; every sentient being, under a motive to act, and not interfered with by any other being, is to all intents free; the fox impelled by hunger, and proceeding unmolested to a poultry yard, is a free agent." (*Mental Science*, p. 398-399.) It may be mentioned, however, that the question here is not about the presence or

absence of external constraint, but about the power of free determination on the part of self: the point at issue is not the relation of self to not-self, but the relation of motive or impulse to agent. Are we to conceive the self as merely passive—a mere aggregate of impulses, “a reservoir of ideal ends”—in which these decide by their mutual trial of strength what is to be achieved? Is self but the arena where rival combatants fight out their cause by measuring their strength? We should remember that the impulses or ends are not independent agents but mental modifications, the relative strength of which depends on the character of mental activity or the exercise of attention. Is reflection indifferent to its materials or are they affected in any way by it? An appeal to consciousness reveals that we can determine by personal reflection which impulse is to gain in force and which to lose. (*Vide* § 5.) Even Sidgwick, with his hedonistic leanings, admits that “Against the formidable array of cumulative evidence offered for Determinism there is but one opposing argument of real force; the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action. And certainly when I have a distinct consciousness of choosing between alternatives of conduct, one of which I conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive.” (*Methods* p. 67.) Let us now consider the formidable array of cumulative evidence offered for Determinism, confining our attention first to the psychological aspect of the problem.

outer constraint, but one of inner free choice.

The impulses are but mental modifications, the relative intensities of which are determined by personal reflection.

Admission of Sidgwick.

Arguments in favour of ‘Determinism,’ examined.

It is urged that the strongest motive or impulse always determines volition.

Human volitions, it is said, are as invariably determined by inclinations and circumstances as natural effects by natural causes.

But we should remember that causality implies efficiency and not

It is contended, as we have seen, that acts uniformly follow from character and circumstances, so that the strongest motive or impulse always determines our choice. "The law of causality," it is urged "applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena," involving in both cases "not constraint," but "invariable, certain, and unconditional sequence." (Mill's *Logic*, Bk. VI, Ch. II, § 2.) The moral causes or antecedents, determining volition, "are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions, combined with outward circumstances suited to call those internal incentives into action. All these again are effects of causes, those of them which are mental being consequences of education, and of other moral and physical influences." (*Examination of Hamilton*, p. 561.) The 'doctrine of Philosophical Necessity,' accordingly, is "That, given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred: that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical event." (*Logic*, Bk. II, Chap. II, § 2. Vol. II, p. 410.)

We have already seen (*Vide* § 5) that causality does not necessarily mean uniformity or invariability, and that its essence lies in efficiency, of which we are immediately conscious in the first instance in the exercise of our own will. It is this inner

causality which serves as a key to the outer, and the latter not a key to the former. A careful and impartial analysis of the causal conception reveals that mere invariable sequence gathered from outer experience is not adequate to the interpretation of causality. Mill himself writes, "There are few to whom mere constancy of succession appears a sufficiently stringent bond of union for so peculiar a relation as that of cause and effect. Even if the reason repudiates, the imagination retains, the feeling of some more intimate connection, of some peculiar tie, or mysterious constraint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent. Now this it is which, considered as applying to the human will, conflicts with our consciousness, and revolts our feelings. We are certain that, in the case of our volitions, there is not this mysterious constraint." (*Logic*, Bk. VI, Chap. II, § 2.) Now, if all that we know of causation is the empirical sequence of events, how is it that we come to have "the feeling of some more intimate connection, of some peculiar tie or mysterious constraint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent"? How do we come to necessity from contingency, to the 'must' from the 'does'? (*Vide* § 2.) The fact is, that we are immediately aware of the necessary connection between volition as cause and a particular determination as effect, and we transfer this connection to outer relations when they simulate the subjective relation of volition to a definite course of action. As the empiricists, however,

necessarily uniformity.

Inner causality explains the outer, and not *vice versa*.

Mere invariable sequence gathered from sense-perception cannot explain causation.

Mill's admission.

Empirical sequence cannot account for necessary connection.

The notion of necessary connection gathered from inner experience is really used to

interpret
outer
sequence.

are pledged to the denial of all innate tendencies and notions, they are naturally perplexed at the thought of 'necessity,' which experience does not furnish. Thus empiricism, which usually goes with determinism, fails to give a satisfactory account of causal necessity. But, with all the restraints of their system, they cannot shut their eyes to the fact that there is a 'peculiar tie' or 'mysterious constraint' between cause and effect. It is 'peculiar' or 'mysterious', because it cannot be satisfactorily explained from the empirical standpoint; and if it is thought that reason repudiates such a connection, it is because reason is often suborned by interest. But imagination, still true to original experience, can never get rid of 'the feeling' of such a 'connection' or 'tie'. We see then that causality, properly construed, does not contradict, but support, the doctrine of freedom of will.

Causality
rightly
interpreted
supports
freedom
of will.

Character,
though
subsequently
influencing
volition, is
originally
determined
by it.

Let us next examine to what extent action is invariably the outcome of character and circumstances. 'Character' can never be interpreted by empiricists as an original frame of the mind, nor as a habitual disposition caused by a series of voluntary acts. Character is taken by them as determining volition; and not volition, character. At the earliest stage of action there must thus be a character of some sort, so that it may infallibly determine our acts. And, if such a character be not an original tendency, it must be a bent of the mind wholly created by circumstances. Are we to conceive then the human mind as a tennis ball

driven hither and thither by impulses supplied from without? Does not the very conception of an impulse involve an original susceptibility, variation in which occasions variation in the impulses? And is the strength of an impulse dependent entirely on circumstances and not at all on the mental attitude towards them? We have already given reasons for holding that man is to a great extent a master, and not a creature, of circumstances. The character of his experience and conduct is mainly determined by him and not for him; so that if he falls, he alone is responsible for it; and if he improves his nature, the merit is his. Our destiny is thus to a great extent shaped by us. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 9.) "The character", as Martineau observes, "*includes the Will*"; and so, while determining the act, leaves room for *self-determination*". (*Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 239.)

We have seen that the plausibility of the empirical and utilitarian position depends mainly on confusion and fallacy (*Vide* Chap X, § 10); and such a confusion is also illustrated in the connected doctrine of will. It is contended that the strongest motive always determines our volition. But what is our measure for the strongest motive? "How shall we know", argues Reid very appropriately, "whether the strongest motive always prevails, if we know not which is strongest? There must be some test by which their strength is to be tried, some balance in which they may be weighed; otherwise, to say that the strongest motive always prevails, is to

Determinism rests on fallacy and confusion.

How are we to determine the strongest motive?

speak without any meaning. We must therefore search for this test or balance, since they who have laid so much stress upon this axiom, have left us wholly in the dark as to its meaning. I grant, that, when the contrary motives are of the same kind, and differ only in quantity, it may be easy to say which is the strongest. Thus a bribe of a thousand pounds is a stronger motive than a bribe of a hundred pounds. But when the motives are of different kinds—as money and fame, duty and worldly interest, health and strength, riches and honour—by what rule shall we judge which is the strongest motive?

“Either we measure the strength of motives merely by their prevalence, or by some other standard distinct from their prevalence.

“If we measure their strength merely by their prevalence, and by the strongest motive mean only the motive that prevails, it will be true indeed that the strongest motive prevails; but the proposition will be identical, and mean no more than that the strongest motive is the strongest motive. From this surely no conclusion can be drawn.

“If it should be said, That by the strength of a motive is not meant its prevalence, but the cause of its prevalence; that we measure the cause by the effect, and from the superiority of the effect conclude the superiority of the cause, as we conclude that to be the heaviest weight which bears down the scale: I answer, That, according to this explication of the axiom, it takes for granted that motives are the

If, by the result, the position becomes tautologous.

If, by the cause, the position involves a vicious circle.

causes, and the sole causes, of actions. Nothing is left to the agent, but to be acted upon by the motives, as the balance is by the weights. The axiom supposes, that the agent does not act, but is acted upon; and, from this supposition, it is concluded that he does not act. This is to reason in a circle, or rather it is not reasoning but begging the question." (*Reid's Works*, Hamilton's Edition, Vol. II, p. 610.)

The doctrine, therefore, that the strongest motive uniformly determines volition is either fallacious or false. It either entangles us in a vicious circle or gives the lie to consciousness which is the only secure foundation of all sound reasoning and philosophy. If, as Bain says, "We always judge of strength of motive by the action that prevails" (*Mental Science*, p. 401), then the position only means that the prevailing motive prevails; and this is analogous to the explanation given by Moliere's physician of the sleep-producing property of opium by reference to its soporific virtue. If, however, by the strength of a motive is meant its intensity, then consciousness testifies to the fact that the felt intensity of an impulse may be strengthened or weakened by personal reflection or the regulation of attention, so that if subsequently we act in the direction of what appears to be the strongest motive, it is because the will gave the motive its strength. It not infrequently happens that we restrain a violent passion by a calm resolve which finally stifles the passion altogether. "Often," writes Martineau, "a vehement passion may be controlled by the mere

Determinism
is false and
fallacious.

Personal
reflection
modifies an
impulse.

Admission of
Edwards.

Unlike
natural
events,
volition is
essentially
prospective
and free.

D'Arcy's
testimony.

tranquil memory of a resolve quite distasteful to us at the moment. What else indeed do we mean when we speak of the frequent opposition of inclination and duty?" (*Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 233.) To solve a problem of will we should carefully observe, as Edwards points out, "The nature and circumstances of the *thing viewed*; the nature and circumstances of the *mind that views*; and the degree and manner of its *view*." (*Freedom of Will*, I, ii, 2.) It is admitted, then, that 'the degree and manner of view' affects a voluntary action. Nay, if we closely examine the character of human volition, we notice a fundamental difference between it and a natural event. The latter is *externally* determined by *previous events*, while the former is *internally* determined by reference to *future requirements*. Futurity, however, is intelligible only by reference to a mind conceiving it; and anything undertaken with regard to it is undertaken only to satisfy a mental need. "An act of will," says D'Arcy, "is determined by an idea of an end not yet realised....It is, in fact, from its very nature, the self-determination of a self-presenting subject; for not only does the idea of the end lie altogether within the subject, but its adoption by the subject as his personal good is his self-expression. The very fact, then, that volition is determined by motives is enough to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity or Determinism, in all its forms. *The Will is Free just because it is determined by motives.*" (*Short Study of Ethics*, pp. 37-38.)

If, as Mill

"Necessitarians," as Mill observes, "affirm, as a

truth of experience, that volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents with the same uniformity, and (when we have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances) with the same certainty, as physical effects follow their physical causes." (Mill, *Examination*, p. 561.) But if, even "when we have sufficient knowledge of circumstances," we can never be aware of necessary connection in the sphere of physical causation, which is taken as the primary experience, how can we be sure of such connection in the sphere of human volition which is interpreted only by way of analogy to our experience of physical phenomena? How can we break through 'does' or contingency and arrive at 'must' or certainty in any sphere? But, even if we waive such an objection, which may be pressed against the school of Mill, according to his admissions, it still remains to be proved as a fact of personal experience that volitions always follow determinate moral antecedents with uniformity and certainty. Character, no doubt, implies a definite tendency, formed by previous experience, to act or behave in a certain way under certain circumstances. But is it of such an inflexible nature as to warrant prediction without any possibility of failure? Character leaves room for expectation because it is due to the prior habitual exercise of our powers along definite lines. But is not such exercise itself the outcome of repeated acts of free choice, which gradually become uniform and mechanical because of the uniformity with which such choice is made? We must remember that the true source of

observes, necessity is an illusion, how can we be aware of the necessary connection of motive with action?

Character, which is the outcome of the habitual exercise of will in definite directions, is not so inflexible and mechanical as to exclude the possibility of deviation.

character is to be found in the central fact of personality which, though ordinarily moving along definite lines by reason of previous experience, may baffle all expectations by a free and capricious exercise of its power. Thus, in the midst of self-imposed uniformity, there is always the active spontaneity of the ego that may surprise us with novelty and a regeneration of character along altogether different lines. As Mansel observes, "That no conceivable amount of information could enable a being of human constitution to predict with certainty the acts of another, is established by the same evidence of consciousness by which we know that there is a human constitution at all." (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 336.)

The spontaneity of the ego is implied in volition as well as in character. Mansel's testimony.

It is urged that character can never be modified without a prior modification of the motives which determine it.

Bain.

It is contended by the supporters of determinism that any deviation from a habitual course of action or any regeneration of character must itself be conditioned by appropriate motives. It is urged that so long as the motives remain the same, the acts must continue to be the same; and when the motives are modified by circumstances, the acts necessarily vary. "Our character," says Bain, "is improvable, when there are present to our minds motives to improve it; it is not improvable without such motives. No character is ever improved without an opposite train of motives—either the punishment renounced by the Owenite, or certain feelings of another kind, such as affections, sympathies, lofty ideals, and so on. To present these motives to the mind of any one is to employ the engines of improvement. To say to a man, you can improve if you will, is to employ a

nonsensical formula ; under cover of which, however, may lie some genuine motive power. For the speaker is, at the same time, intimating his own strong wish that his hearer should improve ; he is presenting to the hearer's mind the IDEA of improvement : and probably, along with that, a number of fortifying considerations, all of the nature of proper motives." (*Mental Science*, p. 405.) Mill likewise observes, "The causes, on which action depends, are never uncontrollable ; and any given effect is only necessary provided that the causes tending to produce it are not controlled. That whatever happens could not have happened otherwise unless something had taken place which was capable of preventing it, no one surely needs hesitate to admit." (*Logic*, VI, Ch. 2, § 3.) That the presence of motives is essential to action or modification of character is evidently a palpable psychological fact ; and "Whatever happens could not have happened otherwise, unless something had taken place which was capable of preventing it," is also a truism of the type expressed in the nursery rhyme—

"There was an old woman lived under a hill,
And if she's not gone, she lives there still."

The question, however, is not about the presence or absence of motives, or about their modification to bring about a modification of character ; but about the determining influence of the motives themselves apart from any agency on the part of the mind. Are the suggestion of the idea of improvement and the presentation of 'a number of fortifying consid-

But the
modification

of motives
can be effect-
ed by person-
al agency
alone, and
not by
external
suggestions.

Volition is a
reflective
solution of a
practical
problem.

'The motive
of reflection'
is not an
external
force, but an
inward im-
pulse, in-
fluencing
conduct.

erations' alone adequate to bring about an improvement of character, without any determination on the part of the agent? Can the mind place itself on the way to improvement by strengthening some tendencies to action and by weakening others? And can such tendencies have any influence on our will, apart from active reflection or deliberative choice? Volition is not merely the mechanical resultant of the (passive) influences at work on the mind; it is a reflective solution of a practical problem by reference to such influences. "Voluntary action," as Aristotle says, "is that of which the *arche*, or originating cause, lies in the agent." (Wallace's *Aristotle*, p. 105.) Psychological examination thus reveals that, if motives ever determine a course of action, it is because the strength of motives is derived from the agency of the mind itself, which by reflection intensifies some motives and weakens others. It is, no doubt, contended by the advocates of the doctrine of Necessity that reflection itself is determined by motives. The direction of attention, it is urged, is itself conditioned by what is called 'the motive of reflection' or the recollection of the agreeable and disagreeable consequences of different acts. But it should be remembered that 'the motive of reflection' is not an external force or fascination, which chains the mind to a definite course. It is but the reason or ground, the motive or end, due to the essentially discriminative or elective character of our rational constitution. Though reasons are thus brought before the mind at the time of decision, yet the mind

is not constrained to act in the direction of this or that reason. The reasons are mere ideal or prospective considerations, the *pros* and *cons*, discussed before action; and that which is chosen becomes the motive. The reasons influence, but do not determine, action: they are inducements to will, and not fetters on it. To extinguish the reasons would be to destroy the rationality of our constitution and set up blind necessity in its place. The free activity of the mind can never be denied without falsifying consciousness, which is the only secure foundation of all sound philosophy.

(II) **The Ethical Aspect.**—The ethical aspect of the controversy is due to the importance of freedom in our moral life. It is generally accepted that freedom is a postulate of morality, so that a being who is constrained to act in a certain direction can never be praised or blamed for his acts. Sidgwick, however, is inclined to hold that the free-will question is not of fundamental importance in an ethical system: he observes, "I do not think that a solution of this metaphysical problem is really important for the general regulation of human conduct, whatever method be adopted for framing such regulation." (*Methods*, p. 59.) And he adds, "Free-will is obviously not included in our common notions of physical and intellectual perfection: and it seems to me also not to be included in the common notions of the excellences of character which we call virtues: the manifestations of courage, temperance and justice do not become less admirable because we can trace

Free-will cannot be denied without contradicting consciousness.

(II) *The Ethical Aspect of the question.*

Free-will is generally regarded as a postulate of morality.

Some, however, contend that the question of free-will is immaterial in ethics.

Sidgwick.

their antecedents in a happy balance of inherited dispositions developed by a careful education." (*Ibid.*, p. 69.) This explains, we believe, the vacillating attitude of Sidgwick and his comparatively meagre treatment of the subject, in his classical work. "The question of free-will," he observes, "can hardly be passed without some sort of struggle, even by those who—like myself—seek to evade the sphinx rather than to solve her riddle." (*Mind*, 1888, p. 405.) Fowler also is inclined to agree with Sidgwick as to the ethical unimportance of the free-will controversy he writes, "With Professor Sidgwick's opinion as to the unimportance of this question in its bearings on the regulation of actual conduct I entirely concur." (*Principles of Morals*, Part II, Chap. IX, p. 331. See also *Mind*, 1890, p. 89.)

Fowler.

Whether the problem of freedom of will is vitally connected or not with the facts of our moral life can be determined only by a careful examination of these facts. Right and wrong, duty and right, merit and demerit, virtue and sin, remorse and responsibility, penalty and cruelty become unmeaning, if our acts are really determined by motives. How can we characterize an act as right or wrong, if it be but the necessary outcome of circumstances? An act in such a case may be called right in the sense that it fits in with the other events of the universe; and an act is wrong in the sense of being out of tune with the order of the world. As, however, objectively, every event is determined in its place by antecedent circumstances, it can never be in conflict with the

The rejection of freedom of will renders a satisfactory explanation of the facts of moral life impossible.

current of the universe. Thus, what we regard as objectively wrong or inharmonious is due merely to our partial conception: on a fuller view everything is found to be in its own place and so right and proper. The wrong, accordingly, vanishes altogether except from subjective conception which, when analysed, turns out to be also illusory. If, therefore, everything be right, then there can no more be any room for the distinction between right and wrong, except in a mind labouring under an illusion. Thus moral distinctions have no place in a mechanized world, where everything is in the iron grasp of necessity. Objective rightness can have a meaning only by reference to the election and ways of the Supreme Mind, that is conceived as preferring what is just and benevolent to what is inconsistent with the perfection and progress of the universe. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 3.) Hence we find objective ethics usually associated with idealism, such as is illustrated in Hegelianism or Vedantism. We see, then, that moral distinctions, to be of any significance, must imply rational choice, whether on the part of finite or infinite intelligence. And this logical consequence is borne out by psychological analysis. Introspection reveals that we are struck with compunction when we do anything wrong, however agreeable its consequences; and we have a feeling of self-complacency in doing what is right, however sorry we may be for unforeseen unhappy results. The inner verdict, as we have seen, is always by reference to the conscious difference in moral worth among

In such a case, there can be no room for evil, except in a mind labouring under illusion.

Objective rightness is intelligible by reference to subjective.

Rational choice is essential to morality.

the competing impulses ; and is not at all connected with what is described as objective rightness or the moral administration of the world. The conditions of our trial are fulfilled when the real or objective difference in moral worth among the conflicting impulses is known and the power of freely choosing from among them is assumed, whatever may be the outward events or consequences. Man carries his destiny, as explained above (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 9), in his own constitution.

“ Secure from outward force, within himself
The danger lies, yet lies within his power :
Against his will he can receive no harm.
But God left free the will, for what obeys
Reason, is free, and reason he made right.” (*Milton.*)

Similarly, what meaning can there be in Duty, when it is but a necessity of nature ? If we cannot but act in a certain direction, then there can be no meaning in obedience. As, on such a supposition, we never have the power to go against inclinations or circumstances, we are reduced to the level of inanimate objects impelled by mechanical forces. Does the addition of reflective choice, therefore, produce no other difference in the human constitution than the presence of consciousness ? Then well might a Schopenhauer say that it is rather a curse than a boon to mankind, since it is but the parent of all sorrow and grief. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 12.) If moral requirement or obligation and willing submission or obedience thus find no room in determinism, it evidently fails to account for our estimates of merit and

The conditions of moral life are satisfied when the real difference in moral worth among the impulses, with the power of free choice from among them, is granted.

Determinism fails to give a satisfactory explanation of Duty, Obedience,

Merit,

virtue, or to give a satisfactory explanation of penalty or punishment. What reason is there for holding a man accountable for what he cannot help performing, or for attributing merit to him for what he cannot but possess? If virtue is but the necessity of nature, we should only admire it as we admire a beautiful landscape. Virtue is then not earned or acquired by faithful service, but forced upon an individual by a fortuitous combination of circumstances. However much one may be influenced, favourably or unfavourably, by his natural and social surroundings, he is always credited with the power of modifying such influences by personal reflection. Without such a power man would merely be a creature of circumstances, devoid of all responsibility and so destitute of the moral sentiments which constitute his distinctive nature. There can, therefore, be no justification for punishing a man when he has really no control over himself. It is maintained, no doubt, by determinists that punishment is inflicted not for what *has been* done but for what *may be* avoided. It is a matter of policy to regulate human conduct, and not a matter of justice to vindicate what is right and proper. But, may it not be asked, can the person regulating and the person regulated do otherwise under the circumstances? If not, what meaning is there in regulation or correction? Regulation implies active control or direction of will, and not merely the passive resolution of forces at work. The impulses or passions roused by circumstances, if left to themselves, would weaken our moral constitution and

Responsi-
bility,

Virtue,

Punishment,

and Regula-
tion or
CorrectionA man led
by impulses
is reduced to

the level of
brutes.

finally take away the true dignity of human nature.

"Thou must chain thy passions down :

Well to serve, but ill to sway,

Like the fire, they must obey.

They are good, in subject state,

To strengthen, warm, and animate ;

But if once we let them reign,

They sweep with desolating train,

Till they but leave a hated name,

A ruin'd soul, and blackened fame."

(*Eliza Cook.*)

The neces-
sarian
explanation
of the
phenomena
of will—such
as Volition,

The determinists, no doubt, try to explain the phenomena of will in their own way. *Volition* is explained by them as a development out of reflex, spontaneous, or instinctive movements, aided by the laws of self-conservation and contiguity. When a child, for example, accidentally scratches an itching surface, then the agreeable experience becomes associated with that definite movement, which is continued for the sake of the pleasure or relief from pain. Subsequently when the child again experiences a similar itching sensation, it is led by contiguity to repeat the same movement for the sake of relief; and thus, it is alleged, a voluntary movement is induced. Volition is then a natural growth of blind necessity out of materials, and according to laws, over which we have no control. *Choice* is, accordingly, nothing more than the greatest attraction which an object has pre-eminently of all other objects. *Deliberation* is but the mutual trial of strength of conflicting impulses, prolonged owing to

Choice,

Deliberation,

the recollection of the painful consequences of hasty action; and *Resolution* is mere suspension of outward activity owing to the absence of suitable opportunity. *Freedom*, as Hodgson says, is only "The action and reaction of motives with each other within the mind, not fettered by external restraint, but free to exert each its own kind and degree of energy." Such explanations of the leading terms connected with will are, however, inconsistent with facts. The essence of all these volitional exercises lies in free activity which regulates the impulses in the light of previous knowledge. Will determined from without, choice necessitated by charms and allurements, deliberation or resolution brought about merely by circumstances and prior experience, and freedom constrained by motives are explanations not acceptable to the unsophisticated consciousness of mankind.

It is contended that unsuspected motives and subconscious factors exercise such a subtle influence on the will that it is often very difficult to decipher them. It should be remembered, however, that ethics is rigorously restricted to the sphere of distinct consciousness, so that any subconscious influence operating in the mind can never be said to bring credit or discredit to it. We may then be praised or blamed as much for the organic influence of good or bad digestion, or for the natural influence of fine or foul weather. All the influences at work cannot be regarded as motives. The blind promptings of instinct or the organic wants of our physical

Resolution,
and
Freedom—

is inconsistent with the facts of consciousness.

Necessarians urge that subconscious influences often determine volition.

frame become motives only when they are intensified by the direction of attention and so fastened upon by the mind. (*Vide* § 4.) Factors below the threshold of consciousness, though *influencing* the will, can never be said to *determine* it. Will, as we have said, is essentially rational or discriminating. The passive determination by blind forces is, therefore, altogether inconsistent with its nature. A fact outside consciousness is thus outside the range of will; and, in order that it may come within this range, it must be raised by attentive fixation above the threshold of consciousness. The testimony of consciousness must be accepted as final in this controversy, as in all matters pertaining to mind and morals. Leslie Stephen's criticism of Sidgwick, that his "Appeal to the consciousness is an appeal to a judge not in possession of the necessary facts" (*Frazer's Magazine*, March, 1875), overlooks the only secure test of moral and psychological inquiry.

Freedom of will properly implies, therefore, not the unobstructed exercise of natural propensities, but the rational regulation of these according to the requirements of the mind. Such a regulation, as we have seen, is essential to our moral life which, without it, becomes unmeaning. "The fall of liberty," observes Diderot in his article on *Liberte* in the *Encyclopedie*, "brings down with it all order and police, confounds vice and virtue, legitimates every prodigy of infamy, extinguishes all shame and all remorse, and hopelessly mars the whole human race. A doctrine so monstrous is fitter to be

As will, however, is essentially discriminative, it can never be passively determined by blind forces.

A fact outside consciousness is outside will.

Freedom of will implies, not the unobstructed exercise of natural propensities, but their rational regulation.

The fall of liberty would undermine our moral constitution.

punished by the magistrate than examined in the schools." We may, accordingly, maintain that, though the psychological aspect of this problem may be supposed to be of doubtful issue, the moral aspect leaves no room for doubt. As Martineau observes, "Either free-will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion." (*Types of Ethical Theory*, Vol. II, p. 41.) The determinist explains only what *will* happen, while morality requires what *ought* to happen. The sphere of morality is the sphere of the ideal and contingent and not that of the actual and necessary. The ideal, however, is intelligible only by reference to a mind that conceives it and guides its conduct by it. Hence Kant, Selby Bigge (*Mind*, 1890, p. 93), and others are disposed to base libertarianism on moral grounds instead of on psychological: "Thou oughtest implies thou canst." The doctrine of necessity annuls moral law and falsifies all moral experience. If necessity be the law of our being, the 'ought' becomes unmeaning. Professor Sidgwick himself, in spite of his contention that the free-will controversy is immaterial in ethics, admits that acts become "less meritorious" as they are determined by natural propensities and circumstances and that the denial of freedom tends to upset all our fundamental moral notions. With regard to the supposition of freedom as illusory he writes, "I cannot conceive myself seeing this, without at the same time conceiving my whole conception of what I now call "my" action fundamentally altered: I cannot conceive that if I contemplated

The moral evidence of freedom is even stronger than the psychological.

Morality is concerned with the contingent and not with the necessary.

Sidgwick's admission.

the actions of my organism in this light I should refer them to my "self"—i. e., to the mind so contemplating—in the sense in which I now refer them." (*Methods*, p. 68.)

In rejecting determinism we should not fall into the opposite error of supposing that will is not even influenced by impulses, as is done by the advocates of the theory of the Liberty of Indifference. Such a theory is—

(1) irrelevant, as it leaves the point at issue undecided,

and (2) false, as there can be no occasion for an exercise of will when the impulses do not supply the materials.

Before closing this topic we must mention that in the heat of controversy often extreme positions are maintained which calm reflection shows to be equally untenable. If the determinists contend that in every case volition is determined by the strongest motive, some advocates of human liberty go to the opposite extreme and hold that motives have nothing to do with the determinations of will. This is known as the doctrine of the *Liberty of Indifference*. Such a doctrine, however, is (1) logically irrelevant and (2) psychologically untenable. (1) To maintain that the will is not at all affected by impulses or motives is to avoid the problem altogether, and thus to leave undecided the case when will is influenced by them. (2) Liberty of indifference is a psychological absurdity, in as much as the materials for an exercise of will must always be supplied by impulses. We never will to will; we always will to do this or that, indicated by inclination or duty. "A mere will," says Leibniz, "without any motive, is chimerical and contradictory." (*Letters of Leibniz and Clarke*, p. 93.)

The proper view is the mean between these two extreme positions, viz., that an exercise of will must always be by reference to impulses which influence it. It is not left, however, to the impulses to decide the course of action; the decision rests with the

will after the pleadings of hostile impulses are over. The fact is that when the mind is modified in two hostile ways by distinct considerations, it is left to its own free spontaneous activity to settle the question this way or that by the personal direction of attention. The direction of attention, as we have seen, raises an impulse to the position of a dominant inclination, motive, or resolve; so that if finally motive determines the will, it is because the will gave the motive its strength. This is the true character of freedom implied in all moral effort, in all the verdicts of mankind upon human action, and in all the machinery of punishment for the regulation of human conduct. Such a freedom is consistent with the reign of law, both in the physical and the moral world, and excludes bondage and license alike. "So far as the idea of subjection is concerned," remarks Bain, "the virtuous man is the greater slave of the two; the more virtuous he is, the more he submits himself to authority and restraints of every description; while the thoroughly vicious man emancipates himself from every obligation, and is only rendered a slave at last when his fellows will tolerate him no longer. The true type of freedom is an unpunished villain, or a successful usurper." (*Mental Science*, p. 398.) The very fact, however, that the virtuous man 'submits himself to authority and restraints of every description' reveals that it is not slavery but self-imposed restraint. The 'unpunished villain or successful usurper,' on the contrary, is gradually enslaved by his passions and propensions;

The impulses are but incitements to activity, which is really determined by will or rational choice.

True freedom leads to virtue, which is not bondage as supposed by Bain,

and preserves
the purity
and integrity
of the moral
constitution.

so that he finally loses the freedom by strengthening the sway of inclination and weakening the wholesome influence of reason or conscience. We find, accordingly, that both common opinion and reflective judgment characterize the vicious life as a 'life of bondage' as distinguished from the truly free life of virtue. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 3 and § 4.) As the *Geeta* says—

“धृत्या यथा धारयते मनःप्रायेन्द्रियक्रियाः ।

योगेनाव्यभिचारिण्या धृतिः सा पाथं सात्त्विकी” ॥१८॥३३॥

“The firmness, unflinching through Yoga, by which one restraineth the actions of Manas (mind), of the life-breaths and of the sense-organs, that firmness, O Partha, is *sattvic* or truly virtuous.” (Annie Besant's Translation, XVIII, 33.)

The freedom
of will is gen-
erally accept-
ed by com-
mon and re-
flective men,
unless they
are led astray
by conflicting
theories.

Physicists,
empiricists,
utilitarians,
Calvinists,
and pan-
theists are
thus preju-
diced against
the doctrine
of liberty,

In concluding this section let us mention that the universal conviction of mankind is that our will is free and not determined by motives. Such a belief, as we have seen, is supported by the moral experiences and is the only justification for an attempt at the regulation of human conduct. It is endorsed also by the general testimony of reflective minds who are not biased in favour of a particular theory. We find, accordingly, that determinism is ordinarily restricted to the ranks of empiricists, utilitarians, Calvinists, and pantheists, who, to defend their position, are constrained to adopt the doctrine of necessity: “Although, in theory,” writes Martineau, “the doctrine of necessity may be held in conjunction with *any* ideal of character, in fact it is found in close combination with the *utilitarian*.” (*Study of*

Religion, Vol. II, p. 312.) When experience or pleasure is taken as the sole determinant of action, or when the doctrine of predestination or of the unity of the finite with the Infinite Mind is adopted as the key to the interpretation of the universe, then the only course left open is to defend inflexible order or absolute necessity everywhere. Physicists, likewise, who trespass on the province of metaphysics, usually bring with them their vague notions of physical necessity to interpret human volition, and thoughtlessly advocate determinism, without caring to examine it independently by introspective analysis or by reference to the fundamental facts of our moral life. A careful and impartial survey of the facts of our mental and moral constitution bears out, however, the common belief of freedom with the implied sense of justice and responsibility.

though it is supported by consciousness.

"Placed for his trial on this bustling stage,
From thoughtless youth to ruminating age,
Free in his will to choose or to refuse,
Man may improve the crisis, or abuse ;
Else, on the fatalist's unrighteous plan,
Say to what bar amenable were man ?
With naught in charge he could betray no trust ;
And if he fell, would fall because he must ;
If Love reward him, or if Vengeance strike,
His recompense in both unjust alike." (*Cowper*.)

According to Mill, determinism leaves room for modification of character, while fatalism does not.

§ 7. Necessity and Fatalism. According to Mill, the difference between necessity and fatalism lies in the fact that, in the one case, in spite of the determination of acts by character and circumstances, there

is a desire for the modification of character; while in the other no such desire can exist owing to 'the depressing effect' of the conviction that our lot is fore-ordained in every detail. If, in the latter case, a desire ever arises for the modification of character, it is instantly repressed by the conviction that we are altogether impotent to struggle against it. In the case of necessity or determinism, on the other hand, the presence of a desire to improve our character involves the conviction "that the work is not so irrevocably done as to be incapable of being altered." The one supposes such an antagonism between desire and character as to render the former altogether ineffectual, while the other assumes no such antagonism and regards desire as an important factor influencing and even modifying character. "A fatalist", says Mill, "believes, or half believes (for nobody is a consistent fatalist), not only that whatever is about to happen, will be the infallible result of the causes which produce it, (which is the true necessarian doctrine,) but moreover that there is no use in struggling against it; that it will happen however we may strive to prevent it." (*Logic*, Bk. VI, Chap. II, § 3.) A determinist, on the other hand, believes that "He has, to a certain extent, a power to alter his character. Its being, in the ultimate resort formed for him, is not inconsistent with its being, in part, formed by him as one of the intermediate agents. His character is formed by his circumstances (including among these his particular organisation); but his own desire to mould it in a particular way,

Fatalism is thus viewed as a depressing doctrine, which determinism is not taken to be.

is one of those circumstances, and by no means one of the least influential." (*Ibid.*)

The above distinction, viewed from the surface, seems to be plausible ; but, when examined a little closely, it disappears altogether. Does determinism leave any room for personal effort, either on the part of an agent or on the part of those who are bent upon improving his character ? Action from motive, motive from character and circumstances constitute the indissoluble chain which binds man to his lot. An individual may be led to think, no doubt, that he can improve his character if he wills to do so ; but is he right in this conviction of his from the necessarian position ? "We cannot, indeed," writes Mill, "directly will to be different from what we are. But neither did those who are supposed to have formed our characters, directly will that we should be what we are. Their will had no direct power except over their own actions. They made us what they did make us, by willing, not the end, but the requisite means ; and we, when our habits are not too inveterate, can, by similarly willing the requisite means, make ourselves different. If they could place us under the influence of certain circumstances, we, in like manner, can place ourselves under the influence of other circumstances. We are exactly as capable of making our own character, *if we will*, as others are of making it for us." (*Ibid.*) Now, if "we can not directly will to be different from what we are," no amount of indirect help will be of any avail to regenerate our character. Again,

But the necessarian assumption of invariable connection between motive (impulse) and action leaves as little room for modification of character as any fatalistic doctrine.

Mill contends that we can improve our character by adopting suitable means.

if it be true that we can never directly improve our own character, how can it be said of others, disposed to help us in this respect, that "there will had no direct power except over their own actions"? If we have no control over our own acts, how can others have any over theirs? The very fact that others or ourselves can adopt "the requisite means" for the improvement of character shows that our conduct is determined by ideal considerations and not by the actual. Only the appropriate means, suited to the end fixed upon by the mind, is adopted, while others are rejected as not conducive to the desired result. Thus, the doctrine of necessity can never free itself from the firm hold of fatalism, without perjuring itself and advocating a control over conduct for which there can possibly be no room in its tenets. "If man's consciousness," observes D'Arcy, "is like some strange phosphorescence fitfully playing over the surface of an iron necessity of material causation—a mere by-product of physical forces—and if man's will has no power of free determination, it is useless to appeal to him as to one who can choose the right and act accordingly." (*Short Study of Ethics*, p. XXV.) If "we can place ourselves under the influence" of certain circumstances and "are capable of making our own character, if we will," then personal control over impulses is admitted and the doctrine of necessity is abandoned. On such a supposition it is not intelligible how "others are capable of making our character for us." A character formed simply by

The very fact, however, that we can adopt the appropriate means, 'if we will,' implies freedom and not necessity.

The doctrine of necessity, therefore, cannot consistently be distinguished from fatalism.

external influences is no character at all; it is analogous to the conditions of weather determined by physical forces or to the organic and reflex movements conditioned by natural laws. Such a character can never be an object of moral criticism or moral science. If acts are invariably determined by motives, and motives by circumstances, then it is as little possible for us to be other than what we are, as it is for one who is ruled by the Fates.

moulded simply from without can never be an object of moral criticism.

The doctrines of necessity and fatalism are identical in their results.

§ 8. **Free-will and Fore-knowledge.** Without trespassing on the spheres of metaphysics and religion, we may simply consider here to what extent foreknowledge of the Creator, if there be any, is consistent with the freedom of His creatures. If God knows what is to happen, how is it possible for us to do otherwise? The doctrine of predestination thus ordinarily goes with the doctrine of necessity. But, rightly understood, divine foreknowledge does not necessarily exclude human freedom. Two possible explanations may be suggested:

Divine foreknowledge is not inconsistent with human liberty.

(1) If temporal succession is due to mere human limitation, which leads us to conceive events as successive, even when they are really simultaneous, then the difficulty of the co-existence of freedom and prescience does not arise at all. If, to the Deity, time is an eternal now, then the distinction of prior and posterior disappears altogether and freedom may co-exist with what we call foreknowledge.

(1) If Time is but a form of the human mind, then the difficulty of reconciling the two does not arise at all.

"Man (ingenious to contrive his woe,
 And rob himself of all that makes this vale
 Of tears bloom comfort) cries, If God foresees
 Our future actings, then the objects known
 Must be determined, or the knowledge fail;
 Thus liberty's destroy'd, and all we do
 Or suffer, by a fatal thread is spun.
 Say, fool, with too much subtilty misled,
 Who reasonest but to err, does Prescience change
 The property of things? Is ought thou seest
 Caused by thy vision, not thy vision caused
 By forms that previously exist? To God
 This mode of seeing future deeds extends,
 And freedom with foreknowledge may exist."

(*Baily.*)

(2) Without prejudging the character of time,
 we may still reconcile freedom with foreknowledge.
 If we bear in mind the distinction between subjective
 and objective morality, the ethics of human
 conduct and the ethics of divine administration,
 then we can see that while there is room for freedom
 in the case of the former, there is ample room for
 foreknowledge in the case of the latter. Freedom
 satisfies, as we have seen, the conditions of moral
 trial in an individual, although his efforts are not
 crowned with success. While foreknowledge deter-
 mines events in their proper places and establishes
 the reign of law and necessity in the external sphere
 of our existence, freedom still leaves subjective
 determinations contingent which do not affect in the
 least the main drift of the objective flow of events.

(2) Subjective
 control over
 impulses is
 not inconsis-
 tent with the
 objective reg-
 ulation
 of events by
 Providence.

Thus, while men are undergoing their trial under the eyes of the Great Judge, their destinies and interests are wisely regulated by Him by invariable and beneficent laws. Human liberty is, therefore, not inconsistent with holy resignation or due faith in the righteous rule of God—

“That God, which ever lives and loves,
One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off divine event
To which the whole creation moves.”

(*Tennyson.*)

The guiding hand of Providence encourages us with success and corrects us with disappointments, according as our plans agree or disagree with His. The unusual severity of a winter or the timely arrival of a Blucher may thus falsify the calculations and frustrate the designs of a Napoleon; and a timely storm or an opportune fog may likewise crown with success the patriotic efforts of a Lord Howard or an Admiral Togo. Such events are, no doubt, ordinarily attributed to accident or chance.

We are rewarded or punished according as our plans agree or disagree with the Divine scheme.

“Wondrous chance!

Or rather wondrous conduct of the gods!

By mortals, from their blindness, chance misnam'd.”

(*Thomson.*)

And so natural is the conviction of divine agency in such cases that even coins have ~~been~~ struck by sovereigns with the inscription, “God breathed and they were scattered,” expressive of the moral sentiment. Thus while men earn merit or demerit for their honest or dishonest efforts, the ways of

Thus, subjective freedom may co-exist with objective necessity.

Providence continue undisturbed to promote the well-being of the universe. Objective necessity, due to divine prescience, is not at all inconsistent with subjective freedom. Hence the belief of pious and thoughtful men in the divine regulation of events in the midst of our warring passions and inclinations. "Although all mankind," observes Vico, "are distracted by the three vicious appetites of fierceness, avarice, and ambition, the divine Spirit so employs them as to give rise, in a natural human way, to a legislation which produces from them the army, commerce, and the court,—that is to say, strength, wealth, and the knowledge of government." That, while pursuing our moral ends, we may thus be the unconscious instruments in the divine administration of the world, is well expressed by Shelly.

"As inland boats are driven to Ocean
Down streams made strong with mountain-thaw ;
And first there comes a gentle sound
To those in talk or slumber bound,
And wakes the destined soft emotion,
Attracts, impels them : those who saw
Say from the breathing earth behind
There steams a plume-uplifting wind
Which drives them on their path, while they
Believe their own swift wings and feet
The sweet desires within obey :
And so they float upon their way."

(*Prometheus Unbound*, Act II, Sec. ii.)

Such an explanation may harmonize our faith in the beneficent divine administration of the world with our moral convictions. Objective necessity

alone, when extended to the mental and moral world, would swallow up all moral distinctions, nullify all trials, and leave room only for prudence and economy ; and subjective freedom, if applied to explain the events of the natural world, would give rise to caprice and chaos, baffling all calculation and expectation and so rendering life miserable and intolerable. The two extremes, however, when united in the way indicated above, yield harmony out of discord and reconcile our moral nature with our lot.

“ One adequate support
For the calamities of mortal life
Exists—one only ; an assured belief
That the procession of our fate, howe'er
Sad or disturb'd, is order'd by a Being
Of infinite benevolence and power,
Whose everlasting purposes embrace
All accidents, converting them to good.”

(*Wordsworth.*)

We should not judge things by abstract possibility, but by what Leibnitz calls concrete ‘compossibility.’ Abstractly considered, law or order involves a restraint on divine omnipotence ; the presence of sufferings, on His benevolence ; and the unequal distribution of agreeable and disagreeable experiences, on His justice. But can there be knowledge without law and order, true benevolence without regulation and penalty, and justice without unequal distribution of pleasures and pains ? We should not take a limited view of a particular factor, ignoring all the rest. We should not try, therefore, to

Such a view
saves our
moral
nature as
well as
natural
order, and
induces
pious
resignation.

Divine
ignorance
of human
volition is
not a
inconsistent
with His
Perfection.

Martineau's
testimony.

universalize natural necessity and thereby discredit the facts of personal consciousness ; nor should we strive to establish the universal sway of absolute freedom, which contradicts experience and substitutes caprice for law. Human freedom implies, no doubt, that even God is not previously aware of our determinations ; but such is the only logical postulate of our moral life and the moral administration of the world. Without freedom there can be no meaning in morality, whether human or divine ; and causality too is bereft of its true and adequate meaning. Divine omniscience must operate consistently with divine holiness ; and the two together justify faith in subjective morality and objective necessity. "Is this a *limitation* of God's foresight, that he can not read all volitions that are to be ? Yes : but it is a *self-limitation* just like his abstinence from causing them : lending us a portion of his causation, he refrains from covering all with his omniscience. Foreknowledge of the contingent is not a perfection ; and if, rather than have a reign of universal necessity and stereotyped futurity, he willed, in order to prepare scope for a gift of moral freedom, to set up a range of alternative possibilities, he could but render some knowledge conditional for the sake of making any righteousness attainable ; leaving enough that is determinate, for science ; and enough that is indeterminate, for character." (Martineau, *Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 279.)

Even if the above account fail to relieve an inquisitive mind, it may be said that the positive

declarations of personal consciousness can never be set aside for an abstract theory of the universe. There are many things which we cannot explain and reconcile; and if this be made a ground for the rejection of patent facts, then there would be no more any security for truth or any solid foundation for a theory. "We are not justified," remarks Mansel, "in rejecting what we can comprehend because we do not understand its possible relation to what we cannot." (*Prolegomena Logica*, p. 336.) And we may add that, if such be our attitude, very few things would be left which could lay claim to existence.

It may, however, be urged against our position that the above reconciliation of human liberty and divine foreknowledge, of subjective freedom and objective necessity, leaves very little room for any sphere of work for man. He is practically confined within the shadowy region of motives and shut out from the real world of Nature. Of what avail, it may be asked, is his freedom, if he cannot effect anything beyond the determinations of his own mind? Moreover, validity of our position may be questioned by an appeal to facts which seem to justify belief in efficacy of our power to produce results as contemplated by us. Do I not succeed, for example, in putting down on paper what I am anxious to express, or in bringing from the shelf before me a book which I want for the purpose? Am I not successful in giving a beggar a coin to remove his want or wiping out the tears of a person in agony? Can I not snatch an article from another,

(3) The positive declarations of consciousness in favour of human liberty and responsibility should never be rejected owing to theoretic difficulties.

The above view may seem to be inconsistent with the efficacy of human acts to achieve desired results in many cases.

if I be so disposed, or to strike or insult him for no fault of his own? How, can we, in the face of such facts, maintain that there is any objective necessity at all. If belief in foreknowledge may lead one to deny subjective freedom, facts like these may incline another to deny foreknowledge altogether. We may, however, try to defend our intermediate position between these two extreme views by considerations like the following:—

We can, no doubt, produce such results as have been mentioned above, but only with the help of the laws of Nature and so far as consistent with them. If, for instance, my limbs be paralysed or the book and the coin be too heavy for me, then certainly I can not attain my object. And, as Nature works for comprehensive ends, the particular results in individual instances are not of much moment to her. For her comprehensive purposes, it is immaterial whether the book, for example, be on the shelf or on my table, whether the coin be with me or with the beggar. No doubt, the communication of knowledge or the alleviation of suffering may be included within the comprehensive ends; but the particular issue in any case is the resultant of so many factors—the character of the agent, the character of the object, and other attendant circumstances connected with them—that it would be presumption on the part of an individual to attribute the efficacy of an act to his own agency alone. We should remember that with regard to the great objective moral ends, which sway the destinies of

We may, no doubt, succeed in attaining our ends, but only with the help of natural laws, and consistently with the general scheme of things.

Nature works for comprehensive

nations, the personal experiences of individuals are of little consequence. "Whether the individual exists or not," writes Hegel, "is a matter of indifference to the objective ethical order, which alone is steadfast. It is the power by which the life of individuals is ruled. It has been represented by nations as eternal justice, or as deities who are absolute, in contrast with whom the striving of individuals is an empty game, like the tossing of the sea." (*The Philosophy of Right*, Dyde's Translation, p. 156.) But though the objective ethical order is thus steadfast, yet individual efforts contribute their humble share towards the realization of its great ends; and so these efforts are of great moment to the individuals themselves.

ends, to which the personal interests of individuals are not of much moment.

Individuals may contribute their humble share towards the fulfilment of Divine ends.

"Not all who seem to fail, have failed indeed ;
 Not all who fail have therefore worked in vain :
 For all our acts to many issues lead ;
 And out of earnest purpose, pure and plain,
 Enforced by honest toil of hand or brain,
 The Lord will fashion, in His own good time,
 (Be this the labourer's proudly humble creed,)
 Such ends as, to His wisdom, fittest chime
 With His vast love's eternal harmonies.
 There is no failure for the good and wise :
 What though thy seed should fall by the way-
side
 And the birds snatch it ;—yet the birds are fed ;
 Or they may bear it far across the tide,
 To give rich harvests after thou art dead."

(*Politics for the People*. 1848.)

Personal efforts are thus of supreme importance to individuals, who stand on their trial here.

Personal efforts, therefore, are of vital importance to the individuals themselves as deciding for them the alternatives of good and bad, virtue and sin, beatitude and mortification. Motives here determine the character of their acts and regulate their moral advance or decline. And the success of an enterprise depends, to a great extent, on the purity of motives and the force of will, which are very closely connected with each other. This evidently indicates that our efforts are crowned with success when they are not inconsistent with the operation of the Moral Principle at work in the universe. That the force of will increases with the purity of motives and that its efficacy then is also increased, are facts supported by phenomena connected with hypnotism and mesmerism. To a hypnotized patient a pebble seems to be a huge block of stone, or a cat seems to be a man, when so suggested by the hypnotizer. And the effect at times is not merely subjective but objective. The bones and muscles become strong as steel, so that several persons are supported on slender arms, and even hemorrhage is arrested in the case of a puncture or wound. Thus, by the sheer force of will, an individual can perform difficult and extraordinary feats. Such phenomena evidently suggest that there are wider laws connecting our subjective determinations with objective issues which, being characterized by purity, are furthered only by honest volitions. These laws, however, constitute only a fragment of the universal framework regulating the march of events. The effect in any case, then, is really the resultant of

There are perhaps ultimate or comprehensive laws connecting honest human efforts with objective issues.

various factors, one of which may be the virtuous efforts of individuals. And, if these efforts determine the issue in any case, they do so only because they come under Nature's laws. Hence so far as the objective results are concerned, nothing is accidental or inharmonious.

The issue in any case is a resultant of various factors.

"All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee ;
All Chance, Direction, which thou canst not see ;
All Discord, Harmony not understood ;
All partial Evil, universal Good." (*Pope.*)

§ 9. **Free-will and Character.** We have seen that morality postulates freedom and involves character. Character indicates, however, a determinate tendency to act for good or for ill and constitutes the ground for our expectations and calculations of human conduct. If character is thus open to computation, it must fall within the domain of necessity and be thus inconsistent with freedom. How are we to remove this difficulty? The difficulty is solved by reference to the complex character of the human constitution in which several factors co-operate to bring about a result. When the phenomenon of habit is induced on an exercise of will, the foundation of character is laid. Character thus involves will. By the repeated and uniform exercise of free choice in any direction we build up a character to act in that direction; so that character reveals merely the persistent effort of a soul bent either on obedience or transgression. When we hold a man accountable for his character and praise or blame him for what issues from it, we assume that he might have formed a different

Is character, as a definite tendency, consistent with freedom?

Character involves will.

Character as
a passive
product
cannot be an
object of
moral criti-
cism.

Will moulds
character.

character by modifying the influences which worked on his will. Character, which is the outcome of necessity, is merely a passive product, which can no more be the subject of moral criticism than a determinate current of water or wind. We ennoble or debase our constitution according as we mould a virtuous or a sinful character out of our natural propensities by their due or undue regulation. It is the will which can thus make us a master or a slave by strengthening or weakening our higher or lower tendencies to action and thereby bringing about a virtuous or a sinful character. Tennyson thus describes the function of will in this sphere :

“ O well for him whose will is strong !
He suffers, but he will not suffer long ;
He suffers, but he cannot suffer wrong :
For him nor moves the loud world's random mock,
Nor all Calamity's hugest waves confound,
Who seems a promontory of rock,
That, compass'd round with turbulent sound,
In middle ocean meets the surging shock,
Tempest-buffeted, citadel-crown'd.

But ill for him who, bettering not with time,
Corrupts the strength of heaven-descended Will,
And ever weaker grows thro' acted crime,
Or seeming-genial venial fault,
Recurring and suggesting still !
He seems as one whose footsteps halt,
Toiling in immeasurable sand,
And o'er a weary sultry land,
Far beneath a blazing vault,
Sown in a wrinkle of the monstrous hill,
The city sparkles like a grain of salt.” (*Will.*)

Free-will is thus not inconsistent with character. It is but the acquired tendency of the mind to think, feel, or act in certain habitual ways by reason of the prior uniform exercise of will in those directions. It is the self definitely modified by personal exercise of power. And self, as we have seen, is the basis of morality. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) "The mind," says Buddha, "is the origin of all that is; the mind is the master, the mind is the cause. If in the midst of the mind there are evil thoughts, then the words are evil, the deeds are evil, and the sorrow which results from sin follows that man, as the chariot wheel follows him who draws it. The mind is the origin of all that is; it is the mind that commands, it is the mind that contrives. If in the mind there are good thoughts, then the words are good and the deeds good, and the happiness which results from such conduct follows that man, as the shadow accompanies the substance." (*Dhammapada*, Sec. IX.)

In proportion as character grows strictly uniform and conduct becomes habitual, there is left little room for merit or demerit, though the sway of virtue or vice is more firmly established. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 1.) And when conduct becomes quite mechanical, owing to the rigid sway of habit, acts pass out of the sphere of consciousness altogether and come within the range of organic necessity with which morality has no concern. The self, revealing itself in a definite form of character, is an active agent shaping its own destiny, and not merely a passive

Character is, so to speak, the configuration of the self,

brought about by previous acts of choice and revealing the tendency of future choice. Martineau's testimony.

Will is the centre of responsibility.

product formed by the convergence or conflict of natural laws. "We think," writes Martineau, "not merely of a manufactured Ego, the resultant of its own experiences and therefore changing through their course, but of a permanent self-identical Ego living through all, responsible now for what it is because responsible all through for what it *does*. And when we say that an act gives evidence of the character, we mean, not that it is retrospective and reveals the past and established habits, but that it shows us the kind of use which the living Ego makes of its freedom." (*Study of Religion*, Vol. II, p. 239.) Every one is conscious within himself of his ability thus to shape his own character; and our criticism of the conduct of others rests also on such an assumption. The good will, as Kant observes, is like a jewel which "shines by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself." (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 20.) We are judged here by it, and we also expect to be tried by it hereafter by the Supreme Judge who has given us this power to stand or fall.

"—Here I bring, within my trembling hand,
This will of mine—a thing that seemeth small;
And thou alone, O Lord, canst understand
How, when I yield Thee this, I yield mine all.
Hidden therein Thy searching gaze canst see
Struggles of passion, visions of delight,
All that I have, or am, or fain would be,—
Deep loves, fond hopes, and longings infinite."

BOOK VI.
CONCRETE MORAL LIFE.
CHAPTER XXI.

THE MORAL CONSTITUTION.

§ 1. **Character of the Moral Constitution.** Let us now bring our inquiry into the character and conditions of our moral life to a close with a brief account of the way in which the several factors operate in the concrete life of an individual. In the preceding chapters we have considered separately the different elements of our moral constitution with a view to determine their contents, conditions, and significance. But such an examination, however useful for scientific purposes, is more or less arbitrary and one-sided. In dwelling on one aspect we are prone to overlook others and thus to give a partial and incorrect estimate of the several elements. Our estimate of one factor must, therefore, be always relative to the contents and significance of the rest, so that we may not wander from the truth.

"Affections, Instincts, Principles, and Powers,
Impulse and Reason, Freedom and Control—
So men, unravelling God's harmonious whole,
Rend in a thousand shreds this life of ours.
Vain labour! Deep and broad, where none may see,
Spring the foundations of that shadowy throne
Where man's one nature, queen-like, sits alone,
Centred in a majestic unity." (*Matthew Arnold.*)

Our moral constitution is a harmonious whole, the several parts of which should be studied in relation to one another.

Let us, therefore, conclude the above meagre and imperfect account of the different elements of moral life with a brief reference to their co-presence and co-operation in the moral life of an individual. The cognitive, emotive, and conative factors, discussed in the previous Books, all contribute their share towards the rearing of a healthy moral character which is the goal of our being. If Conscience supplies the light, the Inclinations and Passions supply the motive power of our moral life, which is under the control of Rational Will. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) If the control be imperfectly exercised, if the passions and propensities be allowed to have their way, then the harmony of our moral constitution is disturbed, which is indicated by the 'stings of conscience.'

"O how the passions, insolent and strong,
Bear our weak minds their rapid course along ;
Make us the madness of their will obey ;
Then die, and leave us to our griefs a prey !"

(*Crabbe.*)

And the security of our moral constitution is ensured not merely by the subjective pain attendant on the violation of duty, but also by the condemnation of others and the penalties of Nature. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 6 and § 7.) "Cruelty and treachery," observes Hume, "displease from their very nature ; nor is it possible ever to reconcile us to these qualities, either in ourselves or others. Virtue, therefore, produces always a pleasure distinct from the pride or self-satisfaction which attends it : Vice, an uneasiness separate from the humility or remorse." (*Disserta-*

The harmony is disturbed by the undue preponderance of the inclinations.

The purity of our moral constitution is preserved by the moral sentiments and the natural and social penalties. Hume's testimony.

tion on the Passions.) If we are sentient beings, the sufferings connected with our moral nature must be regarded as an important safeguard against immorality. If, again, we walk in the path of virtue, the joys of sympathy and affection and the peace and contentment of an honest life cheer us up and lead us onward towards our goal. It should be remembered, however, that these moral sentiments are mere aids to moral life, the essence of which lies in a disinterested performance of our duties. Wisdom is inferior to Virtue; and Prudence inferior to Wisdom. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 7 and § 8.) We must also remember that the strife of Reason and Sensibility, of Duty and Inclination is essential to Virtue. Without conflict there can be no trial and no merit. As Paulsen says, "Where there has never been a conflict between inclination and duty, where the will has never had an opportunity of deciding against inclination and for duty, the character has not been tested." And character, as we have said, is the concrete embodiment of the different elements of our moral life which, by co-operation and conflict, gradually assume a determinate form, affording room for expectation and progress, though not excluding altogether disappointment and degradation. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 9.) Let us, therefore, consider first the conditions of character and its influence on moral life.

Conflict is essential to morality.

Concrete moral life is revealed in character.

§ 2. Character and Conduct. Character (from Gr. *charakter*, a mark cut or engraved) properly implies a peculiarity of mental or moral constitution which distinguishes one individual from another. It

Character in a wide sense indicates merely the bent of the mind, due to the habitual exercise of will in certain directions.

The effects of our acts thus persist in our character.

Character thus signifies the form

is, as it were, a moral mark which indicates the peculiar bent of his mind whether due to habit or natural endowment. The character of an individual is determined partly by his natural abilities and partly by his acquirements; but in either case it depends on the use he makes of his powers and attainments. Even natural abilities may improve or deteriorate according as we uniformly exercise them in the right or in the wrong direction. What goes, therefore, to build up character is the uniform exercise of will in certain directions. One habitually acting in the wrong direction thus acquires a bad character, while one habitually acting in the right direction comes to possess a virtuous character. In this way, an individual sets up a disposition in him to think, feel, or act in certain ways according to the bent of his character. The *Nyaya* aphorism, that "Our actions, though apparently disappearing, remain unperceived, and reappear in their effects as tendencies" (*Pravrittis*), has, therefore, a significance even in this life. As we are scrupulous or careless in the estimate and execution of our duties, so do we lay the foundation of a good or a bad character and become disposed afterwards to act in analogous ways under like circumstances. Thus, through culture, an individual becomes sympathetic or selfish, honest or dishonest, virtuous or sinful. We see, then, that character, though growing out of habit, reacts on it; as character is formed, our habits also become steady and uniform. Character thus comes to stand for the moral constitution as it is modified

by personal efforts. "Character," says Stout, "is just the constitution of the Self as a whole. Character exists only in so far as unity and continuity of conscious life exists and manifests itself in systematic consistency of conduct. Animals can scarcely be said to have a character, because their actions flow from disconnected impulse." (*Manual of Psychology*, p. 633.)

The formation of character is due to the regulative influence of Reason and the strength of the virtuous Will. Nature has endowed man with certain qualities—cognitive, emotional, and conative—with an adjustment among them, which it is for him either to preserve and promote or to subvert and weaken by a legitimate or illegitimate exercise of his powers. If, overlooking the claims of reason, a man follows the humour of a moment, then he degenerates into a brute. His rational nature and the connected sentiments, however, stand prominently in the way of such degradation, so that it is only with dogged pertinacity and wicked perversity that he can succeed in drowning altogether the glory of his nature. Ordinarily an individual is disposed to exercise his powers according to the dictates of reason and thus to set up at least a prudential, if not a virtuous, character. Seth writes, "It is in the possibility of transfiguring this natural animal life, and making it the instrument and expression of spiritual purpose, that morality consists. Morality is the formation, out of this raw material of nature, of a character. The seething and tumultu-

which the moral constitution assumes in an individual through his personal exertions.

There is room for character only so long as Reason and Will exercise their wholesome influence on the passions and inclinations.

The natural tendency is to subordinate impulse to reason.

Seth's testimony.

ous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and desire, must be reduced to some common human measure.....It is only by taking in hand his original nature or disposition, and gathering up its manifold elements into the unity of a consistent character, that man becomes truly man.....The way from nature to character is laborious, and full of effort." (*Ethical Principles*, pp. 49-50.) The word 'character' has thus acquired a specific sense, viz., that of good character, into which the human constitution ordinarily tends to develop under normal conditions. It implies, as Sully says, "A morally disciplined will, including a virtuous condition of the whole mind, that is, the disposition to think and feel (as well as to act) in ways conducive to the ends of morality." (*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 440.)

Thus, in a narrow sense, character has come to mean good character.

Conduct is the expression of character in a series of outward acts.

Conduct is but the expression of character in a series of outward acts. As character assumes a determinate form, conduct becomes more and more uniform which reveals the character to others. As Alexander says, "Think of a man's conduct in relation to the mental conditions from which it proceeds and you think of his character; think of his character as it produces results beyond these sentiments themselves and you have conduct." (*Moral Order and Progress*, p. 49.) The term 'conduct,' no doubt, has, like the term 'character,' been used at times in a very wide and loose sense, so as to cover all vital activities directed towards certain ends, whether operating consciously or not. Thus, Spencer speaks of the conduct of infusoria and mollusca and describes

'an advance in conduct,' as increased 'adjustment of acts to ends.' (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2.) It may be mentioned, however, that instinctive or spontaneous adjustments cannot with propriety be included in conduct. Conduct implies a system of acts expressive of character, as it is formed by the repeated and uniform exercise of will in certain directions. "It seems best," says Mackenzie, "to confine the term conduct to those acts that are not merely adjusted to ends, but also definitely willed. A person's conduct, then, is the complete system of such acts, corresponding to his character." (*Ethics*, p. 85.)

Man, as endowed with reason and will, has to achieve for himself what may be secured to the lower animals merely by the drift of nature. And this achievement, when becoming a definite and dominant tendency, constitutes character and issues in conduct.

term 'conduct' is not justifiable.

The distinctive feature of man lies in his character.

From the above account it is clear that character and conduct are marked by consistency and rationality. In fact, there is consistency owing to rationality, owing to the regulation of the desires and inclinations according to the dictates of reason. As, therefore, our life comes more and more under the influence of rational impulses, it acquires the capacity of successfully resisting the lower propensities and of uniformly acting in the direction of virtue and wisdom. When the rational impulses are of an inferior rank (as in the case of an economist of pleasure), a low type of character develops, such as is illustrated in the life of a Heliogabalus or a Nero ;

Character and conduct are marked by consistency and rationality.

The development of character illustrates the increasing influence of the rational impulses ; and the form of character is determined by the quality of

such
impulses.

and when such impulses are of an elevated type, they give rise to an exalted character, such as is illustrated in the life of a Ramchandra or a Yudhis-thir, a John the Good or an Empress Victoria, a Garibaldi or a Gladstone. We should remember, however, that in the case of an inferior character, consistency is not so much possible as in the case of an elevated one. An individual can never be thoroughly consistent in his wickedness, however much he may try to be so; but one moved by pure regard for good is always consistent in his conduct. Strict consistency, the strongest force in the world, is thus the privilege of the virtuous. Virtuous character is thus the noblest thing on earth which brings health and strength, peace and happiness, prosperity and progress to individuals and nations. "Give us men," cries the earnest preacher,

"Give us men—strong, stalwart men,
Men whom highest hope inspires,
Men whom purest honour fires,
Men who trample *self* beneath them,
Men who make their country wreath them
As noble sons of worthy sires;
Men who never shame their mothers,
Men who never fail their brothers,
True, however false are others;
Give us men; I say again,
Give us men."

§ 3. **The Growth of Character.** The due development of character is the chief end of our moral efforts. This development is closely connected with

Virtuous
character
alone is
marked by
strict con-
sistency and
sufficient
strength.

moral training explained in § 4 of Chapter VIII. It involves the following factors:—

(1) It implies better insight into the conditions of Duty and a wider conception of moral ideals. If Understanding be at fault then Will may be misguided, thereby preventing the perfect development of character. An individual in such a case may now follow his inclination and now follow duty and so fail to form virtuous habits which underlie good character. Narrow estimates of duties, likewise, lead to contracted notions of virtues which tend to make men more egoistic and thus to weaken their character.

(2) The strength of Will is specially needed to build up character. If one cannot resist the sollicitations of sense and the allurements of passion, then he becomes a prey to the passing inclinations and desires, without having any solidity of character. Character, as we have seen, is not at all inconsistent with the freedom of will. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 9.) Nay, we may say that one is really free when he acts from character instead of from impulse. Subjection to impulse is bondage, while the ability to act according to one's own character is really the very essence of freedom. "Acts," says Stout, "are free in so far as they flow from the character of the agent." We thus find greater freedom or strength of character in a Sir Philip Sidney, while refusing a cup of water, than in a gourmand who is quite at the mercy of every tempting dish. And we find more consistency in the character of a person of

Due development of character involves—

(1) Proper estimate of duty and the moral ideal.

(2) The strength of will.

the former type than in that of the latter.*

(3) Bestowal of time and attention on a definite course of action.

(3) A certain amount of time and attention is also essential to the growth of character. A sufficient quantity of psycho-physical energy must be expended in a definite direction to beget a tendency to act similarly under like circumstances. Character is not the product of a day, nor of a thoughtless or automatic execution of work. The more attention we pay to a line of work and the longer we persist in the direction, the stronger is the consequent habit.

(4) Uniformity and frequency of action.

(4) For the growth of character, uniformity and frequency are of greater moment than the mere number of repetitions. When certain acts are performed in quick succession and with unfailing uniformity, then a comparatively stable character is formed in the direction. Thus, for the strength of character, one should be at least as much careful of what are called the minor duties of life as for those that are regarded as the major or more prominent. Here we should guard against two principal dangers which tend to weaken character by lapses and failures. (a) One risk is the temptation to transgress owing to our dissatisfaction with the ways of the world. In such cases the Tempter may whisper within us—

We should be no less careful of the minor than of the major duties of life.

We must be ware of two risks here, viz.—

(a) Dissatisfaction with the ways of the world,

“Why urge the long unequal fight

Since truth has fallen in the street,

* Sir Philip Sidney received a mortal wound at the battle of Zutphen for having stripped off some of his own armour to lend it to another officer. And he refused a cup of water when fainting in the field of battle, in order that it might be given to a wounded soldier looking at it with wistful eyes.

Or lift anew the trampled light,
 Quenched by the heedless million's feet ?
 Give o'er the thankless task ; forsake
 The fools who know not ill from good ;
 Eat, drink, enjoy thy own, and take

Thine ease among the multitude." (*Whittier.*)

But we should remember that the true test of virtue is difficulty ; and the more honest an individual, the severer must be his test. If, however, one succumbs to such difficulties, then his character is impaired and he begins a downward course. (b) The other risk arises from the violence of passions which at times lead men to act contrary to their character and thereby to weaken it. This risk is greater in the case of individuals whose character has not been completely formed and who are, therefore, liable to lose the benefit of their previous efforts by such lapses.

and (b) the urgency of violent passions.

" Like mighty rivers, with resistless force
 The passions rage, obstructed in their course,
 Swell to new heights, forbidden paths explore,
 And drown those virtues which they fed before."
 (*Pope.*)

In such cases we should put forth sufficient strength of will to overcome the force of the passions, and thus to preserve the integrity of our character. We should remember that one lapse prepares the way for another and next for another, and so on, until the character is ruined, and the individual becomes a prey to the charms of passion.

(5) Sincerity and earnestness.

(5) To preserve the purity and strength of

character one should always be sincere and earnest in his work, never deviating in the least from the path of rectitude. One should always be open to conviction and disposed to do what is best under the circumstances, that he may really be consistent in conduct, thereby preserving the integrity of his character. Such a character raises one above the smiles and frowns of men and fortune and gives him true strength and peace. Emerson rightly observes, "I see not any road of perfect peace which a man can walk, but after the counsel of his own bosom. Let him quit too much association, let him go home much, and establish himself in those courses he approves. The unremitting retention of simple and high sentiments in obscure duties is hardening the character to that temper which will work with honour, if need be, in the tumult, or on the scaffold." (*Essay on Heroism.*)

It is evident from the foregoing remarks that the growth of character implies the increased subordination of impulse to reason. The mere intensification of an impulse through repetition can scarcely be said to constitute character—at least in the case of man. Herein we find the point of difference between mere habit and character. Habit grows mechanical with practice; but character never loses its rationality with its growth. Both habit and character are, no doubt, marked by uniformity; but the uniformity in the one case becomes almost a physical necessity, while in the other it amounts only to moral certainty. The strength of habit as

Difference
between
habit and
character :
The one is
mechanical,
while the
other,
rational.

well as of character is judged generally by the facility of performance and the concomitant feelings: the stronger a habit or character, the greater the ease and pleasure with which an act according to it is performed and the greater the pain in departing from it. Though habit and character are thus similar and closely connected, yet the one is comparatively blind, while the other is clear-sighted. The uniformity of character is based on Reason and Conscience, and so it is never beyond the regulating influence of principles. "All that we are," says Buddha, "is the result of what we have thought: it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts." (*Dhammapada*.) It may be said of a man of character that—

The strength of habit and character is indicated by the ease and facility of performance.

Character is never beyond the regulating influence of principles.

"His words are bonds, his oaths are oracles,
His love sincere, his thoughts immaculate,
His tears pure messengers sent from his heart,
His heart as far from fraud as heaven from earth."
(*Shakespeare*.)

§ 4. **Moral Ideal and Moral Progress.** The connection between moral ideal and moral progress is, as we shall see, very close. The principal question in the concrete moral life of an individual or of a society is the question of moral progress. It is a question relating to the proper development of character, individual or national. Though the connection between individual and social progress is very close, yet, for convenience of treatment, we shall confine our attention to the former in this

Moral
ideal
regulates
moral
progress,
though the
latter
reacts on the
former.

section and shall discuss the latter in section 6. Moral progress is determined by the concurrent development of the different sides of our moral nature according to the requirements of the moral laws. It is thus intimately connected with the form of the moral ideal as conceived by an agent and furnished by the society in which he lives. The relation of moral progress to moral ideal, like many other relations, is one of reciprocity: they condition each other, so that every moral advance tends to raise the moral ideal*, which in its turn prompts to

* Mackenzie observes with regard to the *Moral Ideal*: "An ideal means a type, model, or standard; and that which is ideal is that which is normal, that which conforms to its type or standard. The adjective 'ideal,' however, corresponds to the two nouns 'Idea' and 'Ideal,' and there is a certain ambiguity in its use. As corresponding to 'idea' (in the sense made current in English by Locke, Berkeley and Hume) it is apt to be understood as referring to that which is merely fancied, as distinguished from that which exists in fact.....And indeed this meaning clings even to the noun 'Ideal,' and to 'ideal' as an adjective corresponding to that noun. An artist's Ideal is apt to be understood as meaning a type of beauty which is nowhere to be found existing.....In this sense also an Ideal state, like Plato's Republic, is contrasted with actually existing conditions. Now this use of the word is apt to be very misleading in Ethics. In order to avoid such confusion it is well for the student to think of the moral Ideal, not in relation to Ideal States or the artist's Ideal, but rather in relation to the logical Ideal. The Ideal of correct thinking is not something in the air, but is something that is realized every time we think at all; for to think wrongly is to a certain extent not to think. Similarly the moral ideal may be said to be realized everytime we truly act. It is important that we should get rid of the habit of thinking of the Ideal as something 'too good to be true,' and learn to think of it rather as the determining principle in reality." (*Manual of Ethics*, pp. 28-29, foot-note.) It may be mentioned, however, that the current use of the term, as an imaginary model of perfection, is not at all inconsistent with the admission of the moral standard as an actual test of rectitude. There is difference between the actual standard employed to measure our concrete moral experiences and an ideal type of character which is made

more righteous forms of activity and thus to give rise to a more elevated type of character. Let us, therefore, refer here to the circumstances which favour the due development of the moral ideal and thus determine the moral progress of individuals.

(1) The due *cultivation of intelligence* to arrive at valid estimates of duties is an important factor of moral progress. As mentioned in § 5 of Chapter VIII, our moral ideal improves with the widening of our mental horizon : narrow or contracted moral notions give way before elevated moral ideas. Moreover, our estimates of the several duties of life should be harmonious and comprehensive enough, so as not to neglect or overlook some, while enforcing the rest. Thus an ideal character should not neglect some duties as insignificant, while attending to others as important. Each is important in its own sphere and can never possibly be replaced by another. Thus our duties to the State, the community, and self, to

The circumstances helping the proper development of the moral ideal in an individual and thus regulating his moral progress are--
(1) A just and comprehensive estimate of duties,

the object of our moral aspiration. In the case of Veracity or Justice, for example, the standard is always definite determining whether an act is in or out of conformity with it. But an ideal of Veracity (such as is represented in a Judhithir) or of Justice (such as is represented in a Ramchandra) is often very difficult to be realized in practice owing to the imperfections of character. There is thus a difference between the standard as a measure of actual cases and an ideal which is regarded as a perfect embodiment of the standard in the life of an individual or community. And this difference is enormously heightened when we consider not merely this or that standard or virtue, but the standard as a whole and character or virtues as a whole. Though particular acts may now and then be characterized by justice, veracity, benevolence, and sobriety, yet an ideal of character which is a perfect representation of all the virtues is rare indeed. And such an ideal it is, which supplies the true inspiration for moral progress.

animals, and plants as well, should all be scrupulously determined and discharged. A really good man is a good son, a good brother, a good husband, a good parent, a good friend, a good neighbour, a good workman, and a good citizen. One should be catholic in his views and liberal in his pursuits, avoiding selfish ends.

"Know, Nature's children all divide her care ;
The fur that warms a monarch, warm'd a bear.
While man exclaims, "See all things for my use !"
"See man for mine !" replies a pamper'd goose :
And just as short of reason he must fall.
Who thinks all made for one, not one for all."

(Pope.)

regard for
others,

One should always respect other persons and their rights and should always avoid ignoble ends. He should be severe in the estimate of his own character but charitable in the estimate of others. How often do we unjustly criticise others, thus debasing our own character ! Vishnusarma well illustrates this with regard to the way in which we often judge the conduct of servants. How hard, he writes, is the lot of a servant : "If he be silent, he is called a fool ; if talkative, a prattler ; if patient, a coward ; if he endure not, a boor ; at hand, impertinent ; at a distance, good for nothing." (*Hitopodesha*, Surhidveda, 25.)

“मौनान्मुखः प्रवचनपटुर्वातुलो जल्पको वा
क्षान्त्या भौर्यदि न सहते प्रायशो नाभिजातः ।
घृष्टः पार्श्वे वसति निशतं दूरतश्चाप्रगल्भः
सेवाधमः परमगहनो योगिनामप्यगम्यः ॥ २५ ॥

Thus, by a careful and impartial estimate of the facts of our moral life, we should always try to arrive at an elevated moral ideal which would lead us onward in our moral struggles. But merely the conception of a noble ideal is not adequate to give rise to a yearning for a higher type of character. It is further necessary that one should be conscious of his shortcoming. It is a notorious fact that the lower one sinks in immorality, the less is he susceptible to the nobler sentiments and the more is he given to self-sophistication. Virtuous natures generally have an acute consciousness of their defects and failings.

and con-
sciousness of
shortcoming.

(2) The *moral sentiments* affect in an important way moral ideals and moral progress. When the sentiments are misdirected they lower the ideals and retard progress; when they are healthy and strong, they lend force to ideals and expedite progress. (*Vide* Chap. XVII.) We should remember in this connection the function of penitence as a means of moral regeneration. "Of all acts," writes Carlyle, "is not, for a man, *repentance* the most divine? The deadliest sin, I say, were that same supercilious consciousness of no sin;—that is death; the heart so conscious is divorced from sincerity, humility and fact; is dead: it is 'pure' as dead dry sand is pure." (*Hero-Worship*, Lecture II.) The deep consciousness of sin sometimes produces such a revolution in the moral constitution and gives rise to so strong a resolution to improve one's character that thenceforward he may move along new lines altogether, beginning, as it were, a new moral life.

(2) The pur-
ity and fresh-
ness of the
moral senti-
ments.

Penitence.

The life of a Saul, a Ratnakar, or an Asoka illustrates what a change may be wrought in the soul by genuine repentance. In order, however, that a moral re-awakening may follow, the consciousness of sin must be deep and strong and not momentary and fitful. One, moved by sincere compunction, is inspired, as it were, with supernatural strength; and, as the darkest cloud puts on a golden hue when the rays of the sun fall on it, so the blackest nature assumes a bright aspect when divine grace shines on it.

Penitence is not illusory, as supposed by determinists.

Compunction, no doubt, has been treated by hedonists and determinists as a mere illusion due to a confusion of the present with the past. Priestley, for example, observes, "A man, when he reproaches himself for any particular action in his past conduct, may fancy that if he was in the same situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere deception, and if he examines himself strictly, and takes in all the circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the same inward disposition of mind, and with precisely the same views of things as he had then, and exclusive of all others which he has acquired by reflection since, he could not have acted otherwise than he did." (*Illust. of Phil. Necessity*, p. 99.) But the universal conviction of sin in the case of a moral transgression, with the consequent feeling of remorse, can no more be extinguished by the prejudiced declarations of a few interested philosophers than can the general consciousness of colour be set aside by the verdict of a council of the blind. (*Vide* Chap. XVII, § 5.)

(3) The purity of the moral ideal is secured also by the *control of the passions and the due regulation of the impulses*. We have seen (*Vide* Chap. VIII) how our moral vision is distorted and our moral growth dwarfed by moral transgressions. We should, therefore, try our very best to keep to the road of moral progress by preserving the balance of our moral constitution.

(3) Due regulation of the impulses and control of the passions.

"Passions, like Elements, tho' born to fight,
Yet, mix'd and soften'd, in his work unite :
These 'tis enough to temper and employ ;
But what composes Man, can Man destroy ?
Suffice that Reason keep to Nature's road,
Subject, compound them, follow her and God."

(*Pope.*)

We have seen that, properly speaking, man can never be idle. Thus, the great secret of moral progress lies in always making a right use of time. (*Vide* Chap. XIV, § 8.) "A man," says Bacon, "that is young in years may be old in hours, if he have lost no time." (*Essay on Youth and Age.*)

The right use of time.

"We have not wings, we cannot soar,
But we have feet to scale and climb
By slow degrees, by more and more,
The cloudy summits of our time."

When we thus work sincerely and steadily we gradually acquire a virtuous character, which enables us to conceive nobler ideals and to make further moral advance. As Goethe says—

"Like as a star,
That maketh not haste,
That taketh not rest,
Be each one fulfilling
His god-given Hest."

Scrupulous
and steady
adherence to
what is right
elevates the
moral ideal
and furthers
moral
progress.

From the above remarks it is evident that, by the proper regulation of the different sides of our moral nature, we are able to form correct moral ideals which in their turn contribute to further moral advance. It is by practice and perseverance that we can improve our character. "The way," says D'Arcy, "to solve the moral perplexities of great occasions is to practise morality every day. The way to be good in great things is to be good in little things. The way to know the good when knowledge is hard is to do the good when knowledge is easy." (*Short Study of Ethics*, p. 220.) Moral progress is measured by greater ease in controlling the passions and by increased peace and resignation. The resignation of a virtuous life, however, is not one of inaction and torpor; it is born of cheerful and disinterested activity in the service of Duty. He is thus contented and happy; for true happiness lies not in hankering after pleasure but in pious self-dependence. Manu very well observes—

"यदयत् परवशं कर्मात्तत्तदयत्नेन वञ्चयेत् ।

यदयदात्मवशन्तु स्यात्तत्तत् सेवेत यव्रतः ॥

सर्वं परवशं दुःखं सर्वमात्मवशं सुखं ।

एतद्विद्यात् समासेन लक्षणं सुखदुःखयोः ॥"

(*Manava Dharma-Sastra*, IV, 159-160.)

Moral pro-
gress is indi-
cated by in-
creased peace,
self-depen-
dence, and
resignation.

"Abandon all those acts that depend on others and scrupulously perform all those that depend on self, for all that depends on self is the source of pleasure and all that depends on another is the source of pain. Know this to be the true mark of pleasure and pain."

We have in this section discussed the moral ideal and moral progress only so far as they depend on personal exertion ; but as a matter of fact, they are often conditioned by social environment. We have already considered in Chap. V, § 4, how the development of moral consciousness is furthered or retarded by social influence ; and we shall again advert to it in section 6, after considering the relation of the Individual to Society.

Moral ideal and moral progress are influenced to a great extent by the social environment.

§ 5. **Relation of Individual to Society.** The relation of the Individual to Society is very close indeed. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 6.) We are what we are, not simply by our own exertions, but also, to a great extent, by the influence of society. The influence of society is often silent and subtle, but nevertheless it is generally very potent. We imbibe notions of propriety and elegance from society which do not fail to influence our conduct. Tradition, language, and heredity—all illustrate to what extent we depend on others for our mental and moral development. Even the original form and constitution of our mind betray on analysis the intimate relation in which we stand to others. Our passions and affections, our hopes and fears, our sympathies and antipathies are often connected with the behaviour

Our mental constitution and development betray the intimate relation in which individuals stand to society.

and attitude of others. Nay, the very constitution of Reason—the distinctive attribute of man—reveals community of nature and the unity of the human race. Social fibres, as we have said, throb in our very constitution.

“Man in society is like a flower
Blown in its native bed. 'Tis there alone
His faculties expanded in full bloom
Shine out, there only reach their proper use.”
(*Cowper.*)

Owing to this intimate connection, every individual unconsciously promotes the general well-being, even when apparently pursuing his own private ends.

This dependence of individuals on society springs out of the vital connection in which they stand to it. The modern conception of social organism, of which individuals are but parts, may thus be defended not only on mechanical but also on teleological principles. It is supported no less by Hegelianism than by Evolutionism. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2 and Chap. XII, § 6.) We have seen that outward results are to a great extent independent of our choice. Thus, while every one pursues his own end he becomes an unconscious instrument in the hands of Providence in promoting the ends of humanity and of the universe. History has, accordingly, been sometimes likened to a fool's comedy where every player tries to deceive others, but ends by deceiving himself. That we are thus members of the social organism whose ends we promote by personal efforts is supported by analogous experiences in other spheres. In the case of our physical constitution, for example, we find that while every organ performs its own appropriate function,

Analogous relation in the case of an organism and its parts.

it promotes in its own way the general well-being of the entire organism. And physiology testifies to the fact that millions of corpuscles, red and white, which compose our system, preserve the entire frame, while pursuing their own ends.* Thus, though every actor plays his own part in this great drama of the world, yet he contributes his share towards the harmony of the entire plot as conceived by the great Dramatist. (*Vide* Chap. XX, § 8.) As Pope says—

“A mightier pow’r the strong direction sends,
And several men impels to several ends.”

The difference, however, between man and other creatures is that while these are led simply by their spontaneous instincts towards their proper sphere of work, he can regulate his activities by the conscious exercise of Reason. If it is his privilege to understand the mechanism of things and to utilize them for his purposes, it is also his responsibility to use his powers aright consistently with the general drift of nature. Our previous analysis has shown the ascendancy of Conscience in the human constitution and the moral necessity of regulating the different faculties according to its dictates. When, therefore, we are conscious of our vital connection with society in every way, it becomes our sacred duty to promote its interests as far as practicable. The superior claim of society is admitted by all moralists, whatever

It is thus obligatory on individuals to subordinate self-interest to common welfare.

*Our blood with its millions of corpuscles has at times been likened to a great community or republic. The red corpuscles are regarded as the workers whose duty it is to carry oxygen from the lungs to all parts of the body; and the white corpuscles are believed to be the soldiers whose duty it is to watch for any foreign and injurious microbe or bacillus finding entrance into the body and to destroy and remove it.

may be the theoretic grounds on which it is defended. No doubt, led by passion and inclination, man is often led to rate his own interests high and so to slight the claims of society ; but in doing so, he not only degrades his own nature but misses also the happiness which he thus vainly seeks. "The rationality of self-regard," says Sidgwick, "seemed to me as undeniable as the rationality of self-sacrifice." ('Autobiographical Note,' *Mind*, 1901, p. 289.) Bacon likewise observes, "Divide with reason between self-love and society ; and be so true to thyself as thou be not false to others, especially to thy king and country. It is a poor centre of a man's actions, himself. It is right earth. For that only stands fast upon his own centre ; whereas all things that have affinity with the heavens move upon the centre of another, which they benefit." (*Essay on Wisdom for a Man's Self*.) Thus we should all try to promote the well-being of the community in which we live and of humanity at large in our own humble ways ; and we should not be parasites destroying the organism whence we draw our sustenance. Egoism is an extravagant theory supported neither by facts nor by reason. It carries its own refutation in the presence of instinctive love and sympathy.

"The meal unshared is food unblest ;

Thou hoard'st in vain what love should spend ;

Self-ease is pain ; thy only rest

Is labour for a worthy end." (*Whittier*.)

Seneca rightly says, " You must live for another,

Testimonies
of Sidgwick,

Bacon,

Seneca,

if you wish to live for yourself." "The social state," and Mill. says Mill, "is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 46.)

§ 6. **Moral Progress in the Race.** The concrete moral life of an individual is conditioned, as we have said, not merely by the personal factor but also by the social. The weal or woe of an individual is inseparably connected with that of the community of which he forms a part. An individual living in a civilized community has, therefore, one form of moral development, which is not exactly the same as is illustrated in an individual living in a savage community. And the moral progress of a society, too, is determined, as explained above, by the moral insight and culture of the individuals constituting it. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 6 and § 7.) Bearing this correspondence in mind we shall only indicate here the main lines along which moral progress proceeds in society, giving rise to *Moral Institutions* of different degrees of perfection or excellence.

Individual and social moral progress are inter-dependent.

The development of Moral Institutions with moral progress :

(1) **The Family.** The first moral institution, with which an individual comes in contact, is the Family. It is based on natural affection and is thus best fitted for the disinterested promotion of the well-being of the child—physical, intellectual, and moral. It acts moreover on the tender susceptibilities of the child, thus making a deep and lasting impression on his mind. The best men have thus

(1) The Family, which is based on natural affection and is thus best fitted to rear young minds.

Its defect is due to the blinding effect of affection.

(2) Society, which, through public opinion, exercises a powerful influence on the moral development of individuals.

(3) The School, which, by encouraging habits of diligence, perseverance, obedience, and self-control, materially moulds the character of individuals.

been moulded by virtuous families—and specially by noble mothers whose moral influence over their children is the greatest. But home influence has its draw-back due to the blinding effect of affection. Hence the importance of other moral institutions.

(2) **Society.** The force of what we call public opinion in the moral sphere is no less important than the influence of the Family. We have seen how moral development in every case is affected by the Ethos of a people. (*Vide* Chap. V, § 4.) Its effect is not less prominent when operating through non-political associations or members of a community. Society either in the form of constituted bodies (such as Purity Societies) or in the form of indefinite members of a community (such as neighbours, friends, etc.) always exercises a powerful influence on the character and conduct of individuals. Social condemnation and encouragement, when duly employed, cannot fail to advance the moral interests of a people. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 6.)

(3) **The School.** Next to the moral influence of the Family and Society we have that of Educational Institutions. Alexander was not altogether wrong when he said that he was no less indebted to his tutor than to his parents, considering the character of the tutor he had. Educational Institutions of all kinds tend to strengthen the character by developing habits of diligence, perseverance, and self-control. By encouraging application and industry and fostering fellow-feeling, accuracy, and integrity,

they materially mould the character of youths. They are at times more effective than domestic or social control, specially in the case of the indolent, the negligent, and the refractory. Industrial Institutions and Reformatories have thus achieved results which could never have been attained by fond parents or incompetent societies. Even when no direct moral instruction is received, indirectly the character is improved through the cultivation of habits of industry, obedience, and sincerity. We have already indicated the influence of Education on character in Chapter III, § 9 and Chapter VIII, § 4. Its influence on the common mind is great indeed.

"Tis education forms the common mind,
Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclined."

(*Pope.*)

(4) **The Church.** The chastening and elevating influence of Religion has generally been recognised by all great thinkers; and even Voltaire was led to say that were there no God, it would be desirable to invent one. We have seen that the connection between Religion and Morals is very close. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 10.) Thus, due religious control cannot but have a salutary effect on the moral development of individuals. The strength of character begotten of faith in Providence can scarcely be surpassed by mere adherence to the rules of propriety. The difference between the English and the French Revolution in their ways and results illustrates what may be achieved by morality supplemented

(4) The Church, which, by inspiring faith and resignation, tends to strengthen the moral convictions of the people.

by religion as distinguished from what may be done by honest conviction alone.

(5) The State, which may be regarded as the supreme moral institution, as protecting the legitimate interests and advancing the true well-being of the people.

(5) **The State.** The State as the supreme director of the conduct of its subjects and the protector of their legitimate rights and interests is the highest social organization fitted to promote the best interests of morality. In explaining the relation of Ethics to Politics, we have already indicated the close connection in which individuals stand to the State. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 7.) Without a sovereign control there will be no security, so essential to the prosecution of a virtuous life. As Vishnusarma says—

“यदि न स्यान्नरपतिः सम्यङ्नेता ततः प्रजा ।

अकण्ठं धाराजलधौ विप्रवेतेह नौरिव ॥” (*Hitopodesha*.

Bigraha, 2.)

“People, whom a wise sov'reign rules not,
Sink like a ship without a pilot.”

By punishing vice and encouraging virtue, by regulating education and promoting the legitimate interests of society, the State becomes the true guardian of the people. As their protection and advancement constitute its highest duty, so loyalty and devotion to it constitute theirs. Peace, so essential to virtue, prosperity, and happiness, is conferred by the State.

“Oh, Peace! thou source, and soul of social life;
Beneath whose calm inspiring influence,
Science his views enlarges, art refines,
And swelling commerce opens all her ports;
Blest be the man divine, who gives us thee!”

(*Thomson*.)

As individual and social progress act and re-act on each other, any defect or excellence in the one necessarily affects the character of the other. When the Moral Institutions mentioned above are healthy and strong they exercise a wholesome influence on the individual mind; and when they are diseased and weak they tend to weaken the moral strength of individuals. And individuals, too, contribute materially to the progress or decline of the institutions by their virtuous or vicious undertakings and enterprises. This interaction is overlooked by empiricists and Hegelians alike, who emphasize the social or objective side of morality to such an extent as to regard the individual or subjective side as but its reflection or echo. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 14 and Chap. XII, § 6.) Hegel, for example, observes, "The child, in his character of the form of the possibility of a moral individual, is something subjective or negative; his growing to manhood is the ceasing to be of this form, and his education is the discipline or the compulsion thereof. The positive side and the essence is that he is *suckled at the breast of the universal Ethos*." We have seen, however, that an objective morality without a subjective is unmeaning; an objective morality can have a sense only by reference to the processes of some mind, finite or infinite. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 3.) When the child is "suckled at the breast of the universal Ethos," the child must have the ability to suck and to assimilate the milk that it may be converted into blood and strength. The society and

The interdependence of individual and social progress is overlooked by certain writers :

(a) Empiricists and Hegelians, for example, overlook the importance of personal or subjective morality.

But an individual can be trained into morality because he is endowed

with a moral nature.

Seth's testimony.

the individual influence each other by reason of the community of their nature: the general life-blood of the social organism courses in the veins of its organs—the individuals. And as, in the case of an organism and its parts, the health or weakness of the one contributes to the health or weakness of the other, so, in the case of the Society and the Individual, their moral welfare is implicated in each other's condition and attitude. "Moral progress," as Seth observes, "is morality in progress, 'progressive morality'; never at any stage a progress *to* morality, or a progress from the non-moral to the moral stage. This last form of progress, even if it existed, would have an interest only for the anthropologist, not for the moralist, in whose eyes man is from the first moment of his existence, potentially if not actually, a moral being. If man started on his career as a non-moral being, he could never become moral, any more than he could make any intellectual attainments if he were not from the first an intellectual being." (*Ethical Principles*, p. 318.)

(b) M. Fr. Bouillier and his followers, on the other hand, overlook the importance of social or objective morality.

The above correspondence between individual and social progress is again disputed by other writers on the ground that the inwardness of personal morality is weakened by social regulation or control. Moreover, it is urged that an improved society or State would leave very little room for private morality by undertaking to do what otherwise might have been done by individuals. When well-organized alms-houses, hospitals, and other charitable institutions are established, and measures

for improved social economy are adopted, what room, it is asked, will be left to individuals for an exercise of their noble dispositions? On grounds like these it is denied that there can really be any moral progress at all. M. Fr. Bouillier, for example, argues in this strain in his *Memoire*, read before the Academy of Moral Science. But the futility of remarks like these is evident from the fact that the essence of moral progress lies in the unquestionable ascendancy of virtuous dispositions which tend to objectify themselves in the form of improved moral institutions. The institutions, therefore, can never stand unless supported by the conscientious feelings of their members. If the inner springs be dried up, outer institutions would crumble to pieces. Without harmony neither can stand or endure. Again, does social regulation really imply diminished virtue? It may lessen the opportunities to temptation; but it improves the character by strengthening the higher springs of action. And does not the essence of virtue or good character consist in the dominant influence of such impulses? We should not try to strengthen character by seeking opportunities for wrong. We should rather try to gain moral strength by weakening the lower propensities, by avoiding as much as possible occasions for sin. And this is precisely what social regulation tries to achieve. It aims at weakening the evil propensities by removing as far as possible their exciting causes and at strengthening the noble dispositions by supplying occasions for their exercise. Thus the

But the moral institutions are the inevitable outcome of the intrinsic superiority of virtuous dispositions, and cannot fail to influence conduct, because supported by the conscientious feelings of mankind.

Society furthers moral progress by restricting or removing opportunities for sin.

drift of all sound moral training is, in the language of Bossuet, "Never to combat passion directly, but to attack it indirectly." Immunity from vice can be secured by being adequately trained into virtue.

The general course of moral progress is from the outer to the inner, from a contracted to a liberal, estimate of duties and virtues: we thus grow more catholic in our devotions, more strict in self-discipline, and more rational and systematic in our charities.

We should remember in this connection that the general course of moral progress, whether in individuals or society, is from the outer to the inner, from the form to the spirit, from a narrow to a comprehensive estimate of our duties and virtues. It is connected, as we have seen, with the intellectual culture and general enlightenment which tend to widen the mental and moral horizon. (*Vide* Chap. VIII, § 5.) This change is illustrated in respect of all our duties—whether pertaining to self or others. Even in our devotions, we now approach the Deity with prayers for universal good or general well-being instead of for personal advantage. With regard to ourselves, we now try to improve the character as a whole instead of remedying particular defects. By cultivating industrious and abstemious habits and cherishing sympathetic and benevolent dispositions we try to lay a more solid foundation for virtue than by spasmodic efforts to control the passions and propensities as they arise. With regard to others, our charities include not merely friends and neighbours but men of different tastes and nationalities, and we do not forget to ameliorate the condition of dumb animals or to protect from ruthless destruction even members of the vegetable creation. (*Vide* Chap. XIV, § 8.) Our charities also assume a more scientific and

comprehensive form in their attempt to grapple with the causes of misery and suffering. Alms-houses, relief-works, and manufactories take the place of indiscriminate alms-giving which, far from removing the causes, tends to perpetuate them. Of course, one should never check the spontaneous outflow of his heart at the sight of misery; nor should he withhold his charities by merely entertaining idle or visionary schemes of relief. We should remember, however, that the constant sense of inferiority and dependence which begging encourages and the habits of idleness with the concomitant evils which it engenders debase human nature and prepare the way for almost all the sins flesh is heir to. Remembering this, we should do all in our power to devise and adopt all means for well-regulated, systematic, and comprehensive forms of charity.

It is not to be surmised from the preceding remarks that we are already on the threshold of the golden age and that civilization leads only to moral advance. Rather, to deplore the past and condemn the present is the inevitable tendency of the human mind. "To complain of the age we live in," says Burke, "to murmur at the present possessors of power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant hopes of the future, are the common dispositions of the greatest part of mankind." (*Thoughts on the Present Discontents.*) We long to have again "the good old things" and to possess afresh "the wisdom of our ancestors." Civilization, too, is not taken by Rousseau and his followers as a source of purity and

Civilization is not an unmixed good; and the present age, with all its merits, has also its defects.

progress. A return to the original and ideal state of nature is deemed by them as the only hope of moral reclamation. All this goes to show that every age has its defects and drawbacks, more or less, and that we are not altogether unconscious of them. The present age, therefore, with all its civilization, is not without its faults. More attention is often paid to the cultivation of outer Nature than to that of the inner nature of man. "Undue cultivation of the outward," says Carlyle, "though less immediately prejudicial, and even for the time productive of many palpable benefits, must, in the long-run, by destroying Moral Force, which is the parent of all other Force, prove not less certainly, and perhaps still more hopelessly, pernicious. This, we take it, is the grand characteristic of our age. By our skill in Mechanism, it has come to pass, that in the management of external things we excel all other ages; while in whatever respects the pure moral nature, in the true dignity of soul and character, we are perhaps inferior to most civilised ages." (*Essays* II, p. 111.) Channing similarly observes, "The vast activity of this age of which I have spoken is too much confined to the sensual and material, to gain, and pleasure, and show. Could this activity be swayed and purified by a noble aim, not a single comfort of life would be retrenched, whilst its beauty and grace and interest would be unspeakably increased. There is another dark feature of this age. It is the spirit of collision, contention, discord, which breaks forth in religion, in politics, in business,

Testimonies
of Carlyle

and Chann-
ing.

in private affairs ; a result, and necessary issue of the selfishness which promotes the endless activity of life. The mighty forces, which are this moment acting in society, are not and can not be in harmony, for they are not governed by Love. They jar ; they are discordant. Life now has little music in it. It is not only on the field of battle that men fight. They fight on the Exchange. Business is war, a conflict of skill, management, and too often fraud ; to snatch the prey from our neighbour is the end of all this stir. Religion is war ; Christians, forsaking their one Lord, gather under various standards, to gain victory for their sects. Politics are war, breaking the whole people into fierce and unscrupulous parties, which forget their country in conflicts for office and power. The age needs nothing more than peace-makers, men of serene, commanding virtue, to preach in life and word the gospel of human brotherhood, to allay the fires of jealousy and hate." (*Works*, I, pp. 502-503.) In spite of these defects, however, it cannot be denied that the present age is not without its merits. If, in the sphere of politics or commerce, industry or war, new instruments and engines have been invented for fraud and destruction, yet even in these spheres improved moral ideas have introduced restraints and refinements not conceived before. Our domestic virtues and public charities have generally become more strict and systematic ; our social regulation and distribution of justice, more humane and equitable ; our views, more wide and catholic ; and our efforts to

But the excellences of the present age should not be overlooked.

improvement, more reasonable, practical, and methodical.

The vitality of our moral life should be preserved. It should not be destroyed by mere mechanical execution of work.

Let us conclude this section with a brief reference to another risk which attends moral progress. As virtuous habits are established or moral institutions become deep-rooted, they tend to run in grooves, doing away with all discrimination and drying up the inner feelings of the heart. Moral problems, as we have seen, have all a concrete reference without which they lose their context and meaning. Thus, routine work can no more be of any good to an individual than to an institution. Even in a workshop or a hospital all inmates do not require equal care or relief. If mechanical uniformity takes the place of inspiration, then spirit again is replaced by form ; and, in such a case, instead of progress there is decline. We should measure progress in the moral sphere not by mere extent or magnitude, number or duration, but by the depth of feeling, the compass of thought, the strength of will, and the consequent elevation of character.

"We live in deeds, not years ; in thoughts, not breaths ;

In feelings, not in figures on a dial.

We should count time by heart-throbs. He most lives

Who thinks most, feels the noblest, acts the best."

(*Baily.*)

§ 7. **Moral Responsibility.** Character, as we have seen, is the form which Personality assumes through repeated and uniform exercise of its different

The measure of moral progress is the extent of the elevation of character.

tendencies and faculties in certain directions. Such exercise may, however, be either in the direction of conscience and virtue or in the direction of pleasure and enjoyment. The problem of Hercules is a problem for mankind. As man is entrusted with the knowledge of right and wrong and also with the ability of regulating his powers according to this knowledge, he is responsible for the proper execution of his trust. He may either (a) employ his higher powers in the service of the lower or (b) duly subordinate the latter to the former.

As our interests have been entrusted to us, we are responsible for our acts.

We may either ennoble or debase our nature.

(a) In the one case he becomes worse than a brute. Brutes seek merely to gratify their natural instincts promoting their being's end; but man exercises his imagination and thought to devise new means for gratifying his senses. As Pope says—

(a) When we subject the higher to the lower powers, we become worse than brutes and suffer in every way.

“Imagination plies her dang’rous art,

And pours it all upon the peccant part.”

And the result in such a case is that while the brutes are satisfied with the removal of their natural wants, man is troubled by an insatiable thirst for enjoyments and pleasures.

“Man only, irked by calm, and rent

By each emotion’s throes,

Neither in passion finds content,

Nor finds it in repose.” (*Watson.*)

Thus, in hankering after pleasure, he misses it; in going against the voice of his conscience, he loses the peace of his mind. And he soon discovers that his best interests suffer as long as he pursues a career of infamy and sin.

(b) When, on the other hand, we subordinate the lower to the higher, we preserve the dignity of our nature and secure true happiness.

(b) In the other case, he becomes his own master, he proves his superiority to brutes by elevating his character. Moral superiority does not lie in merely acting according to brute force but in subjecting it to the dictates of reason and conscience. There is thus greater strength in restraint than in license; greater glory in self-sacrifice than in self-satisfaction. Even from the stand-point of happiness, we find that it really consists in self-control than in self-gratification. As Vishnusarma says—

“आपदां कथितः पथा इन्द्रियाणामसंयमः ।

तज्जयः सम्पदां मार्गा येनेष्टं तेन गम्यतां ॥”

(*Hitopadesha*, Mitralava, 29.)

“Passion will be Slave or Mistress : follow her, she brings to woe ;

Lead her, 'tis the way to Fortune. Choose the path that thou wilt go.”

(*Arnold's Translation*.)

Man soon discovers that neither gain nor glory can bring him true satisfaction. The thirst for gain only parches the mind ; and the pursuit of glory brings no less misery and suffering. “Glorious men,” says Bacon, “are the scorn of wise men, the admiration of fools, the idols of parasites, and the slaves of their own vaunts.” (*Essay on Vain Glory*.) Thus, man finds peace only in preserving the harmony of his moral constitution ; and he soon discovers that his best interests are promoted by acting according to the requirements of his moral nature. (*Vide Chap. XVI, § 6 and 7.*)

Now, “look here upon this picture (b) and on

this (a)," and say which of them is more eligible. If, as rational beings, we are entrusted with our own interests, then certainly it is our duty to choose that which secures them best. We find that these are really promoted so long as moral harmony is preserved, and that they are sacrificed when it is violated. This conviction naturally strengthens the sense of responsibility born of moral consciousness. We have seen that there is correspondence between the inner verdict and the outer law, between the subjective conviction of right and the objective regulation of events (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 6 and § 8), and also that the supremacy of the moral standard is supported by entire nature (*Vide* Chap. XIII). This standard requires us to subordinate the passions and inclinations to Conscience and thereby maintain the dignity of our nature and secure our best interests. If, therefore, we wilfully go against this requirement and fail to improve our character, then we do not prove ourselves worthy of the trust. And the magnitude of the trust is great indeed. Before action, when we are tempted by hostile inclinations, we have a definite knowledge of the eligibility of a course and also the power to act in the direction if we like. We have thus at our disposal the alternatives of virtue and sin, of peace and discord, of happiness and misery, of a life full of promise and a life blighted and ruined. It is this endowment which renders us responsible for what we do. And the consciousness of the trust reposed in us lies at the root of our sense of responsibility. "A machine," says Butler, "is inanimate

these two courses of action, we find that our best interests lie in the direction of virtue, and so we realize our responsibility to act in that direction.

The supremacy of our moral nature enjoins on us the necessity of acting in the right direction.

There is thus the consequent sense of responsibility for moral acts.

and passive: but we are agents. Our constitution is put in our own power. We are charged with it; and therefore are accountable for any disorder or violation of it." (*Preface to Sermons.*)

Responsibility varies directly with the degree of perfection and strength of character.

Moral responsibility, though primarily resting on the above peculiarity of our constitution, is affected by other circumstances connected with it. Anything which tends to enlarge or diminish our knowledge of what is right and ability to act in the direction of duty naturally affects our responsibility. "Morality," as Janet observes, "consists, not merely in an act of the free will, but in a compound relation of knowledge and of will." (*Theory of Morals*, p. 417.) An individual, therefore, who can better determine his duties and can with less difficulty act in the direction of his conviction is more responsible for his acts than another not having such a privilege. Thus idiots and lunatics devoid of knowledge and self-control are held irresponsible for their conduct. We never condemn the conduct of Mary Lamb who, in a fit of her insanity, stabbed her mother to death, though our indignation knows no bounds when we find similar acts done by a Domitian or a Richard II, an Asoka or an Aurengzeb. And the degree of responsibility varies with the degree of strength of character: responsibility increases with the elevation of character and declines with its deterioration. The higher the rank, the greater the responsibility. If, therefore, heredity or experience, enlightenment or inclination places one in an advantageous or disadvantageous position, then the

degree of his responsibility is heightened or diminished. Thus, it varies inversely as merit and directly as virtue. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 1.) The more virtuous is a man, the greater is his responsibility. An individual should not be led to think, however, that he can avoid responsibility by neglecting to improve his character, for such neglect itself is a moral act which brings him guilt and shame. If we wish to enjoy higher privileges, we must have greater responsibilities.

Responsibility varies inversely as merit and directly as virtue.

Hedonists, Empiricists, and Determinists find it hard to give a satisfactory explanation of moral responsibility. If pleasure alone determines rectitude and there is nothing higher than the facts of experience, then scarcely any intelligible sense can be attached to the consciousness of a trust which may possibly be betrayed. Attempts have, accordingly, been made by them to explain responsibility by reference to external authority. Bain, for example, observes, "The word responsibility is, properly speaking, figurative; by what is called 'metonymy,' the fact intended to be expressed is denoted by one of the adjuncts. A whole train of circumstances is supposed, of which only one is named. There are assumed (1) Law, or Authority, (2) actual or possible Disobedience, (3) an Accusation brought against the person disobeying, (4) the *Answer* to this accusation, and (5) the infliction of Punishment, in case the answer is deemed insufficient to purge the accusation." (*Mental Science*, p. 403.) Thus, responsibility is equivalent to punishability: a person may be said to be responsible or accountable when he is liable to punishment for in-

Hedonists, Empiricists, and Determinists cannot give a satisfactory explanation of moral responsibility

Bain explains it as punishability.

But the exercise of authority or the infliction of punishment presupposes responsibility and so does not explain it.

fringement of law—domestic, social, or political. But such an explanation cannot be accepted as satisfactory:—(1) The efficacy of punishment, as we have seen, lies not merely in the infliction of pain but in retributory justice. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 15.) The outer verdict presupposes the inner which always carries with it a sense of responsibility, apart from any penalty meted out by external authority. (2) Again, mere authority—domestic, social, or political—can never be the final explanation of what is right or wrong. If something is enforced or prohibited by an authority, there must be some ground for such enforcement or prohibition. Man, being rational, can never accept the dogmatic declaration of any body or person. The right, as explained above, is imperative and self-evident at the same time. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 1.) Social authority to be efficacious must rest on the moral; and even the fortune of States and nations depends, as Montesquieu points out, not so much on the accidents of victories or defeats, as on the force of public sentiment and love of honour and virtue. Thus external authority is exercised under a sense of responsibility which it is called upon to explain.

The sense of responsibility is keen in a healthy moral nature.

Adequate consciousness of moral responsibility indicates a sound moral constitution. The greater the virtue, the intenser the consciousness and (as the personal factor is eliminated in such cases) the greater the solicitude to promote the well-being of others by the scrupulous discharge of the several duties of life. One, having a keen sense of responsibility, may safely be entrusted with any work, for if he be incompetent or unwilling, he

would decline it. Thus Lucian changed his profession of law for philosophy in disgust. Responsibility and character are very closely connected. A man of character is conscious of his responsibility all round: he aims at purity of thought, of feeling, of action. As character is purged of its impurities by a due sense of responsibility, it shines, to use a metaphor of Kant, like a jewel, "by its own light." It raises its possessor above the vicissitudes of fortune and endears him to all for its intrinsic worth. To such an individual all things are equal and the whole human race constitutes one universal brotherhood. His character is well described in the *Geeta*—

Respon-
sibility and
character
are closely
connected.

The sense
of respon-
sibility
tends to
improve
character
and so to
secure
peace and
harmony.

“समदुःखसुखः स्वस्थः समलोटाश्रमकाचनः ।

तुल्यप्रियाप्रियो धीरस्तुल्यनिन्दात्मसंस्तुतिः ॥२४॥

मानापमानयोस्तुल्यं तुल्यो मित्रारिपक्षयोः ।

सर्वारम्भपरित्यागी गुणातीतः स उच्यते” ॥२५॥

“He unto whom—self-centred—grief and joy
Sound as one word ; to whose deep-seeing eyes
The clod, the marble, and the gold are one ;
Whose equal heart holds the same gentleness
For lovely and unlovely things, firm-set,
Well-pleased in praise and dispraise ; satisfied
With honour or dishonour ; unto friends
And unto foes alike in tolerance ;
Detached from undertakings,—he is named
Surmounter of the Qualities ?”

(*Arnold's Translation, XIV, 24-25.*)

No doubt, in a materialistic age, such a type of character is not likely to be encouraged. Nay, it may even have the slur of a misguided and fanciful life on it. But, when the unit of measurement

varies, the resulting judgments necessarily vary. And those who unscrupulously pursue a life of gain and glory can never show that, even in respect of happiness, they are better off. "The paths of glory lead but to the grave." The difference between a life of sense and a life of reason is felt to the last. And when the curtain falls, the one usually closes with regrets and yearnings, while the other, with peaceful resignation. To the virtuous, death is

"Like sleep,
A gentle wafting to immortal life."

(Milton, *P. L.*)

The sense of responsibility is innate in the human constitution.

The sense of responsibility, connected with our moral life, is so natural to the human constitution and so inseparable from it, that even at the funerals of the world's greatest Emperors and Peace Makers it is sung—

"Now the labourer's task is o'er ;
Now the battle day is past ;
Now upon the farther shore
Lands the voyager at last.
Father, in Thy gracious keeping
Leave we now Thy servant sleeping.
There the tears of earth are dried ;
There its hidden things are clear ;
There the work of life is tried
By a juster Judge than here.
Father, in Thy gracious keeping
Leave we now Thy servant sleeping ."

But here we are already on the threshold of the Metaphysics of Ethics, which is outside the scope of this volume. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 11.)

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BY THE SAME AUTHOR,

**THE PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC,
DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE.
With Marginal Notes, Important
Questions, Numerous Examples,
and Hints for Solving
Problems.**

*(Adapted to the Syllabus in Logic for the Intermediate
Examination in Arts.)*

PART I. DEDUCTION. *(Nearly Ready.)*

PART II. INDUCTION.

Opinions on 'The Elements of Morals.'

Dr. P. K. Ray, D. Sc. (London and Edinburgh), *Formerly
Principal and Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, Calcutta,*
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"I think you have done a great service by writing and publishing this book...You have gone over a very large ground and taken a comprehensive view of the chief systems. It has become, therefore, a very good compilation and will, I think, prove very useful to students and also to teachers. The book contains ample evi-

dence of your very wide reading. The quotations from philosophers and poets are well-chosen and the latter are a special feature of the book, which will, I think, be attractive to the students."

Dated Calcutta, March 23, 1912.

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Dated Calcutta, March 26, 1912.

The Most Revd. R. S. Copleston, M.A., D.D., D.C.L.,
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The Indian Daily News, Calcutta, writes :—

"The idea of the book may be described as an attempt to explain moral principles with special reference to their concrete application. With a view to this end Prof. Mitra has entered into a careful study of the chief moral problems and a critical estimate of the leading ethical systems of the East and the West. His account and criticisms of the systems of so many schools of ancient and modern times—from Vedantism and Platonism to Positivism and Hegelianism—are always clear, concise and accurate. His estimate of the views of Mill, Bain, Martineau and Calderwood is at once precise and lucid ; and his remarks are always appropriate and just. The chapters on the Perplexity of Conscience, Duties and Rights, Virtue and Wisdom are very instructive and are calculated to foster the growth of a healthy moral character. As a text-book, it is valuable, not merely for its covering the B.A. syllabus in Ethics, but also for its wholesome practical teachings. The marginal notes will be very useful to examinees." *Dated June 29, 1912.*